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ABSTRACT 
Housing Policy and Community Action in County Durham and County Armagh:
a Comparative Study.
The problem which this thesis addresses is the relationship between
housing policies and community action during the 1970s and early 1980s
in County Durham, North East England and the north of County Armagh,
Northern Ireland. This historical period has seen a transition from the
dominance of "modernisation" objectives in housing and planning, and of
modernist organised capitalist processes, to a "post-modern" period in
which "disorganised" capitalist forms predominate.
The thesis presents a located, comparative historical account of how
housing policy worked out in County Durham and County Armagh in relation
to national and sub-national policy (the latter term being employed to
take account of the considerable degree of administrative autonomy of
the Stormont administration as a component of the UK state as well as
local state processes in Britain). It then proceeds to a series of case
studies of "community action", conceived of as accounts of reaction to
the impact of modernisation and consequent housing and planning policies
on working class localities, considered as bases of common experience
and communal identification.
Through fundamentally historical methods the thesis documents and
analyses the nature of housing policies in County Durham and County
Armagh, ensuing action consequences and how housing policy responded
(while also being subject to other sources of change). The end of
"modernisation" is considered crucial to understanding the history of
these events.
Tim Blackman.
December 1987 
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COLONIAL CONSEQUENCE
The colony's so old it's out of touch
with much that's bruited in the Capitol.
The ports are silted up. The winds are such
that most who leave are driven to the west,
returning seldom if they cone at all;
infrequent letters, tediously expressed,
yield year by year diminished interest.
But strangers from the mainland, eager men,
the latest jargon lively on the tongue,
here make their way among us; not as when
our fathers came to tame this land and till
and plant a thriving nation here among
the black-browed tribes whose remnants linger still
with random beacons on insurgent hill.
And briskly to their profit they attend,
stuffing their satchels while we stand and gape,
so drilled in old obedience we lend
the stranger's voice authority and awe,
and have among us some who seek to ape
his accent, seeing how all strangers draw
vast credit from this insubstantial law.
Yet we have seen them come and watched them go,
their flashing names forgotten in a year,
with not a shred of evidence to show
by what manoeuvres they achieved their score,
while out of that old superstitious fear
we greet the newest corners to our shore,
no whit the wiser than we were before.
John Hewitt
1986
(x)
A NOTE ON REFERENCING 
This thesis draws on a wide variety of data sources and literature. For
books, Journal articles, reports, working papers, major conference
papers, etc., sources cited in the text are listed alphabetically by
author in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis. For all other
written data sources, including pamphlets, newsletters, minutes,
letters, statistical sources, etc., and for interviews and participant
observation roles, details are given in Appendix 2, which is referred to
by means of numbers inserted at appropriate points in the text.
Appendix 1 discusses general methodological issues. It also lists all
newspapers and magazines consulted and all interviews undertaken. With
regard to interviews, informants' names are not given in cases where
this was considered inappropriate, but in all cases the position and
location of the informant and the date of the interview are stated.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 III? issue: the wnrking class experience nf mnderrasation.
The research issue and problematic (1) of this thesis is
"modernisation". This term is used to describe the large-scale state
provision and management of housing and infrastructure in County Durham
and North Armagh during the post-war period until the end of the long
post-war boom, when the state began retreating into much more selective
and "entrepreneurial" interventions. The present thesis arises from an
interest in a number of cases of community action about housing and
planning in County Durham and North Armagh in the late 1970s, at the end
of the "modernisation era". These struggles related to two features of
housing policy in this era: (i) the centrality of redevelopment; and
(ii) mass housing in "growth centres". Both of these dominated the
working class experience of modernisation in County Durham and North
Armagh.
The local state was the vehicle for modernisation in housing and
planning but the "public housing apparatus" - the powerful organisations
and groups which determined the post-war policy of mass clearance and
rehousing in managed and "functionally efficient" mass state housing -
consisted essentially of central government, the design professionals
and the construction industry (Dunleavy, 1981, pp. 9-33). Modernising
housing and planning policies were transformed more dramatically than
— 2 -
any other area of the Keynesian Welfare State by the effects of the
slow-down in economic expansion during the 1970s and public expenditure
restraint. The present thesis attempts to show how these national
changes interacted with people and localities in County Durham and North
Armagh.
The thesis has two main types of concern. First, a concern with the
transition to "early post-modernism" in housing and planning in County
Durham and North Armagh. Other authors have discussed the general
features of economic and political changes which have been involved in
an apparent transition in the UK and US economies from "modern" to
"post-modern" accumulation and legitimation strategies, especially the
shift from "Fordise to "flexible accumulation" and from the Keynesian
Welfare State to NonetarismiThatcherism (Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison,
1984; Gough, 1986; Harvey, 1987; Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling,
1984; Scott and Storper, 1986). The transition has recently been
subjected to detailed analysis by Lash and Urry (1987), who equate the
end of "modernisation" with the end of "organised capitalism", and
"post-modernism" with "disorganised capitalise. They argue that the
general features of organised capitalism have been strong centralisation
and interconnections between banks and industry, managerialism and
technocratic planning, an organised and central manufacturing workforce,
clearly identifiable regional economies and "modern" cultural and
ideological values. The general features of disorganised capitalism
have been a deconcentration of capital, the rise of white-collar workers
as a distinctive "service class" against a background of major losses of
blue-collar jobs, a fragmentation of trade union activity, a breaking
- 3 -
down of "regional economies" and the growth of "post-modern" cultural
and ideological values. Lash and Urry show that while not all these
developments occurred at the same time or in the sane way in all western
countries, a structural transformation is evident. In the case of the
UK, they argue that capitalism started to "organise" in the inter-war
period and began "disorganising" in the 1960s, bringing about major
changes in the social relations of civil society and the state:
"Economic change, most notably the effects on occupational structure
connected with the accumulation of capital, is subsequently the
precondition of disorganisation of civil society. The latter, most
visible in multiplication and fragmentation of interest groups -
Inside and outside of the labour movement - is itself the
precondition of disorganisation in the state, in the ideal-typical
model, instantiated in, for example, the decline of neo-corporatism,
the development of the catch-all party, and class dealignment." (p.
7)
The present study is specifically concerned with changes in housing and
planning strategies which appear to have closely followed this economic
restructuring, principally recommodification and the expansion of
entrepreneurialism in "post-modern" housing and planning policy. Harvey
(1987, p. 7) contrasts this with the "managerialism" of modernisation.
The second main concern of the thesis is to present a structured account
of freedom and constraint in civil society by focusing on "community
action" about housing in County Durham and North Armagh. Particular
attention is paid to the constraining institutional environment,
particularly that of the state, in case studies of community action
which document sequences of action and reaction in time. This empirical
- 4 -
work is then related to the perspectives on modernisation and post-
modernism developed in chapter 2 in particular.
Chapter 2 conceptualises "modernisation" as a strategy which attempted
to accommodate two conflicting forces. On the one hand the strategy was
a response to expectations among a relatively united and homogeneous
Industrial working class during the era of "organised" capitalism for
social reconstruction and a larger share of the fruits of economic
expansion. On the other hand the strategy was a response to the needs
of major, increasingly transnational, corporations for state
intervention to create large pools of labour and modern infrastructure
to develop the productive forces of social labour during the post-war
boom. It is argued that "full employment", subsidised state housing,
"universalist" social welfare and "comprehensive" land-use planning were
components of this strategy, constituting what has been termed the
Keynesian Welfare State (Gough, 1979, pp. 55-74; Jessop, 1982, p. 244;
Panitch, 1986, pp. 4-9). Although there were differences between Labour
and Conservative Governments in specific policy areas, there was until
the 1970s generally a consensus about these objectives of state
intervention to manage the economy and provide welfare within a "one
nation" framework (see Plant, 1983). In economic policy the main
features during the "modernisation era" were the rationalisation of old
basic industries, with serious job losses, the expansion of state
services and employment, and the creation on a large scale of additional
labour reserves in peripheral regions (Massey, 1984, p. 251). These
developments had a major impact on both County Durham and North Armagh.
— 5 -
Thus, a transition from "modernism" to "early post-modernism" is
postulated, involving a significant restructuring of social relations as
a result of economic restructuring, particularly an increasing
differentiation of the working class and of consumption patterns, and
marked ideological shifts in many areas (see Gough, 1986; Hall, 1983).
Under the Thatcher Governments policies have been directed towards
strengthening the frameworks within which markets operate, at the cost
of increasing polarisation, especially in housing (Plant, 1983; Forrest
and Murie, 1986). However, the terns "modernisation" and "post-
modernism!' are not employed in the present thesis as theoretical
concepts, implying a general theory of state intervention over these
periods, but as descriptions of what appear to be two rather different
eras of accumulation, consumption and state policy, separated by a
period of transition during the late 1960s-1970s. The reason for the
transition certainly seems to be connected with changes in accumulation
strategies resulting from crises of over-accumulation (Harvey, 1987),
but as Ball (1986a) stresses, identifying mechanisms which lead to
pressures for state intervention (or retrenchment) does not enable its
particular form to be predicted. The form of intervention has to be
politically constructed. It is this process, as it occurred in housing
and planning policy in relation to particular localities, that is
documented in the case studies which follow chapter 2.
Massey (1984, pp. 236-264) has argued that the failure of
"modernisation" to prevent economic crisis in the UK lay in its weakness
as a strategy to control either labour or capital. It had attempted to
do this by constructing a corporatist alliance between big "modern"
— 6 -
capital and the male manual working class. Thompson (1984) argues that
this alliance culminated with the 1964-70 Labour administration, when it
was also a means of attempting to deal with intensifying industrial
conflict brought about by the effects of the transition to
"disorganisation" (see Lash and Urry, 1987, pp. 108-109). Massey (1984)
describes the important general features of "modern" corporatism, which
spanned over twenty-five years of different governments until the final
break from the Keynesian Welfare State following the New Right's General
Election victory of 1979:
"The attempt to incorporate the working class in the strategy for
modernisation also included the appointment of 'its representatives'
in State and para-State organisations ... The hope in particular was
that trade union leaders - and thereby the membership - would co-
operate by bearing the immediate burdens of technical change and
restructuring - in other words, of 'modernisation'. In return,
there was to be a strong element of social democratic reform ...
(But the) whole conception of reform was a 'from-the-top-down'
affair, transmitted through the organs of the State." (pp. 238-239,
252)
An aspect of modernisation which had a major impact on both County
Durham and North Armagh was the large-scale population movements
necessitated by the policy of assembling additional labour reserves.
This exercise was legitimated by environmental professionals and
political leaders with claims that the needs of capital were basically
identical to those of working class people. The new housing estates
were not just to serve incoming transnationals, but also to improve the
quality of working class life. Community action against the effects of
modernising housing and planning policies took place within a context
pre-structured by the dominating interests of capital, central
- 7 -
government strategy, the local government system and environmental
professionals. This context changed markedly as the modernisation era
drew to a close, and this had a determining effect on the outcomes of
community action.
Although it is argued that post-war modernisation was the historical
backcloth to community action about housing and planning in County
Durham and North Armagh in the late 1970s, this action was investigated
during a time of major changes in housing and planning policy. These
changes transformed the structures and policies of modernisation,
particularly centralised planning, the large-scale production of
infrastructure and mass state housing managed by big corporate local
authorities. The new structures and policies are referred to in this
thesis as "early post-modern". Important legislation was the 1980
Housing Act and the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act, which
brought about a very substantial shift in the balance of power between
local and central government towards the latter, the curtailment of
expanding local government expenditures and a markedly increased
emphasis on commodification measures, privatised consumption and means
of self-help rather than collective provision, state services and the
reduction of social inequalities (Loughlin, Gelfand and Young, 1985;
Ball, 1983a). Although certain aspects of these post-1979 policies
might still be regarded as "modernist" - the programmes of the Urban
Development Corporations for example - such intervention has been very
localised and designed to support market processes rather than to
reconstruct the economic and social fabric of large areas to bring them
into "one nation" - which, in theory at least, was the intention of the
"growth centre" strategies of the modernisation era in peripheral
regions (see Klausner, 1986; and chapters 2 and 9).
Most of the community action studied during the research for this thesis
happened when the framework was being put into place for the beginning
of the "early post-modern era" in housing and planning policy. As
discussed in chapter 2, this was not a clean break with past policy but
an intensification of earlier trends. These developments had a
significant bearing upon community action about housing and planning in
County Durham and North Armagh, especially the effects on civil society
of the demise of strategic spatial policy, the decline of local state
expenditures on housing provision and services, the shift towards
rehabilitation and away from redevelopment, the expansion of "self-help"
housing schemes, and the residualisation of state housing. The changes
were associated with a considerable weakening of the powers of local
government. Local government appeared to become increasingly redundant
from the point of view of the central state as modernisation cane to an
end. In contrast to the generally consensual relationships between
local and central government which existed during the modernisation era
of expanding local state expenditures, the 1970s, and post-1979 in
particular, saw this relationship in a state of crisis in many areas of
Britain (see Bramley, 1984). As well as ratecapping and abolition of
the Metropolitan County Councils, a declining proportion of public
spending was by elected local government with the expansion of unelected
quasi-governmental agencies in housing and planning (McConaghy, 1985).
In Northern Ireland, such agencies dominated housing and planning by the
- 9 -
early 1970s, although the process of relegating local government to a
marginal role had a different history (see below and chapter 2).
1.2 The research problem: community action about housing 
Modernisation in housing and planning involved the intervention on a
large scale of various agencies of the state in civil society in Canty
Durham and North Armagh. It also involved the promulgation of a
modernist ideology. The agencies involved included local councils mew
town development corporations, the Department of the Environment and the
Northern Ireland Housing Executive. These agencies had significance
beyond the actual process of providing housing; they were means of
implementing strategic spatial policies which involved the physical re-
location and re-housing of local populations. These were central
components of the modernisation strategy for accumulation and
reproduction within the post-war political settlement of reform and
expansion. However, from the late 1970s these agencies operated in the
very different climate of early post-modernism, and other agencies suCh
as housing associations grew in prominence as local council and new town
development corporation involvement in redevelopment and the direct
provision of rented housing was considerably reduced.
These changes had profound effects on the nature of social action in
civil society. It is the manifestation of community action against the
local state about housing and planning which forms the operational area
of investigation of this thesis - the research problem. This action is
analysed as responses to the experience of modernisation among sections
-10-
of the working class. The experience of economic modernisation has been
documented for a number of localities in North East England and Northern
Ireland (e.g. Coventry, Liverpool, Newcastle, North Tyneside Trades
Councils, 1980; Hudson, 1985; Austrin and Beynon, 1979; Hall, 1986;
Gillespie, 1983). There have also been a number of studies of the
social costs (e.g. Dennis, 1970; 1972; North Tyneside Community
Development Project, 1976; Bulner, 1978; Wiener, 1980). The present
thesis attempts, through a comparative study, to theorise the experience
of modernisation in housing and planning in terns of a "contest of
domains" between the capitalist state and civil society.
There are many definitions of "community action", but one of the most
straightforward is that of Lovett, Clarke and Kilmurray (1983, p. 13),
who state:
"... community action is a category of collective social action,
based in working class residential areas, to tackle a wide range of
Issues arising outside the traditional places of employment. It is
therefore to be distinguished from industrial action taken by trade
unionists and from the electoral activities of formal political
parties. It is also separate from the statutory social services run
by state welfare bodies."
Thus community action takes place in civil society, by which is meant
"where people live" or what Urry (1985, p. 22) calls "the characteristic
social relations and social practices within and between households".
Urry (1981a) describes civil society as "a set of social relations that
lie between the economic structure and the state" (p. 10). He argues
that it is comprised of three spheres: (i) the sphere of circulation is
the buying and selling of commodities; (ii) the sphere of reproduction
Is the distribution and consumption of commodities, which in the case of
the reproduction of labour power in particular demands state policy and
action; and (iii) the sphere of struggle describes the social struggles
for "formal exchange equality" (the exchange of commodities between
formally free and equal Juridic subjects) and for political equality.
These two types of struggle relate to the first two spheres - struggles
for exchange equality relate to the sphere of circulation and for
political equality to the sphere of reproduction. The community action
studied in the present thesis involves struggles in both of Urry's
spheres, e.g. struggles for the "freedom' of groups of private housing
owners to do with their housing what they please (even in one case to
convert to a housing co-operative), and struggles by groups of tenants
for more control over the actions of their public sector landlords.
At an abstract level this community action entailed a "contest of
domains". The domain of the capitalist state expanded considerably
during post-war modernisation (to such an extent that the notion of an
autonomous "civil society" becomes problematic, a question which is
addressed in chapter 9). The extent of this expansion - a product of
reproduction needs - became a major political issue in the early post-
modern period when the Thatcherite state was attempting to reduce state
provision and expand the sphere of circulation by privatising housing,
encouraging entrepreneurial planning and stimulating self-reliance.
Both during modernisation and subsequent early post-modernism this
contest required mechanisms by which the central state could resolve
housing and planning issues "in the national interest", whether through,
for example, a new town corporation or the public local inquiry. From
-12-
1979 the expansion of central control has meant considerably reducing
Individual local councils' discretion to make policy decisions for their
areas (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1983).
As is shown in later chapters, community action about modernisation was
diverse and complex. It does not seem possible to analyse it simply in
terms of class struggle between labour and capital, but involves
examining what different groups did in the context of the system forces
of capitalism acting upon them. Panitch (1986a) analyses the origins of
the "post-modern" economic and social policies of the Thatcher
Governments in terns of changes in accumulation strategies, and the
failure of the Keynesian Welfare State to resolve capitalist crises
without major costs to capital. In housing and planning these national
"post-modern" policies had to be applied in particular localities, with
the possibility of conflicts between the two levels of government noted
above, particularly in areas like County Durham and North Armagh where
modernisation had been so ingrained in local state institutions.
However, the situation was more complicated than this. The introduction
of the new policies also meant changes in the context of other
relationships such as those between county and districts, and between
local government and people in local civil society ("officialdom-people"
relations). Although addressing aspects of the former, it is the latter
on which the present thesis focuses.
The "local state", the sub-national policy-making and administrative
state bodies such as the Stormont government, local councils, new town
development corporations and quasi-governmental agencies of various
-13-
kinds, is in greater proximity to local civil society than the central
state. It is located within the conflicting social forces of civil
society. Civil society is a domain in which classes and other forces
interrelate, rather than in which there is a straightforward
identification of class interests (Urry, 1981a, p. 152). Thus the local
state figures prominently in the community action studied in this
thesis, for it was integrally involved in housing and planning functions
and conflicts at local level. Primarily this entailed elected local
government in County Durham and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive,
an unelected quasi-governmental agency, in North Armagh, but new town
development agencies also had important roles in both sub-regions.
However, policy conflicts between central and local government in recent
years, and the increase in the dominance of the centre, meant that
national politics were a crucial determining factor in local
"officialdom-people" conflicts, not least in bringing about the end of
modernising housing and planning policy.
In Northern Ireland the national state intervened to govern localities
directly in 1972 with the introduction of Direct Rule, brought about by
the political crisis in which local government was deeply caught up
(Birrell and Murie, 1980, pp. 155-190; O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson,
1980, pp. 95-118). In Britain the erosion of local government autonomy
accelerated after 1979 - also, it has been argued, because the local
state was too vulnerable to the politics of the locality, which could
present disruptive opposition to the national project of restructuring
for capital (Duncan and Goodwin, 1982).
- 14-
As will be apparent from the above discussion, the field of
investigation of the present thesis is social policy, and specifically
housing and planning policy. It is within this field that the research
problem is located. Material is drawn from the various disciplines of
the social sciences, especially the body of critical and marxist work in
urban and regional studies which developed during the 1970s (see Lebas,
1982 for a review). The primary purpose of doing this is not to
contribute to the theoretical development of any particular
"discipline", but to attempt to understand the area of social reality
under consideration and to draw out the implications of this
understanding for further work. As was proposed above, it is intended
to conceptualise the problem of community action as a contest of domains
between state and civil society. This is done by presenting structured
accounts of social action, showing how key issues emerged from people's
experiences of the state in civil society, what they did about it and
the outcomes of local struggles. This evidence is then discussed in the
concluding chapter in terms of the concepts discussed in this chapter
and the contextual material of chapter 2.
The developments in realist method in social science have been useful in
analysing this evidence. These developments are not, it is argued, a
return to Althusserianism as Saunders (1986, pp. 352-362) claims.
Rather, they are a means of organising information so that knowledge
about what appear to be generative mechanisms can be combined with
knowledge about contingently related phenomena to build explanations of
concrete outcomes that vary across time and space (Dickens, Duncan,
Goodwin and Gray, 1985, p. 249; see also subsequent discussions and
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Appendix 1). These explanations can then be critically scrutinised and
discussed. As Urry (1981a, p. 8) puts it, although realist accounts may
fall into the trap of Althusserian determinism, this has to be guarded
against by establishing the crucial roles of social concepts, forms of 
struggle and the state in civil society which mediate between social
actors and necessary generative mechanisms in the capitalist system,
causing variations in concrete outcomes.
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. The remainder of the
present chapter, chapter 1, is devoted a discussion of the research
strategy, methodology and the concepts of class, locality and state as
they are used in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 is an account of the
spatial and housing policy contexts of the investigation, particularly
the "structural" pressures on actors in localities which result from
movements of capital and central government intervention. Chapters 3 to
8 present the case studies of community action, showing how policy
applied throughout the country interacted with social action in
localities. Chapter 9 synthesises the material of chapters 3 to 8 in
the context of chapter 1, and makes some conclusions.
1.3 The research strategy 
The research strategy involves a historical investigation based on a
series of case studies of community action which are analysed to
identify regularities, common patterns and distinguishing features.
These are explained by reference to analytical concepts which are
discussed in this chapter. Thus, the strategy is "extensive" rather
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than "intensive" (Sayer, 1984, pp. 219-228), although the number of case
studies is relatively small and the accounts, of necessity, relatively
detailed. However, while Sayer (1984, pp. 222-223) states that
quantitative techniques are the typical tools of extensive research,
which often involves many cases, this study uses qualitative techniques
which are fundamentally historical. Qualitative techniques were
necessary, in Giddens' (1984, p. 327) words, to enable the
"methodological insertion of the research investigator into whatever
material is the object of study". In this case, the researcher studied
community action through interviews, inspection of a diverse range of
documents and periods of participant observation. Jenkins (1983, p. 24)
describes this as "a methodologically promiscuous approach" which, he
suggests, is fundamental to "a social science paradigm which allows us
to construct a model of the institutional pattern of society as produced
and reproduced in the practice of real people".
Methodological details and a discussion of issues raised may be found in
Appendix 1. Details of data sources, other than bibliographical
references, are given in Appendix 2, to which reference is made in the
text as appropriate.
The author spent many months interacting with social actors involved in
community action, as well as conducting semi-structured interviews with
other actors who had been involved in the social processes being
Investigated, such as housing officers and community workers. The
author deliberately inserted himself at the community action, rather
than the state management, end of things, so that the accounts produced
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are from the perspective of the location of social actors in civil
society (but not necessarily reflecting the perspectives of the actors
themselves). Frequent informal discussions were held with community
action participants about the nature of the processes in which they were
involved.
Although establishing good relations with these actors, the author did
not engage in committed action-research for two reasons. The first was
the extensive and historical nature of the research, which made in-depth
involvement in specific struggles impractical. The second was that by
avoiding open partisanship in the case studies, it was possible to
obtain information that might not otherwise have been disclosed.
However, in every case informants were made aware of the research
context of the author's interaction, and in general co-operation was
forthcoming (there were a few cases of participants in past community
action and private building contractors refusing co-operation).
Informants often engaged in debate with the author about their
particular point of view and provided information of value to the study
to support their position. As Castells (1983, p. 342) reports,
researchers are often granted a surprising amount of co-operation
because of people's desire to understand their own experience. But, as
considered in Appendix 1, there are limits to how far this approach,
especially in an extensive research strategy, reveals knowledge beyond
the partial accounts of social actors whom it was possible to access.
These accounts, however, are largely what the thesis - with its aim of
placing working class experience and action in a critical historical and
theoretical context - is about.
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In essence, the raw data for the present thesis were experiences: those
reported by informants, what it was possible to glean from documents and
the researcher's own in his participant observation roles. Analysis
involved establishing a conceptual framework able to explain the history
of community action about housing and planning in the case study areas
over the period under investigation. This was done through studying the
literature and discussions with colleagues with the aim of arriving at
working positions on key concepts. The evidence gathered in the field
as case studies was then used to inform these interpretations and to
propose a framework for understanding what happened.
Sayer (1984, pp. 79-107) argues that such a framework must be able to
explain social phenomena at the appropriate level(s) at which necessary
and/or sufficient conditions occur that generate the phenomena the
investigator is interested in explaining. Thus the research strategy
involves conceptualising key generative processes, gathering data which
are then analysed using these concepts, and drawing conclusions about
what is discovered and its significance.
The combination of a broadly extensive research strategy and qualitative
techniques involved the collection of data on several case studies. The
accounts based on these data are constructed to show how processes
worked in each case - what produced certain changes and what social
actors actually did. However the extension of the research across
several case studies in two sub-regions inevitably meant for practical
reasons that intensive studies could not be made of each case. Rather,
the aim was to identify characteristics and processes common to the case
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studies, and to examine whether these could be postulated as necessary
generative mechanisms. Given the extensive nature of the research,
general conclusions are likely to be provisional.
It has been proposed that the test of whether explanations at an
abstract level can be accepted, at least provisionally, as accounting
for the social phenomena reported is that they must be capable of
extension to lower, mare concrete levels without contradiction (Sayer,
1984, pp. 79-107; Jessop, 1982, pp. 212-220). As far as the present
research is not intensive, i.e. as far as no thorough causal explanation
of any particular case is presented, this must remain an open question
for further research. What is claimed is that by demonstrating that
"modernisation" generated community action about housing in both North
Armagh and Country Durham, and that the transition to early post-
modernism largely resolved the type of issues involved, but generated
new ones that again were similar in both areas, e.g. for the occupants
of the mass state housing modernisation spawned, then this process plays
a necessary role in what happened in two areas that might otherwise be
thought to be rather different. Furthermore, it is suggested (i) that
"modernist" and "post-modernist" policies themselves operated in virtue
of more abstract generative forces and (ii) that general conclusions can
be made from a study of modernism and post-modernism about the nature of
relations between state, civil society and capital. These two points,
however, involve more speculative analysis.
A key methodological aid in constructing explanations at a more abstract
level than the "local-concrete" from local case studies is comparative
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analysis. Harloe and Martens (1984) argue that comparative housing
research is of considerable value in helping to understand the
directions in which housing markets and policies are moving. With
regard to international comparisons these authors state that the
approach has two main advantages:
"The first, and maybe most important, is the new light they can cast
on old housing problems. In this sense comparative analysis acts as
an heuristic device, questioning old concepts and modes of thought.
The second advantage of the comparative method is that some
generalizations may be made about the broad factors which help to
structure housing markets and policies ... At the sane tine, the
approach that we have suggested can also begin to analyse the
variation in how these broad problems are experienced in practice in
each country (and why such variations exist)." (p. 272)
Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, pp. 23-31) develop the
heuristic aspect of the usefulness of comparative analysis. They argue
that although such analysis does not enable social science to emulate
experimental control in natural science, it does have two major roles.
Firstly, it guards against taking situations for granted and against
false generalization or abstraction because findings can be cross-
checked. Secondly, although it is not possible to control the
variability of social reality, comparative analysis does permit some
reduction in variability. It can be used to attempt to isolate common
generative processes, while also identifying what is particular about
any one case.
To conclude this section, it is important to emphasise that the present
thesis is primarily an historical study. The historical component has
consisted of constructing accounts of the background to, and the course
— 21 -
and experience of, community action about housing. This has involved
using a combination of unpublished and published documentary material
and oral history to "discover" what happened in the case study areas.
This historical approach was necessary in order to explain what was
encountered during the period of fieldwork, mainly between 1980 and
1982. What Abrams (1982, p. 302) describes as "how it happened puzzles"
are approached by attempting to demonstrate "significant patterning"
which can then by explained in terns of the key concepts of the thesis
as expressions of historical processes with certain generative
mechanisms underlying them. These key concepts have been considerably
developed subsequent to the collection of empirical material largely
because the ideas which suggested them have only fairly recently
appeared and been debated in the literature, such as in the work on the
local state, localities and modernisation and post-modern strategies.
Their availability has enabled a much more satisfactory analysis of the
material collected to illuminate the research problem than would have
been the case in the early 1980s. Thus, although the present researcher
set out to answer "how it happened" questions, i.e. to demonstrate
eventuation, and "how it was" questions, i.e. to describe experiences of
events, in undertaking his collection of empirical material, this
material has itself been analytically structured by looking back at
these events and experiences. As Abrams (1982, p. 317) puts it in his
discussion of historical sociology:
"(W)e cannot as I see it hope to recover the past (or the present)
as it was in all its empirical actuality, only to know it as it
'must have been' from our own more or less theoretically considered
present situation. Social realities are there for the discovering
but discovering them involves analytical distance as well as
empirical access; they are not to be known by direct representation.
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Social reality stands behind social appearances not in the relation
of face to veil but in the relation of process to moment. Its
apprehension is more a matter of analytical structuring than of
empirical seeing-through,"
1.4 Choosing the case studies 
Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985) argue that it is the unusual or
abnormal case that is often the most useful in comparative work, because
it enables generalizations and variations to be more rigorously
examined, Northern Ireland was selected as a region from which to draw
case studies of community action for comparison with studies made in
County Durham, where the researcher was based. O'Dowd, Rolston and
Tomlinson (1980) have put forward an influential argument that Northern
Ireland is an "abnormal" capitalist society because of deep structural
sectarian divisions and the marginality of "class" politics in a region
where it might be expected to be more central. They claim that:
"This is no accident or atavistic survival immune to modern
political forme, for sectarianism in the ideological sense does not
merely obscure class differences, it also reveals the materiality of
sectarian division at all levels in Northern Ireland." (p. 26)
It was decided to compare cases of community action in this "abnormal
society" with cases drawn from County Durham, a sub-region with
relatively few deep religious or ethnic divisions and where "class
politics" has a continuing centrality. If community action in Northern
Ireland can be shown to be generated by wider common processes and to be
linked via these processes with other cases in County Durham, then
explanations at a general and abstract level can begin to be constructed
- 23 -
which should be capable of extension to lower concrete levels, taking
into account local contingencies. These contingencies may be very
important in explaining local variations, but are not the necessary
generative mechanisms.
An example, it is suggested, is sectarianism and related social
segregation in Northern Ireland. In their study, O'Dowd, Rolston and
Tomlinson (1980, pp. 31-67) suggest that Craigavon new town, which forms
the case study area for chapters 7 and 8, was a creation of
sectarianism: Stormont's Brasilia. However, the analysis developed in
the present thesis is that the generative mechanism which gave rise to
new towns as growth centres for peripheral regions derived from
"modernisation", a strategy which responded to the system forces of
capitalism at the time (especially the Fordist-type accumulation
strategies of transnationals, including the factors identified by Lash
and Urry, 1987, pp. 101-102)). Modernising "solutions" interacted with
particular local conditions - in this example sectarian division in
Northern Ireland - to give rise to variation between Northern Ireland
and North East England in the actual nature of the same processes of
redevelopment, infrastructure provision and large scale population
movement. This is described in more detail in chapter 2. The analysis,
which was suggested (although not specifically for Northern Ireland) by
Massey (1983), counters that of O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson (1980),
who treat sectarianism as a basal, generative phenomenon.
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What are interpreted as contingently related conditions in this thesis,
such as sectarianism, are not irrelevant to the process of explanation.
As Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, p. 249) state:
"... 'contingent conditions' should in no sense be considered
'secondary' or 'unimportant', since it is these which are activating
and determining where, when, how, perhaps even whether necessary
relations and tendencies generate concrete outcomes. Causal
mechanisms are only activated through the operation of contingent
relations which are not necessary to the objects or relations which
incorporate necessary generative mechanisms."
Five case studies were drawn from County Durham, an area of
predominantly small towns and villages associated with a history of coal
mining and where two early post-war new towns, Peterlee and Newton
Aycliffe, are located. A third new town, Washington, was designated in
1964, but from 1974 became part of Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County.
These new towns were central elements of post-war social and economic
modernisation in the region.
The Korth East as a whole has a history of regionally-based capital
(dominated by the "coal combines"), the importance of which, however,
was replaced during the post-war period of modernisation by
transnational capital (Benwell Community Project, 1978; Massey, 1984,
pp. 99-109). The industrialisation of the region gave rise to a large
industrial working class within which the British Labour Party became
hegemonic by 1945. Post-war economic and social change recomposed the
class to a considerable extent, but the region has remained a "Labour
heartland", especially County Durham.
— 25 -
Chapman (1985, p. 13) argues that the North East is by almost any
criterion a distinctive region. The coalfield areas of County Durham
are even more distinctive because of their narrow industrial base and
the subsequent effects of its dramatic decline (with, for example, some
48,000 jobs lost in its pits in just four years from 1964 to 1968;
Massey, 1984, p. 244)). Post-war policies of spatial reorganisation to
create new conditions for capital accumulation were particularly visible
responses to this decline. They took the form of "settlement
categorisation" whereby labour was concentrated in large pools in
"growth centres" while smaller, peripheral settlements were subjected to
disinvestment and decline. Major local government figures in the region
played a crucial part in this exercise.
The political culture of Northern Ireland presents a stark contrast to
the Labourism of North East England, although the region has much in
common with the North East's experience of industrialisation and narrow
sectoral specialisation, followed by deindustrialisation and
modernisation policies (Hall, 1986). Three case studies were drawn from
North Armagh, or Mid-Ulster, which was an industrial heartland
manufacturing textiles and clothing. The two main local centres of
North Armagh were Lurgan and Portadown. The industrial base of the area
was severely eroded by the accelerating downward trend in traditional
linen production and employment during the 1950s and 1960s, and the
subsequent penetration of transnationals through both new investment
(attracted by modern infrastructure and assisted by government grants)
and take-overs (Hall, 1986, pp. 192-216, 228-232, 270-274). Lurgan and
Portadown became the two ends of a linear new town, Craigavon,
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designated in 1965 as Northern Ireland's centre-piece of modernisation
and prime "growth centre".
At the outset of the research an overview was made of contemporary and
recent cases of community action about housing and planning issues in
County Durham and North Armagh (see Appendix 1). Such struggles can
take a wide range of forms, many being small-scale incidences of
collective action about transitory issues. However in County Durham
four particularly sustained and illustrative cases were identified in
the new town of Peterlee, the mass housing estate of Bessemer Park and
in the villages of Langley Park and Framwellgate Moor (chapters 4, 5 and
6 respectively). The first two were about housing conditions in "growth
centres" and the second two were about redevelopment in old urban
centres in the county.
The history of post-war redevelopment and state housing in County Durham
Is associated with settlement categorisation to a remarkable degree (see
chapter 2). The widespread community action in the county during the
1960s and 1970s which was generated by settlement categorisation and its
housing and planning corollaries forms a separate case study (chapter
3). The chapter is important historical background to the later and
much fewer cases of community action in the late 1970s/ early 1980s.
In North Armagh cases of community action were found in the new town of
Craigavon, particularly in the new housing sector of Brownlow (chapter
8). Towards the end of the fieldwork in 1982 attempts began to
Incorporate community action in this locale into a Housing Executive
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management exercise to reduce vacancies in the housing stock. As in
County Durham, the context of the situation in which residents in
Craigavon found themselves in the early 1980s could be located
historically in terms of a strategy of spatial restructuring and
modernisation during the 1960s-1970s. This had also encountered
resistance in the form of community action in localities threatened with
disinvestment and depopulation as resources were concentrated in "growth
centres" (chapter 7).
The empirical data are organised into chapters 3 to 8, which take the
reader through a structured account of modernisation, community action
responses and early post-modern conjunctures in County Durham and North
Armagh. Both sub-regions saw fairly extensive community action against
spatial restructuring in the 1960s and '70s (chapters 3 and 7). The
case studies of this action form introductions to the accounts of
community action of the late 1970s and early 1980s in County Durham
(chapters 4, 5 and 6) and North Armagh (chapter 8). Analysis is
presented at appropriate points in these chapters, with a synthesis in
chapter 9.
It is necessary, to appreciate why analysis has been conducted the way
it has, to consider certain concepts which are used in the thesis. The
relevance of "civil society" as a realm where community action occurs
against the state in response to particular experiences has already been
noted. The related notion of contending domains of the capitalist state
and civil society has also been introduced. The next sections further
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develop the points that have been made about these issues by considering
specifically the concepts of class, locality and state.
1.5 Class relations 
This thesis is not concerned with the analysis of class relations, which
is more appropriately investigated through intensive research.
Therefore, a general working position has been adopted which defines the
working class in the broad sense which Nichols (1981, p. 164) uses:
"It is a class which lacks not only effective economic ownership but
lacks possession, both in the sense of control over physical means
of production, and in the sense of control over the labour power of
others."
It is recognised that within such a large category there will be
significant differentiation according to gender, occupation, income,
age, ethnic origin, consumption, lifestyle, religion, etc. However it
is accepted that the basal division is between capital and the working
class, that is, "who is on what side in the dominant relations of
exploitation!' (Nichols, 1981, pp. 167-168; emphasis added). But within
the working class relations of domination exist which are reproduced
institutionally and relate to cultural, gender, occupational and other
bases for this division. In the present thesis it is argued that
sectarian division within the working class of Northern Ireland is an
example of relations of domination; it is also a division which has
unjustifiably received more attention from academics than gender
division in the region (Hall, 1986, p. 43). As well as benefitting
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those who dominate, such relations give rise to a range of different
working class experiences of exploitation under capitalism (Miliband,
1985).
The crucial distinguishing feature between class relations and
sectarian, gender or other types of social relations is that the former
are relations of exploitation - the appropriation of surplus value by
capital - and the latter are relations of domination - putting one
section of the working class in charge of the other (Byrne and Parson,
1983, p. 149). Thus while struggles against exploitation entail
struggle by working class actors against capital (struggle in all its
various forms as Cleaver (1979) analyses them), struggles against
domination can involve the "dominating" group in the struggle to
emancipate the "dominated" (for example, the involvement of protestant
workers in campaigns against discrimination or emergency legislation in
Northern Ireland, or men's involvement in women's struggles).
The implication of the above discussion for the present study is that it
seems quite possible to accommodate the conflicts within the working
class which are described in the case studies within a broadly marxist
framework. For example, conflict between a working class community
association and a Labour-controlled local authority may be analysed in
terms of relations of domination, a point further developed in section
1.7 below. As was discussed above, this may be conceptualised as a
conflict between two domains - civil society, or the places where
working people live their day-to-day lives - and the local state,
concerned with the management of reproduction w thin, in County Durham,
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a social democratic ideology of modernisation, and in Northern Ireland
within an ideology of sectarian modernisation until the statelet was
brought under the direct administration of the British state in 1972,
which managed the abandonment of modernisation. The termination of the
role of directly elected local councils in administering reproduction in
Northern Ireland made the relations of domination somewhat clearer,
although the incorporation of tenant action into housing management
which occurred in the early 1980s in Craigavon indicated a concern, at
least initially, with legitimizing the management of reproduction in the
absence of local democracy.
Urry (1981a) relates the state's role within civil society to the two
spheres of civil society he identifies: the sphere of circulation and
the sphere of reproductton. He argues that the dominance of
reproduction in the post-war period has seen a proportionate decline in
class as opposed to other kinds of struggle (p. 129). However others,
such as Cockburn (1978) and Cowley, Kaye, Mayo and Thompson (1977) argue
that reproduction is "the new terrain of class struggle" (Cockburn,
1978, pp. 158-184; in fact reproductive struggles are not so new
(Samuel, 1985; Mark-Lawson, Savage and Warde, 1985)). Cleaver (1979,
pp. 26-27) conceptualises reproduction in much broader terns than Urry
as the "social factory", where "sectoral" class struggles circulate
about consumption issues. Consumption, in Cleaver's analysis, is
absolutely central to the reproduction of capitalism and the working
class within it, not just because this is how labour power is reproduced
but also, crucially, because of the significance of the consuming power
of society in surplus value production (see al o O'Connor, 1981).
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The social factory concept treats reproduction which occurs outside the
workplace as a class process and an arena of class struggle. This class
nature of reproduction has to be approached historically. For example,
while during the modernisation era Fordist production techniques in
transnational branch plants demanded large labour pools in "growth
centres", which only mass housing provided and managed by the state
could supply, in the early post-modern era of "flexible accumulation"
such labour pools have become redundant in many areas. National policy
could return mass housing to the market, to a commodity to be
individually owned, serviced and exchanged, except for a residual
"welfare sector" which comprised much of the "modern housing" for
"central workers" that was marginalised with the failure of
modernisation. The decommodification and recommodification of housing
have been reproductive strategies, which may well accommodate popular
pressures (e.g. the quality and subsidisation of early council housing
or mortgage interest tax relief in recent years) and are thus contingent
upon the balance of social forces. Different housing consumption
experiences result from this, but their cause is in terms of the
articulation of reproduction. However, as just suggested, reproduction
does not happen as an unmediated expression of central capitalist
mechanisms, such as the drive to support accumulation in "growth
centres" followed by the effects of over-accumulation (i.e. "capital
logic"). It also involves processes of ideological construction, social
struggle and state intervention which may be complicated by ideological,
cultural and political relationships (see the discussion of Urry, 1981a,
above). These often have strong local dimensions which may markedly
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influence the nature of local reproduction and the struggles which may
occur on this terrain.
Urry (1981a) defines reproduction rather narrowly in terms of the
distribution and consumption of commodities, defining their exchange as
circulation. The dominance of the former in the post-war period, he
argues, has seen the decline of class politics and the rise of other
types of "social struggle". However, Urry's analysis appears to need
revision in the light of post-1979 developments. This is because the
dominance of reproduction, as defined by Urry, now appears to have been
a feature of post-war modernisation and the Keynesian Welfare State.
Whilst the state has still necessarily been involved in reproduction
during the early post-modern period, Thatcher Governments since 1979
have pursued a strategy of extending the sphere of circulation and
capital has encouraged cultural and ideological practices which
stimulate the consumption of commodities and self-provisioning rather
than make demands on the state which displace the market. Some writers
have interpreted the new forms of capitalism in the early post-modern
era, especially the opportunities for consumption offered by flexible
accumulation, as opening up the prospect of a future politics of radical
individualism (Leadbeater, 1987; Saunders, 1986a; 1986b, pp. 332-351).
However, as Harvey (1987) points out, this view fails to locate new
forms of accumulation in terns of the reorganisation of exploitation and
domination consequent upon periods of crisis in the system.
For example, it has been argued above that the demise of social
democratic modernisation and large-scale state intervention to provide
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directly means of reproduction during the 1970s was brought about by
this strategy's failure to tackle economic crisis in UK capitalism, an
Important component of which was the power of organised labour after
years of full employment and growth. Class struggle was clearly central
to the history of this period (see Massey, 1984). However, Saunders
(1986b, pp. 289-351) argues that the revival of the sphere of
circulation (privatised consumption) in the early post-modern period has
Increased the significance of consumption-based struggles compared with
class struggle. This is somewhat confusing given Urry's (1981a)
analysis, described above, which is the other way round. The problem
seems to be due to both authors' attempts to exorcize class from their
analyses of struggles outside the realm of capitalist production.
Saunders (1986b, pp. 312-332) uses the concept of "consumption sectors"
In his development of a non-class explanation of struggles outside the
workplace. He attaches much significance to "cleavages" between social
groups on the basis of differences in the types of goods and services
these groups consume. This relates to the above discussion of class
division, and the concept must clearly be considered when analysing
housing struggles, particularly because one of the cleavages which has
received most attention is that between those who can afford to purchase
their housing on the market and those who have to rely on an
increasingly residualised state sector.
For Saunders, far from uniting the working class, housing issues now
divide it along consumption cleavages. He writes:
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"Rather than assuming that consumption issues can unite classes
which are normally opposed, it is empirically and theoretically more
plausible to suggest that such issues may be expected to fragment
classes which are normally unified. For every example of an urban
movement which draws on a pluri-class social base, there are
probably many more of consumption cleavages cutting through a single
class and setting its members against each other. Like gender,
ethnicity and nationality, consumption location tends to be class-
divisive, and this is especially the case in a context (such as that
In Britain since the late 1970s) where collective consumption
provisions are being selectively cut back." (Saunders, 1986b,
235-236).
The concept of tenure divisions as consumption cleavages is criticised
by Merrett with Gray (1982, pp. 288-289) with reference to the work of
Dunleavy, who first introduced the idea into the literature. They point
out that within owner-occupation - and indeed state housing as well -
there is marked differentiation and many possible "cleavages". Examples
might be the conflict of interests between residents in older housing
areas facing redevelopment proposals, when some want their houses
retained and improved, and others want to sell up and move out of the
area; or between the tenants of a "priority estate" which wins extra
funds for improvements and the tenants of other estates in the district
who see general maintenance spending cut back as a result (there are
many other examples, but these were encountered during fieldwork for the
present thesis). Saunders (1986a, p. 158) argues that nevertheless
owner-occupation is a source of fundamentally different interests, and
different "life chances", compared with state housing - which is hardly
contentious as a generalization - but goes on to argue that owner-
occupation is determining rather than determined,. This leads to perhaps
the most fundamental criticism of consumption cleavages that the nature
of the capitalist production of all housing is incorrectly removed from
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analysis (see Ball, 1986a, for a detailed critique). The criticisms of
the emphasis on consumption/distribution in housing research, rather
than on the structures of provision which actually determine the nature
of housing provision and housing problems in all "tenures", apply
equally to consumption cleavages (see Kemeny, 1980; Harloe and Martens,
1984; Ball, 1983a, 1983b; Merrett, 1979). Ball (1985) suns these up in
arguing that housing issues have to be analysed in terns of the
capitalist structures of housing provision which dominate people's
experience of "housing consumption". As he puts it:
"Instead of simply delimiting a means of consumption, housing tenure
is associated with historically specific relations of provision. A
series of social agencies are associated with housing provision in
any tenure form. Their existence is not a necessary consequence of
the tenure itself, but the products of long historical struggles.
The interrelation of those social agents determines the contemporary
characteristics of a tenure form, like house price inflation or
Jerry built high rise council blocks. To ignore those social
agencies leads to a failure to analyse the causes of particular
characteristics of housing tenures ..." (p. 24)
Thus state intervention in the housing market is explained in terns of
the failures of specific capitalist structures of provision as means of
reproduction (ideological and physical). In the case of housing
renewal, with which the present thesis is particularly concerned, the
state underpins market processes but does not confront the market forces
which cause obsolescence in the first place (Stewart, 1982). It is
responding primarily to political pressures while avoiding displacing
private capital from housing provision. Furthermore, it seems very
difficult to make generalisations about the way "tenure" determines
political or community action, and thus demands on the state, as for
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example Boddy (1980, pp. 23-26) does in arguing that there is more
potential for collective action in state housing. In the case studies
of the present thesis, the most effective community action was by
working class owner-occupiers, and struggles in state housing were
weaker and more short-lived. Although these struggles were about the
imposition of "housing consumption experiences" upon the working class,
in which local state institutions played crucial roles, it is argued
that these experiences have to be set within the context of the
capitalist processes, including resistance to market forces, which were
determining factors in shaping housing policies.
The parallel between the concept of consumption sector and O'Dowd,
Rolston and Tomlinson's (1980) conceptualisation of sectarian division
in Northern Ireland as located in the "substructure" of the society, on
a par with class division, is very strong. These are analyses based on
claims for the explanatory power of divisions between "non-class based
material interests" (Saunders, 1984, p. 206). Both approaches explain
social conflict and change with reference to sections of a class
achieving superior access to means of consumption, especially housing,
through "sectoral" struggles within the class, and that this can
outweigh class membership in its economic and political effects. For
purposes of further criticism, the two approaches can be taken together.
The idea of "sectoral" struggles bears close resemblance to Giddens'
(1984) concept of power, which suggests how one sector is able to
dominate another outside of class relations. The "media" of power are
"allocative resources", such as means of production and reproduction,
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and "authoritative resources", such as means for the co-ordination of
people in their different activities and the distribution of life
chances. Structures of domination are made up of these two sorts of
resources, and "knowledgeable agents" draw upon and reproduce them in
their social interactions. However, while this constitutes an analysis
of what power is, it still does not explain on what basis power comes to
be distributed differentially among and within the working class,
management or the bourgeoisie. This criticism can be applied to
consumption sectors: the success or otherwise of particular groups in
meeting their needs and wants does not take place in the context of an
objective social reality. For marxists, reality is pre-structured by
the powerful system forces of capitalism and its managerial strategies.
Thus, the division and fragmentation of the working class in the UK, and
the differential consumption of the products of flexible accumulation,
are aspects of capitalist reproduction. They are less marked in states
where organised labour is strong, such as Sweden (Olofsson, 1985).
Urry, in Lash and Urry (1987), appears to revise his position in an
explicit distancing from the "end of the working class" thesis of Gorz
(1982), arguing that class struggle has not disappeared, been
marginalised or eclipsed by new social struggles, but has become more
sectional with the end of organised capitalism. While continuing to
distinguish between "working class struggle" and "new social movements",
Lash and Urry suggest a "transformational oppositional culture" based on
an alliance between these forces (p. 8). This is essentially a
refinement of narxist theory rather than a rejection of the relevance of
marxism in explanations of recent developments.
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Capitalism as the fundamental determinant of social existence, and
specifically the wage labour-capital relationship, is at the centre of
all marxist theory. But can this most abstract of concepts be a
starting point for explanation? The purpose of using comparative method
in the present thesis is to explore this question by using this marxist
approach as a basis for constructing a coherent description and
explanation of the research problem. The concept can be reformulated at
lower levels of abstraction. Byrne and Parson (1983) conclude that the
autonomy and living standards of different sections of the working class
depend on their position in the wage labour-capital relationship;
whether, for example, their skills are seen as essential by management
or they can exercise power in the labour market by means of organisation
and exclusion (see also Barbalet, 1982). However, in contemporary UK
capitalist society, millions of people are actually outside the wage
labour-capital relationship, i.e. unemployed, at any point in time.
Byrne (1986) considers their position in terns of the concept of the
"social proletariat". This is the marginalised working class whose
experience is more one of social security, state housing and insecure
employment than formal, permanent employment and home ownership. He
argues that the social proletariat is reproduced within capitalist
relations of production as reserve labour - over-represented in the
worst housing areas and managed by "poverty professionals". Byrne does
not use the example, but the most explicit aspect of this process is the
re-assertion of the poor law principle of "less eligibility" which has
accompanied the expansion of the sphere of circulation and the
contraction of the sphere of reproduction in recent years of Thatcherism
(Loney, 1986). Increasingly state provision for the "surplus
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population" who cannot get the price for their labour power necessary to
buy what they need has been relegated to a residual role, and even
transferred to charitable provision, most notably in the case of housing
(Forrest and Murie, 1986). While, for example, hone owners are regarded
as "self-reliant", state tenants are "dependent", and this appears to
legitimize policies that support the former (tax relief, grants,
promotion) and "save" the latter from continuing dependency (reducing
general subsidies, recommodifying, transfering ownership, encouraging
self-help, etc.).
Harvey (1987) treats change in regimes of capital accumulation as of
crucial importance in determining state policies and actions in civil
society. But his analysis is to a large extent "capital-logic" in the
sense of looking to the strategies of capital for explanations of
events. While Harvey recognises that capital is not unified and is
composed of often conflicting fractions, even though certain "system
forces" may be clearly dominant (such as the strategies of transnational
corporations or international finance capital), and that the state is
also not a unified entity in capitalist society, his analysis does not
consider the autonomous power of the working class - itself, of course,
divided - as a generative mechanism in bringing about crisis in the
system. By contrast, Cleaver (1979) places the ability of workers to
disrupt capitalism from within at the centre of his analysis of
capitalist crisis. While this autonomy is a constant threat, the system
is obviously not always in crisis but crisis-prone. Mass politics in
the UK has generally been about the nature of the state's mediation of
capitalism rather than direct challenges that may be posed by more local
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or sectional struggles. Cockburn's (1977) work in particular stressed
the local state's role in crisis avoidance through the management of the
working class, including the management of conflict and the organisation
of social reproduction, but again she tended to explain this in terns of
capital-logic (see Duncan and Goodwin, 1982, for a critique). Cleaver's
(1979) work presents one of strongest statements within marxism against
the view that events can be explained with reference to capital logic.
In place of the logic of capital he puts the balance of social forces,
which in his analysis is determined by the course of struggle about the
subordination of the working class to the wage labour-capital
relationship.
The case studies of redevelopment in County Durham show how local
councils under Labour control and still committed to social democratic
modernisation in housing policies were clearly pursuing an anomalous
approach in the context of the early post-modernism of the central state
in the early 1980s. The situation had to be resolved through political
processes within the state apparatus. The fact that ultimate state
power was in the hands of the "post-modern" New Right while the local
state in County Durham was still "modernist" reflected the dimensions of
the state's penetration by contending social forces. The intervention
of the central state, against municipal provision and in favour of "self
reliance" and "the individual", decided the issue in one case (chapter
5), while in another the local council succeeded in avoiding such direct
intervention but was forced to conform to early post-modern housing
solutions by other means (chapter 6). In addition, community action did
not meet the sane type of response from the state in every case. For
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example, in the village of Langley Park a central government department
Intervened and supported the residents against the local council
(chapter 5), but in the new town of Peterlee community action received
no support from the local council or central government, despite the
council's calls for more resources to deal with its housing problems
(chapter 4), and in Craigavon attempts were made to incorporate
community action into local housing management (chapter 8).
Some indications about why this should be so are to be found in Williams
(1973). He argues that the response of the "dominant culture" depends
on whether it has an interest at stake, and to what extent - it will
respond accordingly by ignoring, incorporating or extirpating practices
and meanings outside or against the dominant mode. Similarly Kraushaar
(1981) discusses how state responses vary according to the extent to
which the practices and meanings conflict with the reproduction of the
dominant social order. Williams (1973) suggests that state actions in
the "superstructure" (the cultural realm) are crucial for the
reproduction of the "base" (the economic realm), although the base
ultimately exerts determining pressures on what is possible in the
superstructure without revolutionary transformation. Modernisation is a
very good example.
A strategy such as modernisation may have ideological aspects which
continue after the strategy is abandoned by dominant economic and
political institutions as too costly and ineffective. This appears to
have been the case in County Durham. The final break with the
corporatist/social democratic Keynesian Welfare State at a national
- 42 -
level in 1979 meant that political support and, crucially, funding for
modernisation policies were largely abandoned (the "early post-modern"
phase described above). However, in Durham the two local authorities
involved in the case studies of redevelopment in the early 1980s
remained ideologically committed to modernising housing policy, which
was seen to be improving local conditions for the working class through
slum clearance and council housing. This ideology was a product of the
post-war settlement between labour and capital, even though there were
conflicts about housing quality and subsidies. By the late 1970s
restructuring for capital appeared to demand a new strategy of re-
asserting privatised consumption, self-reliance and the strong state:
the social market economy (Gamble, 1980). Local government action was
curtailed accordingly by central legislative and administrative
mechanisms. But the modernisation strategy could not claim to have
popular support in County Durham, or North Armagh, and the actual
experience of it, as distinct from the ideology surrounding it, was
negative for many people.
The above discussion indicates how the state itself disorganised as the
modernisation era ended. As Lash and Urry (1987, pp. 10-11) point out,
a feature of modernisation was the extent not only of the spatial
concentration of means of production and reproduction but also of the
role of the corporate state in organising this. Chapter 2 shows how
planning strategy in the modernisation era deliberately concentrated
labour and its means of reproduction in "growth centres" in County
Durham and North Armagh. "Disorganised capitalism", however, has seen a
spatial scattering or deconcentration of large firms' various production
- 43 -
processes and an increase in the number of small enterprises often
dependent on them. The transition is summarised by Lash and Urry (1987,
pp. 306-307) as follows:
"(D)uring the period of organized capitalism a particular 'spatial
fix' got established between the dominant manufacturing/extractive
industries, major industrial cities, particular regions dominated by
such industries, and labour and capital 'organised' in a given
structural pattern ... Major spatial and industrial changes of a
disorganizing kind occurred in Britain from the 1960s onwards: these
include the collapse of spatially concentrated manufacturing
employment; the increase in service employment which is more
spatially dispersed; the decline in population in the cities and the
extensive process of 'counter-urbanization'; the shifting of
Industry away from the major urban centres especially in the north
and west of Britain; the reduced significance of 'regions' as any
sort of organizational entity and the central importance of local 
variation; increases in the number of smaller plants, enterprises,
hone-workers and the self-employed; the 'unbundling' and development
of specialized producer services firms; the flattening out of trade
unionism between different areas; and the declining significance of
the 'city' for oppositional activity."
The disorganisation of capitalism saw the relaxation of "growth centre"
strategy in County Durham and North Armagh and an emphasis on
"entrepreneurial" planning in local areas. It is argued in the present
study that it was this shift away from modernisation, which had been a
response to organised capitalism, and which Durham County Council
especially saw as vital to the growth of the region, that required the
disorganisation of the "modern" state: the emasculation of local
government, the running down or disbandonment of new town development
corporations and the abandonment of corporatism for example. The
situation in North Armagh was complicated by the problem of managing
sectarian conflict, but the same trends are evident. The "early post-
modern" state is characterised by a centralisation of state power within
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a "strong state/free market" framework and a growth in the roles of
quasi-governmental agencies and private sector-public sector
partnerships. A major purpose of this thesis is to show how the
"disorganisation" of the "modern" state in County Durham and North
Arnagh brought about changes in housing and planning which re-orientated
policies from modernisation to post-modern or disorganised capitalism,
considerably altering the housing and planning scenario which community
action faced.
These processes were experienced in "localities", which is the level at
which fieldwork was focused. So it will be useful at this stage to
explore the concept of "locality" before taking this introductory
discussion further.
1.6 Locality 
Williams (1983) attaches much importance to local social relations in
working class culture. There is in his work a suggestion that the
struggle between labour and capital is reflected in struggles between
"communities" and non-local institutions, especially the transnational
corporations and the nation state. The community is for Williams those
local social relations through which people "do and must live";
"immediate and actual groupings" which have been subordinated to the
dominantion of nation states and corporations which are in
"contradiction" and not "significant continuity" with these more limited
but much more human relationships and "placeable bondings" (Williams,
1983, pp. 179-180). This analysis seems to ha y potential for helping
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to explain why modernisation met with community action in County Durham
and North Armagh; why there was a contest of domains between local state
and local civil society, rather than a continuity.
Sandercock (1985) writes in a similar vein about localities as "life
spaces", threatened by the creation and destruction of "economic spaces"
by capital. In the case study of Peterlee (chapter 4) it is shown how
the new town was actually built as a new "life space" to replace the old
pit villages, before the pit closures of the 1950s and '60s which badly
eroded the "economic space" of the area. In most other cases
modernisation strategies attempted to rebuild "economic spaces" in the
growth centres which would replace capital's "redundant spaces" in the
old industrial villages and towns, only for these in turn to be
marginalised as branch plants declined (Austrin and Beynon, 1979;
Parson, 1981). Local struggles to defend the economic and social spaces
of localities from this "nomad capitalism" often take the form of cross-
class spatial coalitions in response to uneven development at various
scales (Pickvance, 1985). The struggles are essentially against the
"logic" of capital, which decides what is and is not "economic". As
Thompson (1978) writes:
"... while one form which opposition to capitalism takes is in
direct economic antagonism - resistance to exploitation whether as
producer or consumer - another form is, exactly, resistance to
capitalism's innate tendency to reduce all human relationships to
economic definitions ... " (Thompson, 1978, p. 84).
Economic, social and technological changes wrought by capitalist
restructuring have broken up many "communities" in the traditional
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sense, processes in which planning on behalf of capital has been deeply
implicated (see, for example, Wiener's (1980) study of the process in
Northern Ireland; the accounts of Snowdon (1979) and Durham Strong Words
Collective (1979) of the destruction of "communities" in County Durham;
and the discussion by Williams (1985) of the miners' struggle of 1985/86
to save their communities). Thus, the locality is where restructuring
may be experienced and resistance may be based. This resistance appears
generally to occur in response to the disruption of civil society.
Thus, a critique of modernisation (and post-modernism) seems to have to
begin in the realities of place and community.
The significance of "locale" in the "constitution of society" has been
examined by Giddens (1984). He develops the concept in terns of the
locality as the site of social reproduction, but with knowledgeable
social actors shaping as well as being shaped by the processes in which
they are located. He too emphasies the social importance of the
locality:
"Feelings of identifications with larger locales - regions, nations,
etc. - seem distinguishable from those bred and reinforced by the
localized contexts of day-to-day life. The latter are probably much
more important in respect of the reproduction of large-scale
institutions than are the former" (p. 367).
This echoes Williams (1983), not just in terns of dominant ideologies
which attempt to construct a prime popular identification with the
nation state or the large corporation, rather than with "locales", but
also in terms of the need for the state to become involved in local
civil society to reproduce the conditions for a cumulation and
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reproduction given the imperatives of the system at the tine. However
these perspectives, and particularly the work of Giddens, have been
strongly criticised. Saunders (1986b) argues that they over-emphasise
space and give it generative status, when space in fact only enters into
processes of social change in a contingent way. There is, he suggests,
no centrality of space to social theory:
"Just as social life has to a large extent transcended the temporal
dimension (e.g. we may work at night as well as in the day, and the
rhythm of social life does not vary much between winter and summer),
so too it has transcended the spatial dimension. What happens in_D 
particular place is largely determined, not by the character of the 
place itself, but by the operation of the land market and the 
intervention of the state (p. 283; emphasis added).
Saunders acknowledges that social processes work out differently across
space according to specific conjunctures of relations which occur in
different places, but argues that this constitutes a contingent status
for location, not a key status for it in analysis.
This debate is about the role of "locality" in causal mechanisms.
Clearly many determinations are at work in localities, as is shown in
the case studies. At a general level, Jessop (1982) suggests a realist
schema for organising how such determinations may be analysed. He
conceptualises a gradation from "abstract determinations" to the "real
concrete". "Abstract determinations" are powers, tendencies, counter-
tendencies, etc. The "real concrete" is stratified into various layers
and regions at which specific mechanisms generate actual agents and
events.
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This approach may help with the analysis of community action about
redevelopment. Class struggle about reproduction in the industrial city
and successive legislation requiring local authorities to take action
against unfit or substandard housing might be postulated as the
necessary generative mechanism (Merrett, 1979, pp. 3-62). In this way
the state acts to reproduce labour in conditions that improve
productivity, reduce class conflict and assist the functioning of the
housing market by sustaining exchange values and undertaking
unprofitable functions. However such action may cause conflict if it
extends into "near slums" where residents want to continue living
(Dennis, 1970; 1972; Byrne, Harrison, Keithley and McCarthy, 1986, pp.
24-30). Opposition may be due to the social and financial costs borne
by the displaced residents (contingent factors). For collective action
to occur, however, residents have to consider that the advantages
outweigh the disadvantages, and there have to be the resources and
structures to enable the action (in Tilly's (1978) terns, material
interests alone are not sufficient to produce protest; there also has to
be organisation, mobilization and opportunity).
This can also work the other way round, and in fact the nature of local
struggles may be turning full circle. In recent years the state has
reduced the scale of action to improve the quality, quantity and general
affordability of good housing, and standards have fallen (Ball, 1985).
One consequence is that the issue of "unhealthy" housing areas is re-
emerging (Byrne, Harrison, Keithley and McCarthy, 1986). And judging by
the various reports in magazines such as Community Action and Roof the
issue has seen a rise of community action about health and housing (for
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a discussion in relation to West Belfast, see Blackman, Evason, Melaugh
and Woods, 1987, pp. 1-18).
Even if the locality is contingent, it has so far in this discussion not
been made clear what "locality" is. Duncan (1986) considers the problem
of definition. He criticises the vagueness of the term as it has often
been used. The concept has been employed to denote passive local
variation, the local context of social action, the context which causes
social action or a combination of all of these. There has often been an
unexamined import of implicit ideas of social cohesion and autonomy into
what are essentially case study areas until they can be shown to be
anything else, such as a "community". He argues that locality has been
used as a conceptual gap-filler:
"But if we see general processes as spatial processes which are
constituted in numerous local areas, then the need for such a
conceptual gap-filler disappears. Locality is then only important
if and when locality effects are part of the causal group explaining
any event. And locality may well not be important." (pp. 29-30)
However, Urry (1981b; 1986) argues that locality does natter, and
increasingly so given recent changes in the UK's urban and regional
structures. His argument is that processes internal to local areas
generate concrete outcomes, and thus the nature of the locality is of
great importance in explaining social phenomena. He gives the example
of large firms making decisions on the basis of local conditions, and
the variation in responses to their strategies, such as in the
allocation of local state expenditures, which depend on local economic
and political conditions.
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It is suggested that this apparent disagreement can be resolved by
separating what has been referred to above as the "system forces" of
capitalism (or Jessop's "abstract determinations") from the experiences
of these forces, often mediated by the state, in local areas (civil
society). Action based on these experiences may in turn bring about
change in the system forces. Taylor (1985) makes precisely this point,
both explicitly and in the way his book Political Geography: world-
economy. nation-state and locality is organised. Introducing his final
section, "the political geography of localities", he writes:
"We have reached the scale of experience in our framework for
political geography. The range of this scale is defined by the day-
to-day activities of people in the ordinary business of their lives
... From our perspective localities are important since they provide
different experiences for their populations and these will have
political implications." (pp. 184, 193)
Localities are commonly where the effects of the movements of capital or
central government policies are experienced. Resulting locally-based
reactions may feed into national currents. For example, the formation
of the British Labour Party around the turn of the century as a vehicle
for the working class to take control of the nation state had important
origins in localities (Samuel, 1985), although at the sane time to build
the party spatial constraints had to be overcome. It is suggested in
subsequent chapters that a crucial change occurred in this process with
post-war modernisation: labour leaders became so incorporated in
modernisation and expanding local expenditures that they had no real
constituency, just an abstraction of the working class interest which
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was used to justify rolling over opposition in actual working class
communities.
The prime functions of the capitalist state, in accumulation and
legitimation, demand spatial policies, both to appropriate space where
necessary, or to dominate space. The capitalist state enters into
actual and organised relationships over relevant local areas to
undertake these functions, operating within the structural pressures of
the accumulation strategies of capital and popular resistance to the
exploitation and domination these require. Structures and mechanisms of
management put in place at local level may become arenas of struggle.
However these struggles cannot be analysed solely at the local level.
As Ball (1983, pp. 259, 246) writes in regard to the planning machinery:
"To treat the politics of planning in such parochial terms, however,
denies the spatial consequences of social change. Land-use planning
is a specific intervention by the state in the built environment and
its spatial organization. Local political struggles over planning
policy are part of much wider conflicts over the nature of society
and who controls it ... Changes in the planning system cannot be
divorced from the long-term crisis of British capitalism and the
spatial restructuring associated with it."
Given the importance of the forms of relation between civil society and
political authority, or "people-officialdom" relations, in issues of
control and restructuring, the penultimate section of this chapter is
devoted to the question of the state.
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1.7 The state 
An exhaustive account of competing theoretical perspectives on the state
would be beyond the scope of this thesis (the development of debate on
the subject is illustrated by Gold, Lo and Wright, 1975; Frankel, 1979;
Held et al, 1983; Jessop, 1982; 1985; for Northern Ireland see Bew,
Gibbon and Patterson, 1979; O'Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, 1980; Bew and
Patterson, 1985). The purpose of this section is to consider the
relevance to the present project of two aspects of the state considered
In the recent work of Jessop, namely "people-officialdoe relations and
"two nations" strategy. There are two main reasons why these are
important to a study of "community action" about modernisation in
housing and planning. The first is that modernisation was associated
with a top-down "statist" conception of reform which, because of the
ways in which it subordinated people to the state and bureaucracy, was
often unpopular. Much of the success of the New Right has been
explained in terns of its radical critique of modernisation and
"statist" reform (see especially Hall, 1983). The second is that
modernisation was also associated with "one nation" social democracy in
Labour and Tory versions. A feature of post-modern times has been the
growth of a "second nation" excluded from good jobs and owner-occupied
housing and marginalised as reserve and peripheral labour accommodated
in residualised social housing. For these groups the experience of the
state is frequently still one of domination and bureaucracy.
Chapter 2 is an account of structural pressures which shaped the nature
of local state involvement in civil society, wit specific reference to
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housing and planning policies. This is followed by case studies which
show how these policies worked out in local areas where there were
conflicts about housing provision between community groups and the local
state. Central-local government relations were of considerable
importance in determining the outcome of these conflicts. None of these
struggles were powerful political challenges; what they do is illustrate
how relatively low-level protest was managed in a fairly routine
fashion, and how the outcomes may be explained in terms of the changing
nature of state-civil society relations as early post-modernism
superceded modernisation.
Over the post-war period a growing number of interventionist state
bodies were corporatist in form, for example regional economic planning
councils, new town development corporations, NHS authorities, the 1974
re-organisation of local government and in recent years housing,
planning and educational/training agencies (Cockburn, 1978; Panitch,
1986, pp. 160-186; Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1983). In Northern Ireland the
reform of local government which occurred in 1973 radically extended
corporatist forms of administration following the Macrory Report
(Birrell and Murie, 1980, pp. 155-190). Housing had been brought under
the control of a quasi-governmental agency, the Northern Ireland Housing
Executive, in 1971 following civil rights protests about discrimination
by Unionist local councils.
The development of the corporatist state in the UK occurred with the
growing complexity of managing public spending and public protest (see
Dearlove, 1979). With the end of the post-war b om, high and growing
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levels of state spending on social investment and social consumption
were difficult to sustain, especially as the type of provision was often
decommodified and social expenses were escalating with unemployment
caused by capitalist restructuring. Not only this - modernisation had
failed to win mass commitment and was often experienced as "statism".
The way was paved for Thatcherism as "the way out of the crisis".
Central government intervened much more directly in the local state
following Thatcher's election victory of 1979. The abandonment of
social democratic corporatism and Keynesianism/Labourism saw increasing
fragmentation and division not just in civil society and the economy,
but also within branches of the state system (Jessop, 1985, pp. 126-
127). As Jessop (1982, p. 235) observes:
"In so far as a given state fails to secure the general external
conditions of production •.. then economic crisis can be
anticipated. It will then be subject to various pressures to
respond to such crises - pressures which may involve demands for
more government intervention, new kinds of intervention, or even
disengagement and resort to private, market-generated solutions ...
(T)he state responds to the political repercussions of crisis and
not to the economic crisis (or crises) as such .. The extent to
which a state actually succeeds in maintaining, restoring, or
strengthening the various conditions necessary for accumulation must
always be established in each conjuncture."
Hall (1983) argues that during the 1970s these conditions had to be
secured by shifting towards a coercive, disciplinary state system at the
expense of a consensual, hegemonic state system in the UK. This, he
posits, was achieved within a mass democracy through "authoritarian
populism", which capitalised on the failures of social democratic
corporatism by counter-posing a politics of market = free choice =
freedom and liberty = anti-statism = end creepi g collectivism. This
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was an appeal to the large numbers of people excluded from, and managed
by, corporatist structures. However Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling
(1984) challenge this point of view, arguing that Thatcherism is not
hegemonic but is rather a "two nations project". Jessop (1982, p. 244)
described this strategy in earlier work as follows:
"... 'one nation' strategies aim at an expansive hegemony in which
the support of the entire population is mobilised through material
concessions and symbolic rewards (as in 'social imperialism' or the
'Keynesian-welfare state' projects). In contrast 'two nations'
strategies aim at a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilise the
support of strategically significant sectors of the population and
pass the costs of the project to other sectors (as in fascism or
monetarism)."
The "two nations" concept is a useful analytical tool. Jessop's
analysis is that "two nations" strategies arise in times of economic
recession when general economic expansion cannot generate "one nation"
growth. The state intervenes to favour sections of the population
according to political calculation and economic demands. In housing the
creation of "two nations" was well advanced by the early 1980s with the
general polarization between state housing and owner-occupied housing;
selective state intervention favoured the market and self-help at the
expense of collective state provision and a professional housing service
(see Labour Housing Group, 1984). Jessop (1982, p. 244) describes the
general process as follows:
"... 'two nations' projects require containment and even repression
of the 'other nation' at the sane time as they involve selective
access and concessions for the more 'favoured nation'. This is 
associated with attempts to reorganise the bases of political 
support to reflect a vertical, antagonistic cleavage between the 
'productive' and the 'parasitic' in economic terms and/or the 
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'loyal' and the 'disloyal' in political terns ansl/or the Icivillsede 
and the 'uncivilised' in terns of civil society." (emphasis added)
Although social democratic corporatism was a central element of the "one
nation" project of post-war governments, the incorporation of labour at
leadership level effectively excluded the mass of working people from
participation in state structures (Panitch, 1986, pp. 160-186).
However, significant gains were made through this arrangement, and the
trade union offensives within corporatism in the 1970s appeared to be
the cause of capital's demands for a drastic reduction of trade union
power (Panitch, 1986; see also Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling, 1984;
and Thompson, 1978, pp. 35-91). Panitch (1986, pp. 1-55) argues that
the exclusion of the mass of people from the political structures of the
Keynesian Welfare State meant that it was impossible to create a popular
perception of the counter-attack on it and the need to defend and expand
the principles on which it was based. The corporatism of the Labour
Party in power (locally and centrally) in the 1940s-1970s obstructed
participatory politics; post-war reconstruction and social reform were
for the welfare of, rather than by the agency of, the working class.
Labour politics in County Durham was of this mode. It made assumptions
about how working class needs should be met which in some working class
localities were not what people wanted.
In Northern Ireland this disengagement was carried out very explicitly
to remove state power from contending forces in civil society. Within
Northern Ireland state power had been used by the Orange bourgeoisie to
discriminate against a "second nation" of catholics and prevent working
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class unity (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979; Bew and Patterson, 1985).
With the introduction of Direct Rule state power was delocalised to a
greater extent than in Britain, so that the government of Northern
Ireland became much more clearly concerned with reproducing the working
class and managing conflict outside any real process of democracy (see
Byrne, 1980).
The complex nature of different branches of the state system and their
relationships with varied local civil societies in organising socio-
economic and cultural practices cannot be analysed with a crude
conception of the capitalist state, or a theory which reifies the state.
However, as Jessop (1985) and Williams (1973) argue, there are
determining pressures on state action which orginate from the nature of
the state's relationship to capital and to civil society. Two areas in
civil society where state involvement is necessary have been identified:
circulation and reproduction (as defined by Urry, 1981a). The state
also intervenes in a "sphere of struggle". The community struggles
studied in the present thesis have been conceptualised as a "contest of
domains". Functions devolved to local government mean that it has to
enter into different types of relationship with different local civil
societies. These may also be affected by the way functions are carried
out. Modernisation in County Durham and North Armagh involved such a
structuring of relationships with communities, depending on the
character of their localities and their position within strategic
spatial policy. The issue of the exclusion of certain communities
affected by these functions from decision-making may not be simply a
question of local democracy versus the administration of services
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outside local democracy. It is also likely to be a question of the
structure of the local state, the nature of local politics and the
resources available to groups in civil society.
These aspects will shape the nature of "people-officialdom" relations
(Jessop, 1982, p. 247). "The people" are the social objects of state
intervention in civil society. "Officialdour is the agents of
intervention in the state. Class relations do not necessarily
correspond with political relations. For example, the case studies show
how the working class in the political form of Labour councils in County
Durham conflicted with working class residents in civil society. As
Jessop (p. 251) writes, the spheres of "state/civil society relations
and state/subject relations constitute the field par excellence for ...
'popular (-democratic)' struggles". At first sight this may seem to
bear close resemblance to Pahl's (1970) managerial thesis. However
Jessop's (1982) concept of "people-officialdom" relations is much more
firmly located in an analytical framework which explains the nature of
the state in terns of the nature of the capitalist system and the
overall constraints this imposes on state action beyond a reproduction
function (see also O'Connor, 1981; Cleaver, 1979). It was precisely
this aspect - that urban managerialism neglected the ultimate
constraints on the immediate managers of urban resources - which limited
Pahl's thesis (Taylor, 1985, pp. 189-191). For Jessop (1982) "people-
officialdom" relations are relevant in the theoretical analysis of the
capitalist state
"... only in so far as they serve as conditions of existence of
economic reproduction and/or are themselves affected by economic
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relations. Thus the relations among political categories are not
per se class relations but they may well be class-relevant relations
and/or be overdetermined by class relations" (p. 247).
An aim of this thesis, in addressing its central problem, is to research
community action in terns of the "conditions of existence of economic
reproduction" as these shifted from modernisation to early post-
modernism.
1.8 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the research problem and how the present
thesis addresses it methodologically and conceptually. The thesis is
concerned with the problem of how to analyse cases of community action
about housing and planning in County Durham and North Armagh. The
problem is conceptualised in terns of contesting domains of the local
state and civil society within the structural pressures created by
capital accumulation strategies and central government policies over the
period from "modern" or "organised" capitalism to "post-modern" or
"disorganised" capitalism. Using a series of case studies, the thesis
examines what social actors actually did during this period in struggles
about housing and planning "modernisation", what happened in the
localities where these struggles occurred, and how what happened might
be related to a conceptual framework.
The present chapter has argued that capitalism is the prime determinant
of social existence in UK society, and that it follows that a major
function of the capitalist state is the management of the working class
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which, in varied and sometimes conflicting ways in which "locality" can
play an important role, enters into struggle against the reduction of
social existence to the logic of capital. The changing system forces of
this mode of production, particularly the transition from organised to
disorganised capitalism in the UK, appear to have determined particular
state strategies for housing and planning in County Durham and North
Armagh which are referred to as "modernisation" and "early post-
modernism". The consensus about modernisation ensured relatively
harmonious relationships between central government and an expanding
local government system based on organised capitalism and growth. But
the process of disorganisation and the imposition of early post-modern
restructuring, which particularly affected local government, saw growing
conflict between central government and elected local government. The
expression of these strategies and conflicts in planning and housing
policy is discussed in chapter 2.
It is suggested that the strategy of modernisation shaped the nature of
planning and housing policy in County Durham and North Armagh during the
post-war period until the 1970s. However, relationships between local
councils and "communities" affected by modernisation and the
continuation of modernising policies were far from consensual. The
costs imposed on working class communities resulted in community action
against the policies. Subsequent chapters show that elements of the
modernisation strategy continued in the local state in County Durham and
North Armagh after it had been superceded at national level by early
post-modern policies in housing and planning.
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It was suggested that early post-modern policies were elements of what
Jessop has termed a "two nations project", in contrast to the "one
nation project" of the modernisation era. The policies expanded the
sphere of circulation while reducing the sphere of reproduction. This
shift involved stimulating privatised rather than collective
consumption, and self-provisioning/self-reliance rather than public
services. The transition appears to have been determined by wider
economic pressures.
This thesis is centrally concerned with the history of the working class
experience of state intervention in housing and planning, and in
particular the experience of community action about housing and
planning. This history, as described in chapters 3 to 8, is used to
inform the concepts developed in the present chapter and to work towards
a more refined understanding in the final chapter of what happened,
drawing out its implications for academic and political practice.
The community action studied met with different state responses. It is
proposed that these responses may be conceptualised in terns of state
management along a "people-officialdom" axis of determination, which -
despite Lash and Urry's (1987) contention about the heightened
importance of division between the "people" and the "state" in
"disorganised" capitalism - appears to have been of considerable
significance in both the modernisation and post-modern eras in managing
the implementation of appropriate policies. The nature of this
relationship is important in understanding the way the state performs
its functions. The axis appears necessary because the local state is
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expected to respond to the needs of capital and to legitimate this in
managerial/technical terns. To examine this idea in more detail, the
following chapter addresses the generative processes thought to underlie
conflicts between people and officialdom in County Durham and North
Armagh during both the "modernisation" and the "early post-modern" eras.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERNISATION 
This chapter sets the scene for the case studies which follow. It
discusses the origins of modernisation in housing and planning policies
in County Durham and North Armagh, the nature of these policies and the
changes that occurred to constitute the end of the "modernisation era".
It is a historical chapter, largely based on original documentary
research. It sets out the housing and planning context of the case
studies of community action presented in subsequent chapters, This
Involves showing how modernisation came to be expressed in local land-
use and strategic plans and in state housing, how it was abandoned
through a series of policy changes, and ultimately replaced by planning
frameworks for rationalisation and strengthening markets, and the
expansion of commodification and self-help into housing provisim
These changes were accompanied by increasing central restraints on local
councils in County Durham. In Northern Ireland local policy responded
more directly to central pressures under Direct Rule, but reflected
concerns about not being seen to abandon tackling serious housing
problems and legitimating policy changes. In both areas there were
housing struggles in civil society arising from the impact of
modernisation, and as the context changed at the end of this era, so did
the nature of housing struggles and the structures of opportunities and
constraints in which they were located.
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The main conclusion which this chapter works towards is that civil
society, rather than being an autonomous sphere, was a sphere of
reproduction struggles in County Durham and North Armagh (the "contest
of domains" described in chapter 1). In both areas it is argued that
the local state was incorporated into a strategy of modernising the
"social factory". Although this strategy appeared to be a state
response to the imperatives of "organised" capitalism, it also promised
"a better future" for the working class.
As well as a physical and spatial strategy, modernisation in housing and
planning was an ideology which claimed that the needs of capital were
also the needs of the working class. The present chapter attempts to
demonstrate this by considering relevant aspects of the political
history of the two areas, particularly the process of incorporation,
which left many small communities excluded from decisions about far-
ranging changes in their localities - even the destruction of those
localities - and created new "communities" which were little more than
"urban reservations". This restructuring is shown to be dominated by
the needs of capital. Community action was a response to the experience
of housing policy during modernisation; what housing policy became in
"post-modernise presented a "way out" for some groups, such as working
class owner-occupiers in older areas faced with redevelopment under
modernisation, and a "trap" for others, such as marginalised local
authority tenants living in "modern" mass housing. Thus, these
struggles were essentially about the conditions under which reproduction
would take place, especially in terms of the form, tenure and location
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of housing. How the state responded was very much shaped by the wider
transition to post-modern policies.
It might be concluded from this introduction that to accept the
existence of "civil society" at all is inaccurate, as it is in reality
the "social factory" of capitalism. This, of course, was essentially
the position of early Poulantzas (1973), whose structuralist analysis
had no room for civil society as a separate sphere from the capitalist
state and the relations of production. Urry (1981a) rejects this
analysis and, as discussed in chapter 1, argues that civil society
consists of spheres of circulation, reproduction and struggle which are
"between" the state and the economy. In other words, civil society is
the everyday world where goods and services are sold, bought and
consumed, labour power reproduced and struggles about
consumption/reproduction occur. As also discussed in chapter 1, the
experience of the modernisation era in County Durham and North Armagh
was dominated by reproduction in Urry's sense of state policy and action
based on the idealism of universal interests, while post-modernism saw
an expansion of circulation into areas partially deconnodified under
modernisation - particularly housing - and the breaking down of a
universal "one nation" ideology. In a general sense, both are
reproductive processes and the struggles which occurred in both eras
were essentially struggles about the conditions of reproduction, thus
decreasing the significance of civil society as a separate sphere (see
Frankel, 1987, pp. 202-206). Civil society, though, still seems to be a
useful methodological device for the purposes of the present thesis. It
is used to distinguish between the state and the sphere of "private"
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everyday relations and practices within and between households in which
the state intervenes and out of which struggles about this intervention
may emerge. As suggested in chapter 1, this helps to specify the
distinctiveness of "the local" as opposed to national/international
forces, and the possibility of contradictions between these levels.
Nodernisation did not end in a clear-cut fashion, and was itself
essentially restructured by changes in policy and expenditure during the
1970s, which was a period of transition between modernisation and early
post-modernism. In County Durham modernisation was 'moderated through
community and district council pressure on a county council strategy
which was increasingly difficult to legitimate, and later abandoned as a
result of central government intervention. In North Armagh central
government adjusted strategic plans to "early post-modernism", although
Housing Executive policy retained a strong modernising element as its
allocations were not as severely cut back as English local councils.
Vhile these changes were results of the exercise of political authority,
the position of "modernisers" in the late 1970s appeared to be at odds
with both the working class experience of modernisation as "statist"
and, in many localities, destructive of use values, exchange values and
"community supports" in local civil society, and the failure of large-
scale modernisation to deliver economic growth and a better quality of
life in either County Durham or North Armagh. "Post-modernism" could
both seek legitimacy on this basis, and develop policies more
"appropriate" to the needs of capital in the 1980s.
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2.1 The political origins of modernisation 
North Armagh and County Durham are areas now on the industrial periphery
of the UK. Production in some of the basic industries of imperial
Britain for long structured economic and social life in these areas, and
the pattern of settlement. Both were industrial heartlands of
nineteenth century accumulation, producing coal and linen respectively.
In 1911, 46 per cent of male workers (but only 1 per cent of female
workers) in County Durham were enumerated by the Census as employed in
the coal industry. Excluding the main urban centres, 61 per cent of
male workers were in the coal industry. In County Armagh 13 per cent of
male workers were enumerated by the 1911 Census as employed in textiles,
and 48 per cent of females workers (2). In the main linen centres of
Lurgan and Portadown in North Armagh, 42 per cent of all workers were in
textiles according to the Census, and Mid-Ulster's textile and clothing
sector, which centred on these two towns, contained 21 per cent of the
total six county workforce in employment (Hall, 1986, p. 108).
The County Durham pit settlements were "class communities", with a
homogeneous working class political culture based on the need for
solidarity and loyalty, although with a clear separation of roles
between the sexes (Chaplin, 1978; Williamson, 1982a). In North Armagh
the working class was differentiated as a result of the history of
colonisation and industrial development in the North East of Ireland.
This created a skilled male workforce, overwhelmingly protestant and
unionist, and an unskilled workforce which was overwhelmingly catholic
and nationalist (Hall, 1986, pp. 94-137). A clientelist "class
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alliance" was constructed between the protestant bourgeoisie and the
protestant working class based on protestant workers' and protestant
capital's mutual interests in maintaining the union with Britain in the
face of Irish nationalism. This entailed, among other things, material
concessions on wages and conditions to prevent a class fracturing of the
unionist bloc (McLaughlin, 1980; Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979;
Probert, 1978; Purdie, 1983).
In County Durham there was no such strong base for differentiation
within the male industrial working class, and the rise of the British
Labour Party united the class around universalist demands (Samuel, 1985;
Byrne and Parson, 1983). In Northern Ireland the Labour project never
succeeded in overcoming what was in effect a regional two-nations
strategy of its bourgeoisie (Walker, 1985; Devlin, 1981; see also
chapter 1). An important consequence of this situation was the
prolonged survival of the protestant petit bourgeoisie in local
government in Northern Ireland, where it could protect its housing and
property interests. This group effectively blocked centralised planning
in the province until the mid-1960s, when its power was much weaker as a
result of economic restructuring (Wiener, 1980; see also subsequent
discussion). In North East England, by contrast, the petit bourgeoisie
was largely eliminated from local government by 1945 as a result of the
political successes of the Labour Party (Byrne, 1982).
The centrality of the skilled protestant worker in Northern Ireland had
major implications in the sphere of reproduction/consumption. Not only
did protestants achieve superior access to employment, but also to
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housing. Clientelism often "delivered the goods", made possible by the
Unionist Party's continual control of the Stormont Parliament and all
but a few local councils. Although complicated by the fact that
unskilled protestants were far from privileged under unionism, but
nevertheless generally believed that acquiescence to the unionist ruling
class was morally appropriate, protestant workers' acceptance of the
class alliance was essentially a strategy of a fraction of the working
class in relation to regionally-based capital (Hall, 1986, pp. 1-51).
In Northern Ireland, what appeared to be a "consumption cleavage" in
housing along sectarian lines was in fact ultimately rooted in the
strength of a politically and economically central section of the
working class. As Harloe (1984), drawing on Barbalet's (1982) work on
"exclusionary closure", concludes, the capacity to resist exploitation
under capitalism is unevenly distributed through the working class.
Groups of workers may take advantage of political or economic strength
to improve their position in consumption, even if this is actually
achieved through closure against other groups. This is not to suggest
that workers' demands, especially of the labour movement, were generally
for such selective privilege, even in Northern Ireland. As in Britain
the protestant working class after the second world war pressed with
marked success for universalist welfare provision that would inevitably
benefit the class as a whole (Hall, 1986; Walker, 1985; Byrne, 1979;
Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1979). Rather, exclusionary closure may
appear as a response to competition for Jobs and housing when
universalist demands have failed. The "two-nations" strategy should be
interpreted as the ruling class's response to these demands, selectively
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favouring politically and economically key groups while reproducing the
wage labour-capital relationship.
In County Durham capital was confronted by a largely homogeneous working
class and universalist demands were much more difficult to resist
politically. But in the sane way that the unionist bourgeoisie
attempted to accommodate the protestant working class into a dominant
ideology through the Orange Lodges, in County Durham the coal owners
attempted to construct an ideology of supposed mutual interest. Benwell
Community Project (1978, pp. 37-48) describe the coal owners as members
of a hegenonic class, exerting ideological control through the provision
of institutions such as churches, schools, working men's institutes and
libraries. However it was not as easy for the Durham bourgeoisie to
establish this control as for their unionist counter-parts. The Orange
ideology reflected a real material interest because of the benefits of
the union for the major industries of north-east Ireland. In County
Durham the conflicting interests of the miners and their employers were
much more difficult to mask by the "liberal" ideology of community and a
harmony of interests between labour and capital. As a result, from the
mid-1880s industrial conflict led growing numbers of miners to desert
the Liberal Party and support the ascending labour movement and its
Labour Party (Carney and Hudson, 1978).
This struggle in County Durham was expressed culturally by the miners
building their own autonomous institutions. As Williamson (1982, p.
230) writes of the pit community of Throckley:
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The men who cane to Throckley built a life for themselves, as far
as they could, free from the constraints of the company and its
rules and the vicissitudes of winning coal. The community which
developed had 'that necessary habit of mutuality' which many writers
have detected as central to working-class communities (Jackson,
1968, p. 166). But its structures were not simply defensive or as
isolated as this image suggests; the union lodge, the Labour Party,
the co-operate store had an offensive rationale, too, displaying at
different points in time changing images of a better society,
adjusting strategies for achieving it according to the opportunities
they were presented with."
By the early 1900s it was clear that strikes over wages would become an
increasingly serious threat to the coal combines. Conflict on a large
scale was postponed by the onset of war in 1914 and the reforns
introduced immediately after the war. Swenarton (1981) shows how Lloyd
George's "hones fit for heroes" council housebuilding programme was
designed to defuse class conflict at this tine. Until 1921 the coal
combines enjoyed booming profits, but with the sudden end of boom
conditions they reacted by again forcing down wages and increasing
working hours. A series of bitter struggles ensued, culminating in the
lock-out and general strike of 1926, when the Durham miners struck for
several months after they had been abandoned by the TUC.
The defeat of 1926 was a crucial factor in shaping subsequent political
developments, especially in bringing to power moderate labour leaders
willing to co-operate with capital within corporatist arrangements.
Hall (1984, p. 43) traces the history of this period, showing how 1926
was the culmination of a ruling class strategy to defeat working class
radicalism:
"The focal point of the strategy was to split 'moderates' from
'extremists'. The syndicalist, rank-and-file insurgency of the
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Triple Alliance had to be separated from 'moderate and responsible
trade unionism'. The trump card was the recognition that, in this
enterprise, the TUC and the Labour Party were actually the state's
strongest allies ... The expansion of the formalized machinery of
industrial bargaining, conciliation and negotiation through the
state was one key element. Here, in faint outline, we can detect
the origin of that corporatist triangle - the incorporation of the
organised representatives of capital (the employers' organisations),
labour (the TUC) with the state - which later became the centrepiece
of the interventionist state strategy in the 1960s and 1970s.".
Modernisation was carried out from the top. The defeat of the radical
leaders of the 1926 strike, the incorporation of the Labour Party into
the machinery of the state and the growth of careerist Labour
politicians have all been linked to a distancing of the Party from a
base in working class civil society (Alsop, G., 1979; Burnip, 1979;
Byrne, undated). It has been suggested that subsequent post-war
developments almost certainly reinforced this trend in County Durham,
including the movement away from the coalfield of many of the most
active union members with the closures of the 1960s, the
"embourgeoisiement" of the pit villages as the miners bought their
houses, the rise of a new group of planning professionals, not linked to
any political movement, whose technocracy stifled working class self-
activity, the managerial changes in local government which tended to
depoliticise the local state, turning councillors into administrators,
and the management of many local functions by quasi-governmental
agencies (3).
Norman McCord has dubbed the politicians who came to power in the North
East after the second world war as "the Labour lieutenants of
capitalise (4). While the old regional bourgeoisie retreated into
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exercising their influence over the state through bodies such as the
Northern Industrial Group and the North East Development Council
(Benwell Community Project, 1978, pp. 65-67), considerable power was
wielded in the region by a few right-wing Labour leaders in key union
and political positions up to the 1970s (Bulmer, 1978, pp. 95-142).
Milne (1976) gives an account of the corruption that existed at the top
of the region's Labour Party in the 1960s, and its toleration by the
national leadership. This group of "boss men" was wedded to
modernisation, and was in close partnership with private capital. They
sometimes profited well from the arrangement, as epitomised by the
notorious T. Dan Smith (5). Urban renewal and high-rise building were
particularly lucrative.
The class struggles of the inter-war period in the North East took place
in a context of crisis in the major basic industries - the export-
oriented heavy engineering, shipbuilding and textile industries and coal
mining, while the new mass consumption-based industries in the South and
Midlands of England expanded employment and output (Benwell Community
Project, 1978, pp. 49-62). Massey (1984) shows how the changing spatial
division of labour after the First World War meant that unemployment
soared in regions which specialised in the small group of industries
which had been the basis of the British Empire, and its international
dominance, but which went into serious decline as the position of UK
manufacturing in the world economy deteriorated after the war. She
writes of the effects of this structural decline:
"The indices on which this kind of regional inequality was
registered (in other words, the kind of regional problem which was
IN THE INTER-VARTable 2.1:	 UK REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 	 YEARS
Percentages of insured employees
1929	 1932	 1936	 peak month
London 5.6 13.5 7.2 15.0	 (Jan '32)
South-Eastern 5.6 14.3 7.3 16.5	 (Jan '32)
South-Western 8.1 17.1 9.4 19.3	 (Jan '33)
Midlands 9.3 20.1 9.2 22.3	 (July '31)
North-Eastern 13.7 28.5 16.8 31.0	 (Aug '32)
North-Western 13.3 25.8 13.1 31.3 (Sept '31)
Scotland 12.1 27.7 18.7 29.6	 (Jan '33)
Vales 19.3 36.5 29.4 39.9	 (Aug '32)
Northern Ireland 14.8 27.2 22.7 33.4	 (Dec '30)
United Kingdom 10.4 22.1 13.2 23.1	 (Jan '31)
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produced) were the ones which became the classic measures of 'the
regional problem' in Britain. The most important of these measures
was unemployment, with the level of out-migration, per capita
earnings, and the level of manufacturing employment playing
subsidary roles." (p. 130)
The overall pattern of this regional inequality in unemployment in the
inter-war years is shown in Table 2.1,
Source: Townsend, 1983, p. 144.
Large numbers of jobs were lost from coal mining in County Durham in the
1930s, causing very high levels of unemployment. Bulmer (1978, p. 152)
describes as follows how the county experienced perhaps the worst
effects in any part of the country of the crisis in the inter-war years:
"Several commentators have emphasised that this was a period of
economic growth nationally, and even during the Depression one of
increasing prosperity and better housing and health in the South and
Midlands. This was paralleled by a quite different picture in the
depressed areas, which were 'separate enclaves' of unemployment,
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material deprivation and ill-health in an increasingly prosperous
country. No occupation exemplifies these conditions in Wales,
Scotland and the north of England better than the Durham miners.
Measured in terns of unemployment rates, the incidence of death and
disease, housing, or conditions of income maintenance, County Durham
was a depressed, deprived and distressed area between the wars."
Bulner (1978, pp. 150-152) writes that the decline of mining employment
was due to the world depression, the collapse of the coal export trade
and stagnating domestic consumption. However Massey (1984, p. 129) and
Benwell Community Project (1978, p. 55) argue that a crucial factor was
owners moving their capital into other more profitable sectors and other
geographical areas, leaving the nines starved of investment. This view
is supported by the fact that in 1947, when the mines were nationalized,
only 2.4 per cent of output was mechanised (Benwell Community Project,
1978, p. 55). Just as crucially, the shift of capital away from locales
of class conflict to the new industries of the South-East and Midlands
of England had a significant effect on the trade union movement in
Durham and other old industrial areas. As Massey (1984, pp. 129-130),
quoting Cooke's (1981) key observation, states:
"'The demise of the basic industries was accepted as a "second
industrial revolution" particularly by Citrine (The General
Secretary) and Bevin (TGWU General Secretary)' (Cooke, 1981, p. 25).
Such union leaders, as representatives of the new industries and in
the context of their co-operation with the State, thereby eased the
way for the establishment of the newly-emerging spatial division of
labour. 'The interests of the right-wing general unions (TGWU and
NUGMW) in the send-skilled industries, and their subsequent
involvement in government, most obviously in the shape of Bevin,
reflected the regional as well as the sectoral shift that had taken
place in the power-relations of industrial Britain' (Cooke, pp. 26-
7).".
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These processes were not confined to areas outside the depressed
regions. Post-war modernisation saw investment coming back into the
depressed regions in the form of new branch plants employing labour
organized spatially into "growth centres" and economically into the
general unions. In County Durham this gave the right-wing leadership of
the TGWU considerable power in the local state through its influence in
the Labour Party.
Northern Ireland also experienced a severe regional problem between the
wars. The economy was dominated by agriculture, linen and shipbuilding,
all of which were shedding labour on a large scale. Class conflict was
accompanied by sectarian clashes, and united working class action was
very rare with the perhaps over-rated exception of the outdoor relief
riots in 1932 (Devlin, 1981). However, community structures in civil
society were very strong, and were reinforced by territorial politics
(Wiener, 1980). The control of state structures by the Unionist
bourgeoisie, including the regional parliament, was used to employ state
powers to intervene selectively in the economy to maintain the electoral
support of the protestant working class (Morrissey, H., 1984). This was
concentrated on bolstering up the Belfast shipyards. Morrissey
contrasts this to the little help that the linen industry received from
the government, a neglect often criticised by nationalist MPs. But, as
she points out, the linen industry needed protection from imports which
only Westminster could enact. In addition, it was a largely female
employing industry. In this respect, Massey (1984, pp. 130-131) argues
that the textile industry in Britain was also not seen as having the
economic and political importance of male-dominated industries.
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2.1 The modernisation process 
The economic and political processes of liberal capitalism in County
Durham and North Armagh produced "community-based civil societies" which
often became locales of popular resistance to the spatial restructuring
demanded by modernisation. This restructuring was organised through
regional and local planning machinery which incorporated local political
leaders. A feature of modernisation strategy, especially in planning,
was the organisation of processes within regions (see Lash and Urry,
1987, pp. 93-109). Nodernisation in planning and housing policies in
County Durham and North Armagh underpinned "organised" capitalism
through "regional strategy", especially in providing and servicing large
labour pools, from the inter-war years to the end of the "post-war
/mod'. In fact, modernisation in general was closely tied up with a
perceived need for "planning". In industry Fordism exemplified the
modernist approach, and large-scale or centralised planning by
corporations and by the state was the strategy's hallmark (Gough, 1986,
p. 62; Harvey, 1987).
By the early 1930s planning had become something of a universal panacea
for the British Labour Party, but in a top-down form. Samuel (1986, p.
29) identifies this as a type of "statism", involving a distancing of
working people from decision-making, which became the preserve of
"experts". Added to this was the influence of a number of technocratic
wartime administrators, of which Beveridge is perhaps the best known but
who also included figures such as Barlow, whose 26 volume report
published in 1940, in essence reviewing the failures of the 1934 Special
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Areas Act, recommended that industry and labour should be dispersed to
"growth centres" in the peripheral regions through positive state action
(Cullingworth, 1985, pp. 8-12). These technocrats saw the Keynesian
Welfare State as the peaceful path to reforming capitalism.
Nationalisation of basic industries, macroeconomic management, economic
corporatism and the welfare state were the main instruments by which
this would be achieved (Thompson, 1984). The improved bargaining
position of labour after the war saw the incorporation of its leaders
into state structures which dominated the working class, but won consent
through political commitments to economic growth and rising living
standards. However, although state planning may have been reformist in
Intent, it was restructuring in practice, as exemplified by the
nationalisation of the coal mines, at no cost to capital, and the state
management of the industry's subsequent and dramatic rationalisation
(Benwell Community Project, 1978, pp. 72-73).
While in industrial policy the 1945 Labour Government attempted to meet
the problems of peripheral regions in Britain such as the North East
through the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, which established the
Development Areas, in Northern Ireland Stormont passed a series of
pieces of industrial development legislation between 1945 and 1954 which
were in fact wider in scope and more attractive to capital than the
British legislation (Birrell and Murie, 1980, p. 203; Wiener, 1980, p.
32). In addition, against a background of the popularity of the welfare
state in Britain, welfare measures were introduced into Northern Ireland
by the Unionist Government, despite the bourgeoisie's traditional
hostility to such provision. Disaffection among the protestant
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industrial working class with Unionist Party policies, expressed in a
large protestant vote for the Northern Ireland Labour Party in the 1945
Stormont elections, was a very significant factor in this move (Bew,
Gibbon and Patterson, 1979, pp. 102-128; Hall, 1986, pp. 210-216;
Walker, 1985, pp. 147-177). However, none of the British Labour
Government's post-war comprehensive planning legislation, principally
the New Towns Act 1946 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1946, was
followed by Stormont. The degree of central control required to
implement such legislation ruled it out until the resistance of the
local councils to any further interference with their powers and
territorial configuration could be overcome (Allen, 1981).
Despite this, Unionist Governments' post-war measures were clearly aimed
at a degree of social and economic modernisation. In housing this took
a typically corporatist form, with the wartime Planning Advisory Board
and Commission drawing up plans for post-war reconstruction and an
ambitious post-war housing programme led by a new corporatist agency,
the Northern Ireland Housing Trust. The economic component of
modernisation, though, was concerned with indigenous, family-owned
businesses - shipbuilding especially, but also textiles and related
engineering. By the end of the 1950s, however, these industries were
very vulnerable to recession. In fact the linen industry shed a large
number of workers during this decade, due both to take-overs and decline
(Hall, 1986, pp. 217-218). In the textile sector, employment fell from
72,800 in 1950 to 54,100 in 1959, a drop of 25.7 per cent, compared with
16.6 per cent in Britain (Hall, 1986, p. 195).
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The period 1958-1964 saw major mobilisations against unemployment and
redundancies by skilled protestant workers in Belfast, with defections
to Labourist politics, and increasing pressure was on the Unionist Party
to take action about the economic situation (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson,
1979). The failure to stem politically costly rising unemployment in
Northern Ireland's traditional industries, without inordinate state
financial support, forced the Unionist statelet to consider a strategy
of attracting into the region external capital rather than supporting
uncompetitive local firms. Captain Terence O'Neill's succession to the
leadership of the Unionist Party in 1963 marked a clear break with past
policies and inaugurated an expansion of the modernisation strategy,
particularly in the field of regional planning. Under O'Neill a
Ministry of Development was established in 1965, and the strategic
Matthew Plan for physically re-shaping the Belfast sub-region and
creating a major new town was adopted (Matthew, 1965). This was an era
of modernisation which paralleled Britain's second post-war wave of new
towns in the 1960s. It was overseen by a "modern" Unionist leadership:
under O'Neill the Irish Congress of Trade Unions was officially
recognised for the first tine, and the historic act of inviting the
Irish Republic's Prime Minister to Stormont for talks about economic co-
operation took place. But neither this Unionist modernism, nor the
economic growth which occurred strongly between 1958 and 1968, were to
last. O'Neill's "fraternisation" with catholics and the Irish Republic
fuelled the rise of Paisleyism, while after 1970 manufacturing industry
went into a decline, dominated by the collapse of large-scale synthetic
fibre plants in Northern Ireland. This reached crisis proportions after
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1979, completely undermining modernist planning and housing strategy
based on this form of accumulation (Gaffikin and Morrissey, 1979).
The Matthew Plan recommended containing the expansion of the Belfast
Urban Area, while re-locating labour and investment to a number of
growth centres within the Belfast sub-region (the predominantly
protestant area within about a thirty mile radius of the city containing
two-thirds of Northern Ireland's population and four-fifths of its
industrial workers). The Plan followed the Hall Report of 1962, which
urged the modernisation of the region's industrial base, and was
complemented by the Wilson Report. The latter report spelt out the
large-scale population movements necessary to attract capital into the
region:
"It would be hard to reconcile a national policy for faster growth
with one of taking manufacturing industry to every town and village
where there was some unemployment. The efficiency of industry in
the broad sense of the term depends partly upon its location and
some locations may be particularly unsuitable. The successful
development of manufacturing industry is also facilitated by
concentration of the population in urban centres of a reasonable
size" (quoted in Hall, 1987, p. 251).
The single most important new development recommended by the Matthew
Plan was the building of a new town on greenfield sites between the
existing declining linen towns of Lurgan and Portadown in North Armagh,
later named Craigavon. This was to be accompanied by tight controls on
the expansion of Belfast and on development in the countryside. The
idea was that the new town would be a major regional focus of industrial
growth, taking in population from nearby rural areas, southern and
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western areas of Northern Ireland, and Belfast - where people would be
displaced by redevelopment to make way for the roads that would link the
city with an inter-urban motorway network (Wiener, 1980, p. 34).
In North East England modernisation took a very similar course. The
transformation of the built environment was fuelled by the abolition of
development charges and building licences in the 1950s. In the post-war
expansionary conditions, many transnationals were attracted by the idea
of locating a branch plant in the Durham coalfield given the
availability of state aid and large labour reserves, especially women
(Austria and Beynon, 1979). However, as in Northern Ireland, state
intervention was necessary to organise the population into labour pools
in locations attractive to capital. Austria and Beynon found that the
"supply of labour" was mentioned repeatedly by managers explaining their
firms' decisions to locate in the area. This need for an adequate pool
of labour arose from the nature of much capitalist production in this
period, which involved "... standardised products, mass production, the
predominant use of semi-skilled labour in repetitive tasks, and
distribution to large, undifferentiated markets" (Gough, 1986, p. 60).
This shaped spatial policy during the post-war modernisation era.
The policy was set out by the Pepler-MacFarlane Report of 1949 on
economic development in the North East. The Report
"... classified areas in terns of economic growth potential and
suggested public sector resource allocations by the State, for
example in housing, to selected locations (those with 'economic
growth' potential) in order to achieve this." (Carney and Hudson,
1976, p. 12)
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After the war, Durham County Council planned within this strategy and
accepted that the county's settlement pattern, largely an outcome of
late nineteenth century industrialisation, was anachronistic given the
needs of modern industry and what it saw as the inevitable decline of
certain old industrial areas. On this basis, the Durham County
Development Plan, drawn up under the Labour Government's 1947 Town and
Country Planning Act, set out a policy for adjusting the whole fabric of
the settlement pattern (Durham County Council, 1951). As was noted
above, such modernism, enabled by a rapid and considerable expansion of
local state expenditure, turning local government into "big business",
appealed to the region's Labour leaders.
The planners assessed the "viability" of each settlement in County
Durham. Settlements were placed into one of four categories. Category
"A" were the growth centres into which considerable investment was
envisaged. Category "B" were stable settlements where investment would
be kept at a level sufficient to cater for their populations at that
tine. Category "C" were settlements where some decline was expected and
investment would be reduced accordingly. Category "D" were settlements
where economic and physical decline and considerable population loss
were expected. It was recommended that no major investments should be
made in Category "D" settlements and that substandard housing should be
replaced elsewhere.
The consequence of this strategy was that many of the old pit
settlements in the west of the county would be depopulated, settlements
in the east of the county would be maintained as the pits there
- 84 -
expanded, and the centre of south of the county would provide growth
sites for new housing estates and new industry.
Spatial restructuring was adopted some twenty years earlier in County
Durham than in Northern Ireland because of the support of central
government and the county council for what Merrett (1979, p. 236),
referring to the policies of the Attlee Government, suns up as "the goal
of an effectively and rationally managed capitalism". In both sub-
regions it was a response to the needs of capital. However, as Jessop
(1982, p. 235) observes, state intervention generally occurs in response
to the political repercussions of economic crisis and not to the
economic crisis as such. The political context of the later adoption of
modernisation and regional planning in Northern Ireland has been
discussed above in terns of the unionist class alliance. In North East
England modernisation has been analysed in terns of the effects on the
labour movement leadership of the defeats of the inter-war years, and
the leadership's incorporation from a position of strength into the
state machinery after the Second World War. Corporatist forms of
administration in Britain were still sensitive to bottom-up pressures,
though, especially spatial coalitions often cutting across class.
Spatial policy provided a means of responding (see Pickvance, 1985).
In North East England the Hailsham Plan was a similar strategy to the
Matthew Plan, responding to local political pressure for state
Intervention due to growing economic problems (Hudson, 1983). A sharp
jump in unemployment in the region in December 1962, which continued
into 1963, increased demands from the Labou Party, trade unions and
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business organisations in the region for central government action.
This, together with the Conservative Government's concern about the
electoral consequences of declining popularity, led to the appointment
of Hailsham as Minister for the North Bast and the adoption of the
Hailsham Plan. This Plan also entailed spatially concentrating
investment - in a series of growth centres in a corridor between the
rivers Tyne and Tees.
These growth centres dominated modernisation strategy in County Durham
and North Armagh until the late 1970s. The strategy was carried over
into the new structure plan drawn up by Durham County Council following
the revision to the British planning system made by the 1968 Town and
Country Planning Act (see chapter 3). It was described by the County
Planning Officer as follows:
"The aim of the policy is to concentrate development into selected
centres in order to achieve the maximum benefit from the limited
amount of resources, both public and private, available in the
County. This, in turn, will help to create better settlements with
a wider range of social and other facilities and, in this way, bring
about better living conditions and stem the loss of population by
outward migration from the County. It will also help to make the
County more attractive for industrial development." (6)
At broadly the same tine, in Northern Ireland the Development Programme 
1970-75 (Matthew, Wilson and Parkinson, 1970) continued and elaborated
the Matthew Plan. This document stated that:
"The planned expansion of the growth centres and the achievement of
their desired momentum in terms of industrial growth depends to a
large extent on movement into them of population from Belfast and
from rural areas. These centres will be among the most valuable
locations which Northern Ireland will be offering to potential
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industrialists in the years up to 1975. It is of crucial importance
therefore that they are able to offer new industry the prospect of
readily available manpower living adjacent to the sites where new
firms will be situated. The provision of this manpower for new
industry will involve movement both from the Belfast Urban Area and
from the outlying areas." (p. 141)
2.3 Modernisation and housing 
Mass state housing built for rent played a major role in modernisation
and its spatial restructuring element. In Britain the expansion of
physical development expenditures put a few large construction companies
in a position from which they could largely determine the form of
housing during this period, especially in the big volume projects for
large urban areas, radically altering the appearance of council housing
(Dunleavy, 1981). In Northern Ireland the introduction of mass state
housing co-incided with the beginning of post-war modernisation,
radically altering the whole nature of housing provision in the
province. This was uniform mass construction, but high-rise was not
extensively employed. In County Durham the relationship between
modernisation and state housing is less direct because of the role of
council housing in class struggles about housing conditions dating back
to the late nineteenth century, but modern mass state housing was quite
distinctive in terms of the large unform housing areas and "modern
environments" it created in the "growth centres".
Local councils in Northern Ireland provided only 15 per cent of a low
total output of new housing between 1919 and 1939, compared with 25 per
cent in England and Wales during the sane period and a housing boom
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(Birrell and Murie, 1980, pp. 209-220). This difference cannot be
explained by differences in central government subsidies. There is
evidence that it was a result of the dominance of the petit bourgeoisie
on small local councils and the absence, for reasons considered above,
of a strong labour movement mobilising around housing issues (see also
McCashin and Morrissey, 1985). Birrell, Hillyard, Murie and Roche
(1971, pp. 49-80) state that inter-war housing policy in Northern
Ireland largely halted with Stormant's 1923 Housing Act, which imitated
the 1923 Chamberlain Act in England and Vales. Except for one small
scheme in Belfast, there was no slum redevelopment in Northern Ireland
between the wars. A reliance by the Unionist statelet on the housing
market, in which many Unionist politicians had vested interests, meant
for the mass of the population a deteriorating housing situation.
The main exception to this laissez-faire approach was housing for
agricultural workers. The social reproduction of rural labour demanded
state intervention and led to Northern Ireland's earliest state housing
under the Rural Labourers Cottages Acts of the turn of the century.
These Acts continued to be used up until the Second World War, and 3,477
cottages were built under them (McCashin and Morrissey, 1985, p. 294).
They comprised much of the housing stock of the Montaighs in North
Armagh, where their renovation and replacement In situ became an
important local issue in the 1970s (see chapter 7).
In great contrast, County Durham stands out as an area of consistently
high rates of council housebuilding dating back to 1919. Dickens,
Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, pp. 147-157) show that Durham was in the
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top group of English counties with regard to council house completions
per thousand population for the whole period from 1919 to 1982. Ryder
(1984) shows that the county's chronically bad housing conditions led to
an exceptionally high level of building by local councils during the
inter-war period. Although the local government electoral successes of
the Labour Party were important in determining this commitment to
council housing, Daunton (1980) shows that the coal companies were not
antipathetic to such provision as a means of reproduction. Their
practice of providing rent-free houses for the miners and their families
was unprofitable and for the nine owners trade union and Labour Party
pressure for higher housing standards was better met through the
ratepayer and taxpayer than by building houses to improved standards
themselves, or increasing the weekly rent allowance paid to some miners.
However, the local councils in County Durham used the ability to build
council houses as an important part of a hegemanic struggle with the
mine owners. Mike Murphy has argued that the early council houses were
vastly superior in quality to the coal company houses, and were a
visible symbol of socialism's achievements over capitalism (7).
The quality of council housing became a major issue between local
councils in County Durham and central government. Rate-borne
expenditure grew throughout the inter-war period as mostly Labour-
controlled councils in the coalfield areas attempted to transform
qualitatively housing conditions for the working class through a tenure
that for most of the inter-war period central governments wanted to
restrict to a basic public health standard (Byrne, Harrison, Keithley
and McCarthy, 1986, pp. 21-28). Ryder (1984, p. 50) comments:
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"The achievement of local authorities in many districts of County
Durham in the inter-war period appears very much, therefore, to have
been in making up a substantial part of the deficiency both in the
quality of working-class housing, for which private enterprise had
previously been responsible, and in the quantity, which even between
the wars the private sector was unable to correct."
The general improvement in housing conditions in County Durham during
the inter-war years contrasted dramatically with Northern Ireland's
deteriorating housing situation. Thus, while post-war modernisation saw
the state's first commitment to major improvements in the quality of
working class housing in Northern Ireland, in County Durham local
councils had been pursuing this objective for many years, and
modernisation was much more a shift in the purpose of state housing
which was reflected in design and planning (essentially from improving
housing quality by rejecting capitalism in housing provision to serving
capitalism by planning housing to meet the reproductive needs of
capital).
Local councils in County Durham, though, were not exclusively committed
to council housing. The 1923 Chamberlain Act enabled councils to
supplement Exchequer subsidies to builders constructing private houses
with a rate fund contribution. At least ten councils in County Durham
took this up (Ryder, 1984). Labour-controlled Easington was
particularly enthusiastic, seeing it as a way of providing houses that
would otherwise have to be built by the council at heavy cost to the
ratepayers, and as a result private building was much higher in
Easington than most other coalfield districts. As chapter 4 shows,
Easington's favourable attitude to construction for owner-occupation by
private builders continued into the 1980s, and its councillors did not
see this as contradicting a "socialist" housing policy because in their
view houses were getting built that would not be otherwise. Easington
also made considerable use of direct labour, with 47 per cent of new
council houses built by this means between 1919 and 1927. While direct
building labour was used by some councils in the county to reduce local
unemployment and increase benefit entitlements, a more important reason
was to reduce costs by cutting out the private builders' profits (Ryder,
1984).
There was differentiation in the quality of state housing (see chapter
l's criticism of "consumption cleavages"). Ryder (1984) concludes that
although the less well-paid working class probably had a better chance
of getting a council house in County Durham than in many other areas,
better quality houses were generally let to better-paid "respectable"
tenants. In part this was because rents reflected the quality of
housing. The high-quality Addison houses were particularly expensive
despite councils' attempts to keep rents down, while the basic 1930s
slum replacement housing was much cheaper.
National housing policy in the 1930s did not show the sane commitment to
modifying the link between income and housing quality as the Addison and
Wheatley periods. It also attempted to relate housing provision to the
uneven development of capital, a strategy typical of the modernisation
era. Labour councils in County Durham were generally hostile to both
these developments. Largely because they could not be relied upon to
plan for the reproductive needs of capital, the Government set up the
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North-Eastern Housing Association in 1936. This was a central
government body established through the Commissioner for the Special
Areas to build and manage rented houses in the region. While reflecting
Government concern about the political consequences of not relieving
widespread mass unemployment when local council housebuilding had been
cut back to slum redevelopment, it was also a means of ensuring that
housing was not built "indiscriminately", i.e. in response to local
political pressures rather than the needs of capital. Along with the
new bodies to administer unemployment assistance and regional policy, it
was a form of corporatist intervention which foreshadowed the post-war
period. It received a mixed reception from the local councils, and
sixteen refused to co-operate with it at all (Ryder, 1984). Councils in
County Durham built for general needs in locations they considered most
appropriate. However, the establishment of the North-Eastern Housing
Association reflected growing central government interest in the
strategic question of where new housing should be built. It was
concerned that housing Investment should not be made in areas where
private capital was not investing. This was further reinforced with the
creation of the South West Durham Improvement Association, also
established through the Commissioner for the Special Areas, which had
the objective of evacuating and demolishing housing in the declining pit
villages in the south-west of the county and returning the land to
agriculture. In addition, the Ministry of Health discouraged council
building in the more depressed districts of the county in the 1930s.
Although council housing was one major programme excluded from the
extension of corporatist administration after the Second World War,
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which embraced the management of the nationalised industries, public
utilities, industrial development, new town development, hospitals and
social security, it was a very important component of modernisation.
While council housing was administered by elected local councils,
Dunleavy (1981) shows how the management of councils as strong and
closed authorities by a small group of council leaders incorporated
within the structures of expanding local expenditures dominated by the
needs of capital, excluded public housing "clients" from decisions about
their "housing needs TM . Indeed, Ball (1985) questions the socialist
nature of council housing and argues that its importance to Labour
Governments tended to be in the provision of social infrastructure for
capitalist accumulation, counter-cyclical Keynesian demand management
and the creation of political support in new council estates.
These were, in fact, precisely the reasons why Unionist governments in
Northern Ireland - which were extremely anti-socialist - built large
numbers of public sector dwellings for the first time after the Second
World War, giving credence to Ball's argument. The main instrument of
this intervention was a body similar to the North-Eastern Housing
Association but in fact modelled on the Scottish Special Housing
Association - the Northern Ireland Housing Trust, established in 1945.
This was created to boost public sector housing in areas where capital
was investing, but also produced houses of relatively high quality to
meet housing needs. McCashin and Morrissey (1985, p. 295) summarise the
background to this intervention in terns that will now be familiar to
the reader:
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"The war saw a period of increasing tension within the alliance of
forces which constituted Unionism. Labour politics seemed to be
gaining some ground particularly with the industrial working class
in Belfast and there was concern in government circles that the
issue of post-war reconstruction be tied to the reconstruction of
its own dominant electoral base. Early promises in that respect
made by Andrews (the Unionist Prime Minister) were not sanctioned by
the British Treasury, but its later conversion to Keynesianism and
the acceptance of the principle of parity for Northern Ireland,
achieved if necessary by subsidy, set the conditions for a more
vigorous public sector housing policy 	 (U)nder new legislation
passed in 1945, the rate of house building increased from 2,500
dwellings per year in the inter-war period to 7,500 in the period
1946-71."
Stormont's 1956 Housing Act required the local councils to draw up
redevelopment schemes. Their reports documented an extensive problem of
unfitness and in Belfast the conjuncture of this with the land demands
of the restructuring strategy set in motion by the Matthew Plan led to a
massive redevelopment programme being launched in 1962 (Wiener, 1980;
Parson, 1981). The displaced population would provide labour for the
modern growth centres in the Belfast sub-region. However, the
continuing refusal to tackle the much worse housing situation of
catholics compared with protestants, especially outside the Belfast sub-
region, was a major, perhaps the major, factor in the rise of the civil
rights movement in the late 1960s. The resulting pressure on Stormont
from the British Government to defuse the situation led to the
establishment of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive in 1971. This
removed housing from local electoral politics. The Housing Executive
took over the housing functions of the local councils, the new town
development commissions and the Northern Ireland Housing Trust. The aim
was to establish a comprehensive regional housing agency, directly
responsible to central government, whose specially selected and
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"balanced" Board of Directors would carry out its housing functions
impartially and would modernise on a large scale to raise standards
across the board (Birrell and Murie, 1980, pp. 214-220).
Except for the five months of the ill-fated Northern Ireland Assembly in
1974, after Direct Rule was imposed in 1972 housing policy in Northern
Ireland broadly followed British policy. But the establishment of the
Housing Executive was meant to depoliticise housing issues in Northern
Ireland. For example, commenting on the composition of the Executive's
Board its chairperson from 1979 to 1984 stated:
"All the major strands of opinion in the community are represented;
but Board members I am glad to say leave their party politics and
their religious prejudices, if any, on the hat-rack outside the
boardroom door." (Brett, 1983; p. 1)
The depoliticisation of housing in Northern Ireland was presented by the
chairperson as a model for housing authorities throughout the UK:
"Northern Ireland is benefitting, to the tune of perhaps £100
million a year, from the fact that its housing administration in
seen as being free from party politics, which sometimes bedevil
housing administration elsewhere." (8)
The Housing Executive aimed to separate housing issues from the conflict
about the state in Northern Ireland by displacing democratic control
(however imperfect) with corporatist control (reformist and modernising
from above). However it was not an exceptional type of state body, and
resembled the large agencies of British post-war corporatism as
described by Dunleavy'(1985, p. 15):
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"Public corporations were created which faithfully mimic the
objectives and managerial style of any other large corporation.
Quasi-governmental agencies, effectively accountable to no elected
representatives, have multiplied and been given functions too
'sensitive' to form the focus of direct political mobilisation."
This absence of accountability meant that the Housing Executive had a
problem of legitimating its policies and actions, particularly when
these involved social costs, such as with redevelopment. It attempted
to deal with this by emphasising its "fair" and "neutral" role in
providing housing services. However it has also engaged in strategies
of incorporation. Parson (1981) gives an account of how the
Introduction into Northern Ireland of Housing Action Areas and housing
association involvement in rehabilitation in 1976 served to incorporate
working class protest about the restructuring of the urban environment
of Belfast. Chapter 8 of the present thesis discusses how tenant
protest in Craigavon was incorporated into structures determined by the
Housing Executive.
Redevelopment also cane to dominate the housing activities of local
councils in County Durham after the war, but within a strategic
framework imposed from above by the County Council to "modernise" the
area and attract capital. Council house completions outnumbered private
completions by two to one between 1959 and 1969 (Wilson, 1970).
Combined with the large-scale clearance of pre-1919 housing, this
activity dramatically altered the age-structure of the county's housing
stock so that by 1965 its proportion of post-war housing was above the
national average. Whilst in 1951 over half of the county's households
had no bath, by 1961 this had fallen to a quarter. The south-west part
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of the county had the worst conditions: in 1961 36 per cent of
households were still without a bath and 40 per cent of houses lacked
hot and cold water and exclusive use of a VC and sink, compared with
less than 30 per cent in the rest of the county. These problems were
reflected in the energetic clearance of houses in the old mining
settlements, but they were replaced in new council estates in the growth
centres often several miles away. These policies continued into the
1970s and met considerable popular resistance (chapter 3). In East
Durham the declining pit villages received similar treatment as new
building was concentrated in the new town of Peterlee (chapter 4).
Whilst the strategic framework for spatial restructuring contained in
county development plans was aimed at depopulating supposedly "unviable"
locations, some of the abandoned pit villages, especially in the north
of the county, cane to provide pools of very cheap private housing for
commuters to the nearby conurbations (Thorpe, 1970, p. 393). This
fuelled claims that private enterprise was being stifled. But it was
the character of individual localities which tended to determine their
potential for new private development so that, for example, pleasant
agricultural villages were converted into "middle class" commuter
suburbs, while many old industrial villages were in fact left to
decline. Some villages with accessible building land attracted
relatively large speculative developers. One such developer accounted
for 33 per cent of all private houses completed in the coalfield area of
County Durham between 1946 and 1966 (Thorpe, 1970, p. 393).
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By no means all local council action was directed at redevelopment.
Between 1971 and 1974 a high level of private sector improvement
activity followed from the enhanced grant rates for improvement work
completed before 1974 introduced into Development Areas and Special
Development Areas by the Conservative Government.
The new emphasis on rehabilitation was very significant. It resulted
from a switch nationally out of subsidising new building by local
councils into improvement of private housing. A series of taxation
benefits implemented during the 1960s were already stimulating the
consumption of private housing (Xerrett with Gray, 1982, pp. 34-35).
The switch to preserving the existing stock began with the 1969 Housing
Act when, with the economic crisis of the late 1960s, the Labour
Government decided that it had to retreat from high levels of council
housebuilding (Balchin, 1985, pp. 62-90; Merrett, 1979, pp. 113-119).
It marked the beginning of the end of modernisation as local authority
expenditure growth slowed down. Housing cost yardsticks had been
introduced in 1967, followed in 1972 by the first attempt in the history
of council housing to make the stock an "investment" yielding a rate of
return to its landlords (Merrett, 1979, pp. 254-268). The era of
modernisation was beginning to come to an end as the post-war boom
turned into economic crisis, but extensive areas of poor housing
remained which the new rehabilitation approach was meant to tackle.
Spatial restructuring had created major additional labour reserves in
the peripheral regions which, as unemployment rose, became depressed
"problem estates".
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Redevelopment and displacement during the modernisation era had become
Increasingly unpopular. The problems of high rise and growing
opposition to "mass housing" environments made it politically extremely
difficult to advocate state housing in the 1970s. This was recognised
by Richard Grossman, when Secretary of State for Social Services, who
took the view that "improvement was safer than building new houses
because it created fewer social problems" (quoted in Balchin, 1985, p.
67). In the sane vein, a few years later when he was Secretary of State
for the Environment he stated with regard to the 1974 Housing Act that:
"I have for long been a passionate opponent of indiscriminate
clearance, which I believe has gone too far ... in many areas. I
believe that indiscriminate clearance can be appallingly destructive
of existing communities and frequently a very expensive solution."
(quoted in Balchin, 1985, p. 75)
In County Durham throughout the period 1961-1974 new build by local
councils and the new town development corporations exceeded the output
of new private housing. But from 1972 the output of new council houses
In the county began to decline as central government used financial
pressures to encourage a transfer of local spending into improvement.
Nevertheless, substantial demolition of older housing continued. This
was despite the fact that by the mid-1960s most of the worst housing of
earlier industrial urbanisation, which was clearly sanitarily
inadequate, had been cleared. Local councils, following the corporatist
reorganisation of 1974, were still in a strong position in the national
polity (see Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1983). Their health inspectors started
to turn their attention to "near slums", and clearance of this type of
housing was often resisted by residents (Dennis, 1970; 1972). Popular
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disenchantment with the actions of many local councils grew, reflected
in the comments of one of their most prominent critics:
"Is it far-fetched to equate Orwell's men of power with the shapers
of the urban environment ...? Consider the experience of Newcastle.
The celebrated Labour leader of its council was T. Dan Smith, who
determined to make that city 'the new Brasilia'. In his memoirs he
describes how 'I hired a Rapide aircraft to make flying visits to
see candidates for our new appointment of a Planning Officer ...
Local government had moved from a parish pump era into the big
business league'. The man he found was Wilfred Burns, who declared
that 'the dwellers of a slum are almost a separate race of people,
with different values, aspirations and ways of living ... Most
people who live in slums have no views on their environment at all.'
Furthermore, 'when we are dealing with people who have no initiative
or civic pride, the task, surely is to break up such groupings even
though the people seem to be satisfied with their miserable
environment and seem to enjoy an extrovert social life in their own
locality.'" (Ward, 1984a, p. 6)
The result of modernisation in housing and planning was often not utopia
but "mass housing" which proved to be very unpopular, especially as its
occupants were increasingly marginalised by the deepening recession in
peripheral areas in the 1970s (Dunleavy, 1981, pp. 1-33). The
abandonment of modernism in national housing policy, and the mass state
housing forms that had often been built so badly, occurred as the era of
large-scale spatial restructuring strategies which had made it possible
cane to a close (see next section). Housing policy could be re-directed
to supporting the housing market and satisfying "consumer demand",
rather than being concerned with the direct provision of state housing
within a strategic spatial framework based on the labour demands of
expanding Fordist-type accumulation. Housing policy would concentrate
on upgrading existing housing, recommodifying the stock, intensifying
management on "problem estates" and developing alternatives to housing
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provision by large municipal landlords. The shift nationally to
rehabilitation by both of Britain's main political parties at the end of
the 1960s reflected a consensus that owner-occupation was "normal" and
preferable to renting, and should be expanded (Merrett with Gray, 1982,
pp. 35-43). In the less affluent regions this expansion was also
stimulated in other ways; for example, the option mortgage scheme, which
by 1972 accounted for a fifth of all mortgages in County Durham (9).
Dunleavy (1981, p. 354) concludes of this period:
The perceived failure of state intervention in housing represented
by high-rise has been used to support virtually all the policy
changes of the last decade ... High-rise also played a central role
in the extraordinary consensus of the early 1970s on the need for
rehabilitation	 the high rise housing boom cast a sizeable blight
on the public image of post-war council housing. The policy lent
itself to analysis in terns of the inherent inefficiency,
bureaucratic indifference, and unresponsiveness of state
intervention compared with market provision."
Although high-rise did not figure prominently in the housing output of
the local state in either County Durham or North Armagh, low-rise mass
housing forms did. Furthermore, the developments which Dunleavy
documents had a marked effect on housing policy in these two areas
because of the way national policy shifted. Opposition to the
"bureaucratisation" of state housing policy and practice and the quality
of the product during the modernisation era was an important aspect of
the community action described in subsequent chapters. However, this
type of state intervention was a result of the processes discussed in
the present chapter; processes which were dominated by the relationship
of the state to capitalism. The next section considers further evidence
for this point by examining how state planning strategy in County Durham
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and North Armagh changed in similar ways as the regime of "modern"
branch plant accumulation, which never developed on the scale planned
for, was transformed by disinvestment and rationalisation.
2.4 Planning in the post-modern era 
As discussed in chapter 1, modernising planning and housing policies
were largely abandoned as the Keynesian Welfare State itself came under
attack from capital and the New Right in the 1970s. There appeared to
be popular disenchantment with modernisation, its top-down large-scale
restructuring, disruptive redevelopment and displacement, mass housing
and failure to deliver economic growth in the regions. Austrin and
Beynon (1979) analyse its fate in North East England in terns of the
vulnerability of the branch-plant economy, which partly replaced the
traditional economic base of the region, to the shifts in international
accumulation and the division of labour, which began to have a major
effect on the North East in the early 1970s, Gaffikin and Morrissey
(1987) describe a similar process of branch-plant withdrawal and a
dramatic economic downturn during the 1970s in Northern Ireland. There
were also heavy redundancies in both regions caused by the
rationalisation of nationalised manufacturing industries (Hudson, 1985;
Beynon, Hudson and Sadler, 1986; Hall, 1986, 288-291). However, a key
process which undermined modernisation was a "decentralising" of
accumulation, making the growth centre strategy in particular
inappropriate, and creating pressures for a more relaxed planning regime
(see Lash and Urry, 1987, pp. 300-301).
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In County Durham the attempt to attract manufacturing capital to replace
Jobs rapidly being lost in coal mining only had notable success in
Durham City. Even there the service sector, and particularly the public
sector, was actually the cornerstone of the employment base and this
sector was not employing the workers who were losing Jobs in the pit
villages (Durham Unemployment Forum, 1983). The new manufacturing base
elsewhere in the county went into deep recession from the late 1970s
after only a short period of accumulation. Townsend (1983, pp. 102-103)
has documented the nature of Job losses in the Northern Region (the
North East and Cumbria) between 1976 and 1982, noting that the region
sustained the highest rates of unemployment in Britain throughout this
period (not the highest rates in the UK - that was Northern Ireland).
These levels of unemployment were caused by branch plant closures and
major rationalisations of nationalised industries. The largest closure
In County Durham was the Courtaulds factory in Spennymoor in 1979, while
the shut down of the Consett steelworks in the north-west of the county
in 1980 showed how devastating Job-shedding by a nationalised industry
could be.
The reformist aspects of modernisation were based on an almost utopian
faith in growth in the UK, and the in the peripheral regions in
particular, fuelled by the capitalist economy. The false hopes raised
by incoming capital in the 1960s and 1970s are exemplified by the short
history of the new Courtaulds factory in Spennymoor which offered in its
recruitment literature "a good wage and a Job for life" only to close
after a few years (Ellis and Fahey, 1979). Consett, which Durham County
Council designated as a growth centre under its post-war settlement
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policy, was crippled by the closure of the town's steelworks, resulting
in direct and indirect Job losses totalling over 9,500 in a town of
30,000 people. Soon after the steelworks shut down a series of major
closures led to Consett losing almost half of its manufacturing
industries in just two years (Chester and Tighe, 1985; Garnett, 1985).
The 1970s and early 1980s were also years of major closures in
manufacturing industry in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Economic
Council, 1983). Closures in the Matthew Plan's growth centres included
Courtaulds in Carrickfergus, British Enkalon in Antrim, Michelin in
Mallusk and Goodyear in Craigavon. Bowers (1985) estimates that over
15,200 direct and indirect jobs were lost in these four closures alone.
The artificial fibre plants which comprised most of the inward
investments attracted by regional policy in the 1960s had by the early
1980s "virtually disappeared along with large chunks of
telecommunications, electronics and rubber production" (Gaffikin and
Morrissey, 1987, p. 41).
Townsend (1983, p. 194) draws the following conclusions from the failure
of post-war regional policy to create economic growth in the "assisted
areas" and the new and expanded towns:
1. Manufacturing industries which expanded in the "growth areas"
experienced employment decline in the 1976-82 recession as badly as
traditional industies had before them (e.g. coal and textiles), The
size of plants in some of the industries worst affected, e.g.
synthetic textiles, resulted in major local impacts; '
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2. Large branch plants cannot be regarded as stable investments;
3. The "assisted regions" are more dependent on their own resources
than at any other time since the 1930s.
In the case of Northern Ireland, Bull, Harrison and Hart (1982) add that
the policy of designating Craigavon and Ballymena as "growth centres"
had very little impact on their growth (and subsequent decline). Their
analysis led them to suggest that the policy essentially followed
existing market trends.
Given the obvious failure of the growth centre strategy as a means of
modernising the industrial base of the regions, no central government
was likely to continue with it. Two factors shaped the subsequent
change in strategy to "early post-modernism" which the disorganising of
capitalism demanded. First, the growing dependence of the peripheral
regions on public expenditure meant that growth in this expenditure had
to be contained. Second, the only available option for the capitalist
state in these regions seemed to be a strategy of what Hudson (1985)
calls "regional self-help" - an ideology of small business revivalism
and indigenous enterprise (Rainnie (1985) argues that this was
essentially about searching out areas of low pay and union
organisation). In addition these regions, once industrial heartlands
and locales of strong trade unionism, were reconstituted through the
crisis of the 1970s into spatial reserve armies of labour which could be
exploited by post-Fordist transnationals looking for labour and supply
flexibility (Holloway, 1987; Sayer, 1986; Byrne and Parson, 1983).
Their role as domestically depressed export platforms to Europe was
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illustrated most clearly by Nissan's decision to locate a major new car
plant in Sunderland to compete for the European market (10).
Rising unemployment and conditions in which only low economic growth was
occurring created a problem for the state which may be analysed using
O'Connor's (1973, pp. 97-178) concepts of social expenses, social
investment and social consumption. Social expenses are the costs of
reproducing the "surplus population", including welfare provision and
law and order, which in the UK and other advanced capitalist states grew
dramatically during the 1960s and 70s (Gough, 1979, pp. 75-101). Social
expenses will be most heavy relative to tax yields in the peripheral
regions. Social investment is state spending on physical
Infrastructure, economic administration, training and research; and
social consumption is state expenditures on reproducing the working
population.
The post-war modernisation strategy in County Durham and North Armagh
was characterised by large state outlays on social investment and social
consumption. The "early post-modern" period, set in motion by economic
crisis during the 1970s and consolidated by the first Thatcher
Government, was characterised by a retrenchmant in state spending in
these areas and the dramatic growth of spending on social expenses. M.
Morrissey (1985, p. 131) shows that in contrast to a very large increase
in state expenditure on social security and law and order in Northern
Ireland between 1973 and 1984, state spending on industrial development
declined by 25 per cent, as shown in Table 2.2:
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Table 2.2: CHANGES IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY SUB-
PROGRAMME, 1973/74 and 1984/85.
Change (1975 prices)	 Percentage of total
1973/74
	 1984/85
Industry, energy
and employment	 -50	 -25	 18.4	 10.2
Law and order	 +54	 +54	 9.0	 10.3
Social security	 +202	 +85	 21.4	 29.3
Source:  Morrissey, M., 1985, p. 131).
The decline in state spending on industrial development resulted from
firms failing to set up or expand in the region: sums were set aside for
industrial development but were not taken up.
A similar pattern emerges in the North of England (the North East and
Cumbria), although it was not possible to obtain directly comparable
data. The North of England County Councils Association (1982, pp. 35-
39) showed that although public expenditure in the North increased in
real terns by 7.9 per cent between 1977/78 and 1981/82, the growth in
expenditure on social security accounted for all but 0.6 per cent of
this increase. The Association reported that since 1975 the region's
share of state expenditure on infrastructure, employment and trade and
industry had been less than its share of the total UK population (p. 9).
It concludes that since 1977:
(E)xpenditure growth has taken place only in those programmes
which benefit individually rather than those which contribute to the
economic objectives of the Region. If social security and special
employment measures are excluded, public expenditure in the North
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actually fell between 1977/78 and 1981/82. The Government's future
plans indicate a continuation of this pattern which, effectively,
finances unemployment by reducing the resources to combat it!"
(North of England County Councils Association (1982, p. 7)
Not only was there a decline in "regional policy expenditures" in the UK
during the 1970s and early 1980s, but the growth areas of South East
England probably received considerably larger social investment and
consumption expenditures than the supposedly "assisted areas". Thomas
(1983, p. 359) writes that:
"... the regional distribution of public spending is coming under
new scrutiny. The regions have been squabbling over aid, narrowly
defined, which has fallen by 40 per cent in real terns since 1975-
76. But this is a tiny proportion of public spending in the
regions. The growth corridor along the M4 gets no regional aid, yet
its success is underpinned by the public sector - Heathrow, the
motorway, high-speed trains and universities."
The need to contain state expenditures and support "regional self-help"
brought about significant revisions of physical planning policy. In
County Durham central government used its powers to modify the structure
plan in line with post-modern developments in national policy. The
County Council had abandoned the controversial Category "D" policy in
1977 following local opposition, but it retained a settlement strategy
based on twelve major designated centres in which housing development
was to be concentrated. The Structure Plan also identified eighteen
major industrial sites linked to these major housing centres. As
required by the legislation, objections to the Structure Plan were heard
at an Examination in Public in December 1979. This instrument is
strongly biased towards the interests of central government. It deals
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only with natters which the Secretary of State considers need
examination in public, and the Secretary of State decides who shall
participate in the examination, whether or not they have made objections
or representations (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 73).
Following the Examination in Public of the Durham Structure Plan the
Panel disagreed with the County Council's settlement categorisation
policy (Policy 7 in the Structure Plan, which named about 100 towns and
villages where development was to be limited to divert resources into
the major centres) and stated that it was too site specific and
inflexible (11). Strategic spatial policy was no longer to be
supported. Following the Panel's report, the Secretary of State
announced that he
"... considers that the level of detail in Policy 7 as submitted is
inappropriate to a structure plan and that District Councils should
be allowed to determine the locations of housing development." (12).
The Plan was accordingly modified and approved with effect from February
1981.
It is necessary to place this episode in context. The end of the post-
war era of modernisation and organised capitalism saw increasing
pressure on the planning system to relax spatial controls and respond
more flexibly to market forces. The 1968 Town and Country Planning Act
ended the system of county "development plans", which were essentially
strategic and detailed statements of development proposals for physical,
economic and social reconstruction in which it was expected that the
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state would have a major role. County development plans had been the
land-use framework for modernisation. The 1968 Act replaced them with
county structure plans, which were designed to be much more responsive
to changing patterns of capital accumulation and to "the resources
likely to be available" (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 61). With the
increasingly flexible nature of accumulation, structure plans came in
for growing criticism as being too insensitive to changing conditions,
especially with regard to capital's decisions when and where to invest.
Demands grew for an "entrepreneurial approach" to planning (Ball, 1983,
p. 271). This implied a relaxation of planning control and a shift in
planning powers from the strategic county level to the local district
level where market forces could exert more influence. These changes
were introduced by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act.
Similar changes occurred in Northern Ireland, where in 1972 the planning
system was brought broadly into line with the British system and, under
Direct Rule, was administered directly by the British Government. The
growth centre strategy of the Matthew Plan was revised in the mid-1970s
by the Regional Physical Development Strategy 1975-95 (Department of the
Environment for Northern Ireland, 1976). The new strategy replaced the
sixteen growth centres of the Development Programme 1970-75, which had
continued Matthew's focus on the Belfast sub-region, with twenty-three
"district towns" throughout Northern Ireland. The Matthew Plan's prime
growth centre, the new town of Craigavon, became a glorified district
town and was to grow "at a slower pace than actually envisaged" (13).
Certain country towns were designated as local centres and larger
villages would be allowed limited expansion if they had adequate
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existing facilities and were near district towns. In line with the
shift in Britain from 1976 of investment away from new towns and into
inner cities, the "regeneration" of the Belfast inner-city was to be a
priority. In addition, the emphasis of housing policy in Northern
Ireland also shifted from redevelopment to rehabilitation of the
existing stock (Parson, 1981). Instead of creating new locales for
accumulation by developing greenfield sites on a large scale, policy was
now directed towards containing problems in the older urban areas and
selectively revalorising parts of these areas with "investment
potential" on which public spending was targetted.
The Regional Physical Development Strategy 1975-95 placed new emphasis
on the containment of public expenditure. Rural populations in
particular were identified as often too costly to reproduce, and the
Strategy stated that:
"The disposition of the rural population in somewhat more
concentrated form will permit greater efficiency and economy in the
provision of schools, postal, health and social services, water,
sewerage and electricity •.. Housing developments will be very
limited in the more remote villages, which in themselves have poor
employment prospects, and from which daily travel to work elsewhere
is difficult." (Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland,
1976, pp. 82, 86)
The •-! m,_	 _.3flevelopment Strategy was accompanied by a policy
statement which generally ruled out planning permission for residential
development outside selected settlements, unless applicants could prove
a need to live in the countryside (14). The move sparked off extensive
protests from farmers and district councils in rural areas where
dispersed settlement patterns were seen as threatened in the same way as
the Category "D" villages in County Durham (Caldwell and Greer, 1984).
The Cockroft Committee was set up to review the policy in 1977. Its
report, published the following year, attacked the policy and called for
a return to a more laissez-faire approach (Cockroft, 1978). In the
early post-modern climate of the late 1970s this found a sympathetic
response at central government level. Caldwell and Greer (1984, p. 13)
suggest that the Cockroft Report was assimilated very rapidly, as almost
immediately after its publication the rate of approvals of planning
applications for residential development in rural areas rose markedly
above the rate during 1976-78, when development control policy appeared
to be aimed at meeting the target populations of the district towns.
Thus, as in County Durham, although the local state substantially
relaxed the growth centre modernisation strategy while attempting to
continue with its basic features, it was largely abandoned following the
Thatcher Government's intervention to relax controls on market
processes.
The changes to the planning system made by central government in England
and Wales by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act were
extended to Northern Ireland by a Ministerial announcement in August
1981. This stated that the presumption must always be in favour of
granting planning permission, and that the planning authority must not
Impose constraints on the physical form of developments where these are
a matter of "aesthetics" (Alcorn, 1981). As Ball (1983a, p. 271)
comments:
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"At tines of economic crisis the economic needs of society become
paramount, which to the corporatist means the direct and immediate
interests of capital. Hence 'we need the entrepreneurial approach
to planning'. By refusing to recognise that its intervention is a
political one into an arena of class struggle rather than an
exercise in social harmony, this ideology of planning converts
planners into an elite operating in the interests of dominant social
forces ... Planning is not in crisis because the notion of a planned
society has failed in practice; instead an elitist form of planning
is collapsing under its own contradictions."
2.5 Housing in the post-modern era 
The main elements of "early postmodernist" housing policy have been a
reduction in the output of state housing and measures to expand owner-
occupation. This has been accompanied by an ideology which not only
encourages the consumption of housing as a commodity but also as an
Image, a development typical of the "postmadernist sensibility" of
disorganised capitalism, itself largely a reaction to modernism (see
Lash and Urry, 1987, pp. 285-300).
Although nationally output started to decline in both the public and
private sectors from the late 1960s, the decline was more marked in the
public sector, particularly since 1977 (Ball, 1983a, pp. 1-22). The
national output of new council housing went into sharp decline following
the public expenditure cuts of 1976 implemented by the Labour
Government, which had abandoned the Keynesian Welfare State strategy in
the face of the continuing economic crisis (CSE State Apparatus and
Expenditure Group, 1979, pp. 27-34). In 1977 Housing Investment
Programmes were introduced in England to control councils' building
(Leather, 1983). This was followed by dramatic cut-backs forced on
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local councils' housing investment by the Thatcher Government elected in
1979, and sharp rent rises. Council housebuilding took the brunt of the
Government's commitment to reduce public expenditure. The cuts were
accompanied by a series of measures which curtailed individual local
authorities' discretion to make policy decisions for their areas
(Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1983). Aspects of the effects of these events are
illustrated in the case studies of subsequent chapters.
In the UK as a whole public sector completions fell from 170,200 in 1977
to 109,800 in 1980 and to 55,100 in 1983, a decline over the whole
period of 68 per cent (15). In the "growth centre" areas where there
had been vigorous modernising housing programmes, the collapse of public
sector output was even more dramatic. In County Durham public
completions fell from 1,401 in 1977 to 973 in 1979/80 and to 270 in
1982/83, a decline over the whole period of 81 per cent (16). In the
Northern Ireland Housing Executive's Southern Region, including the
district council areas of Craigavon, Armagh, Banbridge and Newry/Mourne,
Housing Executive completions fell from 1,354 in 1977/78 to 572 in
1979/80 and to 272 in 1982/83, a decline over the whole period of 80 per
cent (17).
In County Durham the decline was not compensated for by an increase in
private sector output as early post-modern strategy intended (Ball,
1982). Although private dwelling completions rose from 1,311 in 1977 to
1,691 in 1979/80, they fell back to 1,037 in 1982/83, a decline over the
whole period of 21 per cent (18). It was not possible to obtain data on
private sector completions over this period for the Housing Executive's
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Southern Region or district council areas, but in Northern Ireland as a
whole private sector completions increased from 3,100 in 1977 to 3,600
in 1980 but stayed at 3,600 in 1983, a rise of over the whole period of
16 per cent, which certainly suggested a degree of "crowding out by
state housing (19). However, total output in Northern Ireland declined
by 15 per cent over this period.
As noted above, the rehabilitation of the existing private housing stock
became an increasingly important component of housing policy from the
late 1960s compared with redevelopment. Retaining traditional housing
forms was popular following the experience of mass state housing during
the 1950s and '60s, and rehabilitation supported a home ownership
centred housing policy. In Northern Ireland there was a dramatic
increase in the number of renovation grants made to private owners from
2,346 in 1973 to 28,933 in 1983, a rise of 1,133 per cent (20). This
reflected the impact of the 1976 Housing Order which switched resources
from redevelopment into renovation following the deepening economic
crisis at the end of the modernisation era and community struggles
against displacement (Parson, 1981). Up until then renovation had
played a small part in housing action in the province. However, between
1973 and 1983 the number of renovation grants made to private owners and
tenants in the Northern Region of England (Northumberland, Cumbria, Tyne
and Wear, Durham and Cleveland) fell from 23,100 to 16,800, a decline of
27.3 per cent, despite an increase in Britain as a whole of 55.3 per
cent (21). This reflected the impact of HIP cuts, combined with local
authorities' decisions about where available funds should go.
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Despite variations between County Durham and North Armagh, the main
effect on housing of the end of modernisation was broadly the sane: the
rapid decline in the output of mass state housing brought about by
central government. This appears not to have been done because housing
conditions for the working class had now been "modernised" -
modernisation had been legitimized as improving housing conditions - but
because accumulation no longer demanded modern growth centres on this
scale. This phase of accumulation had passed, and the housing in which
employed workers were to have lived, and paid their rents, was occupied
by large numbers of unemployed, supported by social security. In fact,
on official indicators, there was a narked slowing down in improvements
in housing conditions in North England, Northern Ireland and England
during the course of the 1970s when the rate of housebuilding was
falling sharply. This is shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: CHANGES IN HOUSING CONDITIONS: NORTH ENGLAND*, NORTHERN
IRELAND AND ENGLAND, 1971-1984,
Northern Ireland
1974	 1979	 1984
North England
1971	 1976	 1981
England
1971	 1976 1981
lacking one or
more amenities 26% 18% 9% 20% 10% 5% 18% 9% 5%
unfit 20% 14% 10% 11% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6%
need major *** 15% 14% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6%
repairs**
Hotes:
	
* North Vest, North, Yorkshire and Humberside.
** In North England, £7,000 and over (1981 prices); in
Northern Ireland £7,000 and over (1984 prices).
*** Not available.
Sources: See note 22.
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"Early Post-modernist" housing policies were entrenched and extended
following the New Right's success in the 1979 General Election. The
1980 Housing Act re-asserted market relationships in housing and the
imagery of owner-occupation, underpinned by a restructuring of state
subsidies to encourage the consumption of housing in the private sector.
Shifferes (1980, p. 10) comments:
"The 1980 Housing Bill is one of the most wide-ranging Bills ever
introduced into Parliament ... (T)he heart of the Bill is the
collection of proposals for the council sector: the right to buy,
the tenants' charter, and the new subsidy system. Taken together
these add up to the most far-reaching changes in the council housing
system since its effective origins at the end of the First World
War."
Schifferes (pp. 10-11) argues that the Act was based on a number of
assumptions which biased its provisions in favour of owner-occupation.
These included assertions about the inherent desirability of hone
ownership even though its expansion would be dependent on subsidies and
discounts, the need to retain and rehabilitate old private housing, the
drastic reduction of council housebuilding because of its "over-
subsidized" and "inefficient" reputation to residual special needs, and
the need for measures to force the sale of land and reduce planning
controls.
The political-ideological structures of modernisation were under attack
- especially the role of local government in providing housing. The
strengthening of the role of the market could be legitimated in terms of
the failure of post-war state intervention in housing, especially the
mass state housing areas of high-rise bloc s and large, isolated
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peripheral estates created by modernist architects and planners for
anonymous "clients". There was pressure from below for change, and the
political conditions were right for the introduction of radical
"solutions". The 1980 Housing Act's central objective was the
recommodification of housing (see Harloe, 1981). That this threatened
to intensify the significant inequities and inefficiencies in the UK
housing system seemed irrelevant; state intervention in housing had not
worked (Malpass, 1986; Labour Housing Group, 1984). The achievement of
this objective necessitated a restructuring of the relationship between
central government and local government, as many local councils did not
support these changes, and this was achieved most obviously by the
withdrawal of central government subsidy to council housing (Gibson,
1981).
Nationally, state expenditure on housing was cut by 61 per cent between
1979/80 and 1984/85. During the sane period subsidies to owner-
occupiers in the forms of mortgage interest tax relief, capital gains
tax exemption and renovation grants increased substantially. "Early
post-modernism" did not involve any substantial reduction in government
financial support for housing, but a significant restructuring in
support towards privatised consumption and circulation. Robinson (1986)
shows that between 1979/80 and 1984/85 there were substantial
reallocations of state expenditure rather than aggregate cuts:
"(I)t ... appears that the nearly £.1 billion reduction in central
government grants to Local Authorities was offset by a similar
increase in rent rebates	 In cash terns the increase in
Improvement grant expenditure of £0.6 billion more than offset the
£0.5 billion reduction in new public s ctor investment ... it is
noticeable that the targetting of subsidies onto lower-income
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groups, which had become a major feature of Local Authority housing
subsidization, has not been extended to the assistance provided for
private improvement investment." (pp. 6-7)
Byrne (1985b) critically reviews postmodernist housing policy in the
North East, with special reference to urban Tyneside, and links it with
the growing problem of disrepair in low income housing (public and
private), the collapse of council building and the residualisation of
council estates. He concludes that national housing policy in the 1980s
was having little to do with "good housing for all".
Problems were not restricted to urban Tyneside. In County Durham,
Derwentside had the third highest proportion of unpopular difficult-to-
let council dwellings in England in 1980 - 24 per cent, compared with 6
per cent for the country as a whole (Matthews and Shaw, 1981).
Sedgefield had the second highest proportion of its total housing stock
needing more than t2,000 of repairs - 36 per cent, compared with 10 per
cent for England as a whole. The new legislation was fairly marginal to
these problems, which demanded considerable public expenditure (see
Cantle, 1986).
The 1980 Housing Act introduced a range of measures to boost
rehabilitation in the private sector, with the aim of saving older
housing from demolition (Balchin, 1985, pp. 79-80). However it failed
to reform a complex grant system and, despite enhanced expense limits
and percentage grant rates, it relaxed standards of improvement and
grant conditions. In the case of intermediate grants councils could no
longer insist that the dwelling was brought up to what the council
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regarded as a good standard with a minimum fifteen year life. The only
requirement would be that the dwelling must be fit. The five year
repayment rule for owner-occupiers was abolished and the highest rates
of grant were extended beyond just dwellings in Housing Action Areas.
However bigger and better grants in theory did not mean this in
practice. Many local authorities did not have the money to pay out
because of cuts in Housing Investment Programme (HIP) allocations and
other priorities.
Despite a national increase in grant expenditure from £134 million in
1979180 to £700 million in 1983/84, reflecting the decline of
redevelopment, very large HIP cuts from 1981 meant that many local
authorities were only able to meet the demand for the mandatory
intermediate and repair grants, and stopped improvement grants. These
were reinstated when central government boosted funding for improvement
at the end of 1982, so that it was conveniently in full swing during the
1983 General Election. By 1984 the proportion of total local authority
capital spending on housing in England and Wales consumed by private
sector improvement had quadrupled from 6 per cent in 1980/81 to 24 per
cent in 1983/84 (Gibson, 1986, p. 105).
After the 1980 Housing Act local authorities attempting to demolish what
they regarded to be substandard older housing found it increasingly
difficult to obtain central government confirmation of comulsory
purchase orders. The situation was strongly criticised by the
Institution of Environmental Health Officers:
- 120-
"It is now clear that the government does not intend to confirm
compulsory purchase orders where owner/occupiers declare at the
inquiry that they intend to carry out improvements. This policy is
regrettable as it inhibits the ability of a local authority to deal
with substandard houses ... There have already been a number of
unfortunate examples where orders have not been confirmed despite
recognition that the properties were unfit. The local authorities
concerned now find themselves in an impossible position, the areas
are deteriorating, the morale of the residents is low and there is
no money available or willingness to undertake improvements"
(Institution of Environmental Health Officers, 1981, pp. 9-10).
The redevelopment versus renewal issue had often been highly charged.
It was frequently not technical arguments that won but political
considerations. The Institution of Environmental Health Officers'
report quoted above argues very strongly in favour of clearance and
redevelopment, and asserts that "the nation must be prepared to pay the
price of that intervention" (p. 12). One of the report's authors was
Birmingham City Council's Chief Urban Renewal Officer. Stewart (1982)
gives an interesting account of how members of this council approved
costly and "uneconomic" expenditure on improvement in a marginal ward in
Birmingham against their officers' advice (which was for replacement)
for fear of losing the Asian vote. Etherington has described a similar
situation on Tyneside, where he claimed that Labour councils were
spending considerable amounts of their budgets on rehabilitating owner-
occupied houses, not for efficiency and effectiveness but to avoid
political damage (23). The main problem, as both the Institution of
Environmental Health Officers and the Association of Metropolitan
Authorities in their 1981 report Ruin or Renewal saw it, was that the
type of housing that has been described in the present thesis as "near
slums", where rehabilitation would often be cost-ineffective but which
was not bad enough for clearance under Part III of the 1957 Housing Act,
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would be left to deteriorate into "slums" (Stewart, 1982, p. 13). But
there was a politics of housing renewal which often eclipsed the
technical arguments, and local councils appear to have been moving
towards more sensitive housing policies under these local pressures
during the 1970s. However, following the 1980 Housing Act, the ability
of local authorities to shape housing policies according to their own
criteria became severely constrained.
During the modernisation era local housing market considerations were
often secondary to strategic planning and large-scale spatial
restructuring imperatives involving very large social investment and
consumption expenditures by the state to accommodate the anticipated
expansion of capital accumulation. In the "early post-modern era"
central government used its powers to increase the pressure of local
housing market factors in determining local planning and housing policy.
Gibson (1986, pp. 119-120) describes the nature of this shift as it was
expressed in renewal policy and as future developments were mapped out
by the 1985 Green Paper Hnne Improvements: A New Approach. He argues
that the new policies comprised a housing component of what is basically
the "two nations" strategy discussed in chapter 1. A minimalist role
for central government was being re-established, with the replacement of
large scale redevelopment by "a token level" of subsidised clearance, by
private improvement and the subsidisation of owner-occupation. The
majority of comfortably housed people, he argues, have a vested interest
In perpetuating housing policies which subsidise consumption in the
private sector, but trap the marginalised into the most unpopular
council housing and the worst owner-occup d housing, deteriorating at a
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faster rate than it was being improved because it could not yield a
sufficient return.
The shift to "early post-modern" housing policy was not as marked in
Northern Ireland, where the risk of worsening the economic and political
crises meant that, in general, state expenditure on housing, in relative
terms, outpaced England following the Thatcher cuts (Singleton, 1986;
Weir, 1983). The factors behind this are considered in chapter 7.
Table 2.4 shows the pattern for Northern Ireland.
Table 2.4: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HOUSING: NORTHERN IRELAND AND NORTH OF
ENGLAND, 1975/6 to 1983/4.
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
% change
Northern Ireland
t per capita*
185.3
191.3
189.1
207.0
187.5
+1.2%
North of England
t per capita*
168.3
178.8
183.9
160.9
118.4
-29.6%
Britain
-39.9%
Notes: * Adjusted 1982/83 cash prices
Sources: see note 24.
The 1980 Housing Act was not extended to Northern Ireland until 1983,
but its main provisions were adopted by the Housing Executive in 1980.
Faced with a need to respond quickly to growing Job losses and
campaigning about poor housing conditions, the Thatcher government
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boosted the Housing Executive's new build programme after initially
cutting it, diverting money from industrial development, which was
increasingly unsuccessful (25). However, the Housing Executive's
enhanced new build progranne from 1981 was on condition that rents were
Increased sharply so that tenants would bear more of the costs
Individually, as in Britain. Sales to sitting tenants would also
generate a large proportion of this increased spending. In 1981/82 a 40
per cent rent increase was forced through by central government
directive in the face of the Housing Executive Board's opposition
(Brett, 1986, p. 113). The following year an increase of 19 per cent
was agreed by the Board. But the growing number of voids in the large
Housing Executive estates that had been built for the growth centres,
together with an upturn in private sector activity stimulated by central
government subsidies for shared ownership, resulted in central
government pressure on the Executive to retreat from new build. In 1983
its target was reduced accordingly from 5,000 houses per annum to 3,200
following a major review of policy, the Corporate Strategy Review. This
stated:
"... the Executive is now in the forefront in developing its own
series of initiatives to encourage the provision of low-cost housing
for sale, including the potential release of up to 260 acres of land
In Executive ownership to private developers ... (T)he public sector
should be prepared to step back from commitments where as a result
of private sector activity over-provision could result. This
demands a closer relationship between the public and private sector,
with the Executive fulfilling a comprehensive role in the sense of
providing market information, under certain circumstances sites, and
if necessary surrendering funds to the private sector, rather than
in the sense of being seen as the first source of housing
provision." (26)
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The post-1979 measures to privatise housing in Northern Ireland resulted
in owner-occupied dwellings increasing as a proportion of all dwellings
- from 49 per cent in 1978 to 57 per cent in 1983. In the North of
England owner-occupation rose from 46 per cent in 1978 to 53 per cent in
1983 (27). Privatisation shifted responsibility for maintenance and
repairs to the individual owner or mortgagor, which has been linked with
rising rates of disrepair in the owner-occupied sector (Gibson, 1986;
Karn, Doling and Stafford, 1986). "Early post-modern" housing policy
also saw an increase in the proportion of household budgets spent on
housing. In Northern Ireland housing costs increased as a proportion of
average weekly household income from 8.8 per cent in 1978/79 to 11.1 per
cent in 1982/83; in the North of England from 10.4 per cent to 11.7 per
cent over the sane period; and in the United Kingdom as a whole from
11.3 per cent to 12.7 per cent (28). This was partly due to house
prices and interest rates rising faster than incomes, but public sector
tenants experienced on average an even higher real increase in rents as
central government used the new subsidy system to phase out general
housing subsidies to the public sector, effectively "pushing" those who
could afford it into owner-occupation, while resulting in a growing
proportion of public sector tenants having to depend on rent
rebates/housing benefit (Karn, Doling and Stafford, 1986; Gibson, 1981;
Robinson, 1986; Singleton, 1986). The effect was increasingly to
residualise state housing.
Thus, "early post-modernist" housing policy was being put into practice
when the fieldwork for the present thesis began in 1980, and during the
subsequent two years of fieldwork its eff cts were being felt throughout
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the housing system, particularly in local government and among tenants.
The postmadernist housing strategy was one of self-reliance and freedom
of choice in a market place strongly underpinned by a framework of
housing and planning policies supporting circulation. Shortly after the
Conservative's 1979 election victory, the new Secretary of State for the
Environment proclaimed this ideology in terns of rolling back the state
- which had for too long subordinated the individual, destroyed
communities and stifled enterprise - and freeing civil society from the
state's interference in the market processes on which freedom itself
depended:
"We intend to provide as far as possible the housing policies that
the British people want. We propose to create a climate in which
those who are able can prosper, choose their own priorities and seek
the rewards and satisfactions that relate to themselves, their
families and their communities. We shall concentrate the resources
of the community increasingly on the members of the community who
are not able to help themselves. In terms of housing policy, our
priority of putting people first must mean more hone ownership,
greater freedom of choice of home and tenure, greater personal
independence, whether as a hone owner or tenant, and a greater
priority on public resources for those with obvious and urgent
need." (quoted in Lundqvist, 1986, pp. 2-3)
2.6 Summary and introduction to the case studies 
County Durham and North Armagh were sub-regions of extensive spatial
restructuring under "modernisation strategies" in housing and planning
which supported a phase of accumulation by transnationals accommodated
in "growth centres". The "modernisation era" was a period of expanding
local expenditures and big local government which deprived many small
communities of any control over the future of their areas or the new
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environments which were being created. However, with the failure of the
branch plant economies of County Durham and North Armagh and the
disorganising of capitalism throughout the UK, modernisation and the
local government system which had grown with it were increasingly under
pressure during the 1970s, and effectively under attack from 1979. In
planning this took the form of pressure for a more flexible regime to
accommodate the decentralising of accumulation, while containing the
costs of reproduction, and in housing pressure for recommodification and
self-reliance. The Thatcher Government elected that year emphasised the
failure of two decades of state intervention in housing to deliver what
people wanted and presented a powerful image of a nation of home owners
accumulating wealth. Its housing and planning policies were a major
break with the past, despite previous trends in their direction, and
have been summed up in the present thesis as "early post-modern" because
their restructuring of reproduction, in which the expansion of
circulation and market relationships and the intensification of
differentiation have been central, appears to have marked an end to the
local state as "moderniser" on the scale experienced in the 1950s and
1960s.
Other authors, such as Lash and Urry (1987), Gough (1986), Armstrong,
Glyn and Harrison (1984), Scott and Storper (1986), Sayer (1986),
Holloway (1987) and Harvey (1987), have described a parallel transition
from "modern" to "post-modern" accumulation regimes by transnationals,
moving from Fordism and "organised" capitalism to flexible
specialisation and "disorganised" capitalism. Many aspects of the
changes in housing and planning policy over this period appear to
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constitute reproductive responses to this structural transition in the
economic base of advanced capitalist states.
Modernisation in County Durham and North Armagh was associated with
extensive local state involvement in spatial reorganisation and the
construction of mass housing to create labour pools for large branch
plants. This was accompanied by claims that the new environments
promised a better future for the working class than the old industrial
settlements. "Modernist" housing policy had redevelopment at its
centre. It was argued in the chapter that the dominant local political
leaderships in the two sub-regions were incorporated into political-
ideological structures of modernisation, and emphasised its reformist
and growth aspects to their constituencies. Policy-making in this era
was top-down and "statist"; the sphere of reproduction dominated the
sphere of circulation. It was also an era of community action as groups
formed to stop local disruptions and the "modernisation" of housing
environments (see Kraushaar's (1981) discussion, which considers how the
transition to what in the present thesis is described as "post-
modernism" has set a different agenda for community action).
Modernisation failed to resolve growing economic and political problems
in the 1970s, Policy shifts in housing appeared to be closely connected
with the increased differentiation in incomes and consumption patterns
brought about by the disorganisation of capitalism and the abandonment
of the Keynesian Welfare State strategy. State intervention in civil
society was re-shaped, with growing tensions between local and central
government in the process, to support expansion of the sphere of
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circulation made up of self-reliant individuals and contraction of the
sphere of reproduction and its "collectivise (see chapter 1 for
definitions of these terms). In particular, Government statements
emphasised consumption of commodities as a sphere of personal autonomy
which had been invaded by the state, and which would now be returned to
the individual by expanding free enterprise, an essential part of
democratic government. This was reflected in changes made to planning
policies - from large-scale spatial restructuring to more localised and
flexible policies for existing urban areas, targeting state expenditures
on supporting entrepreneurialism and containing social expenses - and
changes in housing policy - the decline of public expenditure on the
direct provision of social housing and the expansion of
recommodification and self-help measures.
The transition from "modernisation" to "early post-modernism" in housing
and planning involved a major shift in central-local government power in
County Durham, with increasing central intervention to control local
authority expenditure, particularly on housing, as well as key aspects
of local policy. Throughout Britain the ability of an individual local
authority to determine its own housing policy was severely eroded in the
name of macro-economic management by the central state, bringing local
administration closer to the system of Direct Rule in Northern Ireland.
The ability of local councils to intervene in civil society was reduced.
The next chapters present a series of case studies to show how these
processes worked out at the level of particular localities in County
Durham and North Armagh, where community groups formed either to oppose
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local disruptions caused by modernising state interventions in civil
society or to cope with state retrenchment in the "early post-modern
era".
Chapter 3 is an account of the at tines intense community struggles
against spatial restructuring during the era of modernisation in County
Durham. This took the form of action to defend Category "D" villages,
settlements which were classified by the state as unviable while
resources were concentrated on building up modern infrastructure and
industry in the growth centres.
Chapter 4 is an account of experiences of two growth centres in the
"early post-modern era" of the late 1970s/early 1980s where community
action occurred, although weakly. The shorter account concerns a large
housing estate built as an expansion of an existing town in County
Durham. The longer account concerns a new town in the north-east of the
county built to provide modern housing for miners and their families,
and later incorporated into the growth centre strategy. Both are
examples of how state intervention in housing during the post-war period
came to be perceived as a failure.
Chapters 5 and 6 are accounts of community action in what were Category
"A" growth settlements in County Durham under the modernisation
strategy. The community action occurred in opposition to disruptive
redevelopment proposals pursued by the local councils, but in the wider
climate of the early post-modern era of the late 1970s/ early 1980s,
especially under the new policies of the 1980 Housing Act. The case
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studies show how the transition to the post-modern period shaped the
course of these struggles.
Chapter 7 moves the focus to North Armagh. It describes what emerge as
parallel struggles to those of chapter 3 in the small "rural"
communities bordering the major new growth centre of Craigavon and in
the fringing old industrial centre of Lurgan. It is shown how the
Northern Ireland Housing Executive was able to sustain redevelopment in
the old urban centres within the Craigavon designated area longer than
in County Durham. Housing expenditures were protected from repeated
cuts in response to what appeared to be a concern about the legitimation
implications for the British state in Northern Ireland if the tackling
of high levels of official unfitness and unemployment was seen to be
abandoned. However, redevelopment did not go smoothly, any legitimacy
which the local state might have had in building successful communities
having been shattered by the experience of Craigavon.
Chapter 8 describes the history of Craigavon and the new town sector
itself, and the community action response to conditions in the new town
sector in the early post-modern era.
In summary, the case studies describe a history of groups of people
responding to the experience of modernisation and how the transition to
"early post-modern" policies affected these experiences and actions.
The accounts are related to the general themes of chapter 1 and the
present chapter. An explanatory framework is proposed in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 3
POST-WAR MODERNISATION IN COUNTY DURHAM: SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING AND 
COMMUNITY ACTION 
This chapter discusses opposition to spatial restructuring in post-war
County Durham as experienced through the local impact of restructuring
housing and planning policies. These were based on a strategy of
settlement categorisation which was pursued by the County Council in the
1950s-1960s as its contribution to the modernisation of the region. The
material is drawn from primary and secondary sources. The chapter
attempts to illustrate two aspects which are also identified in the
other accounts of community action in subsequent chapters, and which are
crucial to understanding the community action reponse to these policies.
First, spatial restructuring in County Durham was associated with a
modernising ideology which promoted a disparaging picture of the old
industrial settlements as disorderly slums and a positive image of the
new growth centres and their mass housing estates as modern
environments. For the working class people affected, however, there is
evidence to show that the experience of the old settlements was often
positive and of the new estates frequently negative. Often the modern
ideology of political leaders and planners failed to make sense to many
people against the actual experiences of these localities. A result was
an officialdom-people relation of domination between the Labour Party
controlled local state and many working class "communities".
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Second, it was proposed in chapter 2 that the transition from
modernisation to what were described as "early post-modern" housing and
planning policies was a response to pressures caused by structural
changes in the economy and the "disorganisation" of capitalism. At
local level, however, other factors were at work. Many district
councils in County Durham ended up opposing spatial restructuring under
pressure from below before the policy was abandoned at strategic (county
and national) levels; but ideologically they appeared to remain
committed to elements of modernism in housing policy. This took the
form of a commitment to redevelopment and state housing solutions to
local housing problems, when national policy had shifted to retaining
and improving old private housing, enhancing owner-occupation and
residualising state housing. In addition, Durham County Council,
although moderating spatial restructuring under pressure from below,
only abdandoned the policy when forced to by central government. Thus
institutions of the state were not unified with regard to their
strategies and policies and the early post-modern policies had to be
constituted in localities politically from above, as shown by the
examples of this and subsequent chapters. This question is returned to
in chapter 9 after the empirical material has been presented to cast
light upon the actual processes involved.
3.1 Locality and working class experience in County Diarjaaa
Settlement categorisation was, as Bulmer (1978) observes, associated
with an ideology which negatively labelled the colliery houses and the
pit villages as basically primitive, disord ly and of the past. This
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continued through to the conflicts in the villages of Langley Park and
Framwellgate Moor, considered in chapters 5 and 6, which occurred after
the settlement categorisation issue had been decided. The ideology was
not only a legitimation of settlement categorisation but of modernising
policies in general. Bulmer (1978, p. 178) quotes from Sharp's pamphlet
of 1935, A Derelict Area: a study of the South-West Durham coalfield,
which illustrates the type of elitist social reformism that was to imbue
post-war planning in the county:
"These towns and villages are not such as civilized men (sic) should
be expected to live in. They were ugly and mean from the very
beginning and now most of them are outworn. If they are still to be
inhabited, large parts of them will need to be rebuilt during the
next few decades. Theoretically the simplest plan is to evacuate
the whole territory."
Bulner (1978) shows how state institutions viewed the "slums" in County
Durham as threats to social cohesion and its own legitimacy, a point
also made by Dunleavy (1981, p. 101) in his explanation of redevelopment
in England in the 1950s and 1960s, and a factor which appears to have
contributed to the Northern Ireland Housing Executive being able to
sustain a modernising housing policy longer than in England (see chapter
7).
Chapter 2 argued that in County Durham the local state's response
through its housing and planning policies to the economic situation afer
the Second World War was to pursue a strategy of restructuring the
county's settlement pattern and re-grouping the working class into large
labour pools in growth centres more attractive to transnational capital
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and less costly to reproduce. Although it was viewed necessary for the
local state to attempt to create "modern" conditions for accumulation
through its planning and housing powers if their areas were to share in
economic growth, it was also declared that better housing conditions for
the working class were an important aim of the new plans. A very
similar reformist component was evident in the Matthew Plan for the
Belfast sub-region and in the development of Craigavon (see chapters 2,
8 and 9). However, once spatial restructuring ended with the
abandonment of modernisation in County Durham and North Armagh, so did
the reformist statements about universal improvements in living
conditions.
Sharp's negative description of the pit villages is echoed in the
Pepler-MacFarlane Report (1949), an economic development report for the
North East which recommended the re-grouping of labour into local and
regional centres. It argued that many villages should be depopulated
and not rebuilt. However thirty years later national policy had largely
turned around - by 1979 when the Examination in Public of the Durham
County Structure Plan took place the emphasis was on the rehabilitation
of existing housing, virtually no greenfield development and a much
reduced role, if any, for strategic state planning. The post-war growth
centre strategy in County Durham had been undermined by capitalist
restructuring, which appears to have taken the form of a transition from
a modern regime of Fordist capital accumulation to a post-modern regime
of flexible accumulation, rather than a straightforward pattern of
branch plant closures. The changes wrought by this transition have
included a re-shaping of physical and social space, such as the
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activities of the Urban Development Corporations, new "consumption
cultures" arising from commodity differentiation, and new forms of
struggle against exploitation and domination in its post-modern guises
(Harvey, 1987). In the growth centres of the modern era there were now
large surpluses of labour in the modern housing estates and under-used
modern infrastructure. But local councils in County Durham dominated by
"old guard" Labourism stayed essentially modernist, and their approach
to older dwellings in the villages remained based on the negative image
of colliery housing. Housing conflicts emerged about redevelopment
versus rehabilitation within "localities" rather than about any large-
scale spatial reorganisation, indicating a contraction of modernism into
the housing policies of district councils (see chapters 5 and 6).
The negative labelling of colliery houses was not without Justification.
Conditions in these houses between the wars had been very bad. One
description by a retired Durham miner gives a lucid picture of the back-
to-backs which were built in large numbers to house the colliery
workforces:
"The houses were not good. They were built back to back - no
ventilation. Beckside was an open sewer with pig styes in it. All
pouring into the beck. In 1924-25 all the back streets were ash.
People threw their fire ashes out to keep the passages dry. Then
they later paved the sewers and drains in with granite blocks.
Before then many of the drains had collapsed, many were over-
flowing, effluent in back yards. Diptheria was rife and so was
smallpox, and scarlet fever. We had an isolation hospital up near
Helmington Row. Nothing else but fever cases were up at Homelands.
The number of bairns that died of diptheria was no-one's business,
T.B. too." (Machell, 1979; p. 48)
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However, by the end of the 1960s this housing type had been largely
cleared away by the local councils; what were left were mostly the "near
slums" referred to in chapter 2. Residents often had a very different
view about these houses, which could be rehabilitated to satisfactory
standards, to local councils. But modernist housing policy tended to
tar them with the sane brush as the inter-war sluns. One sunning up of
the situation which would have certainly net with the agreement of many
of Durham's villagers was made by Ted Nicklin, an architect who worked
with community groups opposing settlement categorisation and
redevelopment in the North East:
The question is, why do these practices continue, despite years of
Whitehall encouragement of rehabilitation and renewal. My
suggestion is that there remains in many people's minds -
councillors, officers, and the public too - a conception of housing
as a problem to be 'solved', rather than as a basic human activity
which a housing authority can either help and encourage, or thwart
and distort. The problem/solution approach to housing is amenable
to bureaucratic processes; it is essentially a game of numbers. The
activity view is altogether different; organisationally messy, since
it involves people in all their diversity, and politically difficult
to grasp since it must cross and re-cross so many well-narked
political guidelines on ownership, tenure, subsidy, and tax rebate.
Perhaps there is a new generation of politicians to replace the
Jaded heavies of the last two disastrous decades of public sector
housing policy. We certainly hope so•" (29)
This architect emphasises an important feature of the people-officialdom
relation in modernist housing policy - that the policy was often imposed
on local populations which had no or minimal involvement in policy-
making and whose concept of "the problem" was often very different to
the local council. There are also echoes of Saunders' (1986a) argument
that given a loss of autonomy and fulfilment in paid employment, the
sphere of consumption offers an opportunity for personal control and
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autonomy. It follows from such a perspective that state housing, of the
form produced on a massive scale during the modernisation era, should
have become the major target of "anti-statist" criticisms because it
excluded its "clients" from making choices about their housing.
Alternatively, although not wholly dismissing this point, the perceived
failure of state intervention in housing may be interpreted as a result
of its production under capitalist conditions as a means of reproduction
during the post-war boom, with a quantitative expansion but a
qualitative decline compared with early council housing, which had been
produced explicitly to transform working class housing qualitatively
(see chapter 2). What has to be determined in the present study is
whether community struggles against modernisation were struggles for a
sphere of personal autonomy which could exist within a society based on
a capitalist economy, or whether these were struggles against state
institutions undertaking reproductive strategies, and thus essentially
class struggles (Cockburn, 1978, pp. 158-184).
Housing issues played an important part in the Labour Party coming to
power in County Durham, committed to council housing as the best
alternative for the working class to colliery houses. Chapter 2
discussed the high level of council housing activity in the county
between the wars and the readiness of councils under Labour control to
step in and make up for the failures of private enterprise once enabling
legislation was passed. This commitment to council housing continued
during the post-war period, including during the 1970s when the Labour
Party nationally associated owner-occupation with "social advance",
against a background of declining support f r council housing and a
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growing crisis in the structure of provision associated with it (Ball,
1985). Even in the early 1980s some councils in the county were still
committed to clearance and council rebuilding as the central activity of
their housing departments.
With spatial restructuring in County Durham abandoned after 1979, and an
end to central government support for expanding local government
expenditure, there was no longer provision for new council building and
redevelopment on any scale. Such intervention conflicted with "post-
modern" housing priorities, primarily recommodification and greater
self-reliance through hone ownership and self-help housing. In
addition, conditions in the older housing stock which remained after the
large-scale clearances of the 1960s were failing to generate local
support for the replacement of what were not seen by residents as
unhealthy houses. Local people faced with "slum clearance" not only
began to oppose losing their houses on the grounds that their
"communities" would be destroyed, but also because this housing was so
much better than the state housing that was available in the growth
centres. They did not want to exchange their old terraced hone in a
"community" for a modern council house on an estate. A graphic local
view of this, which brings out the reproductive aspect of mass housing
very well, is the following account by the secretary of Wear Valley
Trades Council:
"We all call the housing estates 'reservations'. That's just what
they are. The council have rehoused people, but that's all they've
done. They've stuck people in one part of the town, built a few
houses and that's it; there are hardly any shops on them even. This
Is where they expect people to live and this is the environment they
expect people to respect	 They expect some sort of respect just
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because the council build houses. But people weren't allowed to be
involved in the creation of the estates, or in the type of housing.
People have no say. Middle class architects design houses in a
middle class type for working class people who haven't got the
resources to keep up with any middle class concepts. Who can afford
£13 rent from £38 net pay that some get from the factories in Crook?
People from Stanley moved to Billy Row. All these houses had
expensive central heating installed. Some of them were getting
bills for £70 to £100 a quarter, having moved from comparatively
cheap housing with coal fires. With an open fire you have some
flexibility. If you're short of money you can go to the woods and
get some timber or go to the slag heap. But in Billy Row this
wasn't possible. There was only one form of heating available"
(Ayre, 1979, p. 14).
This experience of the social relations of a particular type of housing
provision, mass state housing, which dominated housing provision in the
modernisation era, was of crucial importance in shaping popular views
about local state intervention in civil society in County Durham
However, as the present thesis attempts to illustrate, housing
consumption experiences were determined to a very large degree by the
changing position of particular localities in processes of uneven
development.
H iU
Durham County Housing Association 
As discussed in chapter 2, the most controversial component of
settlement categorisation was the designation of Category "D" villages.
Perhaps the most well-known Category "D" village in the county was
Witton Park, not in fact a pit village but originally built to house
workers for the South Durham Iron and Steel Company. The Pepler-
MacFarlane Report (1949) had stated bluntly of the village:
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"Witton Park and Escomb should be wholly depopulated and returned to
agriculture ... Eldon Lane and Coundon Grange are in an area
terribly cut up by railways, sidings and collieries, and not fit for
human habitation. We recommend the removal of the entire
population." (p. 181)
Snowdon (1979), who was actively involved as a senior council officer in
implementing the Category "D" policy, but later critically re-assessed
the approach, describes Witton Park in the abstract to his MA thesis as:
"... the devastated archetype Category 'D' village, a victim of
prejudice and time seemingly forever to bear a slum label as a
shrine to the County Development Plan."
He sums up housing action in the area during the 1960s in the following
terms:
"It is contended that undue attention was paid by bureaucracy to a
distorted image of slum housing which resulted in extensive and
excessive demolition with consequential individual and collective
injustice; and that an almost excessive over-emphasis on physical
aspects destroyed the territorial basis of community life, and
ignored people and their aspirations."
It has been argued above that redevelopment was legitimated in terns of
removing disorderly slums and of the prospect of rising working class
housing standards. As it is unlikely that many ordinary people read the
reports of these tines, this attempt at legitimation was probably aimed
at local political leaders whose incorporation into the planning
machinery and programmes of expanding local expenditures was a marked
feature of modernisation. In addition, environmental professionals
working in the local councils generally accepted the premises and
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approaches of modernism, especially its promise to transform social
conditions by transforming space, even though this was an ideology
generated by construction interests (Dunleavy, 1981). They were in
positions to exert a dominant influence on housing and planning policy
at the local level (Etherington, 1982; Snowdon, 1979; Hadden, 1974). It
was difficult to disagree with them, as report after report emphasised
the "logic" of the modernisation solution. Hailsam's North East Study
of 1963 continued to promulgate this influential analysis:
"The present uneven spread of economic activity and the wide
disparity in employment opportunities are socially harmful and
economically inefficient. Our plan is to narrow the gap by creating
the conditions in which more jobs will be provided in growing
concerns within the region. In so far as it succeeds it should
enhance the prospects for growth in the economy as a whole as well
as making the region a better place to live in." (quoted in Carney
and Hudson, 1974, p. 12)
The North East Study's policy of concentrating investments in selected
centres was recognised as having costs outside of these centres, and
this was legitimated as follows:
"The concentration of effort on the growth zone is bound to mean a
relative worsening in the prospects for local industrial jobs in
places outside it ... This is the price which has to be paid for
faster economic development of the region as a whole." (quoted in
Carney and Hudson, 1976, p. 14)
When Witton Park was designated as Category "D" by the Durham County
Development Plan this was not a price that the residents were prepared
to pay. A Defence Committee was formed in 1954 at a meeting organised
by the village's two Labour councillors, who subsequenty resigned from
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the Labour Group in protest against the designation. They criticised
what they saw as the Labour Group's view that the village was largely a
slum that was best depopulated and demolished, and preferred to fight to
save the village unbounded by Labour Group decisions (30).
Snowdon (1979) presents a wealth of evidence to show that Witton Park
was a vigorous community when it was declared a Category "D" village.
Despite this the Defence Committee was not successful and the population
fell from about 6,000 to around 300 people as a result of extensive
demolition (31). Many residents were rehoused in Bishop Auckland's
Woodhouse Close Estate, which became a residualised ghetto in the
closing years of modernisation and was identified as a "problem estate",
with a Family Support Unit established in 1973 (32). Snowdon (1979, p.
205) writes that:
"On being moved to Woodhouse Close Estate, where trellises and
fences were banned, every fourth door painted olive green, and only
standard size greenhouses allowed, they had the benefit of modern
houses at higher rents, and for a long time they experienced social
isolation; for the elderly problems posed cast deeper shadows
because they no longer had the resilience of youth. In the 1963
Written Statement to the County Development Plan, First Review the
County Planning Officer wrote:
'Many villages suffer from lack of support because younger people
demand a wider range of better facilities which are not available
and cannot be provided within each village. The need to provide a
better quality social life and recreational facilities can only be
met by concentrating development in selected areas'
At Woodhouse Close for many years there was a complete lack of play
areas and social facilities. Even now provision is minimal, and
over a period of almost twenty five years Witton Park exiles have
regularly returned to their village to enjoy the social life
offered, though on a much reduced scale."
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Community action in South West Durham about settlement categorisation
was more intense than in any other part of the county because the threat
to existing communities was greater given the degree of decline of the
coal industry in the area. In 1967 the County Redevelopment of Villages
Action Committee (CROVAC) was formed by several Independent councillors
elected on the Category "D" issue, representing Coundon Grange,
Binchester, Newfield and Witton Park, with the objective of rescuing the
villages threatened by the policy. Its main activities were in the
Gurney Valley, and the Eldon Lane area in particular. An action
committee, the Eldon Lane and District Redevelopment Association
(ELDRA), had already been formed in this area in 1962 to protest against
Category "D" designation and seek support for village rehabilitation.
CROVAC conducted a political campaign, putting up candidates in both
district and county elections, but its influence was limited by the
small number of candidates it could field (33). Its anti-Labour Party
activities included inviting Geoffrey Ripon and Jeremy Thorpe to
meetings to speak out against Category "D".
In addition to campaigning, some residents decided that practical action
had to be taken to preserve the housing stock in the villages, and were
able to take advantage of the shift in national housing policy towards
rehabilitation in the late 1960s. By forming the Durham County Housing
Association (DCHA), which arose out of CROVAC, they were able to develop
an alternative to the local council's policies of redevelopment and,
until 1976, of conforming to the County Council's restructuring
strategy. The DCHA was essentially a private non-profit making housing
association and was not involved in campaigning or local politics. It
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illustrated the point, repeated in other case studies, that in resisting
local council policy residents turned to a combination of self-help and
the private market, actions which were thoroughly consistent with post-
modern strategy. The ideological assertion that this would give people
greater personal autonomy is questionable in the case of the history of
the DCHA.
The DCHA was established to rehabilitate old housing in the villages for
sale to tenants. It did not register with the Housing Corporation and
had no tenants on its committee, which its secretary considered would
"Just delay things" (34). The houses were bought with bank overdrafts
and council mortgages, and rehabilitated with council improvement
grants, although the Abbey National Building Society was involved on an
experimental basis in improving five houses in Eldon Lane, a former
Housing Action Area. The DCHA also completely bought the small village
of Binchester when it was a General Improvement Area. One hundred and
twenty old colliery houses were refurbished and allocated through
"personal contact". Its activities were not well received by many local
Labour councillors, who saw the DCHA as a private business selling
houses, charging high rents and failing to maintain good environmental
standards (35).
The DCHA's secretary was an ex-chairperson of the local council's
housing committee who had resigned from the Labour Group of Bishop
Auckland Urban District Council in 1966, had served as an Independent
member and had finally resigned from the council in 1979. Its housing
manager was a former chairperson of the council. They were clearly
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disaffected by the council's modernist housing policy and "council
bureaucracy", but needed public sector support. The DCHA received
council grants and mortgages during the 1960s and early '70s when Bishop
Auckland UDC was under non-Labour control as a result of Labour's
electoral losses over the Category "D" issue (see below). During the
early 1970s central government support enabled enhanced rates of grant
to be made in assisted areas. However, grants continued to be made
after Labour had regained control of the new Wear Valley District
Council in 1974, as rehabilitation was by now emphasised as a priority
in central government allocations (see chapter 2). Over the next five
years almost £0.5 million was paid out by Wear Valley to the DCHA (36).
But the Association was electorally unaccountable and suspicions about
the quality of its management and its services were fuelled by a series
of local newspaper articles which appeared from the late 1970s.
In 1979 there was a police investigation into the sale of eighty-six
houses in Eldon Lane and Coundon Grange to the DCHA by the Cussins
Estates, but no evidence of illegality was found (37). In July
residents in Binchester complained that promised improvements to their
village had not materialised and that refurbished houses still had damp
problems and had not been inspected (38). The DCHA's secretary was
advising purchasers to use the Association's own solicitors to buy
houses in Binchester (breaching Law Society rules about solicitors
acting for both parties in a house sales transaction) and residents
claimed that they were not told before they bought their houses that
they would be responsible for improving the roads, being led to believe
that the roads would be made up by the council under a General
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Improvement Area (39). The Binchester scheme had been discussed at a
meeting of Bishop Auckland UDC on March 30, 1971, when the DCHA's
secretary was chairperson of the housing committee. The press reported
that the financial details were missing from the minutes and there was
no record of the chair declaring an interest in the natter.
The DCHA cane under fire in local newspapers from several Labour
councillors. It was claimed that people were suffering long delays
while they waited for the Association to improve their unfit houses.
The DCHA replied to these criticisms, arguing that the Association's
waiting list of people wanting rehousing from council estates, including
the infamous Bessemer Park (see chapter 4), was "a mile long" (40). The
reason that people had to live in unfit DCHA properties in Ferryhill
Station was, the DCHA claimed, that it had been waiting for improvement
grants from the council. Negotiations were now underway with a larger,
registered housing association, the Three Rivers Housing Association, to
buy the properties.
In October 1979 the Labour Leader of Wear Valley District Council called
for an inquiry into DCHA owned properties at Eldon Lane, where it
emerged that twenty-five houses were to be bricked up until money or
buyers became available (41). The council decided to prepare a report
on the houses, following the example of Sedgefield Council in the case
of DCHA properties bought from the National Coal Board in Ferryhill
Station. One Sedgefield Labour member "demanded council action to make
the association improve its derelict houses or sell up" and the local
Labour MP called for a full investigation into the DCHA (42). Several
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local newspaper reports appeared suggesting that the DCHA was in
financial trouble.
The DCHA rode these controversies, confident that national policy
developments were strongly in its favour, and in 1981 it was planning to
expand (43). Its assets were worth t2.5m. However, at least some local
Labour district council members felt that it was not maintaining and
managing its housing properly, conscious of the fact that their own new
build programmes had been cut back by central government not only to
recommodify housing provision but also because of the cost of
maintaining and managing council estates (44).
The DCHA was all that remained of the Category "D" opposition in the
early 1980s, and was basically a "non-political" agency based in the
housing market in rehabilitated working class homes. The opposition
had, however, turned Wear Valley District Council against County Council
policy in 1976 (see below), but this had not made many Labour
councillors any less hostile to the DCHA, even though there was
agreement that the villages should have secure futures. Like CROVAC,
the DCHA appeared to be closely connected with petit bourgeois/middle
strata interests in the villages and resisted settlement categorisation
not only out of an attachment to the social life of the villages but
also because of its negative impact on local businesses and the local
housing market. Many working class residents of the villages had a
vested interest in supporting this resistance; they had recently become
owner-occupiers. The following local account suggests that this had a
significant effect on popular attitudes which laid an important part of
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the ideological basis for "post-modern" attacks on the Keynesian Welfare
State:
"Another important thing in this village has been the purchase of
houses. The Coal Board offered all sitting tenants their houses to
purchase in 1966. You got them for about £250; and that was quite a
bargain. The people who had been made redundant got somewhere
between £500 and £800 in redundancy money and they used this to
purchase the houses. Most people did that ... it's changed the
whole environment. People have got a different outlook altogether.
People are now getting the idea that 'I own my own property'. To
give an instance, if someone owns a house and he has a car, he'll
stand his car at that door. Suppose somebody wants to pass; 'Vey,
move your car'. 'Vey, what do I want to move me car for? It's
standing at me own door, it's me own property'. And it rather
disturbs you to think that they cane through the struggle. It's a
different situation, different person, and it disturbs me sometimes"
(Alsop, G., 1979, p. 30).
3.3 Political struggles against settlement categorisation 
CROVAC fielded candidates against the Labour Party and in 1964 a major
local political upset was caused when Labour lost control of Bishop
Auckland UDC due to the electoral success of Independent candidates who
opposed Category "D". These Independents were in the main from
professional and small business backgrounds - others had defected from
the Labour Party - and they formed various alliances with Conservatives
and Civics (Snowdon, 1979, pp. 4-26). Their outlook was in general
anti-modernising and they gained considerable local support for their
demands that old communities be retained. Their backgrounds contrasted
with the domination of the local Labour Party by miners and other manual
workers whose outlook remained modernising but whose political support
was weakened by the working class experience of modernisation. Between
1964 and 1970 Labour lost nine councillors in five major Category "D"
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settlements in Bishop Auckland UDC. Some of the new Independent
councillors were from working class backgrounds and initially stood as
Independent Labour candidates.
The political position of the Independents was not strong - they cane to
power on a protest vote in a number of small localities. The
corporatist re-organisation of local government in 1974 made the Labour
Party less electorally vulnerable to very localised protest, and Labour
re-gained control of the new Wear Valley District Council. The
Independents became isolated and effectively powerless.
CROVAC and the Independent councillors had formed the leadership for
working class resistance to Category "D". There was little alternative,
for as Snowdon (1979; abstract page) writes:
"The irony of a working class political machine, over which the
population had virtually no influence, imposing a policy which
destroyed working class life styles is noted, together with the
creation of a bitter and inflexible climate which nurtured an
unintended but resolute opposition and resulted in a change of
political control at local level."
The extensive demolition, refusals of planning permission and cuts in
services to the villages saw twenty-five years of community-based
resistance to settlement categorisation in County Durham. The battle
was particularly intense in Bishop Auckland. Snowdon (45) offered the
following reflections on this period:
"Pre-1970s councils were brainwashed into demolition. They used
simple sub-items of the 1957 Act and were supported by the
Government. I declared houses unfit on, in retrospect, very shaky
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grounds. But the Inspector always approved. Councillors didn't
realise the implications of Category "D" at the tine, and they
couldn't lose face later. It was Labour Group policy handed down to
them by the old guard. One councillor voted against Category "D" at
the District Council and the other way at the County: it was County
'policy'. Callaghan (an Independent councillor) and the others had
the interests of the villages at heart, and the only way they could
support them was by leaving the Labour Group."
It would be very wrong, though, to conclude that there was no opposition
to settlement categorisation from district Labour councillors. After an
initial ambivalence, which Snowdon (1979, pp. 15-17) suggests was
largely due to a failure to appreciate the detailed implications of
County Council policy, there was opposition to Category "D". A key
factor, however, in bringing about this change of attitude was an influx
of younger, more socially conscious councillors who replaced the "old
guard" in the local Labour Party.
Following local government reorganisation and the 1971 Town and Country
Planning Act, Wear Valley District Council acted on a suggestion made by
the Baths Report (1972) and established their own planning department,
appointing a qualified planning officer. In 1976, during preparation of
the county structure plan, the council had the technical confidence to
assert its own view on settlement categorisation and resolved that:
"This Council's policy is total opposition to the principle of
Category "D", and will inform the County Council to that effect.
This Council feels that all planning decisions for development in
the respective villages should be treated on individual merit, and
private development encouraged in order to retain and, where
necessary, extend existing villages." (quoted in Snowdon, 1979, p.
34)
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This was a typically "post-modern" statement, and clearly a major break
with the idea that planning and development should be strategic, large-
scale and functionally efficient in managerialist terns. Such an
approach was a "straightjacket" which no longer seemed to make sense,
Although the council was Labour controlled, the chairperson of its
planning committee was an Independent councillor - one of the founders
of Durham County Housing Association and its housing manager! However,
the District Labour Group was now opposed to Category "D" following
local pressure and the unpopularity of a policy which seemed to have
achieved very few positive results. The Leader of the Labour Group
expained the change of heart as follows:
"It was realised that the provision of services to colliery villages
with no raison d'être any longer would be a strain on the County -
hence the County Development Plan. The disappearance of the mining
industry in these areas was never envisaged, especially without a
whimper. But the planners didn't take into account the reluctance
of people to move even three miles to better housing. Local
resistance wasn't taken account of. The amount of industry expected
in the growth centres didn't cone about.
The demolition of pre-1919 houses in the villages was encouraged by
the local authorities. Remaining houses were given improvement
grants. Oakenshaw for example was almost devastated. Many people
went to Willington or Spennymoor. But many of the villages were
saved. CROVAC set out to rescue the villages, but was mainly active
on the south side of the Wear (the Bishop Auckland area). On this
side (Crook and Willington area) we had bulldozing and building.
Pressure against this came from local councillors. In 1977 I
proposed dropping Category "D", The County Council adopted the
resolution as the Structure Plan was in preparation. It was decided
that limited infill and development could occur within boundaries
agreed between District and County. There was a change of mind;
twenty-five years of resistance in the villages had to be
recognised, as well as the improvement of houses remaining in the
villages. The argument was based on people having a choice of where
to live." (46; parentheses added)
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In October 1977 the Labour-dominated Durham Branch of the Association of
District Councils cane out against Category "D" and issued the following
statement:
"The Association emphasise the desire for a change of heart on the
part of the County Council with regard to the settlement policy, and
a need for District Councils to have freedom in deciding issues
relating to settlements and to housing within them." (quoted in
Snowdon, 1979, p. 34)
As described in chapter 2, Durham County Council revised its settlement
categorisation policy in 1977. All villages were to be placed in either
Category "A" (growth) or "B" (infill and replacement housing within
defined limits). Settlement categorisation was finally rejected by the
Conservative Secretary of State in December 1979 following the
Examination in Public of the County Structure Plan, and planning policy
entered its "early post-modern" period in County Durham.
What Snowdon (1979) describes as the "archetypal" Category "D" village
of Witton Park had been placed in Category "B" of the County County's
revised settlement policy adopted in November 1977. In March of that
year Wear Valley's District Planning Officer stated of the previous
Category "D" designation that:
"... while there is no doubt that the policy has physically wrecked
the village, there is considerable evidence that the policy has
failed to obliterate Witton Park as a community. Examples of this
can be seen in the successful Carnival of 1976, and the
determination of the recently formed Witton Park Action Committee
whose aim is to secure a future for Witton Park as a village.
Having already established that there is a confirmed demand for new
development in Witton Park into which people will move, it is now a
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question of deciding new housing sites for what will virtually be a
new village ..." (quoted in Snowdon, 1979, p. 34)
Development was not forthcoming. In 1980 the Witton Park Action
Committee's main activities were running an environmental improvement
project funded by the Manpower Services Commission, which employed 30
people on temporary contracts and low wages, and looking for ways of
attracting private development and rehabilitating existing housing. The
Action Committee was particularly keen to see new build which it thought
would rejuvenate the village and stimulate property values, and had been
exploring possibilities with housing associations and the district and
county councils (47). Although no longer "condemned to die" by the
state, prospects for growth were slim despite cosmetic efforts to spruce
up the village, and further decline seemed possible.
Private builders had actively lobbied against Category "D", apparently
claiming that "they would build tomorrow" in the threatened villages if
planning restrictions were lifted (48). However, following the
rejection of settlement categorisation by central government, district
councils in the county found themselves unable to build in the villages
due to Housing Investment Programme cuts. The only way building could
begin was through private development. But, while the state had
abandoned the villages in the 1960s, private developers now abandoned
many of them in the early 1980s. Private developers did not respond on
the scale they had suggested during the opposition to Category "D" and
land owned by them often remained undeveloped despite the fact that it
was now possible obtain planning permission (49). The recession meant
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that the market demand was not there. Private builders were mare
interested in other sites in the growth centres where demand was
concentrated, as the National Federation of Building Trades Employers'
statement to the Examination in Public of the county structure plan
reveals:
"... some land indicated as being available for development was
patently unattractive for housing	 They called for the Plan to be
modified to allow additional development at Chester-le-Street,
Durham, Sedgefield and Newton Aycliffe, where they said there was
strong public demand." (50).
In Oakenshaw, Wear Valley District Council managed to secure an
agreement with a private builder to erect new houses on a 5.5 acre site,
but payment for the land would be by number of houses sold (51).
Central government's decision to modify the Durham County Structure Plan
after the Examination in Public in 1979 was greeted as a victory for
those community groups which had been struggling against the county
planning strategy by the community newspaper Durham Street Press:
"Durham County Council Planners got one in the eye last month, when
the Department of the Environment made several amendments to their
grandiose Structure Plan. The changes give local councils, and
indirectly ordinary residents, more say over where houses and
factories are to be built ... The new policy proposed by the DOE
allocates population targets outside of major towns to each
district. Where the houses are built is up to the District Council
to decide. Which is good news for us mortals, because district and
parish councils are easier to influence than the County Council.
Who said 'you can't beat County Hall' anyway?" (52)
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The argument that the decision gave local people more of a say about the
future of their areas should be viewed against the scale of the economic
and housing crisis, especially in the West of the county, which district
councils and local groups were largely powerless to tackle. For
example, Wear Valley District Council's Labour Leader argued that more
far-reaching processes were at work in the area that could not be
influenced at a local level:
"The councillors, often union people, are the reason why the area
has anything much at all. But without industry the area has no
future. Textiles cane into the region in a big way and then pulled
out. There's no industrial rate base, we're just covering essential
services. I'm afraid that the Government is giving up areas that
were based on heavy industry. They'll be surplus labour again. The
Government says people have to move to find jobs. That's got bad
implications for housing here." (53)
3.4 The influence of the central state in bringing about local changes 
In the 1950s and '60s Labour councils were largely preoccupied with
clearing "slums" and building council housing, encouraged and supported
by central governments. As described in chapter 2, the end of the 1960s
saw a shift at national level away from redevelopment towards the
rehabilitation of existing private housing. In County Durham, Bishop
Auckland was the first council to shift towards rehabilitation, and
clearly community action largely accounted for this change of heart
occurring when and how it did. But while the timing of this policy
change depended on such contingent factors, the shifting priorities of
housing policy nationally had considerable influence on where resources
were channelled locally. In other words, the council was able to move
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resources into rehabilitation and increasingly unable to continue
redevelopment. However, it seems unlikely that this could have occurred
with such evident popular support without the nation-wide reaction
against mass state housing based on the experience of it in countless
localities (see Dunleavy, 1981). Snowdon (1979, pp. 178-179) observes
that:
"The present system of improvement grants originated in the 1949
Housing Act, but it was not until 1971 that Bishop Auckland UDC
moved, with any effect, toward the concepts of house and area
improvement - too much, too late. Nevertheless more than three
thousand houses were improved in recognition of the need to preserve
a social asset, with Binchester as a prime example of village
rehabilitation. Full advantage was taken of the 1974 Housing Act in
declaring Eldon Lane/Coundon Grange the first Housing Action Area in
Durham County, which provided the opportunity to put into effect the
many improvement proposals recommended by Consultants, and so
execute an exercise in village preservation. It is ironic that the
first Rehabilitation Order made by Bishop Auckland UDC allowing
condemned houses to be renovated, was at Witton Park 	 Direction
altered, belatedly, in the late 1960s after nearly 2,300 houses had
been demolished. The newer policy of gradual renewal rather than
total clearance was influenced by political change, more enlightened
attitudes and the availability of wider powers."
This account only explains part of the story. Snowdon (54) elaborated
on the influence of changes in central government housing policy as
follows:
"A big influence in shifting the council's attitude towards
improvement was the 1969 Act and General Improvement Areas, and the
1971 Housing Act which introduced 75 per cent grants in assisted
areas. The council had been preoccupied with new build. Woodhouse
Close, with around 1,800 houses, was finished in 1970. The shift
really occurred at one meeting when the Chief Environmental Health
Officer was given the new title of Housing Improvement Officer and
took over from the City Engineer. Then after 1974 houses in
clearance areas had to be 'irredeemably unfit' and were less easy to
demolish. Since 1974 Wear Valley has spent t5-600,000 per year on
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improvement grants. This was cut to £300,000 for 1981/82, and we'll
have to apply for more money mid-year."
Increasingly pressure was placed on local councils to save their
existing private housing stock. Local people wanted to preserve housing
that was "of the past", at least symbolising a "community spirit" that
modernism had destroyed but had been so central to working class culture
and, at tines, ability to resist capitalism. In a time of
disorganisation and uncertainty, this policy could encourage people to
find refuge and security in the images and values of the past. The
crucial policy change was central government's withdrawal of support for
redevelopment. This has to be set in the context discussed in chapter
2. The 1980 Housing Act introduced a new system of renovation grants to
encourage further the retention of old housing (see chapter 2). The
repairs grant was particularly relevant to Wear Valley where some 30 per
cent of its stock was built before 1919. But the council did not know
what the demand for grants would be, and as a result councillors
preferred to allocate money to the council stock. The attitude of Wear
Valley, though, was very different to other authorities in County Durham
examined in the case studies below, particularly Derwentside. When, for
example, residents in Escomb found that their houses were on the
council's substandard list, Wear Valley agreed to meet them and
encouraged the formation of a residents' association. Agreement to
improve was secured and following improvement the houses lept in value
from around £1-2,000 to £20,000. The policy was, in fact, revalorizing
housing by subsidising improvements, rather than decommodifying housing
by replacing a private house with a council house. Wear Valley's
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officers clearly understood the wind of change that had been blowing for
some years as indicated by the following comment by the authority's
Environmental Health Officer:
"At public inquiries the Inspector looks for a willingness to
improve. It takes very little to sway him in favour of
improvement." (55).
Balchin (1985, p. 77) comments that groups such as Shelter doubted
whether sufficient resources would be made available by central
government to make the new emphasis on rehabilitation work as
effectively as had redevelopment in bringing down the rate of official
unfitness. There is some evidence to support this in the case of Wear
Valley. In the Gurney Valley a five-year Housing Action Area programme
secured the improvement of some eighty per cent of the houses. But an
extension was refused by the Department of the Environment, leaving
twenty per cent of the houses unimproved and in a very bad environment.
The council could not afford to implement a General Improvement Area.
The county structure plan had identified the Gurney Valley as an Action
Area for comprehensive treatment by redevelopment, but Wear Valley's
renewal strategy had to be abandoned due to lack of finance in September
1980, with residents claiming that the area was now under "sentence of
death" (57). Wear Valley had inherited forty-five General Improvement
Areas from the four constituent authorities in 1974. Many were
discontinued owing to financial restrictions. By 1981 only six were
completed and the rest were nowhere near completion. The situation
illustrated the extent to which the private market solution was
dependent on public sector support.
- 159 -
It was in the depressed localities that public sector support was
crucial to housing investment. In the type of villages referred to in
chapter 2, which were favourably placed in a market of attractive
village homes for relatively affluent commuters, this was not so
important. For instance, while Witton Park struggled for its existence,
residents in Heighington, near Darlington, organised to oppose further
private development intended by the county structure plan. While Witton
Park residents wanted to see growth, Heighington residents wanted growth
to end. The population of the parish had almost doubled in thirty
years, largely due to an influx of professional workers employed in
expanding services in Darlington, Aycliffe and surrounding areas. It
was a relatively affluent village, with property values reflecting its
pleasant environment and location, and a process of "middle class"
community construction was underway.
At the instigation of Community Service for Durham County's Countryside
Officer, a committee was formed in 1979 to draw up a Parish Study of
Heighington (58). The idea behind this study was that the planning
process could be reversed to a bottom-up rather than top-down approach,
so that a village plan would feed into the district plan which would
feed into county planning (59). The district council planners were keen
on the concept. Policy recommendations were developed on the basis of a
questionnaire of residents, one major recommendation being that housing
development should be restricted to inf ill. The study was put to a
well-attended public meeting. A planning consultant was hired to press
the case for no further major housing development. At the Examination
in Public of the county structure plan in De mber 1979, residents
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objected to their village being designated as a settlement where
development would be allowed (60). As a result of the Secretary of
State's statement on the structure plan, the decision on whether to
permit development at Heighington was transferred from the County
Council to the District Council, with no designations for particular
settlements outside the major centres (61). This was a victory, because
the residents had earlier won the support of Darlington Borough Council,
as well as the local Labour MP (62).
The case is a good example of successful "middle class" community action
defending through exclusionary tactics a very desirable environment (see
Saunders, 1980a, pp. 237-272; Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray, 214-
222; Barlow and Savage, 1986). More fundamentally, this action did not
Involve the intense struggles of Category "D" to "save communities"
against an "economic logic" which ascribed no value to them, but in fact
provided a host of use values essential to working class culture and,
indeed, survival (see Harvey, 1987, pp. 14-17). Heighington was about
maintaining the "tone" of a "middle class" space; arguably, an
environment for reproducing the new "central" workers of post-modern
capitalism.
3.5 Summary 
The above account considers the conflicts that occurred in Durham County
villages as a result of settlement categorisation, especially in South
Vest Durham. The County Council sought to utilise land-use and
strategic planning as part of a modernisation strategy to attract
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capital and reproduce labour power. This was a framework within which
district councils' housing policies were expected to fit. The strategy
was dependent on expanding local state expenditures enabling the
reshaping of the built environment on the basis of assumptions about the
positions of different localities within future patterns of
accumulation. This was held to be in the interests of the working class
people who had to lose their homes and communities and move. Although
these processes were separate from the industrial-economic modernisation
pursued through central government departments for industry and
employment during the post-war period, which are not examined in the
present thesis (but see )assey, 1984; Townsend, 1983; Hall, 1986), they
have close links with economic modernisation, as their demise paralleled
the abandonment of this strategy. Thus, while a "contest of domains"
clearly occurred, along a people-officialdom axis, the reason why this
happened was connected with processes of uneven development which the
state had to manage. One aspect of this was that localities where it
was thought there would not be work were run down through state action.
Defensive struggles against the modernisation strategy of the County
Council took various forms, including the establishment of action
groups, a private housing association and electoral politics. Local
pressure was instrumental in leading district councils into opposing
spatial restructuring, which councillors saw as not delivering the
desired outcomes anyway, and in moderating County Council policy.
County policy, however, was only finally reformulated for the "early
post-modern era" following central government's refusal to approve its
structure plan. As well as this, housing policy was increasingly
- 162 -
"nationalised" to achieve a recommndification of as much of the stock as
possible, including retaining old private housing. But no great
recovery in the fortunes of Category "D" villages appeared to occur
following the abandonment of modernisation, and "private market"
solutions in the depressed localities seemed to demand significant
public sector support, particularly renovation grants, with only the
attractive commuter villages having good prospects. The end of Category
"D" was essentially a product of abandoning modernisation, which emerges
as a phase in the history of accumulation in County Durham.
The reverse side of the coin to Durham's "condemned villages" was the
modern growth centres. The following chapter examines further aspects
of the working class experience of modernisation in County Durham by
presenting the results of work in two growth centres: Peterlee, a new
town, and Bessemer Park, a large housing estate built in an existing
Category "A" settlement, Spennymoor.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIENCES OF GROWTH CENTRES IN COUNTY DURHAM 
This chapter turns to discuss aspects of the development and experience of two
growth centres in County Durham - the new town estates of Peterlee in Easington
and the large council estate of Bessemer Park in the Category "A" town of
Spennymoor - and examines community action in these localities. The moral:Tea
class experience of them was dominated by the history of the rise aneL lall of
"modernisation"; a strategy designed to counter the decline of older industries,
but which remained dependent upon the decisions of capital as to where and
when to invest. Other areas in the county, principally the new town of Newton
Aycliffe, were also areas where this process, with its false promises of
transforming the working class experience of capitalism in County Durham,
occurred. But, for reasons that appeared to relate to the disablement of
community action referred to in chapter 1, such action was not in evidence in
Newton Aycliffe when fieldwork was being undertaken during 1980-82 (63). It
was not a major aim of the research to discover in detail why action did not
occur when it might have been expected (on this, see Kraushaar, 1981). The
major aim was to investigate why in some localities it did occur, and whether
its origins and nature could be explained with reference to the same type of
wider processes constituted in different localities. In other words, the
approach of the present thesis is to work towards revealing the necessary
generative mechanisms behind community action, rather than what is regarded as
the contingent conditions which result in community action occurring in one
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locality while not in another, despite similar housing, economic or other
problems.
Nonetheless, an attempt was made to investigate why community action was not
in evidence in the new town of Newton Aycliffe, which was a depressed "growth
centre" in the early 1980s. One reason for doing this was to verify the
information given by key informants interviewed at the beginning of the
research about where community action was then, or had recently been, occurring
(see Appendix 1).
Newton Aycliffe was designated in 1947, a year before Peterlee, on a greenfield
site to serve an existing industrial estate built for the war effort. Its public
housing was transferred to Sedgefield District Council in 1978, along with
serious problems in the modern systems built dwellings, including leaking flat
roofs, defective and cracking floors and ageing central heating (64). In the
1950s Newton Aycliffe had a sound economic base and good employment prospects
which attracted people to the new town. The Hailsham Report of November 1963
designated the Darlington/Aycliffe area as a "growth centre" with a target
population of 45,000 (Bowden, 1970). However during the 1970s industrial
closures and unemployment rose dramatically, and in 1979, following the
Examination in Public of the Durham County Structure Plan, its population target
was revised down to 32,000 for 1991.
In common with other new towns Newton Aycliffe% level of owner-occupation was
low - approximately fifteen per cent in 1980. Despite the problems in the
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public housing stock, there appeared to have been no organised community action
by tenants. The Development Corporation employed two Community Development
Officers (CD0s). But, mainly because of the Corporation's difficult
relationships with the local district council which considered the new town to
be unfairly privileged in regard to recreational facilities and amenities, the
CDOs avoided supporting tenant organisation (65). In the early 1980s community
associations in the area were solely concerned with recreational and community
service activities. The worst new town estates were stigmatised and unpopular,
and most people just wanted to get out of them. The situation was reflected by
the activities of one community group in Midridge, a commuter village of mostly
private housing in the new town area, which was pressing for the status of a
Parish Council to distinguish the village from the stigmatised new town.
Both Newton Aycliffe and Peterlee were Mark I new towns designated under the
New Towns Act 1946. A third new town was designated in County Durham in 1964
- Washington. Although tenants' associations formed at an early stage in this
new town about housing and heating issues (66), Washington was from 1974 part
of Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County Council and was excluded from the present
study, which focuses on the areas of spatial restructuring outside the major
urban districts of Tyneside, Vearside and Teesside in the case of County
Durham, and of the Belfast Urban Area in the case of North Armagh.
An important observation emerges, however, from this brief survey of the County
Durham new towns. It is clear that the local state agencies of post-war
modernisation in housing and planning in these localities - the new town
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corporations - established reputations among tenants as good housing
authorities, managing a new housing stock and good facilities in promising
economic circumstances and growth conditions nationally (67). This can also be
seen from the accounts of Peterlee and Craigavon in chapters 4 and 8. The
reason for this is well summed up by one of Washington's Community Development
Officers:
"The repairs service under the development corporation was generally good.
There was a commitment to stop housing or social problems developing,
partly because the corporation was keen to prevent a bad image to industry
developing." (68).
In contrast, the local district councils (the Housing Executive in Northern
Ireland) which inherited the new town housing stocks during the 1970s were
often experienced as bad housing authorities - slow on repairs, lacking
commitment to new town estates that were only one part of larger districts and
hostile to community groups. These were the authorities that inherited the
housing legacy of modernisation: growing repairs problems and depressed housing
estates, with much reduced housing and social budgets, and mass unemployment.
Increasing vacancies in the most defective and unpopular housing became a major
headache, especially when in Spennymoor - but to a much lesser extent in
Easington - there was also available both good council housing and older,
relatively cheap, private housing built before modernisation, which reflected the
bad estates in even worse light. Many tenants could escape to these
alternatives.
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The void problem reduced resources that could have been used to maintain the
rest of the housing stock in the growth centres. The experience of tenants
managed by beleaguered landlords was obviously likely to shape popular
attitudes to local councils in these areas as inpenetrable bureaucracies, for
instead of being able to manage growth they were forced to manage decline, a
situation imposed on the councils by the effective collapse of the modern
branch plant economy amid the contining decline of the coal industry and the
effects of central government policy on state housing. Such a strategy of
relegating local government to, in large measure, managing the social
proletariat, seems a significant development of "post-modern" times, and was
made all the easier by the officialdom-people cleavage which occurred during
the years of post-war corporatism in local politics (see chapter 1). A
consequence of this "poverty management" appears to have been an absence of any
organised community action in many of these depressed localities, and this is
remarkable given the nature and scale of problems in these areas. Even in
Bessemer Park and Peterlee community action was very weak. Tenants' energies
went into attempting to "escape" from the worse housing or were incorporated
into the management strategies of the local state. These points are further
developed in the case studies of Bessemer Park and Peterlee which follow.
4.1 A new way of life - in Bessemer Park 
The reader will by this point not be surprised at the rationale for the
construction of the mass housing estate of Bessemer Park. As chapter 3
described, the small village of Binchester was one of the settlements which the
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Durham County Housing Association attempted to save from the terminal decline
envisaged by the growth centre strategy of the County Council. Bessemer Park
was one of the largest of the new modern environments to which people from
such villages were planned to be rehoused. As the Pepler-MacFarlane Report
(1949, p. 182) stated:
"At Binchester the houses are deplorable -. there is no point in
reconstructing them as the population would find much better opportunities
for living in an enlarged Spennymoor."
As part of the Durham County Development Plan, Spennymoor was expanded to
accommodate people moving away from the declining West of the coalfield to
create pools of labour attractive to new industry (Austrin and Beynon, 1979).
As in Northern Ireland, state housing schemes were tailored to this strategy
(Byrne, 1979). In Spennymoor, once a coal and steel town, this gave birth to
Bessemer Park, a large council housing development built on the Bison Wall
Frame system, on the site of what had been a steel works, to house labour for
the new industry that it was intended to bring into the town. The estate was
completed in 1971. It was built at a relatively high density - 23 dwellings
to the acre - and consisted of a 560 unit "Spine" development of five storey
deck-access flats, heated by electric warm air partial central heating, and a
"carpet" of 449 bungalows and houses, heated by gas warm air partial central
heating (69). In 1977 it accounted for 1,009 of Spennymoor's 3,360 council
dwellings (70). The flats were built using the Bison system of Concrete Ltd,
one of the few large firms which dominated the state-created market in mass
housing during modernisation with their industrialised systems. In fact, the
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Bison system became the market leader in high-rise in 1966, although from 1964
the firm's fastest growing market was in low-rise construction, which was the
housing form for Bessemer Park (Dunleavy, 1981, pp. 64-65). In terms of form
and location Bessemer Park was a typical product of the "package deals" of the
industrialised building boom in which these few large firms' profits played a
much greater role than the quality of the product. Industrialised building,
especially but not solely high-rise, was promoted as the ideal method for
producing modern mass housing, as Dunleavy (1981, pp. 102-103) comments:
"A large part of the appeal of high-rise was based on its claim to
newness, to be the product of technical advances -. (T)he legitimacy of
these claims (by the construction industry) provided by architectural
ideology was an especially important influence in producing acceptance
There was -. an extremely optimistic ethos about technology in post-war
British society, an ethos particularly well developed in the political
elite." (parenthesis added)
Spennymoor's experience of economic restructuring appears to be fairly typical
of the modern growth centres. Black & Decker, Courtaulds and Thorns expanded
subsidiaries in the town during the 1960s, promising a new future for local
workers. Courtauld's recruitment literature, for example, stated:
"A GOOD WAGE AND A JOB FOR LIFE. Above all else a job at Courtaulds,
Spennymoor, offers you security with an excellent weekly wage and
employment consistently throughout the year." (quoted in Ellis and Fahey,
1979, p. 90).
But this investment was short-lived. The factory was employing 1,500 people
when, in May 1979, it closed down:
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"It was one of the most advanced worsted spinning factories in the world
and it had opened just ten years earlier with the assistance of local and
national government	 in 1979 the workers were faced with an ultimatum;
'accept a £7 wage cut and 560 redundancies or the plant closes'. At mass
meetings the company's 'offer' was rejected out of hand and a campaign was
set up to 'stop the axe at Spennymoor% At the end of the day however, the
campaign was defeated. Workers accepted the closure as inevitable, and
took their redundancy payments .-" (Ellis and Fahey, 1979, p. 90)
Spennymoor experienced growing unemployment throughout the 1970s as the crisis
in Fordist-type mass production intensified. The problem became concentrated
in areas like Bessemer Park, built to house labour from Category "D" villages,
but now trapping what had become surplus labour in a sink estate. The estate's
problems were not Just caused by the lack of Jobs, but also by serious physical
defects which plagued much of this type of construction. Major problems with
dampness, the cost of heating and extensive vandalism emerged in the Spine
development. In 1977, Just six years after the estate had been completed, the
Housing Department estimated that three-quarters of its problems - in terms of
DHSS Direct Payments, NTQ/Suspended Orders/Court Hearings and rent arrears of
£15 to £100 plus - were concentrated in Bessemer Park (specifically, the Spine
blocks), despite the estate accounting for only one-third of council properties
(71). Mental health problems were a particular concern for community
psychiatric nurses. A filtering process concentrated marginalised groups in the
estate:
"The trend is for people to want to move off the Bessemer Park Estate to
more prosperous council estates elsewhere in the town -. increasingly the
flats are housing people of low income; often non regular payers; and
weaker members of society, who are less able to cope with the problems of
family life and day to day living. In unofficial terms a tenant 'serves
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his time' on an upper flat, moves to a ground floor flat, then to a carpet
dwelling, and finally off the estate." (72)
The County Council's Community Development Officer Assistant summed up the
estate's general situation in an unpublished report of 1977 as follows:
"Bessemer Park is an area of high density population (over 3,000
individuals live within a half square mile area) situated near Spennymoor
Town Centre .- it has acquired for itself the reputation of being one of
the worst complexes of council housing in Sedgefield District, and in
retrospect the Housing Department now concede that in design and
conception, the estate was a mistake from the outset .- we are now dealing
with an area of high discontent which houses a population largely in
transit and has more than its fair share of social, behavioural and
emotional problems -. an air of depression, delapidation and decline
engulfs the whole place." (73)
It is ironic that this description has many similarities with the Pepler-
XacFarlane Report's portrayal of Durham pit villages in 1949. In the same way
that the modern environments of the 1950s and 1960s were to replace the old
depressed settlements of early industrialisation, these environments of later
"branch plant" industrialisation were now depressed areas in a post-modern era
as capital restructured. As Harvey (1978, p. 124) observes:
"Under capitalism there is a perpetual struggle in which capital builds a
physical landscape appropriate to its own condition at a particular moment
in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of a crisis, at
a subsequent point in time."
Faced with the growing marginalisation of the estate's inhabitants, who had
become casualties of this process, the local Labour council agreed to a strategy
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which had a large element of social control, using a community development
approach implemented by what have been aptly termed "poverty professionals"
(see Byrne's (1986) account of the Gateshead-Newcastle Inner City Partnership,
which has many parallels with the present case study). The strategy was
described by the Community Development Officer Assistant with Durham County
Social Services Department as follows:
"The Council acknowledge that it is an estate on the decline but feel that
it is not totally beyond saving, provided steps are taken to stabilise the
population, improve the appearance of the estate, and redress the major
compaints of residents. This is an ideal opportunity for Social Services
to work alongside other council departments and a full-time neighbourhood
or community worker would make an important and unique contribution to
the processes of change and the need for innovation." (74)
Community self-help, supportive group work and preventive community work were
recommended. A family advice and guidance centre was proposed, housed in a
property on the estate:
once the property was acquired, it could serve a dual purpose acting
also as a meeting centre for clubs and groups which the workers and the
people feel would answer needs in the community, drawing it together and
helping to instil a sense of identity and possibly even help build up a
feeling of pride that one lived on Bessemer Park	 (75)
The "Community House" opened on 20 March 1978, with two workers funded by the
Manpower Services Commission. Apparently the council stipulated that the
property was not to be used for tenants' campaigns (76). There was no
encouragement of community action and when an attempt was made in 1982 to
organise a tenants' group about the dampness problem it soon collapsed (77).
-173-
Similar- problems of community organising in "problem estates" were evident in
Peterlee and Craigavon (see this chapter and chapter 8), where high tenant
turnover militated against organisation, although the individual acts of tenants
(arrears, transfer requests, refusals, vandalism, etc.) often had an impact in
making the estates too costly to manage and maintain. Dunleavy (1981) also
reports that tenant opposition to mass state housing was weak, disorganised and
ignored or filtered out by policy-makers.
Another similarity with Craigavon was that some tenants wanted to stay in
generally unpopular housing because space standards were good and the location,
on the edge of the old town centre, convenient (35 per cent of tenants in the
Spine blocks of Bessemer Park were satisfied with the area, 40 per cent of whom
gave reasons of dwelling size and location (78)). However, Spennymoor Council
set up an Officers Working Party to examine constructional defects and
improvements to the flats, which reported in 1978 (79). Serious problems were
found with fire safety, dampness and electrical installation. In June 1980 the
council accepted an out-of-court settlement of £120,000 from the contractors,
Concrete (Northern) Ltd, for alleged design faults at Bessemer Park (80). It
was accepted behind closed doors with an agreement that the amount of the
settlement should not be made public.
It was not until 1982 that proposals for the estate were published in a further
report by the Chief Executive to the Special Housing Committee (81). This
considered three options: refurbishment; partial demolition and refurbishment;
demolition; demolition and redevelopment. The last option was:
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"A radical (and costly!) alternative but the one most likely to
achieve a satisfactory development." (82)
It was pointed out that by 1983/84 the council was likely to be out of
housing subsidy, so that the cost of any solution would fall on rents
and/or rates. The large central government subsidies of the
modernisation era were a thing of the past, and the local authority was
left to deal with the problem largely from within its own limited
resources. An increasing problem, which ultimately determined which
solution the council adopted, was the number of voids appearing in
Bessemer Park as people found housing elsewhere, either in council
houses or in older private housing which in Spennymoor had not been
destroyed on the scale that occurred in the Category "D" villages.
In April 1982 it decided to demolish the flats, displacing almost 1,000
tenants, and to build about 200 traditional houses - a cheaper solution
than attempting repairs (83). However the first phase of rehousing was
to be to vacancies in the existing council stock, many of which were in
unpopular, inconvenient areas (84). The exercise was essentially a
rationalisation designed to reduce costs to the local council of a
difficult-to-let estate, rather than, as in the "modernisation
era", to present the (illusionary) prospect of a better future for the
mass of people living in "slums". Efforts to organise community self-
help to "save" Bessemer Park were unsuccessful, most tenants just
wanting to get out of the estate, and although tenant campaigns were
virtually non-existent, the estate was eventually demolished to
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eliminate its drain on management and maintenance resources as voids and
"social problems" mounted.
4.2 Farewell Squalor?: the case of Peterlee 
The next five sections of the present chapter are a case study of the
new town growth centre of Peterlee in the District of Easington. The
working class experience of modernisation is well-illustrated by this
particular case, which shows the sub-regional impact of a "growth
centre", as well as the pattern of its development during the
"modernisation era" and subsequent decline at the end of the era. While
the housing problems of Bessemer Park could eventually be resolved by
demolishing this "modern housing form", largely because housing was
available in the traditional stock as a result of both a history of
traditional council housebuilding and a remaining stock of older private
housing, in Easington the situation was rather different. Housing
policy in Easington District was dominated during the post-war period by
the needs and strategy of Peterlee Development Corporation. Much of the
traditional terraced housing in the area was demolished, and much of the
Corporation's new build was industrialised mass construction
concentrated in the new town. This stock, which the local council later
inherited from the Development Corporation, had a high percentage of
defective housing, but people had to live in it because of a lack of
alternatives. The council could not consider demolition on any major
scale. This situation had much to do with the fact that Spennynnor was
a "growth centre" which failed to "take off", leading to a degree of
over-provision of housing (an acute problem in Craigavon; see chapter
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8). Except for a period during the late 1950s/early 1960s Easington's
local economy was more stable until the recession of the 1970s, and
housing opportunities were largely restricted to what the new town had
to offer.
Peterlee was designated on 10 March 1948 in the local authority area of
Easington Rural District Council. It was in origin an outcome of a
proposal by the local council which was accommodated within the Nark I
new towns programme of the first post-war Labour Government.
The Labour Party took control of Easington Rural District Council after
the First World War and the authority, like other Labour councils in the
county, pursued an active housing policy during the inter-war period
(Robinson, 1983, p. 265). After the Second World War the council,
responding to the Ministry of Health's request in 1943 for local
authorities to review post-war housing needs, decided the best way
forward would be to concentrate new development in one urban area. The
person behind the decision, which developed into the objective of a new
town for miners and their families, was the council's "modernising"
Engineer and Surveyor, C.W. Clarke. His proposals were published by the
council in 1947 as the pamphlet Farewell Squalor (Clarke, 1947).
Clarke was moved by the appalling housing conditions in the area.
Patton (1978, p. 224) reports the results of a 10 per cent sample survey
of housing conditions in the villages of Easington carried out in 1948
which showed 30 per cent of houses to have no separate kitchen, 46 per
cent to have no fitted bath, 75 per cent to have no indoor lavatory and
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33 per cent to be overcrowded on the criterion of one room per person.
Given this situation, the tone of Farewell Squalor is indignant and
paints a picture of inhuman living conditions in the pit villages.
Clarke (1947) intended that Peterlee should meet all of Easington RDC's
housing needs, including new households and slum clearance, and this aim
was reflected in the Designation Order.
At the Public Inquiry into the Order, objections included
representations from Haswell, Hutton Henry and Thornley Parish Councils,
Thornley Miners' Lodge and the Labour Party in Haswell and South Hetton
(Patton, 1978, p. 230). Their arguments concerned the difficulities of
having to travel to the pits by bus from Peterlee and opposition to the
curtailment of new housing and facilities in the existing villages. As
described in chapters 2 and 3, the centralisation of investment was a
key part of Durham County Council's planning strategy as set out in its
1951 County Development Plan. The Plan's., policy of settlement
categorisation graded settlements A, B, C or D according to their role
in the regional economy and therefore their likely growth and viability.
In the case of Easington Rural District, the Plan states:
"Future development in this district will largely be conditioned by
the erection of a new town at Peterlee, which will draw population
from all the mining communities in the district 	 These are all
predominantly communities containing a considerable amount of low
standard property and lacking many social facilities ... The
population of Peterlee will increase as building proceeds and people
move from the surrounding villages (Durham County Council, 1951, pp.
90-91).
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Fourteen pit villages surrounding the new town were designated Category
"C", with a further ten villages primarily based on agricultural
employment which it was considered would remain stable designated
Category "B". However the district council, Easington RDC, was less
enthusiastic about settlement categorisation. It had pursued a crash
post-war housing programme without hindrance from any superordinate
state body, but from 1951 Durham County Council attempted to restrict
severely housebuilding in Easington's villages. This brought the County
Council into conflict with Easington RDC, as well as other district
councils affected by the settlement policy, which continued to build in
the villages. The County Plannning Department warned Easington RDC that
its housebuilding - actually supported by the Ministry of Housing and
Local Government as part of Macmillan's housing drive (the Ministry of
Town and Country Planning, the promoter of new towns, had been disbanded
by the first post-war Conservative Government) - was threatening the
achievement of Peterlee's 30,000 population target (Leishman, 1971, pp.
109-141). The County Planning Department also argued that new industry
and in-migration from outside the Rural District would be necessary to
reach the new town's target of 30,000, an argument that the Ministry of
Housing and Local Government was later to support and which for them
ruled out new development in the villages. Easington RDC continued to
argue for more development in the surrounding villages than the target
of 30,000 for the new town allowed for, under pressure from an active
parish council lobby and press publicity. But its position became
untenable when the coal mining industry began to contract in the early
1950s, as Leishman (1971, p. 134) comments:
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"If there was anything to argue in favour of a new town in Easington
RD, and many arguments to this point in time had been spurious to a
degree, it was that the whole economic basis on which the villages
existed, coal mining employment, was beginning to disappear. With
the NCB's plans for closure and contraction in the coal industry
it was now beyond a doubt that Peterlee's goal would be that of an
industrial as well as a residential focal point for the area. The
RDC's championship of the villages, as the points of growth, whether
it appreciated this or not, was now a lost cause, and its virulent
opposition began to wane."
Following the Public Inquiry into the Easington Town Map in September
1960, the Minister upheld the original intention that none of the
existing villages should expand, although the amount of replacement
housing in ten of them was increased slightly "on grounds of hardship"
(Leishman, 1971, p. 135).
The Labour councillors on Easington RDC saw the new town as a way of
continuing their inter-war and early post-war drives to Improve the
standard of working class housing, but this time control of the process
was to be with central government and this meant that the villages which
were to bear the costs of the policy had little way of influencing the
planning process. 	 Under the Attlee administration, power was
concentrated at the centre in a strong national state through which the
goal of an effectively and rationally managed national capitalist
economy was sought (Miliband, 1969, pp. 98-106; Merrett, 1979, pp. 235-
236). This was expressed very strongly in the 1946 Few Towns Act, under
which new towns were to be designated by the Minister of Town and
Country Planning on the single policy criterion that designation would
be "expedient in the national interest". They were to be developed and
managed by development corporations appointed by and responsible to the
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Minister. Local government had only a consultative role. As Dickens,
Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, p. 223) comment:
"The principal reason for the power and autonomy of the development
corporation was that it was seen by central government as the most
suitable institutional means for implementing new town policy. If
only by implication, the view was that the great economic and social
experiment would succeed only if it were distanced from existing
forms of local state institutions and from the possibly detrimental
influence of local social relations."
Peterlee's development was a source of conflict between different state
agencies (Leishman, 1971, pp. 109-141). It appears that in agreeing to
Peterlee's designation under the New Towns Act, Easington RDC did not
realise the degree to which it would lose control of the project
(Patton, 1978; Robinson, 1983); a situation very similar to district
councils' lack of understanding of the local consequences of Durham
County Council's spatial restructuring strategy, and further evidence of
the experience of modernisation as imposed at local level (see chapter
3). The Labour Minister, Lewis Silkin, appointed only one Easington
councillor and one other local person to the eight-member board of
Peterlee Development Corporation. The board continued to be dominated
by non-local appointees during the 1950s, again a similar situation to
other corporatist modernisation bodies such as Craigavon Development
Commission and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. This, and other
issues such as the board's secretiveness, meant that relations with the
local council remained poor until the 1970s. In addition, delays in
construction due to the new town's location in an area of subsidence,
and the unpopularity of the Corporation's chairperson, led to hostility
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towards the Development Corporation from local people, who had no direct
means of electorally or politically influencing the board.
The approach of the Development Corporation exemplifies the modernist
ideology which accompanied the imposition of spatial restructuring.
Robinson (1983, p. 270) states that although the Corporation chairperson
was progressive in her outlook, she tended to argue the case for
Peterlee by disparaging the villages, and the fact that she was a woman
did not go down well in a male-dominated working class political
culture. He quotes a confidential report by the Development Corporation
which refers to the "male solidarity that now opposes the introduction
of new ideas and ways into the area" (p. 277). She persuaded the
prominent and idealistic architect, Berthold Lubetkin, to Join the
Corporation and lead the design of the new town (85). Although Lubetkin
saw himself as a socialist, he had little regard for working class
culture in the pit villages, writing of "the aridity of the social life"
and that there was "little social and less cultural provision in the
coalfield. There were no facilities for higher education and none for
social advancement. The villages were isolated from the main currents
of contemporary life - backwaters of traditional habits and prejudices"
(quoted in Patton, 1978, p. 221). Further conflict ensued when Lubetkin
clashed with the National Coal Board and the Attlee Government over his
designs for terraced housing and Bath-like crescents leading to a high-
rise town centre, which would have sterilised millions of tons of coal
(Robinson, 1983; (86)). Lubetkin resigned in 1950 and consultants
(Grenfell Baines) were brought in to draft a new Master Plan which would
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accommodate mining activities. The first tenants eventually moved in to
the new town in February 1951.
The protests from the pit communities in Easington Rural District
against enforced decline as a consequence of the Peterlee development
were successful in achieving some replacement housing in many of the
villages that had been faced with a decimating scale of slum clearance.
The community action succeeded in winning over Easington RDC to the
villages' case, although those villages closest to the new town did go
into decline (Robinson, 1983). However, housing shortages in the
villages forced new households, especially newly married couples, to
move to Peterlee. Rents were much higher in the new town than in the
pit villages, and consequently the turnover of tenants was high. The
progressive attitude of the Development Corporation about providing
opportunities for women to take up paid employment outside the hone was
partly so that families could afford the high rents (Robinson, 1975).
4.3 Peterlee: from miners' town to global outpost 
Peterlee is an example of how local working class aspirations for social
reform were accommodated by central government in a programme of spatial
restructuring to accelerate accumulation. The new town was established
to rehouse miners from the pit villages of the eastern part of County
Durham. As noted above, the idea behind it was to concentrate the post-
war housing programme into one urban area in Easington Rural District,
rather than having development scattered in the small pit villages which
were not attractive to new industry and where reproductive costs would
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be high. However, the National Coal Board's needs dominated Peterlee's
objectives in the sane way that transnationals dominated other growth
centres,
The Pepler-MacFarlane Report (1949) specifically warned against
introducing new industries which would compete with mining for male
labour and attract men away from the pits at a time when coal production
was vital to the economy. In addition, the Board of Trade did not want
Peterlee to create labour shortages in other areas by drawing labour
away from them (Leishman, 1971, pp. 60-65). Some provision for new
firms was made, especially to exploit the reserve army of female labour
in the area, but this was part of the expression of national regional
policy in the North East, which was not very strong in the 1950s
(regional policy had to be strengthened when sharp rises in unemployment
rates in the older industrial regions occurred at the end of the decade,
reflecting the start of the contraction of capital accumulation in their
basic industries (Rees and Lambert, 1985, pp. 49-57); see also chapter
2). The massive scale of rationalisations and closures of high-cost
collieries by the National Coal Board from the late 1950s had not been
anticipated when Peterlee was designated. New employment provision had
not been encouraged, leaving the new town largely with only a collapsing
single industry as its economic base.
As a result, Hailsham's 1963 White Paper on economic development in the
North East (Board of Trade, 1963) saw a new role for Peterlee as a
regional growth point in a Tyne-Tees growth zone. However it now had to
compete with Washington new town which was designated as part of the new
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regional strategy. Despite the provision of more industrial land,
improved communications, large-scale factory building and promotional
campaigns (which included the appointment of T. Dan Smith's publicity
company for this purpose, with Smith himself chairperson of the Peterlee
Development Corporation from 1968 to 1970), unemployment continued to
grow. Thus, Peterlee moved from being a means of improving local
housing conditions for workers in a single dominant industry to,
belatedly, a regional growth point in a competitive restructuring
process. This shift in the objectives of the new town, although
particularly dramatic in the case of Peterlee, occurred generally in the
British new towns. Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, p. 223)
comment in relation to the new towns programme:
" •.• the 1950s was a period when material objectives rapidly
transcended the more nebulous and idealist social ones dominant
immediately after the war."
Although the new towns were instruments of the 1945 Labour Government's
radical reformist approach to urban development (with, for example, the
1946 New Towns Act being the only UK legislation to have succeeded in
collecting betterment), in 1951 the newly elected Conservative
Government decided that while existing new towns would be completed, in
future urban growth would be accommodated through voluntary agreements
between local authorities to expand existing towns within the framework
of the 1952 Town Development Act (Hall, 1980, p. 162). But the
unplanned growth of population during the 1950s forced an about-turn,
and in 1961 another Conservative Government began a second phase of new
town designations. However, the new towns programme was finally
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abandoned in the 1970s. In 1977 Labour Environment Minister Peter Shore
began to wind up new town investment, switching public spending to the
inner cities (Potter, 1985; see also chapter 2).
The Conservative Government elected in 1979 decided to retain the
Scottish new town development corporations and to prolong the life of
the development corporations for the new towns in the North East (to
1988 in the case of Peterlee), but this was to use the corporations as
agents of early post-modern policies in housing and planning. Central
government was much more favourably inclined towards these local state
planning bodies, which in fact were very similar to the powerful Urban
Development Corporations set up under the 1980 Local Government,
Planning and Land Act, than elected local government (Grant and Healey,
1985). The development corporations were given the new Job of selling
off their assets (Town and Country Planning Association, 1983).
The unprofitable public housing stock had been transferred from the
development corporations to the local councils under the New Towns
(Amendment) Act 1976. In fact, the stock was often more than
unprofitable - for a number of councils it was a very costly liability
with which they had been saddled. It was the local councils which bore
these costs of the failure of modernisation, not the large corporations
which had benefitted from this accumulation phase. In 1982 local
authorities in Britain claimed that they faced a £96m repair bill as a
result of central government transferring to them housing in the first
generation new towns (Town and Country Planning Association, 1983).
While the local authorities argued that central government should meet
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most of this bill, central government estimated the repairs at £21m and
limited its support to 40 per cent of this. Easington District Council
alone estimated its repair bill for the new town stock transferred to it
from Peterlee Development Corporation to total £37m, but central
government offered to meet no more than t5m of repair costs. This
became a prominent issue in local politics, as discussed below.
In the mid-1960s Peterlee contributed to a housing surplus in South East
Durham, but by the late 1970s there was a housing shortage in the area.
The new town's impact on the villages was very great, both in terns of
forcing some of them to decline and in leaving them with an ageing
population as younger members moved out to find housing. With little
private housing, they were reliant on state housing. Robinson (1983, p.
273) makes a similar conclusion to that of the previous chapter with
regard to the Category "D" villages of South West Durham:
"With Peterlee approaching its target population, and with the
decision to transfer Corporation housing to the local authority
following the creation of the new Easington District, housing policy
was relaxed in the mid-1970s and, at last, substantial redevelopment
of the villages became possible. But the villages had clearly
suffered years of neglect to ensure Peterlee's growth, contrary to
the assurances of Clarke and Silkin. In some cases the change in
policy may have come too late to bring about a complete revival;
some of the more blighted villages have lost many of their shops and
services, and these are unlikely to be regained" (p. 273).
Peterlee did not reach its population target of 30,000 until the end of
the 1970s. Development was slowed down by the need to phase the
programme with mining, by problems with the Development Corporation's
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private building contractors and by the stultification of industrial
growth.
Peterlee's early housing phases were built to traditional designs, but
in the late 1950s the Development Corporation engaged the modern artist
Victor Passmore "to provide a new housing 'aesthetic'" and "put Peterlee
'on the map' (Robinson, 1983, p. 271). Industrialised construction was
adopted in the 1960s to great cost, as recounted by one of the new
town's long-standing tenant activists, whom it is worth quoting at
length:
"The first houses in Peterlee were built of old-fashioned red clay
bricks. By the standards of the late forties they were good houses
and to anyone living in a colliery house they were a dream cone
true. They look a bit shabby now and in need of repair but they
don't have design faults.
Then industrialised houses became fashionable and were deemed by the
Ministry of Housing to be just the thing for New Towns. Peterlee
Development Corporation built whole estates of pre-fabricated, flat
roofed, concrete houses. They were cheaper than traditional houses,
quicker to build, and filled with all modern amenities. However,
they had one problem. They were riddled with design faults. Pools
of water collected on the flat roofs, and in many houses water
poured through the windows whenever it rained. These together with
heating problems meant many houses suffered from severe damp.
A further cross Peterlee had to bear was the appointment of Victor
Passmore as artistic adviser. He conceived the idea of using black
bricks on some estates to symbolise the darkness of the past and
white bricks on others to symbolise the bright sunlit future that
awaited us. Unfortunately the bricks were made of sand and lime and
were not suitable for the sea air.
Trouble first began in Sunny Blunts where tenants had to be moved
out of their hones while extensive rebuilding took place.
Now Peterlee is fast becoming derelict, Easington Council who took
over the houses four years ago have a mammoth task ahead. Flat
roofs have to be replaced with low pitched aluminium roofs which
improves the appearance of the houses if nothing else. The pebble
dash facing that fell off during a very severe winter has never been
replaced and some houses are in a dangerous condition.
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The residents of Matterdale and Braithwaite estates have been moved
out of their houses for structural repairs and the tenants of
Westmoreland Rise are about to suffer the same fate. On all three
estates the roof tiles have become porous, the foundations are
slipping and have to be stitched. The windows are to be replaced
and in some houses a new damp course is to be inserted. Finally the
symbolic white bricks are to have a protective coat of paint.
Brandling Court in the Town Centre has to be put up for sale as a
single entity. If there are no buyers it will have to cone down.
So if you know of a fool who is anxious to be parted from his money
send him along. Easington Council will be delighted to meet him."
(87).
Peterlee was part of a modernisation strategy which broke up the
"backward" solidaristic relations of the pit villages and displaced much
of their populations to mass state housing labour pools. On a wider
scale, as discussed in chapter 2, this strategy had the effect of
undermining the organisation of the working class at grassroots level in
communities and trade unions. In line with the general social ethos of
the post-war new towns, Silkin saw one of the purposes of Peterlee to be
to introduce a "social nix" into the area to encourage "class harmony".
Despite the 1952 Master Plan's use of the concept of neighbourhood units
(Peterlee Development Corporation, 1952), communities failed to emerge
with the high turnover of tenants, the increasing penetration of
televisions, the lack of local social facilities, especially for youths
and young families who often continued their social life in the villages
from which they had moved, and Easington Council's neglect of the area
(Robinson, 1983). The new town's role moved from being a modern re-
housing focus for miners and their families in the villages to a growth
centre in the central state's regional strategy for renewing conditions
for capitalist accumulation in the North East, drawing in labour
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displaced by industrial decline and redevelopment from both the local
area and the region.
4.4 Peterlee: a new town in decline 
From the mid-1970s most of the UK's new towns started to encounter
difficulty in attracting new industry (Town and Country Planning
Association, 1983). In 1980 the effects of plant closures and the
Conservative Government's housing policies on Peterlee, with its large
state housing sector which accommodated an increasingly redundant labour
pool, were causing serious problems.
In common with other growth centres in the North East, Peterlee's
employment base in the 1960s became dominated by transnationals, mostly
British and American firms, as the region's traditional industries
declined (Austrin and Beynon, 1979). Among the large firms that
expanded subsidiaries in Peterlee were Associated Biscuits, Clix
Fastners (IMI), IBM and Tudor Foods, all based on Fordist patterns of
production. In the mid-1970s factory closures led to escalating
unemployment in the North East generally, affecting both old-established
firms and the companies which had moved into the area under the planning
policies of the 1960s,
Table 4.1 shows the growth of unemployment in the new town, rising by 72
per cent between 1971 and 1981, and much more sharply for women which
many of the new industries predominantly employed. This compares with
percentage increases of 91 per cent in the North Region as a whole, and
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88 per cent in Great Britain. Peterlee had a higher rate of
unemployment in 1981 than both the region and the British average, but
the rate of increase over the previous decade was not as high, and the
new town's unemployment rate was lower than other Employment Exchange
Areas in Easington District. However, clearly the new town was badly
affected by deindustrialisation despite its growth centre status.
Table 4.1: PERCENTAGES OF PETERLEE'S ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OUT
OF WORK, WITH REGIONAL AND NATIONAL COMPARISONS, 1971-1981
Peterlee	 North Region	 Great Britain
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
1971 10.4 6.0 8.9 7.8 5.3 6.9 5.4 4.9 5.2
1981 17.7 11.5 15.3 15.8 9.0 13.2 11.3 7.4 9.8
Sources: see note 88.
The early 1980s saw a series of manufacturing closures in Peterlee. In
June and July of 1982, 295 redundancies were announced by DJB
Engineering Ltd., Cummins Engine Co. Ltd. and Optilon Ltd., representing
a six per cent loss of industrial jobs in Peterlee over just two months
(89). Unemployment in the new town then stood at over 3,000.
Peterlee illustrates very well the growth centre policy of the state
creating conditions for accumulation without interfering in the
accumulation process itself. For example, a glossy brochure published
by Peterlee Development Corporation in 1975 highlighted the pool of
labour available in the new town:
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"Adaptable labour - male and female - is waiting to go to work for
you. East Durham has an unemployment rate twice the national
average and 8,000 Jobs are required in Peterlee by 1985.
Much of the labour available is semi-skilled, but the record of the
North Easterner in acquiring the modern skills needed in today's
high technology industry proves they are ready and able to retrain."
(90).
However, by 1981 only 5,005 jobs had been created in Peterlee since the
1952 Master Plan, despite the Master Plan's target of 8,000 jobs by
1971. Most of the 250,000 square metres of industrial floorspace
provided by the Development Corporation was unused. Despite this
failure, the Corporation continued to stress the new town's
"attractions" with, for example, its chairperson claiming that:
"Among our advantages is a resourceful and versatile workforce ...
Industrial relations are excellent ... the men and women of Peterlee
have a record of productivity second to none 	 shiftwork presents
no problem ..." (91)
Peterlee Development Corporation's efforts to attract industry included
representations to central government about including the new town in a
second round of enterprise zones.
New towns had been built on the assumption that the national economy
would expand and new infrastructure would be necessary to accommodate
accumulation. But many sectors experienced a problem of over-
accumulation from the late 1960s, and restructuring during the 1970s saw
large-scale Job-shedding. It became increasingly clear that there had
been an over-investment in housing provision in new towns located in
peripheral regions that were now hardly growing or actually declining,
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causing voids in the state housing stock to develop on a large scale in
some areas (as in Craigavon) where there were not housing shortages, a
problem aggravated by unpopular housing forms that were difficult-to-
let. Many of the estates in the peripheral new towns thus cane to
accommodate a growing stagnant reserve army of labour that could not
find housing anywhere else, rather than a central working class as had
been anticipated when the new towns were planned (Byrne and Parson,
1983).
In common with other new towns, Peterlee's housing stock was dominated
by state housing. Such an "imbalance" was thought to add to the
Instability of the area and during the 1970s a growing owner-occupied
sector was encouraged by the council partly to reduce the scale of its
"management problem" (see section 4.5 below). This is illustrated by
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: PERCENTAGES OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS IN PETERLEE IN THE THREE
MAIN HOUSING TENURES, WITH REGIONAL AND NATIONAL COMPARISONS, 1971-
1981.
Owner Occupied Rented from
Council or New Town
Rented from
Private Landlord
or Housing Assoc.
1971 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981
Peterlee 4 14 94 85 2 1
North Region 42 45 39 40 19 12
Britain 51 56 28 31 21 13
Sources: see note 92.
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The population of Easington District had been declining rapidly since
the 1960s, and fell from over 109,000 in 1971 to 101,800 in 1981 (93).
This decline was concentrated in the old pit villages, and Peterlee
itself grew by 4 per cent between 1971 and 1981. The number of
households, however, increased in the district as a whole. This was
largely due to Easington's ageing population, which meant growing
pressure for special needs housing and health care, especially for an
old mining population, yet central government policies were severely
restricting expenditure on relevant provision (94). Easington District
faced a serious unemployment situation, especially with the continuing
decline of the mining industry. In 1982 the number of jobs in the
District was below the level of 1951, and there was little prospect of
growth in any sector (95).
4.5 The working class pays for Peterlee: rent increases and remedial 
works.
The vast majority of Easington's unfit old private housing stock had
been replaced shortly after local government reorganisation in 1974 as a
result of post-war modernisation. However, by the late 1970s a major
problem confronting the local council had become the deterioration of
its existing, increasingly residualised, modern state housing. Much of
this stock, especially in Peterlee, had a question mark over its future
if central government cuts continued.
Peterlee's state housing was transferred from the Development
Corporation to Easington District Council in 1978 following the New
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Towns (Amendment) Act. One councillor was expelled from the Labour
Party for resisting the transfer. The massive repair bill that was came
with the stock put pressure on the rents. In November 1980 Easington
increased the rents of its 18,000 properties by 42.5 per cent (96). The
council argued that the rise was necessary to service a £1.3 million
debt on the Housing Revenue Account, brought about by Conservative
Government policy to end general subsidies and transfer more of the cost
of housing to individual consumers. The decision sparked off an angry
reaction from the tenants. The Essington District Housing Action
Campaign (EDHAC) was set up following a public meeting about the rent
increase and with Involvement from the North East Tenants' Organisation
(NETO) (97). The Action Committee argued that the rise was
unnecessarily high, and that the financial burden of the debt should be
spread across council tenants, owner-occupiers and industrialists so
that the rise would be more in line with inflation. A spokesperson for
the Action Committee, following a public meeting about the rent increase
at which the tenants felt the councillors present could not explain why
such a large increase was being implemented, stated:
"Although the area is solid Labour, and will continue to be, we feel
that the Labour Council has let working people down. We would have
expected the local Councillors to resist the increase and rally
people against the Government.
By their complacency they have jeopardised their stronghold on the
Council - people will not be so ready to support Labour, but vote
for independents or the Liberals next tine. However, I hope Labour
Councillors realise they must start to resist this Government and
the cuts, to get people behind them." (98)
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Due substantially to the housing issue and reaction to the Labour
establishment on Easington District Council, Liberals and Independents
took control of (the largely powerless) Peterlee Town Council on a
protest vote, but there was little threat to Labour's position in the
larger District Council. Furthermore, sustained protest failed to
emerge about the rent increases despite their scale, which is
illustrated by the following figures for the rent of a 3 bedroom council
house in the new town (99):
February 1980 
	
 £12.50 per week
November 1980 	  £17.00 per week
April 1981 	  £22.50 per week
November 1981 	
 £25.00 per week
The increases were only partly absorbed by benefit or wage rises and
increasing tenant debts resulted. On 23 February 1981 rent arrears
totalled £126,840 (100). Fifteen distress warrants had been issued in
Peterlee and a further ten were due to be issued in other areas. Goods
had been seized on three occasions.
At a public meeting on 3 April 1981 members of the Action Committee
decided to withhold the £.2 a week rent rise due to begin the following
week in an effort to mobilise protests (101). They also decided to
picket the local rent office, and promised to put up candidates for the
next council election, arguing that the council was not representing the
tenants. The meeting was not well attended, although initially the
campaigns and demonstrations organised as a result of it were well
supported. About a hundred tenants withheld the rent increase and
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picketed the rent office to get the support of other tenants but,
according to one of the activists, there was no effective organisation
and the protest petered out (102). A small group of five tenants
continued with the Action Committee, although the focus of activity
shifted to organising social events. Further public meetings were very
badly attended and the protests collapsed.
The Action Committee received no support from either the Development
Corporation's Social Development Office or local authority community
workers. It carried out widespread leafletting to try and keep up local
interest, but the group collapsed by the summer of 1981. One of its
initiators considered that a reason for the failure to maintain tenants'
involvement in the action was that there was not enough community work
input, and clearly there were few resources to support tenant
organisation (103).
While action on the rent issue was short-lived and attracted little
support, problems connected with remedial works to Peterlee's defective
housing stock in the early 1980s resulted in more success, largely
because of the scale of protest about the physical disruptions involved
and the fact that the council needed the co-operation of the tenants in
its attempts to safeguard its housing stock. Design faults, structural
defects and subsidence were seriously affecting much of its housing.
Conflict with tenants developed about the council's organisation of the
remedial programme which was started to tackle these problems, including
lack of consultation, claims about the poor standard of work and
materials used, and the costs of internal re-decoration.
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There was a variety of problems as the following examples show. During
work to replace flat roofs in one area, rain penetration caused
extensive damage to carpets, wallpaper, clothing and furniture. Old
people faced considerable disruption. The tenants called in the local
Labour MP and threatened legal action against the council in an attempt
to obtain compensation (104). A twelve year old "executive housing"
development was found to be built on sinking sand. People began to
refuse to move in, and as voids built up, vandalism developed and other
tenants moved out. The council unsuccessfully attempted to avoid
demolition by offering the estate for less than £30,000 to private
developers and then to a local church. Over £170,000 was outstanding in
debt charges on the estate, and it was eventually demolished. Some
houses stood for many months boarded up. Major remedial works could
take over lh years and some improvements, such as heating systems which
were a common source of complaints, were not included (105). These
costs - remedial works, cheap sales, voids and demolition - were major
contributions to the council's debt which, under the new housing subsidy
system introduced in 1980, forced it to make its tenants pay for
mistakes made by the Development Corporation. The 1981/82 HIP allocation
to Easington, which included provision for remedial works in Peterlee,
was 70 per cent less than the amount requested, and less than the
allocation received for 1980/81 (106).
A public meeting about major works to 117 dwellings in the Acre Rigg IV
area of Peterlee was held by the council on 12 March 1981, but "the
results were not entirely satisfactory for the Council or the tenants
involved" (107). In view of what it regarded as disruption by a small
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group of activists, the council decided not to hold any further public
meetings and to manage tenant participation instead through information
brochures and an on-site information caravan, which was in fact poorly
used and withdrawn. However an action committee organised a further
public meeting on 30 April 1981 (108). Some of the tenants had been
temporarily rehoused in caravans in poor conditions and with only very
basic facilities. Many tenants were anxious about when they would be
rehoused and the cost of internal redecoration. There was general
concern and lack of knowledge about tenants' rights. One of the most
active local tenants proposed organising a deputation to the council
demanding a grant for redecoration and better facilities in the
caravans.
Tenant agitation was successful in speeding up the council's programming
of its work, and the Housing Department included "tenants' aggravation"
In deciding on priorities (109). But by June 1981 tenants were still
demanding a meeting with the council to discuss the improvement
programme, which it now emerged would last for three years. One of the
tenants, a long-standing trade unionist and socialist, was considering
standing against the Labour Party in the council elections the following
May as an Independent. In the event someone else stood, who had
organised action on the design faults, and was elected as an Independent
member. By August 1982 the housing improvements were well underway.
However, dissatisfaction developed with the standard of work undertaken
by the Council's Direct Labour Organisation (which had submitted the
lowest tenders) and tenants were apparently pleased that two contracts
had recently been awarded to large private building companies (110).
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Damage to furniture and other belongings caused by rain penetration
during the improvement works led to successful claims against the
council. Tenants were also successful in securing redecoration grants
despite the council's initial opposition (111).
4.5 Easington District Council: managing the cuts 
Robinson (1983, p. 280) makes the point that Peterlee Development
Corporation was not accountable to the local electorate. Not only did
the local council criticise this situation, but so also did some of the
Corporation's own staff. A highly critical report by two of its
researchers was published in the mid-1970s quoting the results of a
Durham University survey which revealed that all was not well in the new
town's housing estates:
"29% of respondents considered heating to be bad; 23% considered
house design to be bad; 33% considered the quality to be bad, and
30% considered the privacy to be bad ... Failings are evident in the
location and management of facilities within the town ..." (112)
The report went on to state that the Development Corporation had no
strategy, made little effort to attract industry, failed to collect
information about the town's needs and problems, operated very
restrictive housing management practices, lacked any sympathy for the
villages and was divorced and distant from the local community. It
stated:
"People feel they have no means of influencing the Corporation; the
Durham University survey found that 87% of respondents felt unable
to influence its decisions. It had no established channels of
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contact with the town	 and our interviews revealed the existence
of deep frustration in people's efforts to get through to the
Corporation." (113)
The authors claimed that "the exercise was to win more land and more
life for the Corporation", a similar conclusion to that reached by Bob
Mullan in his study of Stevenage new town (Mullan, 1980). Mullan
describes the "symbiotic relationship" between industry, especially the
British Aircraft Corporation, and the Development Corporation:
"... although it is clearly evident that the Corporation wanted an
extension of its own 'life', this was made possible by the
industrialists urging for more housing (for the future) and
therefore land, together with an industrial structure which
effectively reduced the Corporation to a position of handmaiden" (p.
259)
Mullan illustrates the congruence of interests that existed between
capital and the new town development corporation which, given the limits
on state intervention in a capitalist economy, was inevitable. Even
Easington Council recognised this when, in 1982, it opposed the decision
to wind up Peterlee Development Corporation in 1985 (later extended to
1988). This, it argued, would deprive the area of a crucial industrial
promotion body (114).
The dimensions of the housing problems confronting Easington in the
early 1980s were set out in its HIP submissions (115). The 1981 Housing
Strategy Statement formed the strategy basis of its bids, and clearly
identified the new post-modernisation climate facing the council:
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"The past year has been characterised by fundamental and far
reaching changes in national housing and fiscal policy which have
affected the Housing Investment Programme and the Council's ability
to implement policies and programmes." (116)
In common with other housing authorities in England and Vales, Easington
suffered a large cutback in its 1981/82 housing capital allocation (14
per cent). This was a particularly daunting cut for the council in view
of the 6,500 houses built by the Development Corporation in Peterlee
which it estimated needed a massive £45m to rectify structural and
design faults. Only £1.7 million was allocated by the Department of the
Environment Regional Controller to this remedial work in 1981/82.
Overall, the council estimated in 1981 that 49 per cent of its own stock
and 27 per cent of private sector stock needed improvement or renovation
work. Cutbacks meant that capitalised repairs to the council stock were
now restricted to natters where safety and the authority's statutory
obligations were involved (except, significantly, for expenditure on
Improvement for Sale). All assistance to the North Housing Association,
with which Easington's relations had not been particularly good, was
curtailed following it becoming a registered housing association. With
the council's money for new build drastically reduced, there was some
hope that Housing Corporation funding would help meet needs for new
build. The council's role as a housing authority was being undermined -
a feature of post-modern housing policy which was to become clearer with
subsequent legislation in the 1980s.
Easington District Council was essentially a conservative housing
authority, with members tending to adopt a management rather than policy
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approach to housing, and leaving policy initiatives (such as taking up
the central government's Improvement for Sale scheme) to officers (117).
It had been promoting scattered sites throughout the district for
private builders since its Easington Interim Housing Study of 1975,
although this study did conclude that the need for further housing would
have to be mainly met by council housing. Easington had been offering
long-term tenants discount terns to buy their council houses since 1978.
Many tenants bought in the wake of a £4.5m council programme to install
solid fuel central heating; sales which the council supported even
though the waiting list at the end of 1980 stood at 3,824 (118). The
council had been selling a large number of its houses prior to the 1980
Housing Act following its adoption of a policy of selling to sitting
tenants in 1978, and continued to do so afterwards. Ironically, the
effect of the 1980 Housing Act was to slow sales down due to lengthier
administrative procedures (119). However, the Act was welcomed by the
council in assisting with its policy of promoting hone ownership. In
1981/82 it extended this privatisation into the development of several
"low cost" hone ownership initiatives. Earlier promotional exercises
had resulted in Vimpey building a large estate in Seaham, tapping a big
commuter market of people who worked in Sunderland. A 700 unit private
estate was also built in Peterlee, at prices ranging from t15,500 to
£60,000. In addition, in accordance with central government policy, the
Development Corporation was promoting land for private development.
Easington responded to the cuts of 1981/82 with close financial
monitoring. It also took up Improvement for Sale and made use of
Building Society finance. The council had been attempting to keep rents
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down (with some negative impact on repairs and maintenance), but one of
Its officers expressed some concern that in the longer-term sales would
put pressure on rents and marginalise council housing as a tenure for
"management problem" benefit recipients (120). The council also took
steps to keep its Direct Labour Organisation intact and stable following
the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act, constructing its HIP
programme so that there were opportunities for the DLO to tender. It
continued discretionary Improvement grants, having commitments to supply
grants to National Coal Board properties the NCB wanted to sell. But
the council did not declare any Housing Action Areas or General
Improvement Areas, preferring not to ear-mark areas for improvement. It
was having to be increasingly selective and short-term in its housing
action.
The effects of the shift from "modern" to "early post-modern" housing
policy in Easington can be seen from examining its housing expenditure
(121). This shows a clear movement from new build to renovating the
existing stock, although by far the largest amounts were for renovating
the council stock. This should, however, be seen in conjunction with
the sales policy. In 1977/78, 73 per cent of Easington's HIP
expenditure was allocated to new housebuilding and slum clearance, and
27 per cent to renovation work (including grants and loans). By 1982/83
new build and slum clearance had fallen to 12 per cent and renovation
work grown to 88 per cent. Thirty-two per cent of HIP expenditure in
1981/82 was on council house improvements in the district generally, 25
per cent on remedial works in the new town estates, 5 per cent on
capitalised repairs and 10 per cent on improvement grants.
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The Easington District Plan published in 1982, was a clear departure
from the modernisation policy of the 1960s (122). It argued that the
shortage of sites for private "executive housing" was making the
district less attractive for investors, and also asserted the need for
more private housing generally to achieve a "tenure balance". With the
county structure plan's settlement categoristion policy rejected by
central government in 1980 following the Examination in Public,
Easington saw down-market private housing as a way not only of
correcting "tenure imbalance", but also of stemming the out-migration of
young people from the villages and assisting the return of older people
to their original hones. There was also a commuter market it hoped to
tap. Much of the council's land holdings were in the villages as a
result of earlier clearance. Now private developers were to be
encouraged to make proposals and tender for low cost housing schemes on
these sites. Costs would be reduced, the council argued, by the
prospect of quick returns and "economies in design" (123).
Easington was the first local authority in the country to tackle the
difficult-to-let problens of former Development Corporation stock
through Improvement for Sale. This opportunity was enthusiastically
taken up by council officers following the introduction of Circular
20/80, "Local Authority Improvement for Sale Scheme" (124), t125,000
was allocated for 1981/82 to improve new town properties for sale.
Other areas, however, could not be "saved": 53 dwellings in Peterlee
were demolished in 1981/82 due to structural and stability problems,
with costs borne by the Housing Revenue Account, including outstanding
loan debt. The council suspended consideration of the nature and extent
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of any further demolition pending the outcome of its claim under the
1981 New Towns Act for Exchequer assistance. Another problem it faced
was the unpopularity of remedial work, with its fairly low profit
margins, among private contractors.
The council was very concerned about the falling level of support from
central government. The 1982 HIP bid stressed that capital receipts and
privatisation would not offset diminishing capital allocations from
central government, particularly as the potential for future sales was
United owing to the fact that over 40 per cent of the council's tenants
were receiving supplementary benefit or rent rebate, unemployment was
rising and much of the stock was unsellable (125). Section 51 of the
1981 New Towns Act made available central government assistance with
expenditure required to renovate former Development Corporation
dwellings, and Easington made a claim for £45m at April 1980 prices over
ten years to tackle defects in the 6,500 dwellings affected. The
submitted programme, it added, would be subject to revision "in the
light of changing priorities caused by structural deterioration and
tenant problems" (126). As was noted earlier, central government
assistance was to cone nowhere near the figure bid for. In general, the
housing situation, like the employment situation, was seen to have a
very gloomy future by the council. In 1982 the Easington District Plan
stated:
"Due to the further reduction in housing finance proposed by the
Government, there is likely to be a reduced rate of improvement in
both the public and private sectors over the Plan period. Given the
serious nature and scale of housing problems in the District
(approximately one in three dwellings in need of improvement), the
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prospects over the Plan period are bleak unless Central Government
policy is changed." (127)
4.1 R inTmary 
This chapter has shown, with particular reference to Bessemer Park and
Peterlee, how the working class experience of the growth centres was one
of imposed restructuring followed by decline. This process masre2ated
to the position of these two localities in the accumulation strategies
of transnationals. Bessemer Park moved from being a growth centre's
labour pool for branch plants to a depressed "problem estate" once
employment in these plants declined. Initial attempts to tackle its
problems through community work failed. The decision to demolish the
flats was taken by the local council due to the financial costs of
managing and maintaining an estate that only the most desperate would
live in when "escape" within the district to traditional housing was
possible. Organised tenant protest was virtually absent and appeared to
play no part in this decision. This absence seems to have had much to
do with the way the Bessemer Park "problem" was managed by the local
state. The contrast with the intensity of community action in many
Category "D" villages, and in the old neighbourhoods of Langley Park and
Framwellgate Moor (chapters 5 and 6) is very marked. These were to a
considerable extent "organised", "community-based" civil societies, or
"oppositional cultures" in the context of modernisation, where state
management had penetrated to a very limited extent and where local
populations stood to lose not only use values but also exchange values
if modernisation was imposed. Bessemer Park, however, was never an
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"organised" community, despite efforts by the local state to organise it
on its terns. It was created by the modernisation process but rendered
peripheral by capitalist disorganisation. It was potentially disruptive
but subject to a high degree of direct management by housing and social
work services.
The history of Peter-lee illustrates particularly well the social reform
component of modernisation, but again imposed from above, within a
framework dominated by the needs of capital. There were strong protests
in the pit communities which bore the cost of its sub-regional impact.
The new town shows why modernisation had to be undertaken by a
corporatist agency owing to the vulnerability of the elected local
council to local pressure. Massive physical restructuring made a
"contest of domains" between the state and local civil society
inevitable. Therefore, a state institution insulated from local civil
society was much better placed to undertake restructuring than elected
local government. In addition, the local council later had to manage
the costs of the failure of modernisation in the context of a shortage
of housing that people wanted to live in, falling resources from central
government and the local tax base, and the marginalisation of state
housing. Privatisation was seen as one solution. The community action
response to the increasing individualisation of housing costs through
substantial rent rises was very weak. Again, the disorganisation of the
"community" through unemployment, narginalisation, privatisation and
management of the local population appeared to be a significant factor
here, including the individualisation of tenants' problems through the
mechanisms of housing and social security administration (see Kraushaar,
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1981; also Byrne, 1982; 1986; Mellor, 1985). However, organised tenant
protest about housing improvements was more effective, but in this case
the local council had an interest in achieving the co-operation of
tenants in its efforts to safeguard the housing it could not sell or
demolish, but for which management and maintenance costs would escalate
without structural improvements.
The broad term "modernisation" has been used to describe the large
scale, technologically rational and functionally efficient ethos of
housing and planning policies as they emerged in the post-war local
state in County Durham in response to the organised, Fordist pattern of
production in the transnationals locating in the area. However, it is
clear that this misses much of the detail of policy in this period. The
traditional housing of the early development of Peterlee, its late entry
Into the transnational growth centre strategy, the national policy-
making context, especially with regard to the changes in central
government attitudes to "modern" mass housing (see Dunleavy, 1981) and
the separate failures of industrial modernisation pursued by national
governments (see Massey, 1984), the abandonment of the new towns
programme in the 1950s and the shift to the "modernisation" of inner
cities in 1977, are among the factors which complicate analysis.
Nevertheless, it is still argued that "modernisation" is a good
description of post-war housing and planning up to the 1970s in County
Durham. After several years of transition and conflict which culminated
in a political resolution with the victory of the New Right, a
fundamentally different set of urban policies were implemented in the
County through an increasing "nationalization" of housing and planning
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policies, constituting what has been referred to as "early post-
modernisation". The main elements of these policies have been
identified as an emphasis on the recommodification of housing and
flexible, entrepreneurial planning.
It is significant that in the early 1980s it was not possible to find
any cases of residents organising to defend older private housing
against the redevelopment of "near slums" in Easington, both because the
council had largely adjusted its policies to the early post-modern
climate which could to a large extent accommodate anti-modernisation
attitudes and because of the extensive impact of earlier modernisation.
The council's preoccupations lay elsewhere with the major problem of
finding the resources for remedial works to its defective "modern" new
town housing, and what weak community action there was occurred in these
residualised parts of the new town housing sector. But in other
districts in County Durham "modernisation" remained a strong influence
on local housing policy. The next two chapters turn to the two main
examples of this which were encountered during the research.
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CHAPTER 5
COMMUNITY ACTION IN LANGLEY PARK. DERWENTSIDE. 
5.1 Railway Street: community action against "residual" modernism
This chapter is an account of the struggle of the residents of Railway
Street, a stone-built terrace in the ex-pit village of Langley Park,
County Durham, with the local authority, Labour-controlled Derwentside
District Council, in the late 1970s-early 1980s. It illustrates how
"residual modernism" continued in this area, i.e. how a local council
attempted to pursue a strategy that while typical of the "modernisation
era" was in conflict with many principles of "post-modern" housing
policy as described in chapter 2. Derwentside Council wanted to clear
Railway Street, a terrace of small houses built in the 1870s, and
displace the residents to "better" housing conditions. The residents,
most of whom belonged to the Railway Street Association (RSA), opposed
the council's redevelopment plans and pressed for the retention and
improvement of the Street. For many residents a housing co-operative
was the vehicle by which they wanted to achieve this. Opposition to
redevelopment led to a public local inquiry in February 1981. This
provided an opportunity to examine the role of the inquiry in
"adjusting" local housing policies.
By the end of the 1970s this type of inquiry about redevelopment had
become relatively rare in contrast to the "modernisation era" and
especially the 1960s, The shift in the wider housing policy climate was
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illustrated by the vehicles that were available to the Railway Street
residents to pursue their objectives, particularly Housing Corporation
funding, the bias towards preserving and rehabilitating owner-occupied
housing, encouraging self-help, and the extent of local and media
(including TV) sympathy for campaigns against redevelopment. In fact,
Railway Street's status as a survivor of the "modernist era" gave it a
role as a filming location for a number of historical television dramas
(128).
Railway Street had a lot of support in the village and from less
organised groups facing similar problems elsewhere in the county (129).
While there was always strong local support for the Labour Party in
national elections in Langley Park, there was a feeling in the village
against what was perceived as a lack of interest in the locality by a
district council dominated by the main urban centre of Consett several
miles away. This was reflected in the fact that the parish council was
under Liberal and Independent control. The Labour district councillors'
handling of the Railway Street dispute confirmed many residents' views
that they were subject to the decisions of a party machine which had
lost contact with any working class base in small communities. The
hostility against Labour councillors from the Residents' Association,
and their identification with local Independent councillors, meant that
Railway Street received little support from any section of the Labour
Party.
The arguments of this chapter are that despite the national climate of
"rehabilitation" and particularly the provisions of the 1980 Housing Act
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aimed at retaining the existing stock of older private housing,
Derwentside continued with a "modernising" housing policy based on
redevelopment. Community action in Railway Street can be understood as
having the sane cause, in a rather different context, as that described
in the previous two chapters. This cause was the imposition by
"officialdom" of a policy to replace "slums". While not now part of a
spatial restructuring strategy, the approach bore many similarities with
the corporatist management and social reformism of that era, and
appeared to be a continuation of it within the functions of the district
council. While Labour leaders in County Durham argued in the 1950s and
'60s that "modernisation" was in the interests of the working class - an
argument questioned in previous chapters - this position was even less
convincing in the early post-modern context of the early 1980s, when so
much modern state housing was "difficult-to-live-in" and the attributes
of many areas of older private housing, such as community life, local
amenities and low costs, were seen as particularly attractive.
The next section examines the nature of Derwentide's housing policy in
the late 1970s and early '80s before turning to the RSA's struggle.
5.2 Derwentside Council's attempt to continue a modernist housing 
policy 
As discussed in chapter 2, the 1970s were a period of transition from
"modernism" to "post-modernise in housing policy. When, under the 1974
Housing Act, local authorities were required to develop local
improvement strategies for their older housing stock, rather than
-213-
redevelopment, the new Derwentside District Council reviewed the
condition of older housing in its area. The council inherited a
relatively old stock containing many substandard dwellings. Much of it
had been built for coal, iron and steel workers in the nineteenth
century.
In 1976 the County Planning Department estimated that a third of
Derwentside's housing stock was built before 1919, and reported that the
1971 Census showed that the availability of the three standard amenities
was generally, apart from the provision of hot water, worse than that
for the county as a whole (130). In 1971 over 30 per cent of all
households lacked or shared an internal WC. The council's 1974 survey
found many houses in a state of disrepair. Properties identified as
being beyond "economic rehabilitation" were listed in a report dated
July 1974 which was approved by the council. Railway Street was
Included in this list of clearance area houses, and any entitlement to
renovation grants was withdrawn. Such action had not been the intention
of the 1974 Housing Act!
Derwentside applied Part III of the 1957 Housing Act, a modernising
piece of consolidating legislation. Under this Act, to be included in a
clearance area a house must be unfit or inJurous to health, but need not
be incapable of being made fit at reasonable cost. The criteria applied
are solely physical, in contrast to the social factors and community
orientation of the 1974 Housing Act's provisions for housing renewal (an
early piece of "post-modern" legislation) (McAuslan, 1980, pp. 101-102;
Cullingworth, 1985, pp. 267-268).
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Derwentside adopted a policy of clearing "substandard" private housing
and rehousing displaced households in council accommodation. It
intended to clear 1,889 dwellings over a ten year period, 5.5 per cent
of the total stock in 1976. The council wanted to build new council
houses to modern standards with gardens, and in 1975 declared its
intention to erect 700 houses a year. The dramatic impact of central
government cuts in the 1970s on this objective is illustrated by Table
5.1:
Table 5.1: LOCAL AUTHORITY DWELLINGS STARTED IN DERWENTSIDE, 1972-1981*
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
646 257 241 422 298 150 176 78 9 82
* Pre-1974 figures derived from amalgamations of local authority areas
to approximate Derwentside District
source: see note 131.
Against a background of a slowly declining total population but an
increasing number of households, Derwentside planned to continue a
steady increase in the size of its total housing stock through its
building programme. Between 1967 and 1981 the number of public sector
completions exceeded the private sector, although during the last three
years of this period activity in both sectors slumped to a low level.
Output after 1975 fell far short of the 700 per year target, even
combining the private and public sectors. In addition, by 1980 the
council had cleared 1,029 dwellings, only 55 per cent of the 1984 target
set in 1974, which would not be achieved by a considerable margin.
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Table 5.2 shows how Derwentside's scale of demolitions adjusted to
national pressures to retain older housing a few years after the decline
in house completions brought about by reduced resources at the end of
modernisation, and this was significant from the point of view of the
present case study, for the RSA argued that the two were indeed out of
line.
Table 5.2: CHANGES IN THE HOUSING STOCK, DERWENTSIDE DISTRICT COUNCIL,
1961-1981
Completions 
Year	 Public Private Total Clearance Net change Total stock
1961 174 215 389 68 321 31,232
1971 523 215 738 233 505 33,159
1981 112 71 183 208 -25 35,100
1982/83 89 53 142 36 106 35,300
Sources: see note 132.
The lack of growth which underlay the abandonment of modernisation is
reflected in the County Planning Department's forecasts towards the end
of the 1970s. In 1976 the Department estimated that the future "demand"
for housing in Derwentside in 1981 would be 34,314 houses, and that in
1991 it would be 33,603. Since the total stack in 1974 was estimated at
34,684, it concluded that "no more houses need to be built to meet
projected demand" (133), a very different scenario compared with the
1960s and early '70s.
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The nature of Derwentside's housing activity compared with the average
for the other County Durham district councils during the 1970s is
illustrated in Table 5.3:
Table 5.3: COMPARISONS BETWEEN DERWENTSIDE DISTRICT COUNCIL AND THE
REST OF DURHAM COUNTY DISTRICT COUNCILS (EXCLUDING NEW TOWNS): SLUM
CLEARANCE, DISCRETIONARY RENOVATION GRANTS, PRIVATE DWELLINGS STARTED
AND LOCAL AUTHORITY DWELLINGS STARTED, 1972-1981.
per 10.000 of total population
197211973*1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
SLUM CLEARANCE
Derwentside 35 26 18 21 29 4 42 8 *** ***
The rest** 18 17 6 22 10 8 9 7 *** ***
DISCRETIONARY
RENOVATION
GRANTS
Derwentside 90 120 58 33 24 21 16 24 6 3
The rest 83 82 42 28 24 22 29 20 18 7
PRIVATE
DWELLINGS
STARTED
Derwentside 22 12 5 9 19 20 6 16 3 4
The rest 28 39 20 23 26 28 27 28 13 15
COUNCIL
DWELLINGS
STARTED
Derwentside 69 27 26 46 33 16 20 9 1 9
The rest 24 22 29 28 20 15 15 8 6 3
* Amalgamations of pre-1974 local authority areas to approximate post-
1974 local authority areas.
** Averages for the remaining seven Durham County district councils.
*** Data unavailable.
Sources: see note 134.
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Derwentside's rate of slum clearance was higher than the average for the
other Durham County district councils. Its level of discretionary
grant-aid to private households for renovation was generally similar to
the other authorities. In 1979 and 1980 the number of dwellings cleared
by Derwentside exceeded total public and private new construction
starts, which was unique among the Durham district councils. Its higher
than average level of council house building and appreciably lower level
of private construction are evident from the table. On all indicators
the picture is one of decline in housing activity throughout the county
over this period, especially post-1979, with Derwentside particularly
badly affected in terns of its vulnerability to public housing
expenditure cuts. Derwentside clearly benfitted to an above-average
extent from the funds available for clearance and council housebuilding
during the "modernisation era", but to an equal extent was hit by the
withdrawal of these funds as the era ended. By the end of the 1970s
government cuts had reduced its building to a small residual programme,
principally housing for old persons.
Despite central government constraints, Derwentside remained wedded to
redevelopment and council housing as the main solution to its housing
problems and the central activity of its housing department, rather than
rehabilitation and support for the private sector. However, it adjusted
its approach to demographic changes, as the 1979 Local Housing Strategy
stated:
"There is a clear need for a continuing emphasis to be placed on the
provision of aged persons' dwellings and single person
accommodation, the principle solution to which is to be through
activity in the public sector involving local authority provision
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with some limited Housing Association activity. This is recognised
to be a clear priority of the Authority." (135)
In common with other Durham County authorities, Derwentside concentrated
on the provision of 3 and 4 bedroom houses in the 1960s on the basis of
what emerged as the overblown population projections of the time (136).
The fall in the birth rate in the mid-1960s and the trend to a smaller
household size, compounded by outnigration, left Derwentside with a
shortage of smaller dwellings, a problem which was more acute for the
district than for the county as a whole. 	 The fact that Railway Street
consisted of small two-bedroom houses might be expected to have been in
its favour, but the council did not regard such housing as part of a
modern housing stock,	 The council's view on the matter is set out in
its Housing Strategy and Investment Programme 1979-1984:
"Over 30 per cent of Derwentside's existing housing stock was built
before 1919, much of it in the form of small terraced properties
incapable of satisfactory Improvement to modern living standards.
Whilst it is acknowledged that it is essential to maintain a varied
housing stock capable of meeting the requirements of all family
sizes and incomes, there is at the moment an over representation of 
small terraced dwellings. A certain number have been included on
the list of sub-standard housing and will be dealt with in due
course. The remainder pose a real problem as many can be classed as
being fit according to the Housing Act 1957 definition, but would
require a disproportionate amount of capital to be spent on them to
improve them to an acceptable level. The Council in the meantime
has continued to construct dwellings which are being readily
occupied." (137; emphasis added)
There was clearly no intention to consult with the people affected about
the options available. In common with usual local government
procedures, the HIP documents were drawn up by senior officers and
approved by councillors without any public consultation or
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participation. When Railway Street Residents' Association wanted to
refer to this Local Housing Strategy in the public inquiry, they were
prevented from doing so by the Inspector's ruling that it was beyond the
terns of reference of such an inquiry. Yet one of the main arguments of
the Association was that the Street was being subjected to a policy
prescription that, while having been appropriate in the past, was not
suitable in the contemporary situation. This situation was one where
most of the bad housing stock had been demolished while most of the
remaining old terraced housing was generally popular, relatively cheap
and conveniently located. In addition, public perceptions about poor
design and paternalistic management made a lot of the available council
housing undesirable for local people.
The national "early post-modernist" housing strategy put increasing
pressure on Derwentside to abandon its modernising housing policy and to
retain its older private housing stock. Its HIP allocations were
drastically reduced from 1979/80, and the 1980 Housing Act, particularly
Department of the Environment Circular 13/81, added to the considerably
reduced ability of the council to pursue actions in conflict with
central government policies. The latter were aimed at achieving an
absolute reduction in the size of the state housing sector and a
concentration of resources on "properties that most need improving". It
was clear from the legislation and accompanying circulars that as part
of the strategy of privatising consumption, local councils would be
pressed into making as much use as possible of private sector housing.
For example, Department of the Environment Circular 13/81, issued on 5
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May 1981, made it very difficult for local councils to make Compulsory
Purchase Orders and clear older stock. It stated:
"Compulsory purchase orders almost always cause uncertainty and
anxiety and therefore should not be made unless there is a
compelling case in the public interest for doing so 	 Orders are
unlikely to be confirmed where the acquisition is of private housing
that is in satisfactory condition or of private housing in
unsatisfactory condition where the owners are willing to improve the
dwellings themselves. Confirmation of such orders would be
inconsistent with the Government's policy of concentrating housing
public expenditure on projects where there will be a clear housing
gain not otherwise achieveable." (138)
Despite this clear change in housing policy towards privatisation and a
residual role for the public sector, Derwentside took the decision to
declare the Railway Street clearance area in accordance with the
policies stated in its 1979 Local Housing Strategy (139). The
commitment of successive Labour councils in the area to state housing
meant that Derwentside did not have a crude housing shortage, although
as noted above there was a shortage of small dwellings. In the early
1980 its waiting list stood at 3,000, but many of these applicants had
registered "for the long term" (140). The 1979 Local Housing Strategy
states that Derwentside had a crude housing surplus of 100 dwellings.
For the council, this gave them the justification for the clearance of
older "substandard" housing even when their ability to build had been
drastically curtailed. It was the feeling of being caught in this
numbers game that to a large extent fuelled the determination of the
Railway Street residents to argue their case.
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There was, however, another important reason why the Street's resistance
was so strong, already considered in chapter 2. The experience of mass
state housing had made public sector housing generally unpopular and the
residents had no wish to have the council as their landlord, which many
feared would happen if the Street was redeveloped. In 1980, 44.6 per
cent of Derwentside's housing stock was in the public sector, compared
with a Great Britain average of 32 per cent (141). In the sane year the
council estimated that 30 per cent of its own stock was "difficult-to-
let", the highest proportion for any local authority in England (142).
Many of Derwentside's council houses were not substandard but had been
fitted with electric ceiling heating and were "difficult-to-live-in".
Tenants in these properties were getting extremely high electricity
bills. One of many newspaper reports on the issue described the
situation as follows:
"The 86 families on Langdale Way Estate at Langley Park have sent a
petition demanding action. They have told Derwentside District
Council the problem has existed since the houses were built a decade
ago. Many of the tenants claim they do not know how they will pay
bills of £300 and £400 facing them for using the ceiling heaters
during the freeze up in December and early January. The petition,
which asks that people living in Langdale Way be allowed to remain
on the council housing list and be transferred to other property as
soon as possible if nothing is done to solve their problem, was
organised by Mrs Cynthia Cox, of 66 Langdale Way. Mr Malcolm
Davies, chief technical officer for Derwentside Council, confirmed
they know that the Flexol ceiling heating is expensive to run. The
council have considered changing it, but cutbacks and lack of money
will not allow it" (143).
The issue was highlighted at the Railway Street public inquiry because
some of the Street's residents thought they night be rehoused in
ceiling heated council housing. The existence of unpopular and empty
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council properties not classified as substandard was a threat to them.
Many existing tenants wanted transfers but because the houses were not
classed as substandard they were ineligible for transfer on those
grounds. The council eventually secured the funds for heating
conversions in Langdale Way in 1983. However, at the public inquiry the
RSA planned to present Derwentside as an authority obsessed with
knocking down hones it did not own while many of its tenants were
trapped in unpopular council housing (144).
Derwentside felt it had to maintain its housing capital allocation
despite the eradication of crude shortages and was concerned about the
rundown of state investment in the district's housing and
infrastructure. The council's 1981/82 HIP bid, for example, was for
over £9m, but it was allocated only £3.1m by central government (145).
This decision to grant Derwentside only one third of its HIP bid
severely constrained its housing options. In addition the climate
created by central government circulars was not in line with the
council's approach to older private housing. The HIP cut resulted in
the council taking the decision to limit renovation grants to what by
law it had to provide - mandatory intermediate grants and in some cases
repair grants. The council considered that its own planned housing
programme should take priority over discretionary improvement grants,
even though it was well aware of problems of deterioration in the
private sector (146). The priority for the council was the improvement
of its own housing stock, reflected in the £4.5m for this included in
the 1981/82 HIP bid. In 1981/82 it was approving some repair grants but
intended to cut back on them if the renovation grant budget became
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stretched, and there was no intention to publicise mandatory repair
grants. Although the grants budget increased from L0.30m to £0.46m
between 1979180 and 1980/81, most of this was taken up by increases in
eligible expense limits introduced by the 1980 Housing Act.
Another indication of the relatively low priority given to saving the
older private housing stock of the district was the fact that the only
General Improvement Area in Derwentside was inherited from a small pre-
1974 reorganisation authority. This contrasted with twelve GIAs in the
other main West Durham authority, Wear Valley (see chapter 3). Chester-
le-Street and Durham had one each, Darlington three and Sedgefield nine
(147); yet Derwentside had a greater problem of old and substandard
dwellings than these other authorities.
Derwentside's housing officers were well aware of the new emphases of
"early post-modern" housing policy, and appeared to "play the system" to
some extent. For example, one of its senior officers took the view that
its HIP bids were "excessive" (148). In addition, the 1979 Housing
Strategy included, for the first time, a role for housing associations
and private sector area improvement:
"In connection with the possible improvement of houses in Railway
Street, Langley Park, the Council is in discussion with
representatives of the owners, involving a newly formed Housing Co-
operative working closely with a Housing Association - an
arrangement quite unique for the area ...
In the private sector area improvement schemes have .., not featured
in the Council's programme but following recent approaches by
residents' associations the potential for environmental works has
been considered and it is anticipated that consideration will be
given to the suitability of some General Improvement Areas being
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declared. In this regard properties in New Kyo and Railway Street,
Langley Park may attract support during the period." (149)
The role for housing associations and GIAs referred to in the 1979 Local
Housing Strategy contrasted starkly with the council's determination to
clear Railway Street. It is possible that the council considered that
their HIP bid would be treated more favourably by the Department of the
Environment if it included reference to these items, which were in
favour with central government.
To conclude this section, a number of points can be made. Derwentside
was greatly constrained by financial controls and central government
guidelines from 1980 (the "nationalization of housing policy" referred
to in chapter 2). The time when a local authority could pursue a policy
of slum clearance and building council houses with substantial central
government support had passed. But the council decided to pursue its
case for the demolition of Railway Street. The resulting public inquiry
illustrated many interesting features of "early post-modern" housing
strategy, and showed how the inquiry could be used as a mechanism by
which early post-modern policy at the level of a particular small
locality could be imposed on local government, and parallels growing
concern in planning circles about public inquiries becoming instruments
of policy-making outside of a local democratic process. But it was also
apparent that the local council's corporatist structure - its "inner
circle" of senior Labour Group members and senior officers - and its
organisation and management style, excluded residents affected by its
decisions from any formal means of influencing those decisions, without
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recourse to the public inquiry and "arbitration" by central government.
The Railway Street residents were not involved in, or even consulted
about, a decision that would directly affect them, in the way that the
local council might have consulted with trade unions or local employers.
The council appeared to take the position that the co-operation of the
Railway Street residents was not needed to implement its decision in
contrast to, for example, Peterlee, where the co-operation of tenants
was needed to enable housing improvements to go ahead without disruption
(see chapter 4).
5.3 The public local inquiry 
In September 1978 Railway Street was surveyed by Derwentside's
Environmental Health Department. There was no consultation with
residents about the survey and it caused concern among them about the
Street's future. At a well-attended meeting on 25 September 1978 the
residents decided to form the Railway Street Association (RSA), with the
aim of retaining and improving the Street. A three-year long campaign
began, involving the organisation of a social survey, the production of
two reports, and detailed investigations into sources of funding for
improvements and the feasibility of a housing co-operative. The RSA had
numerous meetings with council officers and councillors. None of this
led the council to change its decision to clear the houses and, as noted
below, the council's actions sometimes gave the appearance of openness
to the residents' counter-proposals while in reality the decision to
demolish had been taken by the Labour Group who regarded the decision as
non-negotiable.
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The social survey was carried by students in 1978. It revealed that
most of the Street's residents were young adults with small children
(148), Twenty-one of the twenty-five houses were occupied, and of these
four were internally modified to form a single dwelling. Nineteen of
the houses were owner-occupied, two were rented as furnished
accommodation, one was derelict and unoccupied, two were owned by the
National Coal Board and one was owned by Derwentside District Council.
When the Street was owned by the NCB the houses often provided the first
home for young mining families who would move on to larger NCB or
council houses as their family grew. As a result, the 1978 survey
showed an average length of residence of four years, with a range from
six months to nine years. The residency of most of the families dated
from the mid-1970s when, following the run-down and eventual closure of
Langley Park colliery in 1976, the NCB started to sell the houses to
their occupants or to non-mining fanilies. Most of the residents lived
locally before moving to Railway Street, There was a strong attachment
to the Street, for both practical and emotional reasons and, it should
be added, it offered an environment conducive to self-help and entailing
low reproductive costs to the state.
The survey discovered that the main reasons why people had moved to the
Street were to be near friends or because it was a close-knit and
friendly community. An important secondary reason was that the houses
were cheap. Half of the Street's adults were in full-tine waged
employment, with a wide range of occupations and socio-economic groups.
Of those not in full-tine waged employment, seven were unemployed, three
were one-parent families, three were students, one an old-age pensioner
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and five were housewives. The survey found the Street "to be in an
ideal position with regards to employment, schools, shops and other
public amenities", contrasting markedly with the type of conditions in
the growth centre mass housing estates described in chapter 4. It found
that there were very close family ties between the Street's residents
and nearby streets and villages. There was also a great deal of sharing
of skills and resources. Of its eighteen families, only one wanted to
move from Railway Street.
Derwentside's Environmental Health Officer recommended clearance action
to the council in February 1979. The residents organised a petition for
any decision to be deferred until they had worked out improvement
proposals, including the housing co-operative. Excluded from any say in
the decision to redevelop the Street, the residents set about developing
their own proposals and organising independent means of realising them.
Support for their case cane from the Beanish North of England Open Air
Museum, which sent a letter to the council pointing out the historic
importance of the "typical pit village cottages" and suggesting that
they should be improved rather than demolished. The Civic Trust also
supported their retention.
Derwentside's Health and Environmental Services Committee deferred the
declaration of a clearance area and authorised a meeting between a sub-
committee of councillors and the residents. This took place on 26 March
1979. The residents were accompanied by a volunteer architect and
submitted a technical report they had drawn up. They told the sub-
committee that ten householders wanted to form a housing co-op and were
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seeking registration and funding from the Housing Corporation. The
remaining twelve householders hoped to obtain improvement grants from
the council. Following the meeting, the sub-committee recommended that
the council should defer the matter for six months so that the
residents' proposals could be examined in more detail and the residents
themselves could complete their investigations and consider the
implications of the council's requirement that all the residents had to
be committed to rehabilitating their houses. There was to be no Housing
Action Area and compulsory improvement.
The RSA had been put in touch with Banks of the Wear Co-operative
Housing Services Ltd., by the Co-operative Housing Agency. Banks of the
Wear CHS was a Sunderland-based secondary housing co-operative which
agreed to act as development agents for the RSA. The Railway Street
Housing Co-operative was registered with the Registrar of Friendly
Societies in 1979. However financial help for the co-operative from the
Housing Corporation was dependent on the council guaranteeing the houses
a thirty year life and supporting environmental works, possibly through
a General Improvement Area. The council was not prepared to do this; it
argued that its housing budget had been so severely reduced in recent
years that it did not have the resources for environmental works to
either private or council housing. In addition, its policy was not to
make improvement grants to "substandard" housing.
The residents, with the support of their architect and Banks of the Wear
CHS, argued that the houses were in near perfect structural condition.
The council did not deny this but insisted that improvement to the
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statutory fitness requirements could not be achieved "economically".
Most of the residents wanted to have these improvements carried out. In
contrast to many other redevelopment campaigns the question of what
constituted a house unfit for human habitation was not at issue
(contrast Franwellgate Moor, Chapter 6; see also Dennis, 1970; 1972).
It was clear, however, that the houses could be improved to a
satisfactory standard. The residents' architect's perception of the
situation is summarised in the following passage from the Inspector's
report on the public inquiry
"The most basic improvement needed is the installation of an
internal water closet. In 11 houses the kitchens are too small and
lack adequate natural lighting. There is evidence of rising damp
which, though slight in most cases, needs attention and the walls
need repointing to prevent penetrating damp. Some chimney stacks
need rebuilding and most of the rainwater fittings need replacing.
The open drainage system for waste water needs replacing with an
enclosed arrangement. About one quarter of the door and windows
need to be repaired or replaced ... The houses are capable of
rehabilitation at reasonable cost. Moreover, their setting is
equally capable of being upgraded." (149)
By August 1979 the RSA had obtained the written commitment of 80 per
cent of the owners to Improvement. The Housing Corporation had agreed
that the houses were suitable for rehabilitation. Despite the RSA's
efforts to furnish the council with the information they required - the
commitment to improvement and detailed plans for rehabilitation and
environmental works - it still refused to award the houses a thirty year
life, and the clearance area was declared in January 1980. In February
a petition was presented to the council with over 1,000 signatures
asking that this decision be over-ruled. The Inspector's report on the
objectors' case states:
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"The request failed and the council made the order. Twelve months
of hard work and co-operation with the council counted for nothing.
The residents had complied with every request and satisfied every
condition made by the council yet the grant of a 30 year life to
houses considered structurally sound by the council and in a
reasonable state of repair was turned down 	 The objectors have
supplied a succession of architect-designed schemes, carried out
exhaustive surveys, made feasibility studies, solved organisational
problems and found outside sources of finance. The council have
done little but stonewall every proposal put to them." (150)
The council's negative attitude to the residents' proposals served to
unite them against the authority. The following account by one of the
residents illustrates how this common experience strengthened their
determination to defend their community:
"The council's tactic was described by one resident, Ken Tait, as
being 'To divide and rule. By putting successive obstacles in our
path they hoped to wear us down'. However they were mistaken
because the longer the battle continued the more determined the
residents became. Instead of dividing the residents the council's
policy helped to unite the residents. 'The more work we did the
more certain we were that the houses could be improved' Ken Tait
said." (151)
The RSA realised that collective activities were important to maintain
solidarity and morale in the Street. The sense of "community" was
deliberately strengthened. As Sennett (1986, p. 222) observes:
"The simplest way in which a communal identity is formed is when a
group is threatened in its very survival ... While taking collective
action to meet this threat, people feel close to one another and
search for images that bind them together."
The RSA organised the clearing up of derelict land, a street party and
the door-to-door petition. As the campaign gathered momentum the Street
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attracted local TV, radio and newspaper publicity. One of the residents
commented:
"The media's coverage did not change the council's mind but it did
embarrass them. The important thing was the support we received
from the public. It was very encouraging. We felt we were winning
and it helped keep us going." (152)
The housing co-op and its members played a very active part in the RSA
and in negotiations with the council, and clearly this alternative
"vision" of co-operative housing motivated its members and highlighted
even more strongly the "statism" of the local council. Opposition to
the council came to focus on the fear of losing the "self help community
spirit" of the Street and the investments that many residents had made
in their homes. For example, two of the residents were mature students
who relied on neighbours to look after their children, while a retired
couple had spent £1,600 installing central heating into their house
(153). The aim of preserving "a community" - in the sense of co-
operation and shared experience in a small geographical area - was a
very strong motivating force. The "modernisation era" had shown the
costs that could be involved once "communities" were broken up and there
was considerable cynicism about council policies,
The RSA also lobbied the local Labour Party, arguing pragmatically:
"The Labour Party heard that there was now a curb on council house
building and tenants were being allowed to buy their own houses, and
now seemed a good time to keep rather than destroy houses" (154).
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The RSA's evidence to the public inquiry attempted to contrast national
housing policy with Derwentside's Local Housing Strategy, arguing that
the council was out of line with new priorities. But this was not
accepted as evidence by the Inspector on the grounds that the inquiry
was not concerned with broad policy issues, only technical evidence
relating to the current situation in the Street. The RSA had aimed to
make a key part of their case a criticism of Derwentside's housing
policy, and were unaware that this could not be accepted at a public
local inquiry. Far from offering an opportunity to debate the issues,
the inquiry was a means by which central government could gather
information about the case and then, not necessarily on the basis of
this information, impose a solution concordant with its own policies.
It is worth noting a few points about the history of the public inquiry,
since it forms a central part of this case study. It has its origins in
the second half of the nineteenth century when industrial capitalists
were coning into conflict with landowners opposing the spread of new
utilities across their land. The new entrepreneurs claimed that these
schemes would "serve the public benefit as well as their own profit"
(155). Parliament became overwhelmed by the proliferation of Private
Bills promoted by industrialists to override the legal protections of
private property enjoyed by landowners. The work became delegated to
Ministers who, it was argued, were "independent of all the parties, and
the only available judge of the public interest". This involved
employing Inspectors to hold public inquiries and report back to the
Minister, who would make the final decision. Thus, inquiries have their
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origins in a concern to achieve central government control over local
conflicts of strategic significance.
In contrast to many planning inquiries, the terns of reference of the
clearance inquiry is limited to questions of "fact" - e.g. is this house
unfit and if so can it be made fit at reasonable cost? - rather than the
interpretation of policy (Wraith and Lamb, 1971, pp. 137-146). The
clearance inquiry is not a means by which the public can participate in
policy-making, public inquiry's adversarial procedures particularly
inhibiting public involvement (Armstrong, 1985), but is a means by which
central government can inform itself of the issues and greatly influence
local authority policy. It gives the impression of popular
participation because of its pluralist appearance, but this form of
management of objections only serves to blur the fact that the final
decision is made by central government according to national priorities.
The Railway Street inquiry was an inquiry under Part III of the Housing
Act 1957 relating to slum clearance. Following the Secretary of State's
consideration of the Inspector's report, his/her decision is final.
The Compulsory Purchase Order may be confirmed, modified or rejected.
In the 1960s a large majority of Compulsory Purchase Orders which went
to public inquiry were confirmed without amendment (Wraith and Lamb,
1971, p. 142); they were often components of urban restructuring
strategies. From the late 1970s, however, the situation was very
different and the emphasis was on preserving private housing. Broadly
the same arguments were often being made by objectors, but their chances
of success in County Durham were much better once strategic spatial
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policy and housing modernisation had been abandoned by central
government.
Aware that national policy was no longer biased towards redevelopment,
Derwentside used a crude market argument to justify the clearance of
Railway Street at the public inquiry (156). In deciding on the
feasibility of improvement the council compared the market price of a
refurbished house with the cost of improving it. The council valued a
refurbished Railway Street house at £8,300, while the present value of
one of the houses (£1,100) plus the cost of improvement (£9,350) and
fees (£1,100) amounted to £11,550. On this basis the council argued
that improvement was not rational. Although building a new council
house would cost more than improving a Railway Street house, there were
sufficient council houses in Langley Park to rehouse displaced
residents.
The council criticised the designs which the residents had submitted as
not reaching modern standards, and argued that an improved Railway
Street house would have only about 70 per cent of the quality of a new
council house, a very subjective assessment with which the Street's
residents totally disagreed. The council also suggested that some
residents would not be able to afford their contribution to improvement.
The council's argument was rejected by the residents at the inquiry, who
replied that available relets were not suitable and were often
difficult-to-let properties. They also pointed out that while the
council was effectively arguing that there was a housing surplus in
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Derwentside, the 1979 HIP bid stated that tenders for 866 new houses
were planned to be let by the council between 1979/80 and 1983/84 (157).
The council's Deputy Chief Executive was cross-examined by a Newcastle-
based solicitor specialising in Legal Aid work who had been working with
the RSA on their case for the inquiry for some weeks. The RSA had
concluded that the council had managed the residents' protests by
"stringing them along", while it was actually determined to pursue
redevelopment, and their solicitor's line of questioning was designed to
try and bring this out into the open. He pointed out that the council
had said that improvement would be accepted if HIP money was available:
therefore the houses were not irredeemably unfit. He suggested that:
"The residents were led along by the council when their suggestions
were doomed from the outset," (158)
He stated that the residents were not disputing that the houses were
unfit and stressed that the council accepted that they could be
improved, its officers having met with the residents to discuss how this
could be done:
"It would appear that some officers were doing all they could to
consider improvement, but that the strategy was eventually rejected
by councillors." (159)
The RSA's solicitor drew the inquiry's attention to the reference to
Railway Street as a potential GIA in the 1979 HIP bid. The Deputy Chief
Environmental Health Officer replied:
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"The reference to Railway Street in the 1979 HIP bid was an attempt
to keep the council's options open, but the money for improvement
was not made available. Railway Street was being discussed at
officer level when the 1979 HIP application was put in to the DOE.
It was an attempt to keep the options open." (160)
The attitude of Derwentside to improving older private housing was not
the same as some other district councils in the North East and it seems
likely that the street would have been retained and improved but for
being in Derwentside (161). In addition, while the Deputy Chief
Environmental Health Officer argued that the 1980 Housing Act did not
affect their decision about Railway Street, he acknowledged that "the
council was beginning to see improvement as an easier option" (162).
However, the council had no intention of working with the residents to
find a solution to the problem, and chose to impose modernisation, as
the following series of exchanges at the public inquiry illustrates:
RSA Solicitor: "I would suggest that the Environmental Health
Officer entered into negotiations with the RSA even though he
thought the houses could not be made fit at reasonable cost"
Deputy Chief Environmental Health Officer: "I accepted that the
residents had the intention to improve, but I doubted their
commitment. In addition, certain of the residents' association's
proposals would not provide satisfactory accommodation"
Inspector (interJecting): "Why did quite a large district council
expect the residents' association to go on trying to improve their
plans themselves, when the council could have assisted with their
own technical officers?"
Deputy Chief Environmental Health Officer: "The council only has
responsibility for public sector housing"
Inspector: "But shouldn't the council have cone up with its own
improvement scheme for some of the oldest and worst housing in their
area?"
Deputy Chief Environmental Health Officer: "The council did
consider its own scheme for extensions but decided it was too
costly"
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Inspector: "This suggests that the council was only prepared to
look at the residents' association's proposals to find errors. I
wonder whether this adds weight to the argument that the council had
made up its mind in advance." (163)
The Inspector continued his intervention by pointing out that certain
design changes could meet most of the council's objections regarding
natural lighting, space requirements and defensible space. The RSA
solicitor suggested that the council's own plans for improving the
houses, which had never been discussed with the residents, only served
to legitimate the claim that the cost of improvement was excessive. It
emerged that the plans the RSA had submitted to the council were not
passed on to the council's architects, but that the decision to turn
them down was taken by the Environmental Health Department.
The RSA argued that while adjoining colliery houses had been
rehabilitated and included in a GIA by the former small Lanchester Rural
District Council, and other adjoining streets were eligible for
improvement grants, Railway Street had been blighted by its inclusion in
the clearance programme of the larger, corporatist post-1974 Derwentside
Council. Despite this, individual owners had sought to maintain and
improve their houses to a good standard - self-reliance which appeared
to impress the Inspector. The council was planning to destroy a piece
of Britain's vernacular building heritage when the Street could be
improved. The houses were basically sound, in contrast to some areas of
recently built public sector housing such as in Peterlee.
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The council's solicitor questioned the credibility of the RSA's
evidence. The RSA was made up of unqualified residents who took a
biased view of the council's proposals.
	 The Inspector was very
sceptical of this professional elitism, and on a number of occasions
expressed surprise at the expertise the residents had shown. Indeed,
this questioning of "professional" values in housing and planning
appeared to reflect a decline of their dominance in urban policy with
the demise of modernisation (see Deakin, 1985).
One of the most effective pieces of evidence at the inquiry was the
contribution by Banks of the Wear CHS, which argued that the housing co-
operative proposals were realistic and the council's proposals
unrealistic.	 A Development Officer claimed that one of the reasons why
Derwentside did not want to award a 30 year life to the houses was that
then all the residents would be able to apply for mandatory renovation
grants. It thus appeared that the denial of 30 year lives was being
used to control the council's own expenditure and to prevent its housing
budget being eaten into by mandatory payments dependent on demand from
owner-occupiers. He attacked Derwentside's "market value" argument:
"As a basis for making a decision for or against improvement, market
value is not necessarily an accurate guide. It is imprecise,
misleading and irrelevant. Very few houses would ever be modernised
on this basis ... The market value method would result in
widespread demolition, out of line with both the DOE and most local
authorities. On this basis, council houses would probably never be
modernised either. Derwentside have a long waiting list for housing
already, which would be lengthened if the Order is confirmed.
Demolition will cause the permanent loss of 25 basically sound
houses from the available stock." (164)
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This reflects how "early post-modern" housing policy was not about
withdrawing subsidy from housing as a whole, but about restructuring
subsidy. The council's argument that demolition was the cheapest option
was not, as night be thought, in harmony with this restructuring. But
the assertion of self-reliance against "statism" was. The ideology of
central government housing policy found a receptive audience in a
community that had seen the results of modernisation in the large
deprived housing estates that now existed in the county. The local
perception of the situation was summed up very well by the chair of the
Independent/Liberal controlled Esh Parish Council:
"The Railway Street Association has the unanimous support of Esh
Parish Council in their desire to stay in their houses. They also
have the support of the three local District councillors. The
application of the market value criterion to other houses in need of
improvement would result in the demolition of large areas of the
village. The council has a deliberate policy of allowing certain
properties to deteriorate, and it has had this 'master plan' for
over a decade. The Parish Council is not aware of there being
enough suitable housing available to rehouse the Railway Street
residents, especially in view of the Right to Buy. How loss will
they have to wait? The decision to demolish is based on the
subjective opinions of the councillors. The houses remind them of
their own deprived childhoods. They think that the residents of
Railway Street are not their sort of people and are better off
dispersed. Councillors with these prejudices voted in support of
the decision to demolish. They are damaging the social fabric of a
community. Why should the council argue that the problems of city
areas are different and therefore require different criteria when
considering redevelopment or improvement?" (165)
Comparisons with state housing were made frequently at the inquiry.
One of the residents, for example, claimed that if one item was enough
to put a house on the "substandard list for demolition", then many
council houses had to be included. A tenant from Langdale Way said that
their houses were becoming as bad as Railway Street. Many people would
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prefer to live in an improved Railway Street house rather than a council
house, especially younger people. Another resident, in the final stages
of the inquiry, stated:
"This public inquiry is the first time residents have been able to
have a voice and not watch themselves being discussed at council
meetings." (166)
5.4 The outcome 
On 13 April 1981 the Northern Regional Office of the Department of the
Environment wrote to the Chief Executive of Derwentside District Council
Informing him of the Secretary of State's decision about the Railway
Street CPO:
"The Inspector found that all the properties in the clearance area
were correctly represented as unfit houses ... He was of the
opinion, however, that demolition was not the most satisfactory
method of dealing with the conditions in the clearance area. The
houses were sturdily constructed with thick stone walls and there
was little evidence of instability. He considered that they should
be improved and not demolished. The dwellings were of a reasonable
size and were capable of improvement at reasonable cost for small
families. He noted that there was a strong local wish that the
houses should be improved and concluded that improvement was the
right course ... The Inspector's findings of fact, conclusions and
recommendation have been accepted and the Secretary of State has
therefore decided not to confirm the order, as recommended by the
Inspector." (167)
This clear-cut decision in favour of improvement would have been very
unlikely at the height of the "modernisation era" in the 1960s (see
chapter 2). But there were not, until the end of the decade, the
vehicles to enable rehabilitation in such circumstances. In Railway
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Street, following the inquiry, the Housing Corporation confirmed funding
for the housing co-operative. As much work as possible was to be done
by the members themselves. Intermediate grants became available to
owner-occupiers in the Street.
However, there was a diminishing interest among residents in the RSA
after the inquiry (168). No longer was it a community under threat.
Some people withdrew from the co-op to apply for grants as owner-
occupiers, influenced by the fact that legally they had to give and
could not sell their house to the co-op. After the inquiry owner-
occupiers stood to gain significantly. They would receive substantial
grant-aid and there was a market demand for the houses.
While the changing attitude to older housing accelerated by the shift in
central government policy from 1979 clearly created a context favourable
to the RSA, if Railway Street had been in another district in the North
East it would probably never have been threatened with clearance action
at this time in the first place, but improved. The expertise and
organisation of the RSA got nowhere with Derwentside District Council
whose policy was set rigidly, but it did impress the Inspector at the
public inquiry.	 Derwentside's Deputy Chief Environmental Health
Officer explained afterwards:
"The council made the decision to clear the houses in Railway Street
before the 1980 Housing Act came into force. They stuck to this
decision, and this put the council's officers in an awkward position
at the inquiry." (169)
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He felt that the willingness of the residents to improve was a major
factor in the outcome of the inquiry. For him this confirmed the
message of recent central government circulars, and many houses would
have to be removed from the council's substandard list in other areas.
5.5 Summary and conclusions 
At first sight, this chapter might be taken as supporting the Weberian
perspectives on "evangelistic bureaucracies" developed by Davies (1972)
and Dennis (1972) in particular. However, similar criticisms concerning
the limitations of these perspectives may be made as with the "urban
managerialism" concept of Pahl, which was discussed in chapter 1.
Specifically, such accounts neglect the structural pressures which shape
the nature of state institutions and state actions in capitalism, and
which act upon the immediate managers of urban resources. In the
present thesis it is suggested that these system forces derived from the
nature of strategies of accumulation during the post-war boom, which
exercised determining pressures for particular forms of reproduction.
It has been argued that the shift of resources out of redevelopment and
into rehabilitation which occurred from the late 1960s, and dominated
national policy after 1979, was associated with the end of a
"modernisation era", when planning and development had concentrated on
the large-scale, technologically rational and functionally efficient re-
shaping of urban environments and regions. This included large-scale
spatial restructuring in County Durham and North Armagh, and heavily
influenced the nature of local housing policies.
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The outcome of the Railway Street public inquiry was consistent with
policy developments in the "early post-modern" period. The effects of
these developments have been noted as increased differentiation in
reproduction/consumption, recommodification and a restructuring of state
spending with the effect of residualising state housing as a solution to
housing problems. Under Thatcher administrations, policies have
increasingly reorientated reproductive strategy to privatised
consumption and forms of self-reliance, adjusting inequalities in
housing consumption to inequalities in income and wealth, and bringing
housing expenditure under closer central control (Ball, 1983, p. 357;
Leather and Murie, 1986). But as early as the 1974 Housing Act policy
emphasised adjusting housing consumption to economic position. A
Departmental circular of this time stated:
"Where authorities have been seeking to clear housing, especially
dwellings which are fit or owner-occupied, it has proved much less
easy to demonstrate that redevelopment is the best course, and
resistance to such action has been increasing from residents of all
kinds ... Rehabilitation should take place to varying standards to
match the effective demand of individual occupiers ... It must be
accepted - and willingly - that some houses of low quality meet a
real need for cheap accommodation ..." (170)
Ironically, it was this legislation that caused Derwentside to review
the condition of its older housing, but it adopted the solution offered
by the modernist 1957 Housing Act, i.e., clearance, as the means of
dealing with "substandard" housing in the private sector. Clearance is
easier for a local authority than improvement, and in the interests of
technical staff still oriented to modernisation. It also appears that
with only what could be described as "near slums" left in the housing
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stock, this housing was being tarnished with the sane brush as slum
housing by Derwentside's older councillors. The existence of a closed
and strong local authority, and the degree of exclusion of housing
"clients" in particular localities, was typical of officialdom-people
relations during the "modernisation era" (see Dunleavy, 1981). Earlier
chapters suggest that such state structures were no longer particularly
functional to capital at the end of the modernisation era, and could
actually be dysfunctional. But Derwentside had been held by the Labour
Party for many years, and was strongly oriented to modernisation, so
that a political commitment to the state as provider of means of
reproduction, rather than as facilitator of an expanding sphere of
circulation, continued into the 1980s, especially when the district had
not seen protest on the scale of the mobilisation against Category "D"
in South West Durham.
The 1969 and 1971 Housing Acts, which introduced General Improvement
Areas and higher rates of grant respectively, did not have the impact on
Derwentside that occurred very clearly in Wear Valley (see Chapter 3).
The contrast is striking. In addition, the message of the 1974 Housing
Act was clearly that housing such as Railway Street should be renovated.
The 1980 Housing Act was not a complete break but a further development
of the renovation approach along the lines of Labour's 1977 Green Paper:
"work on the renovation of older houses should be directed more at
bringing larger numbers of houses up to a decent basic standard
rather than on higher standard improvements of a smaller number of
houses ... Where the economic costs of redevelopment and
rehabilitation are evenly balanced there will normally be a strong
case in favour of rehabilitation because of the social benefits"
(Department of the Environment, 1977, pp. 94, 98).
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The Railway Street public inquiry illustrated how the 1980 Housing Act
resolved the contradiction between the Acts of 1957 and 1974 to put a
clear emphasis on renovating houses that would previously have been
cleared. The inquiry brought hone to Derwentside the realities of the
reaction against redevelopment, in a way that Category "D" struggles did
to Wear Valley, and the effective dominance of national over local
housing policy. The struggle of the Railway Street residents was one
against "residual" modernisation, when modernisation as a growth
strategy for the peripheral regions had ended. It was thus linked to
the struggles described in previous chapters.
While the defence of local authority autonomy in housing policy is often
seen as part of the defence of local democracy, it is apparent that in
Railway Street the residents' experience in civil society of the local
state was not of democratic practices, in the sense of negotiation
between strategic requirements and local perceived needs, but was an
experience of the imposition of a modernist ideology with no reference
to the perceived needs of residents. These needs were largely
prestructured by the reaction against state housing; what they didn't
Deed, was redevelopment. This created the type of officialdom-people
cleavage exploited in New Right ideology which emphasises the local
state in particular as an obstacle to, rather than guarantor of,
freedom and "self ownership", a theme addressed in the concluding
chapter. With regard to local democracy, the above study of the Railway
Street public inquiry supports Bondi's (1987, p. 221) conclusion that:
"... local authorities have been characterized by some as democratic
and open to popular pressure, and by others as elitist and remote
- 246 -
from the public. Authorities obviously differ between themselves,
but	 the use of different styles of negotiation with different
kinds of interests or actors may enable authorities to maintain an
appearance of openness whilst strictly circumscribing the scope for
popular intervention in the policy process."
In Derwentside, although the council's officers included rehabilitation
in policy statements to central government and net with the RSA to
discuss their proposals, the Labour Group which controlled the council
remained committed to redevelopment without the consent of those
directly affected. It chose to impose "modern" housing consumption
values upon a group of residents whose actual housing consumption
experiences in the "slums" of Railway Street were very positive.
Undoubtedly this owed much to their houses' superior form and location
compared with mass state housing, as well as the "community" it
accommodated. Combined with the resources to "take on" the council over
the issue, this led to a struggle which they won. It seems very
unlikely that they would have been successful in retaining the Street in
the 1960s, at the height of modernisation. But the outcome of the
public inquiry reflected the national policy bias in favour of retaining
older private housing and developing alternatives to the large municipal
landlord which had served its purpose, and was increasingly an obstacle
to, rather than agent of, central control and the restructuring of
reproduction in the "post-modern" period.
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CHAPTER 6
COMMUNITY ACTION IN FRAMVELLGATE MOOR, DURHAM CITY 
This chapter is an account of community action against redevelopment in
Old Framwellgate Moor, Durham City. In contrast to Railway Street
(chapter 5), the housing campaign in Framwellgate Moor did not centre
around arguments about the most appropriate solution to unfit housing,
but involved local residents opposing the designation of their hones as
"unfit for human habitation". As such, it was a more direct challenge
to the principles of modernist housing policy because, as discussed in
chapter 2, it became increasingly difficult from the end of the 1960s to
demonstrate that "near slums" were unhealthy and should be cleared. The
local council did not precipitate a public inquiry, and hence direct
central government intervention, by declaring a clearance area. It
adopted a strategy of excluding the housing from renovation grants and
buying up properties, ultimately for clearance. With local housing
policy dominated by the needs of the council's own stock, the residents
of Old Framwellgate Moor seemed left trapped in a situation where a
favourable position in the local housing market was completely
undermined by council policies which were blighting the area. A local
housing authority preoccupied with state housing dominated the housing
consumption experiences of the residents of Old Framwellgate Moor well
after national policy had moved away from state housing as an important
means of reproduction. Old Framwellgate Moor met the needs of its
residents, and although clearly not "modern" housing, was a physical
neighbourhood where people wanted to continue to live. For owner-
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occupiers, the popularity of the area seemed to guarantee their
investments as long as there was no threat of redevelopment.
The following section considers Durham City's "modernist" housing
policies, which are presented as background to the account of community
action in Old Framwellgate Moor.
1974-1982 the defence of cluncil 
housing 
In Durham City, the period 1974 to 1982 could be described as one of
defending council housing against the pressures brought about by the end
of modernisation. This is not immediately obvious. According to the
County Planning Department, although the three former local authorities
that were amalgamated to form Durham District had policies of large-
scale slum clearance during the modernisation era, such an approach was
reviewed by the new district council in 1974, leading to a change in
emphasis towards improvement rather than clearance, in accordance with
central government policy (171). Between 1961 and 1972, 1,462 dwellings
were demolished in the three districts that in 1974 comprised the post-
1974 authority of Durham City, an average of 122 per annum. From 1972
clearance declined to negligible levels and the 1982/83 Housing
Investment Programme anticipated no slum clearance at all from 1981/82
to 1983/84 (172). However, despite an apparent commitment from 1974 to
improving rather than replacing older private housing, the new council
did not declare any Housing Action Areas and only one General
Improvement Area (173).
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Between 1971 and 1973 Durham's Development Area status entitled the city
council to additional central government support for enhanced
improvement grants, and this was reflected in a high rate of grant take-
up. But from 1972 the number of discretionary renovation grants to the
private sector declined. In 1981 they were suspended altogether due to
the reduced HIP allocation and the council's commitment to revitalising
council housing. Table 6.1 illustrates the decline in discretionary
renovation grants during the 1970s. Mandatory grants show a different
pattern however. Although there was also decline during the 1970s, the
1980 Housing Act imposed increased calls on local authority funds in
this direction, as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1: DURHAM DISTRICT: NUMBER OF DISCRETIONARY RENOVATION GRANTS
TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 1972-1981*
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
828 501 223 134 214 133 141 123 100 8
* 1972 and 1973 figures are the sum of figures for the three former
local authorities that formed Durham District.
Source: see note 174.
Table 6.2: DURHAM DISTRICT: NUMBER OF NON-DISCRETIONARY GRANTS TO THE
PRIVATE SECTOR, 1972-1981*
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
126 59 21 7 38 11 9 12 23 59
* 1972 and 1973 figures are the sum of figures for the three former
local authorities that formed Durham District.
Source: see note 175.
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In 1980 Durham City had no obvious housing shortages, with "very short"
waiting lists and three small pockets of "difficult-to-let" properties
(176). Council policy statements identified a need for smaller
accommodation, especially OPDs and sheltered housing (177). There was a
long history of council housebuilding in the district but not, as in
Derwentside, against a background of low levels of private activity. In
fact, private building had been higher than council building since at
least 1961, in contrast to the county as a whole. Table 6.3 illustrates
the changing pattern of housing activity during the 1970s:
Table 6.3: DURHAM DISTRICT: CHANGE IN HOUSING STOCK, 1972-1981*
Completions Demolitions Net change
Private	 Local authority
1972 682 145 182 +645
1973 583 57 65 +575
1974 242 131 67 +306
1975 312 237 115 +434
1976 383 82 7 +458
1977 366 13 25 +354
1978 296 55 22 +329
1979 276 39 26 +289
1980 178 21 6 +193
1981 134 13 0 +147
* 1972 and 1973 figures are the sum of figures for the three former
local authorities that formed Durham District.
source: see note 178.
In the first half of the 1970s completion rates in both the private and
public sectors fluctuated. This gave way to a significant decline in
both sectors in the late 1970s - particularly sharp in the public sector
due to the withdrawal of central government support. Between 1975 and
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1981 the council's new build programme consisted only of bungalows for
the aged and handicapped (179), In 1975 it had been anticipated that 75
units per annum would be built over the next 5 years; an objective which
it fell very far short of (180). As Table 6.3 shows, the stock
continued to increase despite reductions in annual output, although at a
much slower rate.
The major priority of Durham City Council from 1974 was not the
retention and improvement of older private housing but its own council
stock and "a steady programme of new special-category (council) housing;
modernisation of pre-war (council) dwellings; major repairs and rewiring
(of council houses)" (181; parentheses added)). At first this programme
progressed satisfactorily, but reductions in central government
allocations led to revisions and postponements. In 1980/81 a drastic
cut in the HIP allocation severely set back the programme (see below).
These policies reflected the district's housing needs as the authority
saw them, but there was no public consultation about what the needs
were. The council was concerned about the shortage of modern housing in
the City affordable to local people. Because of its stronger local
economy, compared with surrounding depressed ex-pit villages, and its
concentration of service employment, the council's view was that house
prices were pushing new local households out of the City (see Durham
Unemployment Forum, 1983). Although there had been an upward trend in
the birth rate from 1977, this had not been reflected in population
growth due to net migration losses. The council argued that these
losses were largely due to a lack of affordable and suitable housing:
- 252 -
" ••• a proportion of newly formed households seeking accommodation
outside the local authority rented sector have to look outside the
City for suitable accommodation which they can afford." (182)
While the council identified high house prices in the City (which
included Framwellgate Moor) as a cause of people leaving the area,
especially newly-formed households, this also meant a continuing market
in what it regarded as "substandard" property of the type demolished on
a large scale in the 1960s:
"In May 1981 local estate agents indicated that the price of City
Centre terraced housing had increased 100 per cent in 2.5 years .,.
At the lower end of the market, most sub-standard properties can be
sold without undue difficulty." (183)
The council concluded that the severe shortage of modern, relatively
low-priced housing was perpetuating a market in substandard properties
which should be removed from the stock. This shortage was aggravated by
the impact of students on the housing market and the popularity of the
centre of Durham City as a place to live within the North East as a
whole. The council also identified a continuing shortage of suitable
building land. Its identification of potential sites in the 1980s
included localities that during the "modernisation era" of the 1950s-60s
had been declared unviable. For example, the 1982/83 HIP statement
describes "currently untidy and unused" land in Langley Moor as "ideal"
for development, given high demand and planning constraints elsewhere.
Langley Moor is a small village two miles west of the city centre. It
was designated a Category "D" village under the County Development Plan
and in the 1970s was a scene of extensive and controversial clearance
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which encountered local protest and demands that the houses should be
rehabilitated and not demolished. It was this land, previously
considered uneconomic for residential use during the modernisation era,
that was now "high demand" residential development land.
The position of older private "substandard" housing in Durham City in
the late 1970s was uncertain given council attitudes. Not only had the
council continued the policies of its predecessors in not giving grants
to houses considered "substandard", but in 1980 it discontinued lending
to private buyers. The 1982/83 HIP statement argued that lack of funds
prevented it from supporting the bottom end of the housing market:
"The Building Societies in the Support Lending Scheme will not
accept unmodernised properties for advances (unless the Council
agrees to waive repayment of grant in cases of default), whereas the
Council would often be recommended to do so in particular cases if
sufficient money were available to the Council. Unless monies are
available, how can the Council be even 'lenders of last resort'?"
(184)
To Old Framwellgate Moor's cost, the council did not see the
rehabilitation of older private housing as a political priority, despite
the popularity of this housing among low/moderate income groups in
Durham. Its priority was spending on the council stock, which itself
needed major refurbishment and work to correct defects in non-
traditional housing types, a problem revealed by recent surveys which it
argued were not being taken into account in central government HIP
allocations (185).
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In 1981 Durham's council housing stock stood at 12,960 dwellings, 40.2
per cent of the total stock of the district (186). Of these, 3,625 were
pre-war. Three thousand of the post-war properties were over 30 years
old (187). The council estimated that over t5.5m was required for
modernisation and remedial works to its own stock, and in 1980/81 spent
t1.8m on improving and repairing council properties, out of a total HIP
budget of £2.1m (188). In 1981/82 the HIP allocation was cut by 20 per
cent to £1.98m - despite a bid of over £4m - forcing the council to
reduce specifications and standards for improvement work to its stock.
Council mortgages and discretionary improvement grants were suspended.
The cuts meant that the council's priority activities began to become
its only ones, and were not only opposed by the council but also by
local builders. In July 1980 the Durham City based Northern Counties
Region of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers (BFBTE)
protested that the cuts in capital spending would cause large-scale
redundancies (189). The relaxation of Durham County Council's spatial
policy following the Examination in Public of the Structure Plan was
having little impact on builders' declining profits (190). There was a
shortage of work, and the NFBTE accused the council of taking work away
from its members by favouring the Direct Labour Organisation in its
decisions to award contracts for even quite small jobs (191, 192). The
council's Labour Leader replied:
".„ the Government is deliberately attempting to destroy DLOs and
that would leave private firms with a monopoly to charge local
authorities what they liked. If the NFBTE is so worried about jobs
lost it should make representations to its usual allies, the Tory
Party, which is systematically destroying the whole of the building
industry. It should not complain about a council which is striving
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very hard to maintain its present services and workforce for the
benefit of the people of Durham." (193)
In the May 1979 local election Labour lost the overall majority on the
council it had held since the creation of the new authority in 1974.
The Labour Group, however, retained power through the casting vote of
the Mayor and majorities on committees until May 1980, when a coalition
of minority groups narrowly achieved an overall majority and an
Independent Mayor was elected. Controversy followed over the political
distribution of committee chairs and vice-chairs, resulting in Labour
(by far the largest political grouping) refusing offers of some vice-
chairs and going into opposition where its position on Tory cuts would
be unambiguous. This lasted until an overall Labour majority of five
was achieved in May 1983. With ongoing restrictions on local government
spending, the introduction of the 1980 Housing Act caused concern among
Durham City councillors of all political complexions, and from the
Labour Group net condemnation. New build for special needs and repairs
to council housing had been priorities for Labour since 1974. They were
not impressed with the new grants provisions, considering that they
would force a reversal of housing policy in Durham to a "pre-modern
era":
"... Coun. Alan Crooks (Labour, Bearpark) said the Act could be
exploited by anyone buying old properties, installing toilets and
either charging high rents or selling off the properties. 'We are
going to produce better class slums' he said. Coun. Maurice
Crathorne (Labour, Coxhoe) said the Act 'takes about five paces
backwards'. Members had agreed in the past that there were some
properties in the area which were not fit to receive improvement
grants. 'Now we will have to give grants to pig-styes', he said.
But Coun. Michael Johnson (Independent, West Rainton) suggested that
there were some people in Durham on whose properties the council had
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put a limited life who would welcome the Act'." (194; party affiliation
and ward added)
The reference to pig styes did not go unnoticed by the residents of Old
Framwellgate Moor where, as discussed below, they were struggling
against the suspension of improvement grants.
At a special meeting of Durham's Housing Services Committee in January
1981, members considered the implications of the 1980 Housing Act for
renovation grants (195). The new grant provisions were condemned by the
committee, which was all-party without a Labour majority, as forcing
them to accept lower housing standards while making it easier for owner-
occupiers, landlords and builders to profit from the use of public money
for home improvement. Both the Chief Environmental Health Officer and
the City Engineer advised the committee that the new provisions would
lead to deteriorating standards and serious problems in the long-term,
and both officers and members were united in their criticisms of the
Act.
The Labour Group fought both to frustrate council house sales forced by
the 1980 Housing Act and to prevent the withdrawal of subsidy from
council housing (196, 197, 198). In February 1981 a move by the Labour
Group to keep rents below central government targets by increasing the
Rate Fund Contribution to the Housing Revenue Account was successful
(199). Nevertheless, on April 6 council rents increased on average by
the £3.53 per week, a rise of 54 per cent on 1980/81, compared with an
Increase of 11.9 per cent in the rates (made up, however, by a 26.3 per
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cent increase in the City's rate and 9.3 per cent in the County Council
rate) and 15.2 per cent in the water rate. The council argued that 61
per cent of the rent increase was due to a reduction in central
government subsidy, with the remainder due to high interest rates on
borrowing for new build and improvements to the council stock, and the
need to finance structural repairs. This was a large rent increase, but
rents remained low in comparison with, for example, Tyneside
authorities. Without pressure from the Labour Group, the rent increase
would have been slightly higher. The increase could have been kept
lower by making a greater Rate Fund Contribution, by reallocating
expenditure or raising the rates. In view of the way E7 worked in the
Block Grant calculations, increasing the Rate Fund Contribution further
would, in Durham's case, have led to an overall withdrawal of Government
grant, necessitating a rate increase or cuts in expenditure (Gibson,
1981; 200).
In March 1981 the City Architect reported to the Housing Services
Committee that improvement standards for its work on the council stock
might have to be lowered to keep within HIP allocations (201). The
lowest tenders recently bid for five modernisation schemes were all
above the budgeted amount. The committee decided that a working party
would have to prepare revised contracts based on reduced specifications
to achieve a cost saving of 10 per cent on each house.
Although council housing was very much a political priority for Durham
City, either through the direct control of the Labour Group or its
strong influence in Opposition, the authority did not encourage tenant
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participation. There appeared to have been no tenants' association
active in the district since at least 1974 (202). The management of
council housing was very clearly the council's prerogative. The 1980
Housing Act required local authorities to work out and publish
arrangements for consulting tenants about matters affecting their homes
or their tenancies. Some activists in the local Labour Party saw this
as an opportunity to win a role for tenants' associations and adopt a
policy of encouraging their formation, as intended in Labour's 1979
Housing Bill. But at the October 1981 meeting of the Housing Services
Committee any policy of encouraging tenants' associations was rejected
in favour of individual written consultation and a right of appeal to
the committee (203).
Durham's corporate housing management was paternalistic in other
respects. In 1981 lettings still had to be approved by members rather
than made automatically through a points system. In October a
controversy broke out about medical priority for council housing (204).
A housing applicant discovered that confidential medical and personal
details were accessible to the public in the minutes of the Medical
Cases Sub Committee in the city library. Included in the minutes were
names and addresses and details of physical and mental illnesses,
treatments, personal relationships, marital breakdowns and the custody
of children. One woman was described in the minutes as "neglecting her
personal upkeep" and details were included about discussions between the
community physician and Social Services regarding her future (205). The
council, after receiving protests from the British Medical Association
and Shelter about the personal details deposited in the public library,
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replied that they would be revising their minuting system to restrict
the amount of information recorded. But they refused to delete details
in past minutes because they had been signed as a public record of
council business (206).
In November 1981 Durham City was once again faced with the prospect of
having to increase council house rents substantially (207). The City
Treasurer advised the council that central government was likely to
assume a further rent increase in 1982183 of about £3 per week, taking
the HRA into surplus. The Leader of the Labour Group stated that this
meant that since the 1979 General Election rents in Durham had risen by
an average of 130 per cent for a 3 bedroom house and 155 per cent for a
one bedroom bungalow. A £3 rent increase would result in a £800,000
surplus on the HRA. One of the City's three Conservative members argued
that Durham's council house rents had been kept far below private sector
levels by "using central government's money", but he had written to the
Secretary of State calling for "fairness" in his allocations. In
January 1982 the Labour Group's concern about the new housing subsidy
system led to their decision to press for an extraordinary council
meeting (208). The meeting instructed the Chief Executive to prepare
estimates for expenditure in 1981/82 on the basis of no reductions in
council services, and resolved that any forced surplus on the BRA be
used to the benefit of council tenants and not to subsidise the rates,
and that the level of Rate Fund Contribution to the BRA be at least
maintained in 1982/83. Labour's majority at the meeting meant that the
resolutions were approved.
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This successful attempt to give a political lead to officers in a
situation of no overall control reflected the Labour Group's clear
conception of its housing policy, contrasting with the rather piecemeal
and reactive actions of its varied coalition of opponents. Labour
regained a clear majority in the May 1983 council elections, and it is
interesting at this point to note the reflections of a senior local
party figure about Labour's basically corporatist managerial style when
in control of the council:
"some new Labour councillors were elected in May, but the old guard
who want to go on blustering through are still there
	
With the
May election many senior officers welcomed Labour's clear majority
and the clear direction they now had to work with. Under the
Alliance/Independents, agreement about policies sometimes changed
from day to day, with internal arguments and no clear direction."
(209).
But even during the years of no overall control, Labour's influence -
which tended to be reinforced by the council's officers - was strong
(although the Liberal-SDP alliance had a fairly firm base in the
district). It is tempting to suggest, although this was not
investigated directly, that a corporatist relationship existed between
these two groups even though Labour did not hold power, and that this
was an alliance based on state housing. For example, during 1981/82 the
council suspended improvement grants, officers explaining in the council
newsletter:
"The Government have recently brought in legislation to alter
considerably the regulations affecting home improvement grants. The
limit it is possible to claim towards necessary improvement has been
greatly increased. The rules governing the payment of grants have
also been relaxed. Unfortunately due to the big reduction in the
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Housing Investment Allocation by the Government the City Council is
not able to offer discretionary grants at the present tine." (210)
The newsletter was highly critical of the effects of central government
policies on housing in Durham. Although the Housing Services Committee
reintroduced discretionary improvement grants for owner-occupiers for
1982/83, with extra money available largely as a result of capital
receipts from council house sales, only £100,000 was allocated, despite
a HIP bid for £500,000 (the total bid had been £8.3m; the allocation was
£3.5m - thus grants were cut disproportionately). The Labour Group
opposed the allocation, arguing that the money should be used to
accelerate the council housing repairs programme, especially as rents
were increasing so dramatically and much of the increased budget was a
consequence of council house sales. But it was defended by the chair of
the Housing Committee, an Independent councillor for Framwellgate Moor:
"Coun. Jeff Lodge, chairman, commented that if they could save a
house anywhere, they were saving a house for the city." (210)
At the March 1982 meeting of the full council the Labour Group again
moved to increase the Rate Fund Contribution to the HRA, but failed by
one vote (211). An attempt to delete from the estimates the1100,000
for improvement grants and add £500,000 for repairs to the council stock
also failed. The end result was that while the city rate would increase
by 17.5 per cent (which would be reduced to approximately 10 per cent
overall when combined with the decision of the more conservative Labour
controlled County Council), council house rents would increase by 26 per
cent.
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Durham City's 1982/83 HIP statement argued that reductions in HIP
allocations meant fewer or no improvement grants or loans, "to the
effect that deterioration of property will increase" (212). It notes
the need for environmental improvements in some areas and although no
direct reference is made to Old Framwellgate Moor the description of
possible improvements - making up roads, landscaping and off-street car
parking - related closely to the area, but the statement made no bid
under this heading. However a bid for £600,000 was made for "Advances
for Purchase and/or Improvement Works". This was very optimistic in
view of DOB Circular 13/81 which indicated very strongly that the
acquisition, improvement and slum clearance block of HIP allocations
would, along with the new build block, be substantially reduced (213).
A bid for £50,000 "initial finance" was made for acquisitions at
Framwellgate Moor. What appears as a rather weak justification, more
appropriate to the "modernisation era", was made:
"This area is also within 3 miles of the City Centre and is the
subject of a study at the present tine. The area under
consideration adjoins what is otherwise a thriving community, with
all facilities. There are 111 dwellings in tight terraces, all over
100 years old. The physical condition of the properties is such
that no improvement grants have been available for several years.
Drainage is obsolete and open-jointed in places. Most of the narrow
streets are unmade. There is much derelict former garden land
adjacent to the dwellings." (214)
In May 1983 Labour won an overall majority of five on the council. Its
manifesto had contained a radical departure from previous policy in
making an explicit commitment to consult with tenants' associations and
to decentralise housing management. But the housing section of the
manifesto made no reference to policies for the private sector. It
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spelt out a detailed programme for council housing, taking up half of
the document. No mention was made of the Right to Buy. The Party was
clearly going for its traditional vote in the council estates, and won.
The Labour Group viewed the private sector as in competition with
council housing for funds. There was an attitude that owner-occupiers
could look after themselves. Councillors took the view that substandard
private housing should not attract council cash, particularly in a time
of financial restraint. Such housing should ultimately be cleared.
This was a traditional Labour Party position on working class housing,
but one that effectively excluded many working class owner-occupiers and
private tenants. However, much of the "substandard" nineteenth century
stock in the district, mainly in the old industrial villages, had been
demolished and very few areas of unfit houses remained, making area
redevelopment of the type Derwentside had intended for Railway Street
(chapter 5) generally inappropriate. Instead, when it was considered
necessary individual houses were deemed substandard and mortgages and
renovation grants withdrawn, obviously making the chances of unfitness
much greater. By purchasing such properties on the market (in
accordance with central government guidelines on non-statutory blight)
Durham City avoided going to public inquiry even when, as in the case of
Framwellgate Moor, the strategy was essentially area-based.
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6.2 Housing conflict in Old Framwellgate Moor: the defence of private 
housing 
Framwellgate Moor is about three miles from the centre of Durham City on
the former Al road which links Durham with Chester-le-Street. The area
was part of Durham Rural District until its inclusion in an enlarged
Durham City authority after local government reorganisation in 1974.
Old Framwellgate Moor lies on one side of the old Al, while a council
housing estate lies on the opposite side. Newton Hall, a large private
housing estate built in the 1960s to cater for the growth of the city's
service sector, also forms part of Framwellgate Moor.
In October 1980 Old Frawllgate Moor comprised 111 dwellings in close
terraces with mostly unmade narrow streets. They were built as single
storey miners' cottages in the first half of the nineteenth century by
the Framwellgate Moor Colliery Company owned by the Londonderry family
(215). The nine closed in 1924 and in the 1930s the colliery company
began to sell off the cottages. Many of the mining families left in
search of work outside the area, although some may have been rehoused in
the nearby council estate which was started in 1935. Most of the
cottages were bought as a speculative investment by a local greengrocer.
Be extended their size by building second storeys, joining together
adjacent units or building rear extensions. They were then sold to
owner-occupiers or private landlords.
After the Second World War many families from Old Framwellgate Moor were
rehoused in the council estate where building continued into the 1950s
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to cater for the city's growth. The Labour-controlled Rural District
Council proposed eventually to clear all of the area's older housing and
totally "modernise" the stock (216). Meanwhile, individual owner-
occupiers were making improvements to these old houses and by 1969 Old
Framwellgate Moor had a nix of house types: small single and two-storey
cottages, stone-built detached houses and brick-built bungalows. The
dominant form, however, was terraced housing. While the 1959 House
Purchase and Housing Act introduced standard grants based on bringing
houses with at least a fifteen-year life up to a five-point standard,
the Rural District Council did not consider the dwellings in Old
Framwellgate Moor capable of improvement to the necessary fifteen-year
life. Owner-occupiers had to improve their homes with their own
resources. The 1969 Housing Act, however, substantially raised the
level of grants for rehabilitation and with the 1974 Housing Act the
newly-created Durham City Council made available renovation grants to
Old Framwellgate Moor, which were taken up by some of the residents.
In 1977, in the new national climate of economic crisis and cuts in
public expenditure, Durham City's Environmental Health Department
undertook an inspection of the district's housing stock in accordance
with the requirements of the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts. As in Langley
Park, this was carried out without consultation with residents. On 7
March the City Architect, City Engineer, City Environmental Health
Officer and City Planning Officer jointly presented the council's
Housing Services Committee with a brief report on the eligibility of
certain areas in the district for renovation grants. The report noted
that in some streets the council had imposed a time limit on grant
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applications, mainly because the future of these areas was uncertain.
The officers now wished to remove this uncertainty by deciding on the
expected life of these properties to determine eligibility for grant
aid. These "lifing" decisions were a means of rationing the council's
resources.
It was recommended that improvement grants be made available for all
houses with an assured life of at least 30 years, intermediate grants
for houses with a life of at least 15 years and no grants for houses
with "an uncertain life". The report advised that almost all of the
properties in Old Framwellgate Moor - with the main exception of North
Terrace - be regarded as having lives of less than 15 years and
consequently should receive no further grants.
The Housing Services Committee decided to defer any decision on the
officers' recommendations until they had seen a further report detailing
conditions in each of the streets concerned. This was presented to the
Committee on 13 June (217). It contained information from a street-by-
street survey of housing conditions and re-iterated the recommendations
officers made in March. The report was very brief, with the condition
of each street being described in 100-200 words. Just under half of the
dwellings were only subject to an external inspection. The basic shells
were sound. Only 19 of the 155 dwellings inspected were considered
unfit. In addition, 55 houses had received Intermediate grants since
1974. The recommendation for terrace after terrace that "no further
grants be made" was supported by such statements as:
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"There is some dampness and disrepair ... it is doubtful if they
could be made to provide viable units of accommodation 	 six of
the properties have or appear to have internal facilities 	 there
is a lack of space to facilitate full scale improvement ... there is
a considerable number of old persons in the street ... dampness is
evident in some properties and repair varies from good to poor 
all have evidence of rising dampness although in the majority of
cases it is not yet so extensive as to cause the houses to be unfit
Of the twenty-eight properties in the block only fifteen were 
inspected of which eleven had the use of internal facilities,
although some were not satisfactorily arranged internally." (218;
stress added)
This apparent prejudice against older private lousing tcompare wit tbe
priority given to improving pre-war council houses) was accepted ty the
Housing Services Committee, which approved the report's recommendation
that most of the houses in Old Framwellgate Moor would no longer be
eligible for improvement grants. They were condemned ultimately to
clearance. In addition to adopting the no grants policy, the council
decided to serve demolition orders on Nos. 4-9 South Terrace under Part
II, Section 16 of the 1957 Housing Act. The owners decided against
appealing to the County Court. One local observer commented that:
"... the attitude of the owners seemed to be that whilst they wished
to remain in the houses, the council had made up their minds and
there was no point in an appeal." (219)
The 1957 Housing Act does not require the local authority to inform
anyone about a demolition order other than those residents with an
interest in the land and property directly affected. Together with the
decision to withdraw grants, the decision to demolish one of the
terraces in Old Framwellgate Moor served to heighten local residents'
feelings of insecurity.
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The council's decision about grants only became known locally when an
unemployed owner-occupier in Newcastle Terrace approached the council
about the eligibility of his house for an improvement grant. He was
told of the recent decision to withhold grants and draw up a plan for
the redevelopment of Framwellgate Moor, and soon realised that the
effect of no further grants would be that local housing conditions would
deteriorate and the exchange values of the houses would collapse as they
became uninhabitable. He circulated a letter to all the 84 houses in
the area, informing residents of the council's decision to demolish most
of South Terrace and stop improvement grants for almost the whole of Old
Framwellgate Moor. The letter announced a public meeting. Fifty-seven
people attended the meeting in the local community centre on 28 July
1977. After a long discussion, it was decided to form a committee and
draw up a constitution for a residents' association. Community Service
for County Durham's Countryside Officer and the local Independent
councillor were co-opted onto the committee.
Two days later the committee sent a letter together with a 100-signature
petition to the council's Chief Executive communicating the unanimous
resolutions adopted at the public meeting (220). These included calling
for the re-introduction of renovation grants, the lifting of the
demolition orders on South Terrace and consideration to be given to a
GIA for the area. At the meeting many residents objected to the way the
council's decision had been made on the basis of a very superficial
survey carried out with no consultation. The residents decided to
undertake their own survey and work on full plans and costings for
improvements, arguing that these would be less costly than rehousing
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which seemed to be the inevitable result of the council's actions. An
appeal was made for technical help.
A second meeting was called for a fortnight's time. The newly-formed
Old Framwellgate Moor Residents' Association (OFMRA) invited a council
officer to the meeting to answer residents' questions. The Chief
Executive's reply was that the natter would be "brought to the notice of
my council after the August recess" (221). This was not acceptable to
OFMRA. On 20 August they wrote to the Labour Party chair of the Housing
Services Committee requesting a meeting (222). The letter also asked
for an explanation of the decision about no further grants in the light
of central government policy which placed an emphasis on improving older
private housing. OFMRA had to wait until 22 September before receiving
a reply from the Committee chairperson, who refused to meet the group
(223).
Excluded from local council decision-making about their future, on 22
August OFMRA wrote to the local Labour MP stating their case (224). He
met the group on 23 September, but said that he was unable to intervene
on the residents' behalf and advised that they should secure legal
assistance. In order to establish relations with the council, OFMRA
invited the 33 members of the Housing Services Committee to an "open
day" on 8 October. Only one (Liberal Party) councillor turned up. It
was at this stage that OFMRA began to feel that letter writing and
petitions were getting them nowhere and decided to organise a publicity
campaign against the council. They also obtained legal and
architectural assistance, the latter on a voluntary basis from an
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architect working with Tyneside Environmental Concern. His first action
was to write to the council's Chief Environmental Health Officer
requesting a meeting to inspect South Terrace and consider what repairs
would save the houses from demolition (225). Although acknowledged an
28 October, it appears that this letter was not brought to the attention
of the Environmental Health Committee, who at their meeting on 8
November decided to adhere to their decision to demolish the South
Terrace houses. Frustrated by this continuing exclusion, OFMRA decided
to organise a demonstration at the full council meeting on 28 November
which had to ratify the Environmental Health Committee's action,
The publicity campaign got national results, On 7 November The Guardian 
published an article by Judy Hillman on "Life in a scrapheap village:
future indefinate, present imperfect". The following week OFMRA's
architect wrote to The Guardian about its struggle, emphasising its
significance as part of a wider struggle against modernism:
"The state of affairs at Framwellgate village ... is not uncommon in
the north-east. Tyneside Environmental Concern has been asked to
help a number of groups of owner/occupiers and tenants who have been
subjected to similar forms of blight. In New Kyo, a pit village of
511 flats and houses (70 per cent owner-occupied), the Derwentside
District Council has employed the sane tactics as Durham City. In
this case the decline has been in process for some years, and
despite vigorous efforts by the residents' association to change the
situation - including a clear and well-presented report calling for
the designation of the village as a General Improvement Area - the
blight prevails. The prophecy of the local environmental health
officer approaches self-fulfillment as houses change hands at a
fraction of the price they would fetch in normal circumstances. It
is not simply the absence of grants that so depresses the area -
most of the owner-occupied dwellings have been improved without
grants - it is the sentence of death that is implicit in the
council's formal decision to stop all grants." (226)
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In fact, in 1976 Durham City Council's planning office had prepared
plans to make Old Framwellgate Moor a General Improvement Area, in line
with national policy developments (227). However these were abandoned
before being brought to the attention of the council. Instead the
Environmental Health Department's recommendation to demolish some of the
houses in the area and stop renovation grants to most of the remainder
was put forward by the officers and adopted by the council in the
climate of financial cut-backs. While in March 1976 the Planning
Department had considered that some of the houses had a thirty year
life, by June they had been given a life of less than fifteen years and
thus excluded from grant aid.
There are a number of points to be made about this situation. Firstly,
there appeared to be a different approach to older housing areas between
the Planning Department and the Environmental Health Department.
Secondly, a bias towards demolition and council re-housing among older
Labour councillors was evident. Thirdly, while planning decisions
involved various statutory obligations to consult and involve the
public, housing management and environmental health decisions did not
(although this changed in the case of the former as a result of the 1980
Housing Act). Fourthly, the decision on the life of the houses and
hence eligibility for grants appeared to be tied to central government
restrictions on local public housing expenditure which began in 1976.
Thus "lifing", which was determining the future of a whole
neighbourhood, seemed to be far from an objective exercise, but one
which depended on the policy environment and the wider forces which
shaped this.
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Decisions made by the Environmental Health and Housing Departments
obviously had long-term consequences for Old Framwellgate Moor. But
OFMRA found that formal openings for appeal were very limited. As in
Derwentside, the corporatist management style of the council excluded
organised groups as well as the disorganised. There was no recourse to
a public inquiry when the council decided to clear individual unfit
houses in South Terrace through demolition orders. There were no legal
grounds for appealing against the Ming decisions and the removal of
grants. It seemed impossible to influence the Labour Group on the
council. While the local Independent councillor supported the
residents' case, the local ward Labour councillor (who subsequently lost
his seat) refused to support it apparently because of the Labour Group's
decision. Since the residents had no right to speak directly at council
meetings they had to rely on an Opposition councillor to put their case
- however inadequately - or protest directly.
With advice from the voluntary organisation Community Service for County
Durham, OFMRA decided on a strategy of drawing up their own plans for
Old Framwellgate Moor as they were excluded from negotiating with the
council. OFMRA's first priority, however, was to save South Terrace
from demolition. In November 1977 their architect and a local
unemployed builder carried out a structural survey of the Terrace. They
concluded that the cottages were sound and could be improved "at modest
cost" to a life in excess of 30 years. On 25 November the architect
wrote to the council's Environmental Health Officer requesting a meeting
to discuss the defects in the houses (228). OFMRA's solicitor also
wrote to the Chief Executive and the Department of the Environment
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requesting suspension of the demolition orders because the owners had
agreed to repair the cottages (229). The decision to demolish was to be
considered at a full council meeting on 28 November. Forty residents
turned up to demonstrate, ranging from "80 year old couples who have
lived in the area all their life, to middle aged couples, young marrieds
and individual younger tenants" (230).
At the meeting the local Independent councillor moved that the natter be
put back to the Environmental Health Camnittee for recoasidart,tiom,
any decision deferred until the residents had produced their report
stating the case for a GIA (231). This motion was supported by all the
Liberals and most of the Independent councillors, but went down by 21
votes to 29 under the weight of the Labour Group vote. The decision was
met by slow hand-clapping by local residents, leading to their ejection
from the council chamber by the police. The Labour Deputy Mayor
commented to a reporter:
"I don't think they helped their case. Ginn. Lodge (Independent
councillor for Framwellgate Moor) could have put their views, but
the opportunity was missed
	 I haven't seen the houses myself, but
we make these decisions on the advice of our officials, who have. I
cannot say at this stage what action will be taken when the
residents' plans are submitted." (232; parenthesis added)
During their campaign OFMRA also worked generally to improve the
neighbourhood, including pressing for the provision of litter bins and a
children's play area, undertaking a "clean-up weekend" and planning a
landscaping project. This was a similar strategy to create an active
community as was pursued by the Railway Street Association in Langley
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Park (chapter 5). Their main concern was that no further decisions
should be taken about the future of Framwellgate Moor until they had
produced their report on the case for a GIA. On 6 February 1978 the
Housing Services Committee discussed the matter and reaffirmed their
earlier decisions to demolish 6 houses in South Terrace and stop grants
(233). They agreed to consider the residents' report but ultimate
clearance was envisaged and houses offered by their owners would be
purchased by the council.
OFMRA's draft report was discussed at a General Meeting on 13 March 1978
and on 10 May the final report was circulated to their solicitors, the
Chief Executive of Durham City Council, OFMRA's architect, the media,
the public library and the Parish Council. With the aid of survey
results, plans, designs and costings, the report - The Improvement 
Potential of Old Framwellgate Moor - made the case for improving the
area as a GIA in the spirit of the 1974 Housing Act (234) It revealed
that 77 of the 116 dwellings in the area had all five standard amenities
and twelve had central heating. Forty-seven standard grants and two
discretionary grants had been taken up between 1957 and 1977, with 28
improvements financed privately. The physical survey showed the houses
to be in "very good" structural condition. The household questionnaire
revealed the convenient location of the area and a relatively young age
structure. The improvements that residents wanted to see were to make
up the roads, to tidy up the area, to introduce play streets and to
introduce controls to stop non-residents using the streets as car parks.
Only 9 of the 111 households which responded suggested the re-
introduction of renovation grants. The report concluded:
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"Old Framwellgate Moor has every amenity within reach; it has a
wonderful community spirit; it has strong houses that are well-worth
preserving. Unfortunately it lacks made-up roads and has an
abundance of unused land which gives it an overall untidiness at the
moment. But these are surface faults and it takes little
imagination to show what could be made of the village. This report
outlines our ideas for the future improvement of our village which
we hope will be accepted and expanded upon by the officers and
members of the local authority." (235)
As in the case of Railway Street, the neighbourhood met many of the
needs of its residents in the early 1980s when cheap solid fuel heated
housing and convenient facilities were assets lacking in many modern
council estates. Arguably, the struggle for Old Framwellgate Moor, as
in Railway Street, was a post-modern "survival strategy", defending
environments that offered more use values and possibilities for informal
activity and self-provisioning than the large areas of mass housing
built during the modern phase (see Mingione, 1983).
The defence of Old Framwellgate Moor involved a high level of self-
activity among the residents aimed at demonstrating the viability of the
area. OFMRA made a detailed criticism of the council officers' report
of June 1977 (236). They countered the vagueness of the report with
figures from their own questionnaire survey and architects' report on
internal facilities, structure, willingness to improve and social and
demographic composition. The survey revealed that Old Framwellgate Moor
comprised 116 households. Sixty five per cent of the 75 properties were
owner-occupied, 19 per cent were tenanted and the remaining 14 per cent
were empty. The report stated:
"... the Association finds it impossible to understand how the
points given in the survey report led to the opinion that these
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properties had less than a fifteen year life expectancy and would
therefore be ineligible for grants. Almost all have the basic
amenities and also have large gardens, thus making them able to be
extended. No evidence is given of the extent of dampness or
disrepair and the Association is of the opinion that these problems
are not on a major scale, nor are they unable to be remedied at
relatively little cost. Moreover, the houses are basically sound
... the style of this report paints the worst possible picture of 
the area .. if the present blight continues for a long period,
people may well become reluctant to do repairs and houses will
deteriorate." (237; emphasis added)
On 22 January 1979 the local Labour MP wrote to OFMRA explaining that on
2 December the council's Housing Services Committee had discussed an
Action Area Plan drawn up by the City Planning Officer which included
part of Framwellgate Moor (238). The Plan, however, would include some
demolition and would largely be based on a detailed survey to be carried
out by the Environmental Health Officer over December and January. On
26 February the Chief Executive wrote to inform OFMRA that the Action
Area Plan would not be available to the public until June (239). There
was to be no consultation about the Plan. In July the local Independent
councillor told OFMRA that the Environmental Health Officer's survey had
found only three houses in Old Framwellgate Moor to be unfit. It wrote
to the Environmental Health Officer requesting further information about
the survey. In a reply dated 11 July he stated that the survey report
had to remain confidential until it had been seen by the council (240).
It was only one of a number of factors that had to be taken into
account: the City Architect was to carry out a structural survey, and
all the results were to be included in a report by the City Planning
Officer.
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OFMRA wrote to the local Labour MP, the local councillors and the Prime
Minister requesting help in obtaining a copy of the Environmental Health
Officer's survey report. In September OFMRA was eventually informed
that the survey found 3 houses to be unfit, 47 fit and 27 "substandard".
OFMRA continued to press for the production of the County Planning
Officer's Action Area Plan, which by 1980 the council was terming the
Redevelopment Outline Plan.
6.3 Waiting it out 
"(T)he government	 had time and resources on their side and the
process of decline was accelerating all the time ... It is difficult
for a local group to maintain support and credibility over a long
period with few obvious achievements." (Redpath, 1980, p. 160)
The above quote from Redpath's account of the attempt to save the
Shankill Road in Belfast from redevelopment is a good introduction to
the next phase of community action in Old Framwellgate Moor, During
1980 attendance at OFMRA committee meetings dwindled and much of the
work fell upon its chairperson, a self-employed jobbing builder.
However local support for the residents' association remained strong,
and the chairperson stated that there were good turn-outs at important
public meetings (241). He saw his work during a long period of non-
decision making by the council as something of a hobby. He kept up a
steady exchange of correspondence with council officers, the
Environmental Health Officers Association, the Medical Research Council,
Shelter and the Department of the Environment. In particular, he
contested the argument that conditions in Old Framwellgate Moor were
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injurous to health, which provided the council with the "excuse" to
intervene in the area (see chapter 2). The main interest of the
majority of the residents was for "the council to leave them alone".
There was little support for the idea of housing association involvement
or a housing co-operative, in contrast to Railway Street in Langley
Park. Most people preferred to spend their own money on their own
houses, which had sound basic shells. But many now appeared to be
resigned to their fate and ready to sell to the council and move to a
more secure area. There was little support for practical initiatives;
plans for a Manpower Services Commission scheme to improve the area had
met with no support from local residents, who would have had to pay for
materials and machine hire.
Uncertainty continued to hang over Old Framwellgate Moor. On 4 August
the Environmental Health Officer informed OFMRA that the policy of no
improvement grants would remain at least until the City Planning
Officer's "study exercise" was submitted to the council for their
decision (242). On 7 August the City Engineer informed OFMRA that due
to legal and practical difficulties, together with the possibility of
prejudicing the Action Area Plan, the council had to reject OFMRA's
plans for environmental improvements to the area (243). Following
Information from the local Independent councillor that the council was
to meet with regional officials from the Department of the Environment
on 14 October to discuss various housing matters, including Framwellgate
Moor, OFMRA's chairperson wrote to the Department on 3 October stating
that Durham City Council intended to demolish houses it had not surveyed
structurally, that many residents did not want to be moved to council
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houses and that the Environmental Health Officer's survey was now out of
date (244). He enclosed a copy of their architect's structural survey.
The Department of the Environment did approve some money for spending on
acquisition, but this was suspended as a result of central government's
moratorium on housing expenditure that year.
On 29 November 1980 John Stanley, the Conservative Government's Minister
for Housing, attended a public meeting on the "Right to Buy" in Durham
Town Hall. A few Framwellgate Moor residents attended and asked Stanley
about the government's policy towards older housing such as that in
Framwellgate Moor. He stated that he could not answer detailed points,
but invited a letter. OFMRA's new chairperson, a local school teacher,
wrote to Stanley on 1 December pointing out that Durham City Council's
policy of buying up houses that were sound and demolishing them did not
make commercial sense. The letter was sympathetically received, but
again it was stated that no mechanism yet existed for central government
to intervene in the locality.
The lobbying continued until a final decision was made by the Housing
Services Committee at its meeting on 14 September 1981 (245). The
committee considered a report of the Officers' Management Team on Old
Framwellgate Moor and resolved to confirm the existing policy of no
discretionary grants and no mortgages, and to achieve the partial
clearance and redevelopment of 86 properties under Part II or Part III
of the 1957 Housing Act. Twenty-four properties in North Terrace were
made eligible for discretionary renovation grants and mortgages "as and
when HIP monies can be made available". The committee also resolved to
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request the Development Services Committee to instruct the City Planning
Officer to prepare a local plan in due course for the future of Old
Framwellgate Moor as a whole and to request the City Secretary to inform
the residents' association of their decisions. The residents were
informed by written circular on 14 October, explaining that the
suspension of renovation grants would continue and that ultimate
clearance and redevelopment of the area was envisaged, but current
central government policy prevented this at the present time (246).
Residents were invited to offer their houses for sale to the council.
This decision re-energised the residents' association, which had been at
a low ebb over the previous year. It wrote to all the city councillors
stating that the substantial majority of people who owned and lived in
the 86 houses affected did not want them demolished (247). The letter
demanded that the council withdraw plans to purchase and clear the
houses and threatened a campaign against it "similar to the campaign
against the leisure centre", which had generated considerable and
successful opposition to the council in the late 1970s. The letter
stated that a recent questionnaire showed widespread support for such a
campaign and criticised the council's arguments for clearance. After
four years of communications the time had cone for such action, with
maximum publicity. The letter concluded:
"Finally would you please note that we would regret having to launch
a campaign against the council, but what else do you expect us to
do? Also please do not take this as a personal attack on any
councillor or officer. We see it as an attack on the system, a
system which was no doubt suitable for ridding us of the worst back
to back housing of the 1930s, but which is now out of date. One
example of this is the 1957 Housing Act which the Development
Services Committee proposed using in its recent resolution. This
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would seem to require the council to show that the 'arrangement of
the streets and houses' pose a health hazard. Perhaps the narrow
back streets of fifty years ago were such a hazard; but in the 1980s
in Framwellgate Moor where there is about fifteen yards between each
row of houses, where everyone has a refrigerator and the number of
people per house is a fraction of what it used to be, any idea of a
health hazard is Just not on.
Please vote for what the people of Old Framwellgate Moor want."
(248)
At a meeting of OFMRA in October, attended by 20 residents, it was
decided to re-introduce regular monthly meetings and raise subscriptions
to L1 a month for those prepared to pay it. A further letter was sent
to all city councillors arguing that the houses were sound, offered
relatively cheap and basic accommodation and were being blighted (249).
OFMRA questioned the council's view that full scale improvement would
cost about L10,000 per house, equal to the cost of redevelopment. The
letter stated that "even if these figures are correct, which we deny,
the above are not the only two alternatives. There is a third: Just
leave us alone". It continued:
"The correspondence file of communications between this association
and the council and others has grown to about three inches thick
over the last four years. We have decided that the council is
playing for tine, which may well be its best course of action. But
this is not getting the people of Framwellgate Moor anywhere. Hence
our campaign."
Labour lost control of Durham City Council in May 1980. OFMRA were not
now dealing with the "Labour Party machine" and in fact their local
Independent councillor became the chair of the Housing Services
Committee. Following lobbying, he and other councillors agreed to a
meeting with the residents' association in January 1982. OFMRA's
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December newsletter argued that the council resolution to clear 86
houses under the 1957 Housing Act was a device to obtain central
government approval to acquire the houses when there were not enough
funds to clear them in the immediate future (250).
OFMRA was suspicious that the council was attempting to buy up the area
so that they could demolish fit houses without opposition and redevelop
a site with potential for housing or commercial development. This was
made all the easier as building societies would not lend on the
properties while the council's policy remained as it was (251). At the
December meeting of the Housing Services Committee, for example, it was
decided to purchase two houses in Old Framwellgate Moor (252). OFMRA's
newsletter also pointed out that there was a lack of re-lets in nearby
council housing because of its popular location so there was a risk of
displaced residents being rehoused in less popular and convenient
estates, and having to pay much more for their housing when there was a
possibility that some residents would be excluded from state assistance
with the rent because of the money they would receive from the sale of
their homes in Framwellgate Moor.
On January 28, 1982 a packed public meeting was chaired by the chair of
the council's Housing Services Committee in Framwellgate Moor Community
Centre (253). The housing officer explained to the residents the
background to the current situation: the decision to withdraw grants had
been taken in 1977 and to acquire houses in the area in 1978. In
September 1981 the Housing Services Committee decided on partial
clearance under Parts II and III of the 1957 Housing Act, with
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improvement of the neighbourhood and some replacement housing as the
ultimate aim. The council would buy up houses at their market value.
The Environmental Health Officer stated that the majority of the houses
were technically fit but were "nearing the end of their lives" and were
to have a further inspection. There were interjections from the
audience at this stage about the lack of detail involved in these
inspections.
A spokesperson for the residents' association argued that the officers'
report to the council in 1977 made no reference to any structural
problems. The 1979 Environmental Health Officers report contained no
evidence to deny a 30 year life. Being short of money was not a good
reason for the council to pull down the houses; local people just wanted
the council to leave them alone. A 30 year life would enable local
residents to apply to the Housing Corporation for funds to improve the
houses.
OFXRA's volunteer architect argued that the houses were structurally
sound although visually not all that appealing. Local residents had
shown a great deal of initiative and many had carried out work to their
homes. The council had made "brusque and superficial decisions" that
were "paternalistic and authoritarian".
The City Architect replied that the houses were very old and two (sic)
of them were in unsatisfactory structural condition. The residents had
refused full inspections of their houses (but this was disputed by the
residents). The housing officer stated that "the council won't touch
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the houses as long as they are fit". No decision had been taken either
way about the lives of the dwellings.
Several residents argued that there was a market demand for the houses
and they were quite content to be left to the housing market. The
council was preventing this by blighting the area with its policy of no
grants and no mortgages - even if none of these were wanted. There was
no point in clearing the houses, the council did not he the mon” emd
they were not unfit.
In a remarkably candid contribution, the City Planner stated that if the
council was unable to acquire the properties, there would be no
clearance action. If complusory purchase was used residents would have
the right to a public inquiry which, as had happened in Railway Street,
they were very likely to win. Framwellgate Moor was the only area of
the city where the council had a house purchase policy. It was aware
that its previous decisions meant that no building society mortgages
were available, and had therefore resolved to purchase the houses as
they came onto the market.
The chair concluded the meeting by inviting OFMRA to make
recommendations on the future of the area to the Housing Services
Committee, including if they wished the proposal that a 30 year life be
declared.
It is significant that it had to wait until Labour had lost control of
the council before such a public meeting could take place. The meeting
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convinced residents that their main objective now was to get the council
to give the houses a 30 year life so that the few remaining unfit houses
would be eligible for improvement grants, housing credit could be
restored for the area, an unimpeded housing market re-established and
the area given a more secure future. While there was little interest
among residents in a housing co-operative, they decided that if they
informed the council that it was their intention to form a co-op and
seek Housing Corporation funds they night be successful in getting a 30
year life declared for the properties (254). OFMRA's secretary wrote to
the council requesting the removal of any declaration of a limited life
for the houses and, following an invitation, Banks of the Wear
Cooperative Housing Services visited the area in March to discuss the
possibility of a housing co-operative (255).
By 1984 the council had bought up over a quarter of the 86 properties of
Old Framwellgate Moor during the past three years (256). There was a
strong feeling among residents that this was a bid to clear the area
without resorting to compulsory purchase and a public inquiry, and that
the council was blighting the area without producing any definite plan
for its future. OFMRA's secretary commented to a local newspaper:
"..• in the case of the houses in Framwellgate Moor, Building
Societies and Bank surveyors are evidently prepared to put money
into the houses; people are prepared to buy them and maintain them.
It is hard to see the case for the Council meddling in the area."
(257)
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6.4 Sufill-ry and conclusions 
There are many similarities between the present case study and previous
studies. The local Labour Party had a long history of a commitment to
council housing and the eradication of old "substandard" housing. This
continued into the years when many working class people preferred to own
their own hones, a decision in which the failures of mass state housing
during the modernisation era played a significant part as well as the
obvious financial attractions for waged households. It also continued
beyond the end of slum housing to be applied to "near slums" in which
people wanted to continue living and where exchange values reflected
this. Durham City Council remained committed to a modernist housing
policy despite the transition in national policy to recommodification
and the retention of the older private housing stock. Its intervention
in the civil society of Old Framwellgate Moor led to a reaction among
residents who had seen their views about the use value of the houses
reflected in the houses' exchange values until the council blighted the
area. Removing this blight would leave the owners with relatively
attractive investments.
In the case of Old Framwellgate Moor, however, the council could not
secure the resources from central government to carry out redevelopment
and it was an example of what Stewart (1982) has identified as
bureaucratic procedure outstripping financial capacity. This situation
was a product of central government's crack-down on local expenditure on
capital schemes. Amid this, the council avoided a public inquiry by
acquiring properties on the market rather than using compulsory
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purchase, which would have been very difficult to justify as few of the
houses were unfit. It did not improve the houses it purchased in Old
Framwellgate Moor, but bricked them up or rented them out after basic
repairs. Durham City pursued a policy that appeared to hope for a
change in central government policy and eventually the resources for
demolition and selective rebuilding, perhaps under a second phase of
modernisation. Central government policy in the 1980s was to retain
older private housing such as that at Old Framwellgate Moor and
encourage its improvement in stages as owners could afford it, letting
the housing market continue to operate. The older Labour councillors in
Durham, however, were still committed to the modernist clean-sweep
approach to the replacement of these old terraces.
At the Examination in Public of the Durham County Structure Plan, Durham
City Council pressed for an upward revision of the County Council's
population target for 1991 for the City, arguing that people and jobs
continued to be attracted and that major land releases were called for
(258). The Secretary of State agreed with the Panel's recommendation
that the traditional character of the city had to be preserved and that
there should be no further major releases of housing land in the central
area. This was likely to add to the potential exchange value of the
houses in Old Framwellgate Moor and the attractiveness of physical
improvements to them or even - possibly - private redevelopment.
Durham City Council would not accept that Old Framwellgate Moor could be
transformed into "modern" housing without public redevelopment, which
throughout the modernisation era in County Durham had been the vehicle
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for such transfornations. Yet market processes were likely to produce
investment in improving the houses. In Railway Street the "early post-
modern" bias towards retaining and improving older private housing had
been used by local residents to win quite substantial financial
underpinning by the state for their alternative to redevelopment. The
public inquiry meant they planned this alternative in some detail. In
Old Framwellgate Moor residents were more interested in returning to the
status quo. There was no public inquiry, but in fact the council was
forced to retreat. Durham City Council's new build continued to be
largely restricted to old persons dwellings, including some infill in
Old Framwellgate Moor. Building for general needs occurred, on a
significant scale on land near Newton Hall, but in the private sector.
In the end financial pressures forced the council to sell back into the
private sector most of the houses it had acquired in Old Framwellgate
Moor (258). Renovation grants were made available, but on a United
scale due to lack of funds, and Old Framwellgate Moor was not high on
the council's list of priorities for resources when it failed to return
Labour candidates in local elections. The council itself entered a
period in financial crisis after the 1987 General Election, its efforts
to keep council rents down and supplement massively reduced HIP
allocations having been based on hopes for a Labour Party victory
nationally which did not materialise.
Despite their different histories, the two case studies of Railway
Street and Old Framwellgate Moor illustrate, at one level, the
determining role of the "nationalization of housing policy" in local
struggles about housing. The accounts have attempted to show how these
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changes were experienced by people opposing "modernisation" at very
local levels. In the struggle against modernisation, the 1980s saw the
means of realising these projects to some degree become available as
central government attempted to expand circulation and the availability
of means of self-help in its strategy for restructuring reproduction in
ways that would strengthen markets rather than displace them. It was
argued in chapters 1 and 2 that housing and planning policies applied
throughout the country by central governments have had a "logic" which
follows from their nature as strategic interventions to support changing
regimes of accumulation within limits set by legitimation needs. What
emerges from these two case studies, and indeed the studies of Category
"D", Bessemer Park and Peterlee, is the extent to which central control
had to be extended, through various mechanisms, to achieve the end of
"modernisation" as it continued in the housing and planning policies of
local councils in County Durham.
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CHAPTER 7
COMMUNITY ACTION IN NORTH ARMAGH 
This chapter and chapter 8 are accounts of community action about
housing in North Armagh, an area of Northern Ireland which was at the
centre of a regional modernisation strategy during the 1960s. This
entailed large-scale spatial restructuring and the creation of the new
town of Craigavon.
Previous chapters have located community action about housing in County
Durham in the context of modernising and early post-modern planning and
housing strategies, analysing this action in terns of struggle in civil
society against modernisation. As discussed in chapter 1, North Armagh
was selected as a comparative case study area for two inter-related
reasons. Firstly, North Armagh was subject to similar modernisation and
spatial restructuring policies as County Durham and there was sporadic
community action about housing issues associated with these policies
(see chapter 2). Secondly, civil society in Northern Ireland is
different from County Durham, most notably in terns of sectarian
divisions and the insignificant influence of Labourism. In chapter 2 it
was argued that despite the absence of a social democratic hegemony,
corporatist modernisation was pursued during the 1960s by the Unionist
statelet, and for similar reasons regarding the needs of capital and the
management of class struggle to North East England. However, having
conceptualised community action as struggle in civil society in chapter
1, and the locality as an important "experiential sphere", is it
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possible to locate the generative mechanisms of community action about
housing in North Armagh and County Durham in terns of modernisation as,
in the final analysis, a capitalist strategy, treating the apparent
differences in civil society as contingent factors?
This problem is investigated in the present chapter, which examines the
spatial impact of the development of Craigavon and the community action
response, and chapter 8, which examines community action in the new town
itself.
7.1 The creation of a modern city
"Welcome to the home of your dreams!" (graffiti on a vandalised and
boarded up house in Craigavon, 1982).
By the early 1960s Northern Ireland's Unionist administration for the
most part accepted the need for regional planning to modernise the
province's physical infrastructure in the face of international
competition for capital and jobs. With local capital declining in the
face of international competition and the dominance of markets by
transnationals, a new managerial/commercial/middle class Unionist
coalition emerged (Parson, 1980; Wiener, 1980; see also chapter 2).
Its position could be enhanced by regional planning; at the sane time
such planning could be introduced as a reform.
The first major step was the Matthew Report (Matthew, 1963), confined by
Stormont's terns of reference to drawing up planning proposals to
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facilitate the modernisation of the Belfast sub-region, the economic hub
and protestant heartland of Northern Ireland. In essence, Matthew
proposed expanding "growth points" within the Belfast sub-region, while
reducing the concentration of people and employment in the Belfast urban
area itself. His work disregarded the causes and implications of
sectarian division in Northern Ireland (O'Dowd, Tomlinson and Rolston,
1980, pp. 30-67; Allen, 1981). Matthew's main recommendation was, in
line with modernisation strategy in peripheral regions of Britain, that
a new "regional city" in the North of County Armagh should be built to
attract firms from Britain, Europe and the United States, alleviate
housing and traffic pressures on Belfast and form a service centre for
the South and Vest of the province. The Report states:
"It is proposed that the existing towns of Lurgan and Portadown be
expanded into a substantial new city of approximately 100,000
people, this being the most important single new development
suggested in the Plan
	 The proposal, which it is important to
regard as of first priority, is to create a major new urban area for
administration, industry, marketing, technical education and
recreational activities. It presents an opportunity to create a
contemporary urban environment of high quality, which could serve as
a major symbol of regeneration within Northern Ireland." (Matthew,
1963, pp. 29-30)
Matthew's strategy was endorsed by the Wilson Report on economic
development in Northern Ireland (Wilson, 1965). Craigavon was to be a
major new "growth centre" developed between the old plantation towns of
Lurgan and Portadown. These were linen centres which from the early
1950s had been experiencing sharply contracting employment. Matthew
Justified the recommendation on technocratic grounds: proximity to
Belfast, existing transportation routes with potential for expansion,
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land availability and existing urban centres (Matthew, 1963). The
development of the new town, and the implementation of other elements of
the Matthew Plan, involved new corporatist state agencies "above" local
clientelism and committed to technocratic modernisation in the face of
opposition from local councils and the small communities and farmers
affected by restrictions on development outside the new growth centre,
and the complusory purchase of their land for development within it.
Although based on the importation of social democratic-style
modernisation into the province, the new town was incorporated into the
sectarian strategy of the Unionist regime (but, as described below,
their were many aspects of its early development which were "normal" and
not manipulated for sectarian ends).
There was considerable hostility to the new town from Opposition members
at Stormont, who were further antagonised by the Unionist Cabinet's
decision to name it after Northern Ireland's first Prime Minister, and
by the appointment of a past chairman (sic) of Larne Divisional Unionist
Association as the Development Commission's first chairperson. In one
of several Stormont debates on Craigavon, Gerry Fitt (Republican Labour
Party) protested to the Unionist Minister for Housing and Local
Government, V.J. Morgan, that:
"There are more urgent problems to be considered in our existing
towns. If the Minister would take off his rose-coloured spectacles
and look at the appalling housing conditions which exist in our
towns he would get a great deal of satisfaction from trying to
alleviate problems that already exist, without creating further
problems through the institution of a new town. The Matthew Report
was not put to the vote when it was debated in the House. No hon.
Member had an opportunity to express his opinion on the Report in
the Division Lobbies." (260)
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There was considerable concern that the concentration of resources on
developing Craigavon would be to the cost of older towns in the
province, especially those outside the "Unionist pale". The
implications of the spatial impact of the plan were siezed upon much
sooner in the case of the Matthew Report than in the case of the Durham
County Development Plan (see chapter 3). It seems likely that this was
because of sensitivities in Northern Ireland about the sectarian
ramifications of policy decisions, while in County Durham there was
among planners and political leaders an assumption that spatial policy
was "in the common interest". There were also fierce conflicts between
the state and local farmers who faced dispossession without, in their
view, fair compensation. The success of the Unionist Government in this
struggle reflected both the decline of small farming interests within
the Unionist Party and the growing role of state intervention to support
modernisation (Wiener, 1980, pp. 29-48).
Craigavon Development Commission was established in 1965 and took up its
modernising remit vigorously. It was working in a climate of reformism
emanating in large measure from the Wilson Government in Britain, which
firmly backed the modernisation strategy (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson,
1979, pp. 162-206). The first houses it erected, like those in Peterlee
(chapter 4), were of good quality, and similar to those built by the
Northern Ireland Housing Trust, a corporatist agency created in 1945 in
a similar reformist development phase. The Commission pioneered the
introduction of full Parker Morris housing standards into Ireland and
the new town. It was to be a "rural city", with high quality
landscaping and some of the most advanced planning concepts of the day.
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The ideology which imbued the design ideas implemented in Craigavon had
many similarities with the social democratic "vision" which narked the
British new towns, particularly in trying to manufacture harmonious,
modern communities in send-rural settings and in overriding existing
social relations seen as backward and reactionary (Dickens, Duncan,
Goodwin and Gray, 1985 1 pp. 214-222). In fact, the Development
Commission attempted to socially engineer religious mixing by
integrating social facilities and amenities, but this failed with the
intensification of sectarian conflict in the early 1970s (Allen, 1981).
The first sector of the new town earmarked for development, and the only
new sector to be completed, was named after William Brownlow, planter
founder of Lurgan. Building began in 1967 with the crash development of
the Meadowbrook and Moylinn estates for the large Goodyear plant.
Goodyear was one of the first transnationals to locate in Craigavon,
creating 2,000 jobs, many of which were unskilled and went to catholic
workers despite the new town's deliberate location in the Unionist pale.
The company received a government incentive grant believed to be 45 per
cent of the £6.52 needed to install the plant (261). However, it was
not possible to fill Craigavon's labour pool quickly enough and within a
few months Goodyear ran into labour shortage problems which badly
hampered the plant's production targets. The main reason for this was
that people were not moving to the new town because of high rents
resulting from the Commission's obligation to balance its housing
account. Workers from Belfast could not afford to move. The Managing
Director of Goodyear argued that the new town's houses should have been
built to lower standards and rented out more cheaply:
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"I hate to say that housing in Craigavon is too good for those who
cone. I Just think it is a little bit too rich for the pocket
book." (261)
And indeed some of the subsequent building used "quick and cheap package
deals", only to deteriorate rapidly and become the most difficult-to-let
parts of the housing stock when housing surpluses emerged at the end of
the modernisation period (262). Much use was made of experimental
designs, which were criticised in subsequent consultants' reports (see
below).
The adverse effects of high rents on labour mobility were considered by
the Development Programme 1970-75 prepared by Matthew, Wilson and
Parkinson (1970). It argued for more of the costs of modernisation to
be borne by individual households, especially as this would moderate
demands for higher standards for the new housing. It stated:
"Housing subsidies are expensive and with the large housing
programme now contemplated, the total cost becomes formidable.
There may moreover be demands for larger subsidies in order to keep
down rents on the new houses. Such demands may sometimes be made
unreasonably by people who want to have it both ways: they want new
and better houses but they want to pay no more rent. Unreasonable
demands must be resisted and distinguished from genuine cases of
hardship where special measures may be necessary of a radically
different kind ... When tenants object to the payment of a rent of,
say 50s. a week, they probably do not realise that the true annual
cost of the house is over £6 a week. In short the present
arrangements do not bring hone to them the extent to which they are
being assisted. This would be done more clearly if rents were at an
economic level and those in need were given cash or vouchers
equivalent to stated cash amounts that reflected their particular
requirements." (pp. 108-109)
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Means-tested rent rebates were introduced for low-income tenants to
cushion the effect of relatively low wages and high rents. However,
during the 1974-79 Labour Government rents were, in fact, kept down as
part of the strategy on costs and prices agreed with the trade unions.
The Housing Executive was actually refused permission to make a small
rent increase during these years (Brett, 1986, pp. 112-113). It was
only when the general election victory of the New Right in 1979 finally
ended social democratic corporatism that rents were increased - very
substantially - to reduce general subsidies. In Northern Ireland these
dramatic rent rises were forced through by central government directive
in the face of Housing Executive opposition (Brett, 1986, p. 113).
The Development Programme 1970-75 argued that "Craigavon is poised to
advance very quickly" (p. 136) but called on central government to
locate more public projects in the area. Significant economic and
population growth were anticipated (this was 1970). Within a few years,
however, it was clear that these forecasts, on which modernisation had
been based, were optimistic. But the Development Commission continued
with its building programme for a number of reasons. Money was
allocated and very heavy initial state investments had already been
made. In addition, while the "catholic extension" of Lurgan had been
completed, the final phases of the new town's development were a
"protestant extension" of Fortadown. Craigavon's large housing surplus,
creating an intractable housing management problem in the 1980s, largely
originates from this tine.
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In the 1970s a number of articles appeared in the media blaming working
class people for not taking up the opportunities offered by this modern
new town. An economic survey of the province in 1971 stated:
".,. people used to paying low rents for tatty houses were not
prepared to pay the higher rents charged on Craigavon's modern, if
rather uninspired looking, houses. But now a generous rent rebate
scheme is in being and there is a waiting list for the houses ...
Nevertheless there does seem to be a reluctance among the people of
Belfast to move away from the familiar surroundings, however rundown
these may be. This is, perhaps, yet another sign of the innate
social conservatism of Ulster, which both reinforces and is
reinforced by its people's religious prejudices and political
allegiances." (263)
A provincial newspaper argued that people should:
"... raise their standards and behaviour and at least acquire the
intelligence to appreciate the importance of what Craigavon is
offering them." (264)
The imagery of harmonious labour pools was contrasted with the conflict
of the old population centres, as this economic commentary illustrates:
"Craigavon and the new developments planned for Antrim and Ballymena
... should not simply be Ulster's showpieces but the forcing houses
of social change. That is why in planning Ulster's future it is
important that the emphasis should be placed more on the development
of such new growth points than upon propping up the older and more
strife-ridden centres of population. The people of Ulster have to
learn to mix together and, to make sure that happens, they have got
to move." (265)
In addition to the moves to reduce housing costs discussed above, other
measures were introduced to fill up the labour pools, including cash
grants and a proposal (which was not implemented) to remove rent control
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in Belfast to "push" people out of the city (Matthew, Wilson and
Parkinson, 1970). The main method of displacement from Belfast was
large-scale redevelopment in the inner-city which moved thousands of
workers out to where housing was available in the growth centres and
freed valuable land in the city for roads and commercial development
(Wiener, 1980; Parson, 1981).
The sane techniques of modernist propaganda as were encountered in
County Durham were employed in North Armagh. For example, the Craigavon
Planning Executive claimed that:
"CRAIGAVON NEW TOWN IS ABOUT PEOPLE AND THEIR WAY OF LIFE. The aim
of the new town is to offer an alternative way of life to the
present day city, in conditions of well paid jobs, attractive
housing and local amenities and where there are plenty of facilities
for leisure." (266)
Thus Craigavon was to be the beginning of a new era of modernisation.
But its reformist elements contradicted the sectarian motivations of the
Unionist statelet. The contradictions were illustrated by the behaviour
of the Development Commission's Fabian-minded Chief Architect/Planner,
Geoffrey Copcutt. Copcutt had worked with Matthew in Cumbernauld and
was appointed chief architect-planner for Craigavon in August 1963. In
June 1964 he made a speech describing Craigavon as a "stroke of genius"
(267). Two weeks later he resigned, alleging that:
"... the Stormont government would not countenance any scheme that
would upset the voting balance between Protestants and Ronan
Catholics	 Religious and political considerations are dominant in
the new city decision	 I have become disenchanted with the
Stormont scene	 it has shown signs of a crisis ridden regime and
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has asked us to engineer propaganda rather than design a new city
the reJuvination of Londonderry should have preference." (268)
Copcutt was replaced by another modernist technocrat, Alexander
Bannerman. While Copcutt opposed what he saw as sectarian obstacles to
modernisation, his demands for resources to be re-directed to Derry
necessitated a complete revision of modernisation strategy which was out
of the question for both political and economic reasons. In the sane
way that the Stormont regime could not ensure that the development of
Craigavon served its purposes because of its dependence on capital's
investment decisions, it could not as a capitalist state restructure
planning to contradict the dominant economic forces which produced
uneven development. As in County Durham, the local state's strategy was
to facilitate capitalism in the belief that resulting economic growth
would be of political benefit.
Protests against the new town continued. In June 1969 five Opposition
Stormont MPs called on the government to defer developing Craigavon
until it had investigated whether better results would be achieved by
regenerating existing towns (269). A local planner commented in
retrospect:
"There were ideas for image-building, but the myth creation exercise
failed as people cane to realise that Craigavon was Just a housing
estate between Lurgan and Portadown. The Craigavon idea was
superimposed on County Armagh by planners from Cumbernauld.
Planning was used as a sectarian weapon. There were no votes in
developing republican areas." (270)
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The use of an unelected local state agency to "impose" the new town was
the same approach as with the British new towns, although in Northern
Ireland its powers extended to an ability to take over all local
government functions. This was applied to the two rural district
councils but not to the technically and politically stronger Portadown
and Lurgan municipal councils (Allen, 1981). By 1973, however, the
combined effect of centralising major local government functions and
proroguing Stormont had removed all meaningful local democracy in
Northern Ireland (Birrell and Murie, 1980, pp. 182-183). Craigavon
Development Commission was disbanded with the reorganisation of local
government and its functions spread among a number of statutory
agencies.
7.2 The decline of Craigavon 
The fact that Craigavon did not attract large numbers of protestants and
that many of the jobs initially created, and much of the housing, went
to unskilled catholics, meant that there were few Unionist protests when
the British Government dissolved the Development Commission after the
shortest life of any new town development agency in the UK (Carolan,
1987, p. 12). But there was dismay among many local tenants who now
felt abandoned to both a new and notoriously sectarian loyalist Borough
Council and the economic recession (Craigavon Indpendent Advice Centre,
1982, pp. 3-6). A Workers Party member of Craigavon Borough Council
interpreted events as follows:
"Craigavon as a bastion of protestantism didn't work. It was
failing and with catholics coming in, interest and investment
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declined. The idea had been to do away with the ghetto system. But
the new estates were meant to be for protestants. State schools
were provided first." (271)
A local planner explained that in his view:
"Craigavon was a token gesture by O'Neill. Northern Ireland didn't
really need a new town. With the debate in the 60s and 70s in
Britain about inner city investment versus new town investment it
was relatively easy to shift priorities to the inner city (of
Belfast) in 1973 - there was opposition to, and little support for,
Craigavon." (272; parenthesis added)
Far from population movement leading to sectarian nixing and harmonious
pools of labour, many of the new arrivals to Craigavon from the late
1960s were predominantly catholic refugees from the violence in Belfast.
The new town was one area where there was no shortage of housing (Brett,
1986, p. 68). Polarisation occurred and violence and paramilitary
activity escalated in many parts of the new town so that Craigavon cane
to constitute what many catholics dubbed the North Armagh Murder
Triangle. A pattern of religious segregation developed with the Lurgan
side of the new town mainly catholic and the Portadown side mainly
protestant. As this process occurred the new town's economic decline
marginalised growing numbers of residents, and housing problems added to
the crisis.
The state continued to justify Craigavon and explain its failure in
conventional planning terms. For example, a government planner claimed
that:
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"The need to provide for overspill from Belfast and existing
infrastructure made Craigavon the right choice. But the Government
didn't foresee the lack of population nobility and the troubles
which interrupted the supply of new factories." (273)
Craigavon Development Commission had made major investments to attract
capital to the growth centre. £500m at 1976 prices was spent on new
arterial roads, factory space, housing, a government training centre and
a large hospital. Five new industrial sites were established at
Annesborough, Silverwood, Seagoe, Camn and Mahon. Portadown, with its
big protestant population, received the new technical college, the
training centre, the hospital and two large industrial estates. These
investments were part of Stormont's active regional policy in the 1960s,
which succeeded in bringing in very high levels of external investment
and stabilising manufacturing employment (see chapter 2). However, the
disbandonment of Craigavon Development Commission on 30 September 1973
suggested an abandoning of Matthew's conception in the face of major
downward revisions of economic and population growth. Its housing stock
was transferred to the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. Like
Peterlee, the local council was reluctant to see the demise of the new
town agency which at least symbolised a privileged status for the area
(274). A booklet produced by Craigavon Independent Advice Centre
reporting the proceedings of a local conference of community activists
in 1981 concludes that the attempt to modernise the area ended with the
demise of the Development Commission:
"... the major task confronting the planners and the local
authorities was to integrate Lurgan and Portadown successfully in
the overall plan - a task which failed dismally and which was
eventually abandoned in 1973. By the early 70s it had become
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obvious that many of the calculations on which the original plan was
based were false." (275)
The booklet argues that people were attracted to the modern housing
estates between Lurgan and Portadown believing that these were to be the
central part of a new city, but found themselves trapped at the end of
the modernisation era in an area that was politically underrepresented
and neglected by the newly-formed Craigavon Borough Council, had few
local facilities, high housing and fuel costs, and growing unemployment.
The abandonment of the Craigavon growth centre became obvious towards
the end of the 1970s. As in Britain, by 1977 the economic crisis and
growing concern about the consequences of inner city decline led to a
shift of resources away from greenfield development to inner urban areas
and towards rationalising settlement patterns. By the end of the 1970s
the problem of reducing reproductive costs and defending and creating
viable markets appeared to dominate policy-making (see chapter 2). The
Northern Ireland Regional Physical Development Strategy 1975-95 
(Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland, 1976) had revised
planning policy in response to the new economic conditions. Population
would be concentrated into 26 "District Towns" and strict controls over
residential development in the countryside would be implemented. The
"regeneration" of Belfast's inner city, potentially a good market for
new investments in retailing, catering and private housing for upper
income groups moving back into the city (a distinctive post-modern
trend), would be a priority. Craigavon was being left to "go it alone
on the assumption that it is sufficiently established and dynamic to
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ensure regenerative growth" (276). But in contrast to Belfast,
Craigavon was planned for a Fordist regime of standardised accumulation
through mass production ("organised" capitalism). Not only was this in
decline, there were other places for companies to locate in Northern
Ireland, with port facilities, cheaper land and better infrastructure
than Craigavon.
One of the first public signs of concern about the new town's economic
future was a statement issued by the newly-formed Craigavon Trades
Council in 1976 which highlighted the damage caused by the continuing
political violence and the consequences of the new town's growing
economic problems at the end of the modernisation era (277). Although
In 1978 the Craigavon area recorded the lowest rate of unemployment in
Northern Ireland, by the end of the decade industrial decline had taken
hold of the new town and investment had largely dried up (Morrissey,
1980; p. 86). Between 1960 and 1980 there were 52 closures in the area,
representing over half of those firms that were producing in 1960
(278). Over the sane period 60 new firms arrived, mainly state-assisted
American, German and British companies, giving a net gain of only 8
companies, despite massive public investment and promotion. Many of the
remaining employers were public bodies or established local firms taking
advantage of the new town's modern infrastructure and services.
In 1982 the Goodyear plant eventually closed after a series of
redundancies, with the loss of 750 Jobs, soon followed by Ulster Laces,
with the loss of 400 Jobs. Craigavon Independent Advice Centre sunned
up the new town's experience of modernisation as follows:
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The construction of new roads, housing and industrial sites
provided extensive employment opportunities. It is said of many
local entrepreneurs at that time - 'The M1 made him' - but it cannot
be said that the workers of Lurgan received an equal and lasting
share of such good fortune." (279)
The dramatic increase in unemployment in Craigavon during the 1970s,
even when compared with Northern Ireland as a whole, is illustrated in
Table 7.1:
Table 7.1: PERCENTAGES OF CRAIGAVON'S ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
OUT OF WORK, WITH REGIONAL AND NATIONAL COMPARISONS, 1971-1981
Craigavon	 Northern Ireland	 Great Britain
	
Male Female Total Male Female Total 	 Male Female Total
1971 8.8 2.6 6.9 10.1 4.7 8.3 5.4 4.9 5.2
1981 19.0 13.9 17.0 19.1 12.6 16.7 11.3 7.4 9.8
Sources: see note 280.
With such high levels of job losses the main reason why people night
move to what was commonly regarded as Craigavon's inhospitable "modern"
environment disappeared. In the new sector many marginalised tenants
became trapped in sink estates. The population projected for the new
town in 1967 was 100,000 by 1980; in September 1979 the population stood
at 57,500 and was expected to rise to only 70-73,000 by 2000 (281). The
brief for Craigavon had been to plan for 120,000 people by the 1980s,
with growth potential to around 180,000 by the end of the century (282).
- 307 -
The creation of Craigavon had a major impact on surrounding areas in the
same way as the growth centre strategy in County Durham. The next two
sections examine the relationship between this impact and cases of
community action.
7.3 Restructuring and community action in rural areas 
The development of Craigavon contributed to the growth of some villages
in North Armagh which became executive/commuter settlements, such as
Bleary, Waringstown, Tandragee and Rich Hill. Other villages and their
working class populations were effectively starved of housing
investment, a pattern reminiscent of County Durham (see chapter 3). For
example, in Maghery no houses were built for nine years (283). Many
families moved to Browmlow and these areas provided a labour supply for
incoming companies such as Goodyear in the early stages of the new town.
Prior to the transfer of planning powers from local to central
government in 1973, no written planning policy existed for rural areas
outside the Belfast region (284). The Matthew Plan started a
restrictive development control policy around Belfast as part of its
modernisation strategy, but planning authorities in other counties,
Including Arnagh, were less willing to introduce restrictions on local
developers. However, such controls were imposed with the centralisation
of planning powers necessary for regional modernisation and the
introduction of legislation which brought Northern Ireland broadly into
line with planning legislation in England and Wales.
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The recent history of development control in Northern Ireland was
discussed in chapter 2, where restrictive policies were linked
initially to the growth centre strategy and subsequently to the
reduction of reproductive costs and the rationalisation of settlement
patterns. These policies led to the establishment of the Cockroft
Committee in May 1977 by the Department of the Environment for Northern
Ireland in response to representations from councillors about local
people who were unable to find suitable housing in their rural areas.
Farmers' sons, for example, found themselves unable to build on the
family's land. Strong kinship ties in rural areas were a key factor
behind opposition to the restrictive controls. There was also pressure
from speculative builders looking to develop for more affluent urban
buyers. Following the Cockroft Report (1978) the restrictions on
development in the countryside were relaxed in 1979, but the policy of
centralising state investments was not changed. The rationale was not
to displace labour to the growth centres, as it had been under
modernisation, but to reduce social expenses, as the planning service
explained:
"Development in the countryside could present many problems.
Pollution was a factor when there were too many septic tanks.
Schools, hospitals, buses had to be provided. The child populations
would mean demands on expensive-to-provide services. There are
hidden subsidies such as the mail service, Water and electricity
equipment would have to be maintained." (285)
Housebuilding became an issue in the rural areas subjected to these
restrictive planning policies. In North Armagh community action about
the issue arose in an area called "the Montaighs" - the mainly catholic
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rural townlands on the shores of Lough Neagh to the North of Craigavon.
The Nontaighs Housing Action Group (MHAG) was formed to defend the area
from depopulation and decline as the new town was developed (Morrissey,
1980, pp. 105-120).
The Montaighs' major sources of employment between 1870 and 1950 were
turf cutting, weaving, fishing and farming (286). It was a spatial
reserve army of labour: with the creation of Craigavon it provided a
local pool of workers for incoming capital, but as the new town
declined, growing unemployment forced many workers to find jobs in the
black economy, especially building work financed by Housing Executive
renovation grants.
The MHAG was established by a small group of local Republican Club
(later re-named the Workers' Party) activists, and started its campaign
following a public meeting in March 1973. The main issues were the need
for more public sector housing and for improvements to the old rural
labourers' cottages. Two local activists of the tine, Morrissey and
Austin (1974), argue that community action in the Montaighs arose as an
alternative to local clientelist politics which encouraged dependency
rather than involvement. The MHAG aimed to realise an "organic
relationship with the communities of the Montaighs" and to defend the
communities from imposed restructuring. Its members appeared to see it
as a wider base than the Republican Clubs for pursuing the interests of
the area and political education, while gaining general support through
tackling concrete issues. A founder member explained its strategy as
follows:
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"The Republican Clubs were in the Montaighs Housing Action Group
from the word go. Crilly, the local SDLP (Social Democratic and
Labour Party) councillor, shot his mouth off with nationalist
speeches, but was no good. The Housing Action Group got the tenants
together. In fact it was difficult holding the tenants back. They
mistimed demonstrations. The Group tried to restrain them and
direct the action - the toilet dumping for example ... The Workers
Party used the Group to get material for election propaganda. There
was terrific support for republicanism at the tine, but following
the split between the Officials and the Provos, Provisional Sinn
Fein had more sympathy	 Some members saw the Group as a vehicle
for political education - people in control of their own affairs -
and wanted to broaden the issues, pollution in the Lough and so on.
They wanted to get past sectarianism to people's needs 	 In the
1950s councillors' patronage allocated houses. The Montaighs
Housing Action Group could bring people together and made the
Housing Executive move. There were some very large meetings. It
went into protestant areas as well. The Committee was elected and
efficient. There was wide consultation." (287; parentheses added)
Although the strong feeling in the Montaighs that rural areas were being
Ignored by the state gave the MHAG a base of support, it failed to
achieve a re-orientation of local politics. Its close association with
the Republican Clubs became a liability. The Republican Clubs' own
attempts to establish class politics failed and politically it lost
support in the Montaighs in the late 1970s, mostly to extreme
nationalist parties - the Irish Republican Socialist Party (the
political wing of the Irish National Liberation Army, a breakaway
faction of the Provisional IRA) and the catholic nationalist Irish
Independence Party (288). The (majority) moderate vote in the Montaighs
remained with the Social Democratic and Labour Party. As in County
Durham, this community campaign could not win support beyond the small
communities most directly affected by restructuring and when the impact
of modernisation subsided the return to traditional loyalties easily
eroded or marginalised political gains.
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Another parallel with County Durham was the MHAG's resort to producing
its own reports and proposals with which to campaign in response to the
exclusion of local people from corporatist decision-making which
directly affected them. The first major project undertaken by the MBAG
was to prepare the Depopulation Repnrt (289). Significantly, the report
was grant-aided by the Community Relations Commission, which was a major
community development initiative established in 1969 in response to the
escalation of violence. The existence of such initiatives, which
included the Community Worker Research Project discussed in chapter 8,
constituted a major difference in state-civil society relations in
Northern Ireland compared with County Durham, where such well-resourced
support structures for community action were virtually non-existent.
The reason for this may be found in the radically different political
cultures of the two regions. In Northern Ireland the state faced a
crisis of legitimacy. It has been argued that these community
development projects were established with the deliberate intention of
both legitimating the state and channelling social action into forms
that could be incorporated and managed (Rolston, 1981; O'Dowd, Rolston
and Tomlinson, 1980, pp. 148-177). In contrast to the Montaighs, in
County Durham there were no nationalist movements through which
opposition to the state could be expressed and generalised. In Northern
Ireland opposition to modernisation, which had major costs for catholic
and protestant areas, could be used by political groupings to serve
their own purposes: nationalists could claim that it was a struggle
against the forces of British imperialism, while unionists could claim
it was a struggle to defend their heritage. But whatever the
ideological medium through which people made sense of modernisation, the
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process itself was, as argued in chapter 2, part of capitalist
restructuring, and the costs were borne by the working class in similar
fashion in County Durham and North Armagh.
In the Montaighs the Depopulation Report argued that there had been
substantial population losses in the townlands due to housing shortages
as investment was channelled into the Craigavon growth centre. Although
the depopulation figures were subsequently shown to be over-estimates,
the general conclusion that the Montaighs was rapidly depopulating
against the wishes of its residents due to a lack of investment and the
deliberate restriction of housing opportunities to the new town appears
to have been correct (290). The report was a boost for the MHAG,
raising local interest and involvement, and attracting extensive
publicity, as shown by the following selection of local newspaper
headlines:
"RURAL DWELLERS NEED CONSIDERATION TOO"
"COTTAGERS HAVE WAITED THIRTY YEARS FOR BATHROOMS"
"MONTAIGHS GROUP GET ACTION"
"VILLAGES OUT IN THE COLD"
"FAIR DEAL WANTED FOR COTTAGE TENANTS"
"THE MONTAIGHS - AND THE WAY OF LIFE THAT IS DRAINING AWAY" (291)
The Depopulation Report provided a framework for community action by the
MHAG. The Group decided to support the tenants of Ballinamoney cottages
who had been pressurising the Housing Executive to refurbish the 32
houses built some 35 years previously under the Labourers' Cottages
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Acts. Ballinamoney was the closest of the townlands to Lurgan and
adjacent to the new sector of Craigavon. Despite Executive assurances
that action would be taken, nothing happened until work eventually began
following a local campaign that included dumping the contents of the
cottages' earth closets outside the Housing Executive's offices, This
reinforced the view of MHAG members that direct action was how to get
the state to respond to the area's needs.
The MHAG also undertook campaigns on road safety and conditions, rubbish
dumping and water supplies. However, the Loyalist Craigavon Borough
Council regarded it with suspicion and a grant application was turned
down (292). Residents in Bannfoot - a protestant area - refused to
participate in the Group (293). The MHAG's base in a nationalist area
and its tactics of directly challenging the state meant that it was
easily labelled as a republican group rather than as a group attempting
to defend working class people. But an issue was to emerge that
provided an opportunity for the MHAG to break out of the sectarian
mould.
This concerned the price at which unimproved rural labourers' cottages
were being sold, following a new valuation which increased prices by 525
per cent. This raised widespread opposition in the Montaighs
(Morrissey, 1980, p. 115). Prior to the establishment of the Housing
Executive in 1972, rural labourers' cottages were being sold by the
local council at prices affordable for local people (then around £300
each). Subsequently prices rose to reflect market demand to over
£2,000, causing extensive local resentment (292). The Executive's
-314-
policy was to offer the cottages for sale to sitting tenants at a
discount, If the tenant refused the offer, the cottage was put up for
sale on the open market and the tenant re-housed. There was a threat
that the cottages could be bought up as second homes and the small
communities of the area broken up.
A particular concern was that older sitting tenants could not afford to
buy and rehabilitate the cottages. The MHAG discovered that the problem
was not confined to the Montaighs, but existed in many other rural parts
of Northern Ireland, both catholic and protestant. Thus its campaign
could be taken beyond the restricted confines of one area and largely
one section of the working class. The cause attracted support from
Northern Ireland Unionist MPs Jim Molyneaux, Harold McCusker and Ian
Paisley. The Rural Housing Concern Group was formed to stimulate and
co-ordinate local action, but it failed partly because, ironically, the
XHAG was incorporated into a relationship with the state over the issue
which split the campaign.
The MHAG took the position that demands for reducing the gross house
price were unrealistic and they proposed a system of discounts and
grants instead. A package of proposals was agreed with Stormont
officials, helped by the fact that housing policy under the "post-
modern" 1976 Housing Order (which was modelled on the 1974 Housing Act
in England and Wales) was moving in the direction of the Group's
proposals anyway. The package, however, was rejected at a General
Meeting of Rural Housing Concern, where a majority wanted to pursue the
demand for a standard £500 price. The organisation split and collapsed.
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Attempts by the MHAG to encourage the formation of housing associations
in the Montaighs failed; tenants bought as individual owner-occupiers.
At its third Annual General Meeting the MHAG adopted a plan for future
work which included campaigning for amenities for Wolf's Island Terrace,
for new Housing Executive houses at Derrytrasna and for the relaxation
of strict development controls over isolated developments in the
countryside. But no momentum developed and none of the proposed
campaigns were initiated after the meeting. The Group lost three of its
most active members which badly weakened it. One married and had to
leave the area because of a lack of local housing and another was
arrested on a terrorist charge. Getting people to make time commitments
was a continual problem (293). The MHAG's association with the
Republican Clubs continued to discourage people from getting involved in
the Group. After its decline a local priest established a housing
pressure group which, however, was weak and largely ineffective.
Following the Cockroft Report (1978) and the shift towards
"entrepreneurial" planning in the post-modern era, builders did start
erecting private dwellings in some rural areas of Northern Ireland. In
the North Armagh settlement of Derrymacash, for example, the local
builders Lavery's built 62 houses on land originally designated as a
football pitch (294). The Housing Executive deliberately scaled down
its own building programme to avoid crowding out these speculative
developments (Northern Ireland Housing Executive, 1983a). A senior
Housing Executive officer in Craigavon stated;
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"The private sector is stepping in in rural areas. There's no need
for the Housing Executive and no demand for rented housing." (295)
The relaxation of planning controls that occurred in the early 1980s was
clearly aimed at supporting expansion at the bottom end of the housing
market. One Lurgan builder, and chairperson of the Private
Housebuilders Association of Northern Ireland, explained the local
nature of the transition from modernisation to post-modern policy:
"The Association liaise with the Department of the Environment.
There are less stringent controls now to help the construction
industry. The DOE is also moving away from lower densities to
higher densities. The higher priced market has virtually
disappeared .. The land available and the type of housing are all
open to negotiation now	 There's no difficulty, we're building
higher density, low cost housing ... Public housing in the Craigavon
area took up many good sites for private housing ... In the '50s
and '60s Lurgan Borough Council had a good record in public housing
and took the best sites. They could do that; council building
didn't threaten the sectarian balance there." (296)
Although the various stimuli introduced in the early 1980s to promote
private building for owner-occupation meant that it was even more
difficult for the Housing Executive to fill the new town sector's empty
housing, this appeared to be a cost of the transition to early post-
modernism which the government was prepared to bear. Indeed,
Craigavon's dilapidated rows of state housing were evidence of the
failure of state intervention on this scale. However, as in County
Durham where private builders opposed settlement categorisation, the
relaxation of spatial policy and "freeing" of the market had an uneven
effect in North Armagh, with only "attractive" sites receiving
investment. In other areas the future of small communities depended on
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the success of local lobbying of the Housing Executive to build, as in
Derrytrasna where the primary school was at risk of closure (297).
Certainly it was not always the case that the "private sector is
stepping in in rural areas" following the end of large-scale
modernisation, and without state intervention many townlands were
threatened with continuing depopulation, as the following newspaper
report on the views of the rector of Milltown, a small settlement on the
shores of Lough Neagh, exemplifies:
"MY Twaddell hits at landowners who are unwilling to sell even a
plot of land for people wishing to settle in their hone area, and
the failure of people to renovate old houses ... Now is the time to
press for more houses for our people ... Some townlands, once full
of people, are now comparatively empty because the proper action was
not taken at the right tine." (298)
One of the MHAG's leading figures in its early days concluded some years
after the campaigns that the effort was not worth it either in personal
terns or in terns of what it had been possible to achieve for the area
(299). People had become disillusioned, had had their sense of
powerlessness in relation to the state reinforced by the struggle
against modernisation and had retreated into their private concerns.
This retreat into privatism was also a feature of the struggles
documented in County Durham in previous chapters. In these
circumstances, post-modern policy could be legitimised through a
Self/Other opposition to "modernist" policy, which could be portrayed as
having failed to tackle economic problems, as having destroyed
communities and freedom of choice (see Therborn, 1980, pp. 27-28). Far
from reflecting a growing sphere of autonomy in consumption, the
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abandonment of struggle in civil society was a result of an inability to
control what happened to the communities in which people lived in the
Montaighs, and in County Durham. A large part of the blame for this
might seem to lie in terns of the social relations of the local state,
and particularly the people-officialdom relationship. But in fact the
local state's room for manoeuvre was highly constrained by its
subordinate position in relation to central government and capital - the
loss of control over the style and location of state housing for
example. Local projects of reform, or even sectarian discrimination,
had to be pursued within largely prestructured contexts determined
ultimately by the behaviour of capital.
Post-modernism offered the prospect of control via consumption by
individuals in the market place. This has been a powerful ideology, and
certainly seems to have influenced the local politics of reproduction in
County Durham and North Armagh, but has not been expressed in major
party political shifts, an understandable situation given the economic
impact of New Right governments in these areas. The struggles against
modernisation were struggles against a massive disruption of civil
society by external forces, with the state clearly perceived as the
Immediate problem. Post-modern policies disorganised these struggles by
supporting the responsibility of the individual consumer, the community
and the market for reproduction, rather than displacing these as had
undoubtedly occurred during the modernisation era. But while apparently
resolving a problem with the relationship between state and civil
society, this has not resolved the fundamental problem of the
relationship of the working class to dominant capitalist institutions
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and appears, in fact, to have restructured it in response to the needs
of capital, albeit in the cultural clothing of post-modernity (see
Harvey, 1987).
The next section of the present chapter shifts the focus to the impact
of Craigavon on the fringing old urban centre of Lurgan, where residents
also found themselves directly affected by modernisation imposed by the
state.
7.4 Restructuring and community action_ln_urhaa_araaa
The development of Craigavon as a major growth centre had an impact on
the older urban centres of Lurgan and Portadown which fringed the new
town sector. Strict controls were placed on private development in the
designated area and speculative building was forced out to Rich Hill and
Tandragee. The restrictive effect this had was evidenced by the fact
that with the post-1979 relaxation of planning controls outside the "key
centres" speculative building expanded rapidly in Moira, Waringstown,
Bannfoot, Bleary and other "attractive" sites. In Lurgan the
development of the new town sector meant a stop to any expansion of
Lurgan's periphery or additions to the housing stock, and these controls
continued after the decline of new town sector because of the large
number of vacant properties there. Local politicians continued to call
for more Housing Executive building in Lurgan and Portadown;
construction, it should be noted, which was to traditional designs and
would be located in popular areas (300). The Housing Executive's
Regional Director explained why this was resisted;
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"More building is not on when there are 800 houses empty in
Brownlow. Councillors take a personal view of the problem, but the
Executive has to see overall objectives ... Waiting lists are
essential for good housing management. We have to avoid vacant
dwellings." (301)
Housing Executive plans to redevelop old terraced housing in Lurgan
raised fears that families would be re-housed in Brownlow, especially as
the number of houses "put back" could be less than those demolished.
When, in the late 1970s, the catholic St Peter's area of Lurgan was
threatened with plans for a new road and redevelopment, the proposals
were opposed because of the costs of displacement and eventually fell
victim to public expenditure cuts (302). Many Lurgan residents had been
able to purchase their homes from their landlords and they provided
cheap, solid fuel heated and comfortable accommodation in old-
established communities and convenient neighbourhoods. Perhaps above
all sectarian territories were well-established. It was this stock that
was targeted for redevelopment by the Housing Executive at the end of
the 1970s. Despite the demise of modernist planning strategy, the
Housing Executive was able to continue with a significant redevelopment
programme in contrast to Britain, where public sector new build was
slashed, because of the political and economic consequences of any
substantial reduction in housing activity (Singleton, 1986; Weir, 1983).
Insofar as the political/military conflict was intensified by employment
and housing inequalities, the British state would appear to have
regarded the large numbers of unskilled catholic, and to a lesser degree
protestant, workers both employed and housed through a construction
drive as a political benefit of continuing housing "modernisation". But
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this was on a much smaller scale than during the "modernisation era",
and more consideration could be given to the style and location of the
new housing. It was aimed at "bringing in" marginal groups by providing
"modern" housing in place of "slums". It meant the building of "new
communities", on the basis of which the state could attempt to secure
support for its presence in civil society, as well as use redevelopment
to design housing areas in ways that made them easier to police (Alcorn,
1982). Insulated from civil society to a much greater degree than even
the District Councils of County Durham, and free from the pressures
which produced Brownlow's mass housing disasters, the state could pursue
modernising housing policy in Northern Ireland largely unhindered by
local politics, the Housing Executive managing protest as and when it
occurred. Indeed, opposition, which would generally take the form of
defending existing communities, could be portrayed as sectarian and
"getting at the state" if residents refused to co-operate with
consultation exercises later introduced to smooth the transformation of
housing environments.
In Lurgan there was opposition to any prospect of rehousing in the new
town sector and most people displaced by the redevelopment schemes were
re-housed within the old town, such as on the new Shankill estate.
Redevelopment and rehabilitation schemes were started with very little
consultation, progress was slow and the work disruptive and inconvenient
for both those directly affected and neighbouring residents (sometimes
conflicts between streets broke out as a result). Many of the houses
being cleared were fit and had received renovation grants in the recent
past. In one area - Ulster and Clare Streets - original redevelopment
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plans were scrapped when residents protested about losing their sizeable
gardens. The Republican Clubs attempted to use opposition to
modernisation to develop class politics. They promoted direct action,
such as blocking roads. Local councillors did not get involved.
Militant tactics, however, had the effect of more moderate residents
leaving the residents' associations (303). One local activist at the
tine, and ex-chairperson of both St Peter's Community Association and
the Mary Street Action Committee, described the actions in the following
terms:
"The Housing Executive was very slow. There was no concern for
people's welfare. The area was blighted from 1977 and only basic
repairs were done. The houses were cheap to live in. People would
be moved into new Executive houses with £24 (a fortnight) rents ...
In retrospect we should have had a plan of action, kept party
politics out, and campaigned for more say in design and the costs of
rents and heating." (304)
In the St Peter's redevelopment area some replacement terraces were
under construction by the Housing Executive in 1981, but further
development was threatened by cuts. The Executive had responded by
calling for housing association investment in the local newspaper (the
cuts were subsequently reversed but on the condition that further rent
rises were implemented; Brett, 1986, p. 113). In Mary Street conflict
had arisen when residents demanded the retention of the old street name
(305).
The redevelopment areas in Lurgan were predominantly catholic and
feelings of Unionist prejudice against them were common, especially when
they attempted to develop cultural facilities for their areas.
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Craigavon Borough Council opposed the development of a Gaelic football
pitch for St Peter's and also the use of a (nixed) state primary school
as a community centre. Conflicts with the Housing Executive, however,
conformed to the people-officialdom axis identified in chapter 1, with
sectarian issues playing a minor role except indirectly in, for example,
territorial struggles. Community action was aimed at preserving the
attributes of the old environments. Hone ownership seemed central to
this as it meant the opposite of modernism's bureaucratic landlordism,
and generally cheaper costs. Although in Lurgan and Portadown sales
under the Right to Buy were substantial (in contrast to the new town
sector), in the redevelopment areas where new build was to traditional
designs, the Right to Buy was denied new tenants because the historic
cost of building the house had not been eroded by inflation, placing a
floor on discounts little below market price. When house prices started
to stagnate or fall in real terns in the early 1980s, estate agents
argued that hone ownership was now available to more lower-income
households (306). It could cost less to buy a small terraced house with
a mortgage than to rent from the Housing Executive.
Thus despite the "residual" nature of modernist housing action in the
old urban centres, the social relations characteristic of modernism
dominated the housing consumption experiences of the small urban
communities faced with redevelopment. Against this many residents saw
the housing market as guarantor of freedom from interference and of
self-ownership, as well as offering housing in areas where self-help,
cheap costs and convenience were important attributes in the early
1980s.
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7.5 Summary 
This chapter has surveyed the spatial impact of modernisation in North
Armagh and presented community action about housing in areas affected by
the Craigavon growth centre in the context of this restructuring and
uneven development. Many similarities with the case studies from County
Durham were shown, as well as some significant differences which,
however, figured as contingent rather than generative factors in the
community action. As in County Durham community notionim.N4n:Wz.
were generated by modernisation were removed as foci of mobilisation not
by the success of community action but as a consequence of the
transition from modernisation to early post-modernism. "Residual"
modernism persisted in local housing strategies due to its political and
economic significance for the state, but was very different from the
large-scale restructuring of earlier years.
The chapter has suggested that the working class experience of
modernisation created fertile conditions for the ideology of early post-
modernism regarding self-reliance and freedom of the consumer. However,
while some people could take up this option by moving out of the "modern
environments", many others remained trapped in the depressed modern
housing estates of the new town sector. The next chapter turns to
examine this experience, community action responses, and how these were
managed by the state.
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CHAPTER 8
COMMUNITY ACTION IN CRAIGAVON NEW TOWN 
This chapter is an account of the various community projects launched in
Craigavon and arising out of the problems of the new town, of tenants'
struggles in the new town and of the management of these struggles by
the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. As discussed in chapter 7,
Northern Ireland has seen several state initiatives in community
development, establishing support structures which formalise and manage
community action. The present chapter examines struggles both within
and outside these support structures. As in previous chapters, it is
attempted to relate this action to the experience of modernisation and
particularly the experience of living in a "modern environment" in the
early post-modern era.
8.1 Community development in the new town 
In 1972 Craigavon Development Commission's Community Development
Department established the Brownlow Community Council as an umbrella
organisation for estate-based tenants' and community associations in the
new town sector. The Commission envisaged a corporatist relationship
between itself and the Community Council to manage the modernisation
process at grassroots level (Carolan, 1987, p. 45). The Community
Council involved itself in various Joint initiatives with state
agencies, including the Priority Estates Project discussed later in the
present chapter.
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In May 1976 the problems of Craigavon were discussed by a cross-section
of members of Brownlow Community Council at a four-day conference in
Huissen, Holland, sponsored by the Dutch Northern Irish Advisory
Committee. This was essentially a review of the experience of the new
town. Participants also showed an awareness of impending problems as
the modernisation era cane to an end. A number of "priority issues"
were identified (307). The first was local democracy, and it was
decided to lobby for better ward representation in the new town sector
of Brownlow and to look at the possibility of "community candidates".
Other issues were prices in the shops, access to recreational
facilities, the attraction of industry, community job creation, and the
promotion of residential integration.
Another important development was the formation of Craigavon Trades
Council in 1975 as a result of the "Better Life for All" campaign
Initiated by the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of
Trade Unions (Morrissey and Morrissey, 1979). It became one of the more
successful of the new trades councils, and was prominent in promoting a
trade union perspective on a range of issues (Morrissey, 1980, p. 121).
Its involvement in community action was largely shaped by two
individuals - a local community worker and a polytechnic lecturer (308).
When they left the area in 1978, this involvement continued as a result
of the influence of community workers on the Trades Council.
One of the first initiatives undertaken by Craigavon Trades Council was
to tap the support for community development being offered by the
Department of Education under the Labour Government's Lord Melchett.
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The Department launched a Community Worker Research Project in 1978,
allocating £45,000 over three years to be paid directly to community
groups through district councils, community services being one of the
few functions which the local councils retained after 1973. The aims
were to support projects providing for unmet needs and to encourage
district councils to take an interest in community initiatives.
Professor Hywel Griffiths was appointed chairperson of the Project
Steering Committee, At an Inaugural Symposium for the groups selected
for assistance, he described the rationale of the project:
N .., it is here in the sustained and widespread taking of small
beneficial initiatives rather than in any administrative master-plan
or ideological utopia that the foundation of a better future for all
must lie ... This symposium brings together a small representative
sample of those activists who serve the community through direct
action with representatives who serve the community through the
local political system as expressed by the District Councils.
Although from time to time these two groups of people may disagree
with each other they can be recognised by a common badge of
identity: it is a badge of hope, of concern for others, of
perseverance and courage and of constructive social responsibility."
(309)
Griffiths was critical of "modernisation" - the imposition of large-
scale state planning and development especially. In fact, rather than
developing a more "human" alternative to modernisation, which was what
Griffiths appeared to suggest, the Craigavon project ended up relieving
the costs of recession and isolation in the residualised modern housing
estates of the new town sector.
An application was made through Craigavon Trades Council for funds to
employ a community worker to develop three inter-linked projects: a law
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centre, a women's group and a social studies group. The case was made
on the basis of three arguments. First, the general problems of new
towns were exacerbated in Craigavon's case by shortage of funds and
civil unrest; second, the very large proportion of state housing had
resulted in a preponderance of low-income families; and third, there was
inadequate support for community work from Craigavon Borough Council
(310).
The Craigavon Social Studies Group had been forned in 1976 by a group of
teachers and social workers and ran various community education
initiatives in the area, concentrating on political education for local
activists. The Craigavon Women's Group had been set up in May 1977 in
response to the isolated position of many women in the new town to
campaign for women's rights. In August of that year Craigavon Trades
Council sponsored a meeting to discuss establishing a Community Law
Centre. An ad hoc committee was formed with the chairperson of the
Trades Council as its secretary. A lot of activity was generated by
these projects, leading to the submission to the Community Worker
Research Project for a full-tine worker to develop them. The projects
were seen as having the political purpose of linking workplace and
"community" issues (311).
The Craigavon application was one of 14 projects selected out of 48
submissions for funding by the Department of Education. But it ran into
problems when Craigavon Borough Council refused to administer the grant.
The project was seen as an imposition, led by radical activists who were
unaccountable to the public and hostile to Unionism (Morrissey, 1980,
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pp. 126-127). Most of the people involved had, in fact, been involved
with the campaign in the Montaighs (chapter 7). A local newspaper
reported:
"A community trouble-shooter offered free by the Government to help
Craigavon voluntary groups deal with new city social problems has
been flatly rejected by the Borough Council.
In a heated debate this week Councillor Calvert (DUP Mayor)
described those behind the scheme as 'a bunch of people I would not
like to see in a position to do projects in the Craigavon area.'
Councillor Philip Black (OUP Deputy Mayor) said it was a retrograde
step and he didn't want to see taxpayers' money handed out free to
groups over which the public has no control." (312; parentheses
added)
On 31 August 1978 Lord Melchett told the Co-ordinating Committee for the
Craigavon Project that he would be meeting with the Borough Council, and
that it was possible to pay funds directly if its opposition continued.
After several attempts to get a motion supporting the project through
the Borough Council, Workers Party councillor Tom French eventually
succeeded in January 1979, and the project started in April. In January
1980 the Craigavon Independent Advice Centre opened in a previously
vacant Housing Executive property in a run-down estate in Brownlow.
The Centre ran with funding from the Department of Education for
Northern Ireland under the Community Worker Project from April 1979 to
April 1982, and secured further funding to continue beyond this date.
Although the Borough Council had eventually agreed to adminster the
grant, a decision influenced by certain of the more notorious committee
members moving away from the area (Morrissey, 1980, p. 127), there was
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little commitment to the project. In 1982 the council refused a request
for a £6,000 grant to continue the employment of a community worker.
One councillor stated in the debate that "reds under the bed had been
quoted to him" (313).
The Advice Centre's 1981 Annual Report chronicles the growing problems
of marginalisation in the new town. The main activity of the community
worker had become advice work and a wide range of advice and support
work was undertaken with back-up from volunteers from the Women's Group.
This averaged 40 queries a month, many of them referrals from agencies
such as Social Services, including fuel problems, benefits, redundancy,
unfair dismissal, maintenance payments, family crises, separation and
battered women. The report highlights poverty as the main problem the
Centre encountered:
"... one of our main problem areas is general debt and fuel poverty.
We relate this directly to the high rate of unemployment in Northern
Ireland and the high percentage of people who must eke out a living
on benefits which are totally inadequate to meet their needs." (314)
In addition to advice work, the Centre hosted various courses which
reflected the nature of deprivation in the area, including welfare
rights, women in Irish history and housing allocations, and provided a
meeting place for local groups. Its community worker attended a variety
of meetings, including the Northern Ireland Poverty Forum, a Belfast
Housing Inquiry and the Community Education Forum, and made a five-week
visit to Tyneside to look at similar projects. The Centre's users were
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largely the ghettoised tenants of the worst new town estates, mostly
catholics.
The Centre opposed the Borough Council on issues such as the banning of
Sunday opening of recreational facilities and its failure to respond to
social needs. The council had become renown for its sectarianism (315).
In 1981 it refused to take part in a motorcade from Lurgan to Belfast
organised by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions to protest against
unemployment and Conservative Government policies (316), but it actively
supported the Loyalist workers' "Day of Action" in the sane month. In a
debate on continuing the adjournment of council business in protest
against lax security and Anglo-Irish talks in 1982, the DUP Deputy Mayor
was reported as saying that:
"... he had no loyalty to any Government or Parliament and that his
loyalty was to the Queen who was a Protestant." (317)
The council's sectarianism was fuelled by events such as the republican
hunger strikes of 1981. Some catholics in republican areas began to re-
name streets and estates illegally after dead hunger strikers, leading
local unionist politicians to demand that a Lim Housing Executive
improvement scheme on one of the estates in Portadown, named after
Winston Churchill but re-named by the residents after dead hunger
striker Mann Burson, be scrapped. A unionist spokesperson was reported
as saying:
"There are hundreds in loyalist estates in Portadown which require
repairs, and they would deserve public money rather than an estate
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which seeks to dishonour the memory of a man whose leadership led to
an evil tyranny being overthrown." (318)
Brownlow Community Council concerned itself with establishing an
"identity" for the new town sector, arguing that the planners' concept
of "Craigavon" as a corporate whole meant that the particular needs of
Brownlow were not being met or even recognised within a borough
dominated by Portadown and Lurgan. In 1977 it published The Brownlow 
Report which highlighted the political under-representation of the area,
the lack of public facilities and deteriorating housing conditions.
This was followed in 1979 by the report Future of Brownlow. This
identified problems with housing, landscaping, shopping, social
services, education and recreation in the area. The issue of political
representation was prominent. The report stated:
"At present, Brownlow constitutes one ward in Craigavon district.
It is grouped together with five other wards in area 'C' to return
six members to the Borough Council by proportional represelotation..
Unfortunately for the citizens of Brownlow it has 5,747 electors,
whereas the average of the other 24 wards is 1,775 electors ... The
political effects are that Brownlow has one councillor living within
its boundaries ... This has to be balanced against the
representation of Lurgan and Portadown, neither of them much more
than twice the size of Brownlow, which have blocks of
representatives who from time to time think and vote in a group
ignoring party lines ... The only hope for any unity in Craigavon,
any drawing together of the rival towns, distrustful of each other
and of the Craigavon idea, lies in a strong voice for Brownlow ..."
(319).
This under-representation, it argued, meant that there was too little
spending to the benefit of the working class residents of Brownlow,
while public money spent in the area went to major recreational projects
for day-trippers,
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In November 1981 the Management Committee of Craigavon Independent
Advice Centre organised a conference entitled "Craigavon in the 80s".
Papers were presented by local community activists and trade unionists,
and were published the following year (Craigavon Independent Advice
Centre, 1982). The report described the origins of Craigavon, its
failure to reach its population target and to integrate Lurgan and
Portadown in the overall plan for the new town. It argued that the
abolition of Craigavon Development Commission and the establishment of
Craigavon Borough Council, with interests mainly focused on Portadown,
left Brownlow with no real voice. The political under-representation of
Brownlow was underlined. The lack of basic community facilities was
contrasted with the new town's prestigious recreational amenities.
Growing unemployment was portrayed as a critical problem, and controls
over state-assisted companies and employment creation within the
Brownlow housing sector were called for. One consequence of the area's
neglect, it argued, was Brownlow's problem of surplus housing, with
three estates almost derelict. The division of Craigavon's housing
estates along social and religious lines was blamed on the allocation of
more attractive estates to better-off families and the ghettoisation of
the poor. Providing support for Merrett and Gray's (1982. p. 288)
criticism of consumption cleavages that the concept wrongly Implies a
broadly uniform housing consumption experience within a particular
housing tenure, the report highlighted the extent of differentiation
within state housing in Craigavon:
"... it has been pointed out that NIHE (Housing Executive) in
Belfast when offering alternative accommodation to e.g. low income
families, invariably offer housing in Craigavon or Antrim rather
than in Poleglass or any of the new model estates in Belfast ...
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Families on lower incomes are directed to the less desirable housing
and are then blamed for the deterioration of those areas. It is no
wonder that the overwhelming experience of most tenants in relation
to housing management is powerlessness." (320)
It was also noted that only 8 per cent of Brownlow's housing was owner-
occupied, although originally 20 per cent had been planned for. This,
the report argued, had been a factor in the movement of families out of
the area. However, most state housing did not conform to the image of
derelection Craigavon was fast acquiring. Twenty of Brownlow's twenty-
three estates "are all of a more conventional design and generally
present a picture of reasonably well maintained estates, most of them
almost fully occupied" (321). As discussed below, the Housing Executive
promoted this stock for sale, further residualising the rented housing.
Indeed, two of the most desirable estates built by the public sector
were sold to private buyers despite being originally intended as housing
for rent, with the Housing Executive's claiming in publicity that buying
was little more costly than renting.
The cost of heating was identified as a major issue in the report, as
the heating systems had been designed on the basis of cheap oil. Fuel
poverty had reached serious levels. It claimed that the Housing
Executive's attitude to these issues was uncooperative compared with
relations tenants' groups had had with the old Development Commission.
It concluded:
"In view of all the problems, one would possibly expect a high level
of community action around these issues, Surprisingly, however,
this has not been the case. There have been many efforts at
organising community action, and several community workers and
interested community activists were involved in issues in the past
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however, there was no organised, mass protest of tenants against
conditions in the area, even as Brownlow became more and more a
ghost town." (322)
Comparisons can be made with the growth centre estates of Bessemer Park
and Peterlee where, as described in chapter 4, tenant mobilisation was
generally weak. This contrasts with the stronger mobilisations which
occurred in defence of the old settlements, such as the Category "D"
villages and the Montaighs, when they were threatened by spatial
restructuring. Morrissey (1980, p. 123) makes some pertinent
observations:
"The Brownlow sector of Craigavon was a difficult one in which to
develop community action. While the new town generated many
unforeseen social problems, it proved a difficult context for the
growth of community groups ... The relocation of low income families
from Belfast and elsewhere into a town spatially designed for
affluent workers created obvious problems. While certain estates
like Rathmore and Ridgeway were heavily stigmatised, a degree of
stigma was associated with the entire area 	 Coupled with social
problems that undoubtedly existed, such attitudes led to a general
apathy towards community action. When estates were first occupied,
there were many examples of developing residents' associations but
these tended to be short lived."
There was a high turnover of residents and activists in the area which
militated against organisation. Although the Development Commission had
supported the formation of community groups during the modernisation
era, its successors, the Borough Council and the Housing Executive, did
not at first encourage the organisation of tenants (323). The Borough
Council limited its support to "registered" entertainment and social
groups, and by 1980 although Craigavon had many good community centres
and seven community workers, community action remained weak (324).
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Nevertheless, the umbrella organisation Brownlow Community Council
survived, grant-aided by the Borough Council, and was to enter into a
partnership with the Housing Executive in a Priority Estates Project
designed to privatise the estates and stimulate self-help (see below).
Some scathing criticisms of this cooperation were made by a number of
the more radical activists in the new town sector who argued that such
initiatives were little more than tokenism:
"They had a representation dominated by middle-class interests and
by statutory representatives. In the end, they became just a
talking shop with no history of active involvement on the real
issues affecting the people." (325)
The real struggles, they argued, were based outside such partnerships
with state agencies:
"Several (tenants') associations have re-formed and are actively
pressurising for better housing repairs and improved facilities. In
areas where there is district heating, local groups have involved
themselves in a province-wide campaign around problems of excessive
charges and inaccurate meterings. Housing Action Groups were active
against rent rises. The continuing expansion of CIAC (Craigavon
Independent Advice Centre) has provided a valuable focal point for
many active groups in the area and has furthered the links between
trade unionists and community activists by involving Craigavon
Trades Council directly in the management of the centre." (326;
parentheses added)
One initiative the Borough Council did take was to sponsor the Craigavon
Combined Community Associations with the aim of encouraging
"partnership" with statutory bodies, concentrating on promoting
community relations and running functions. But this was unsuccessful.
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Brownlow's tenants' association were varied in terns of their foci and
levels of activity (327). Some were more concerned with excluding
"undesirables" from the estate than tackling social issues. Others
participated in joint ventures with other groups in Northern Ireland,
such as the short-lived campaign against the 40 per cent rent rise of
1981 (328). There were also a few hone owners' associations protesting
about ground rents.
One of the strongest tenants' groups was Meadowbrook Tenants Assocation,
and this estate provided the Housing Executive with a test-bed for
experimenting with the management of the problems of Brownlow. In
particular, there was increasing pressure on the Housing Executive to
replace district heating systems. The growing cost of running the
systems had largely been passed onto tenants and the result was
escalating fuel debt and increasing tenant protests (Action on Debt,
1980, pp. 20-24). To tackle the problem, both to make a case for
financial aid to central government and to ensure a smooth conversion
process, the Executive needed the support and cooperation of the
tenants.
Meadowbrook Tenants' Association had been reformed in February 1981
following a public meeting after a dormant period of some five years
(329). Concern had grown about the danger and expense of bottled gas
used to heat the houses. A survey had shown that 95 per cent of tenants
on the estate did not use the gas central heating, using instead cheaper
paraffin heaters, one-bar electric fires or portable gas heaters. There
had been "huge increases" in gas prices. The association was pressing
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the Housing Executive to convert the houses to solid fuel. It was also
angered by recent rent increases, with the May rise putting £3.50 on top
of a £15 per week rent. The association argued that households' heating
costs were well above the UK average, rents were approaching the UK
average, but average wages were less. The association lent its support
to public protests over the year's rent increase.
Its chairperson had been a committee member of Community Organisations
Northern Ireland (CONI), a short-lived umbrella group aimed at
establishing grassroots participation by uniting community groups in
Northern Ireland, and eight years previously had stood as an SDLP
candidate in the local election. He was a retired general labourer.
His view was that tenants associations had to work as a team with the
Housing Executive - an attitude that no doubt was behind the Executive's
decision to work with his association on the heating issue, leading to a
successful resolution of the bottled gas issue. A senior Housing
Executive officer temporarily based in the Brownlow District Office to
examine the problems of the new town sector recounted an interesting
example of how "tenant participation" in Meadowbrook assisted its
management tasks:
"Meadowbrook Tenants Association and the Housing Executive get on
very well. I talked to the tenants group and then issued a leaflet
giving the tenants a choice between two options. I arranged for the
leaflet to be distributed and collected by the tenants association.
In fact, they made a mistake in delivering some of the leaflets. If
the Executive had made that mistake it would not only have cost
money, but most importantly credibility." (330)
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The chairperson of the association had been involved in the issue of
Brownlow's three "problem" estates which stigmatised the whole area -
Ridgeway, Rathmore and Legahory Green (see below). Some of the tenants
in these estates had called for a public inquiry to bring the architects
responsible to account, and he explained that it was a widespread view
that the blame for the problems of this housing lay with the architects.
The only solution, he argued, was to bulldoze the houses and rebuild -
it was "a lovely site" - and indeed this was the solution eventually
implemented. He, and other tenants like him, welcomed Housing Executive
overtures about tenant participation. He had seen the possibilities
when he participated in the Brownlow Community Council conference in
Holland referred to at the beginning of the present chapter, and had
been impressed with that country's
"... sensible planning and consultation ... they recognised even
small problems from the start. Craigavon had started on too large a
scale. The planners have to work with the people. If it's a good
product there should be no need to advertise it. The Housing
Executive should have tenants on its Board ... and the rents of what
are inadequate houses halved ... Many problems, though, can be
solved by talking them through." (331)
Whether the Housing Executive and the local tenants were now in
agreement about what went wrong with modernisation and how to start
tackling its legacy is a question which the next section addresses.
8.2 The ghettoisatlon of Brownlow 
"House building may well be about to enter a new phase, a phase
which will make the whole process more scientific and exact, and
similar to flow line production. Much better detailing and
finishing can be expected with faster completion tines and over a
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period, against guaranteed programmes, reduced costs or at least
keenly controlled costs." (Craigavon Development Commission, 1966)
"The most important issues facing people in the new town are social
and economic ones. Badly designed housing, expensive and
inefficient heating systems and the general lack of employment
facilities, have been major problems since the inception of the new
city nearly twelve years ago, and certainly since the most recent
economic recession ... Many people find that they have arrived in a
new city area, where they have no relations or friends, no jobs and
a costly new hone to maintain. For many, their dreams of starting
anew in Northern Ireland's first new city have been rudely
shattered." (Craigavon Independent Advice Centre, 1982, p. 6)
These two quotations illustrate the theory and the reality of mass
housing in Craigavon. Although much of the new build in Brownlow was of
a high standard with good local facilities, and by the early 1980s most
of the estates had settled down (with the new sector's population at
some 12,000) the emergence of a housing surplus due to stagnating
economic and population growth meant that growing numbers of houses
began to stand empty in the most unpopular estates. Voids were
concentrated in groups of three storey and split level units based on
the assumption of large families which could afford to furnish and heat
them. Defects associated with system built designs emerged and were
compounded by bad construction. Expensive heating systems were
abandoned by tenants in favour of alternatives which often caused damp
and mould. Some layouts created a maze-like feeling and overblown car
ownership projections led to groups of garages lying empty and
vandalised, with people isolated from the main employment and leisure
centres. Landscaped areas became overgrown and collected litter while
the neighbourhood centres became vandalised and scrawled with graffitti.
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Three estates were particularly badly affected by these problems -
Ridgeway, Rathmore and Rosmoyle. These were built between the years
1969 and 1975 at a total cost of £2.1.m (332). In 1981 only 25 per cent
of the houses in the three estates were occupied, In Ridgeway 78 per
cent of the 192 houses were vacant yet it had been fully occupied in
1974. A consultants' report drawn up for the Housing Executive to
examine the situation stated:
"The 3 storey houses were unusual and alien in character and proved
expensive to heat and furnish. Tenants have complained of roof and
other defects resulting in damp penetration and condensation, and
some of these defects may be traced to bad workmanship, during the
disjointed contract phases. The 2 storey houses also gave cause for
tenants' complaints related mainly to minor repairs. All these
problems have been compounded by a casual level of provision of
municipal services viz. street lighting, street cleansing and refuse
disposal." (333)
Local newspapers reported tenants' complaints about vandalism, house-
stripping, bad designs, rats and lack of play facilities for children.
One report stated:
"The first impression of Ridgeway is one of desolation. Of the 300
houses, only 30-40 are occupied. Windows, if not boarded up or
bricked up, are smashed. Wall tiles have also been smashed by the
vandals and broken glass litters the roads 	 This is contrasted
with the neat, homely interiors of the occupied houses." (334)
The narginalisation of tenants living in what had been planned as modern
accommodation for a major growth centre was graphically described by
another newspaper report:
"When we go into Lurgan to shop, we are ashamed to give our address
because of the bad name the estate has got 	 The residents who are
- 342 -
left are not the gypsies and problem families they are made out to
be	 Why should we pay extra rent for the shacks we are living in,
the rent should be halved. Some of us are suffering from depression
brought on by the conditions, and some are still recovering from
injuries received in their own homes." (335)
Tenants were informed that their problems were under consideration at a
high level, and were left to wait it out. In Ridgeway an Action
Committee was formed in 1979 to press for improvements to the estate,
but received no backing from local councillors except for one Workers'
Party member (336). When it was set up there were 39 families living in
Ridgeway's 192 houses but by June 1981 this had declined to 12-14
families. A particular issue was the difficulty of heating the wooden-
framed and badly insulated houses. The Housing Executive "Just said
they could do nothing ... the tenants were told that they would be
informed when a decision about the estate had been reached" (337).
In September 1979 a protest march was organised to the Housing
Executive's District Office, which was well supported. Demands for
repairs and environmental improvements were made, but the action was
short-lived. The Action Committee folded in the summer of 1980 when the
chairperson was suddenly transferred to a better house on the nearby
Enniskeen estate. Other members became disheartened and people
gradually moved out. In June 1981 most of the remaining tenants had
applications for transfer in with the Housing Executive. One tenant
considered that "the majority of people just used the committee to get a
transfer out" (338).
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In July 1979 a private firm of consultants engaged by the Housing
Executive began to examine Brownlow's problems, especially what to do
with the vacant houses (339). The Study Director was Alexander
Bannerman, ex-chief architect/planner of Craigavon Development
Commission, and his remit was to draw up a physical strategy for
Brownlow "in the context of demand" and "which realistically might be
implemented over the next five years" (340). The consultants' terns of
reference also included a review of the social environment of Brownlow
as well as a design evaluation. After observing that problems were
caused initially by structural and design defects, the report
highlighted the ghettoisation of Brownlow:
The popular image of the core area is a negative one, suggesting a
sub-culture of various forms of anti-social behaviour. This is not
totally the case, but it is fair to state that since the early days
these areas have attracted, or have been allocated, a significant
proportion of social casualties who rely heavily on both statutory
and voluntary welfare services, accumulate rent arrears and other
debts, etc. Any physical initiatives to be undertaken must be
coupled with a resolve by the respective communities to make the
areas progressively viable." (341)
The tenants' action committees in both Ridgeway and Rathmore were
apparently told in informal discussions with the Housing Executive that
the tenants would be the first to see the consultants' report (342).
But the report was kept secret, and it is possible that this "assurance"
had been given to elicit tenants' cooperation with the study. The team
inspected the houses and talked to tenants, asking them what they
thought had to be done, although the only residents listed as consulted
in the report were the chair and secretary of Brownlow Community
Council, the parish priest, the presbyterian minister and "selected
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Brownlow residents". When completed, the report appears to have gone
straight to Stormont without even the Housing Executive District Office
seeing it. Shortly after this, all requests for transfers were granted
and the estates were emptied. The possibility of renovating Ridgeway
was dropped, a decision influenced by the failure of a £1.5m scheme in
Rathmore to entice tenants back into the housing.
However, despite this sporadic community action by the tenants,
organisation was weak and it was largely insignificant compared with the
effect of individual households refusing to live in the houses when
other housing was available. The extent of the breakdown in relations
between tenants and housing management brought about by the crisis was
reported by one of the consultants appointed to assess the situation:
"There was no concerted community action in Brownlow. The Rathnare
and Ridgeway groups didn't really exist - they were completely out-
gunned. Housing Executive officials used disarming tactics - they
would point out speakers at public meetings who had rent arrears.
They would always check on the protestors. We had the impression
there was a lot to hide - maintenance and resources were badly
managed. We recommended (not in the report) that the District
Manager be sacked. She described tenants in the office as
'unnecessary pedestrian traffic'. There was no meaningful dialogue
between the Housing Executive and tenants. They tended to
distinguish between 'respectable' tenants, who they'll talk to, and
others who they won't...
A Ridgeway tenant allocated a house in Enniskeen resulted in
Enniskeen tenants complaining and threatening to move out en masse.
Ridgeway and Rathmore were dumping estates. There were no attempts
to involve the community - no play areas, just despair and
dereliction. The Housing Executive was concerned with control, with
the least possible opposition. Its statutory responsibilities were
its sole concern." (343)
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The consultants' report recommended that Ridgeway, Rathmore and Legahory
Green be delt with through a combination of rehabilitation, demolition
and mothballing. For Ridgeway the report recommended the demolition of
90 of the 192 houses. Its conclusions were based on the optimistic
assumption of Brownlow achieving "modest but sustained growth over the
period 1980-85".
In July 1980 the Housing Executive commissioned a further study by the
Few University of Ulster. This was produced in 1981 in two parts: the
results of an attitude survey of residents and former residents of
Ridgeway, Rathnore and Legahory Green; and an economic appraisal of
options and recommendations (344). The former identified high levels of
dissatisfaction with the houses, mainly concerning their general
appearance, the heating system and dampness, but widespread satisfaction
with most facilities and services. It also revealed a strong kinship
pattern in the Craigavon area with refusers of accommodation tending not
to have relatives in the new town while accepters did. For the majority
of tenants their housing choices were restricted to state housing. The
latter part of the study argued that short-term solutions, such as lower
rents or "homesteading TM , would not work. Applying the (more realistic)
assumption of very low growth in the long term, it was recommended that
existing tenants of the three estates be transferred to one estate, or
one plus part of another estate, and the remaining estate areas be
either demolished or mothballed. The issue was whether a future
increase in demand was likely before vacant houses became vandalised and
irrepairable.
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The Housing Executive appointed a Principal Housing Officer as Acting
District Manager in Brownlow for six months to review the problem in the
light of these studies. None of the findings had been released
publicly; it appeared that the Housing Executive were very sensitive
about releasing any material that night support demands for demolition.
His view was that Brownlow's problems were due to four factors (345).
First, there was a lack of demand for rented housing in the area.
Second, the housing was unpopular and had become dumping estates.
Third, there was a psychological aspect involving people not wanting to
move from Belfast. Fourth, the Executive was faced with a dilemma
between regenerating Belfast and other areas or filling empty houses in
Craigavon. Given these factors, privatisation of as much of the stock
as possible was an attractive option in the present climate; already one
estate had been sold for owner-occupation because the Executive was
convinced that they could not fill it as rented housing. He claimed
that:
At the moment Brownlow is approximately 90 per cent Housing
Executive stock. We hope that in five years time it will be 50:50.
If people buy, people will stay." (346)
The answer was now "conventional" housing, but demolition of non-
conventional housing was difficult to justify on economic grounds. The
existing housing had to be packaged as attractively as possible to sell,
including large discounts and improvement grants, and the worst
demolished and the land sold for speculative development. However, with
the imminent extension of the tenants' consultation provisions of the
1980 Housing Act to Northern Ireland, a related option appeared - to
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package the privatisation "solution" as a tenants' participation
project. The problem for the Housing Executive was, as an unelected
bureaucracy under the direction of the British Government, to establish
the legitimacy of its strategy with potentially disruptive tenants'
associations.
Indeed, the Housing Executive considered that tenants' associations
could assist housing management and were, in fact, more useful than
councillors who were "Just kept informed" and were "just after votes"
(347). The joint approach with Meadowbrook Tenants Association had
worked well for the Executive; it had been "on their terns". A senior
Housing Executive officer explained in the following terns:
"Take Drumbeg. There's no responsible tenants' association so we
can't use the sane approach as in Meadowbrook. We're at a
disadvantage. The motive is self-interest in these exercises. The
Executive doesn't have the resources to offer a comprehensive
service to individuals. It's struggling to maintain its houses and
collect the rent. That's why it's convenient to work with tenants'
associations. They're doing work that could be seen as that of the
Housing Executive. We have to delegate authority - not
responsibility - to them, give them some power. We have to trade
off satisfying a tenants association against satisfying an
individual tenant. The former always wins - it's good politics ...
It's no answer to bring the Housing Executive and community workers
closer together - we must maintain professionalism. Professional
community workers are agency bashers. They don't have to make
priorities between different areas. To them everything is a
priority, but the Executive has to allocate finite resources." (348)
The type of community association that the Housing Executive appeared to
be looking to encourage was one which could be incorporated into its
housing management strategies. For example, while Craigavon's District
Manager described Edenbeg Tenants' Association as "a disaster", a local
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community worker described the group as "... very good ... can't be
pushed around. They're organising a mass appeal against heating
surcharges. They're more Diddle class and know what they're doing"
(349).
The Housing Executive's Regional Director for the Southern Region in
which Craigavon was located described heating costs in the new town
sector as having "gone through the roof", and was sympathetic to
tenants' protests (350). He had unsuccessfully pressed for Craigavon's
district heating costs to be treated as a special case by central
government. Tenants' associations, he argued, could be vehicles for
consultation, but they could be "very self-interested", while the
Executive "had to look after the whole". However his view was that the
Executive should "give tenants a victory when possible". They had to be
sensitive to tenants because the Housing Executive was "an undemocratic
quango".
8.3 Managing the ghetto 
What is being suggested is that one way the Housing Executive responded
to the problems it faced with the failure of modernisation was to
attempt to incorporate potentially disruptive tenants' associations into
"non-political" housing management. This was a very different response
compared with Bessemer Park or Peterlee (chapter 4). As noted in
chapter 2, the situation was different in Northern Ireland because the
Housing Executive had been created to "take housing out of politics"
(351). But while this was originally done to cope with civil unrest, it
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became an accepted feature of housing policy in Northern Ireland and one
that has even been suggested as a model for Britain to follow (Brett,
1986, pp. 132-133). This extension of a measure introduced to deal with
an "emergency" situation into "normal" social policy has been documented
by Ditch and Morrissey (1982), who pay particular attention to the
punitive Payment for Debt Act originally introduced to deal with the
rent strike against internment in 1971-72, but since used to get the
poor to pay their rent and fuel bills - a major reason why attempts to
organise a rent strike against the post-1979 rises was so unsuccessful.
Housing management in the late 1970s, in fact, became the management of
the poor (Singleton, 1986).
The Housing Executive's acceptance of "tenant participation" was
associated with its increasing role of managing the poor in an
undemocratic system. Interestingly, only a few years previously its
chairperson had taken the view that the lack of democracy was a reason
why participation could not be accepted:
"A new phrase has recently crept into currency - 'meaningful
consultation' - by which those concerned mean 'consultation leading
to the outcome we desire'. Any consultation which does not lead to
that result is dismissed as cosmetic and 'meaningless' 	 Let ne
make it plain that I am much in favour of tenant participation in
any reasonably democratic, united and homogeneous society. But in a
community which is deeply divided, it poses extreme dangers. There
is the recurrent fear that paramilitary organisations may, through
unassailable spokesmen, gain control of tenant committees ...
(Brett, 1986, pp. 118-119).
However, prompted by the extension of the 1980 Housing Act's "Tenants'
Charter" to Northern Ireland, and the willingness of a number of
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voluntary organisations to implement participation strategies for the
Housing Executive, it changed its approach, as the following account by
a senior housing officer describes:
"In the early 1970s tenants' opinions about houses being
uninhabitable couldn't be accepted. But we're involved in a
psychological war and had to keep up the spirits of the tenants.
Good housing management looks at what peoples' needs are, but we
don't wash our dirty linen in public. The Executive makes
representations to the Government for funds based on these needs
I'm in favour of strong tenants' associations as consultative
vehicles. Then we don't have to deal with individuals. But the
Executive must watch for political motives, like councillors getting
at the state." (352)
Pressure grew for an initiative in Craigavon. In 1982 Craigavon Borough
Council's Public Health Department served a formal Abatement Notice on
the Housing Executive under the 1978 Pollution Control and Local
Government (Northern Ireland) Order, a move that would not have been
possible in Britain because these two functions - public health and
housing - were carried out by the sane authority, the local council.
Craigavon's decision followed preparation of a report which concluded
that Rathmore, Ridgeway and Legahory Green constituted health hazards
(353). The following week the Health Minister toured the area (354).
Various strategies were considered by the Housing Executive Board.
Their main concern was the unpopularity of much of the housing and the
very high level of voids. A Board paper explained that a waiting list
for housing in the area existed despite this problem because:
"these applicants have either been made numerous offers of
accommodation or await a particular house in a popular area.
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Generally their points levels are so low that the applicant can
afford to await the house of his choice." (355)
The paper stated that Brownlow had the highest tenancy termination rate
in Northern Ireland, including a high proportion of "moonlight flits".
It took the view that although Brownlow's stock of family housing was
Inappropriate against growing needs for small units, the area served a
useful province-wide function as temporary housing (what critics called
a "dumping ground"). It was suggested that this would include those
waiting to buy or who were "transient by nature". However, a
significant increase in Brownlow's housing surplus was predicted. There
was a problem of long-term tenants moving out to the private sector, and
of some properties that had been let to the security forces being
vacated. The paper argued that the district heating issue had to be
tackled urgently, and tenants' views on this were accepted. Although it
was recommended that the paper be presented to Craigavon Borough Council
and Brownlow Community Council, the only role for tenants' groups which
appeared in the paper was the improvement of security on the estates.
The recommended strategy was (i) the demolition of Ridgeway; (ii) the
consolidation of other problem areas, except for Rathmore (where most of
the houses lay vandalised) and Legahory Green, whose future was to be
kept under review; (iii) sixty per cent sales discounts; (iv)
homesteading and (v) equity sharing. The emphasis was on privatising as
much of the stock as possible.
There followed implementation of a "Priority Estates" programme for
Brownlow's ten emptiest estates, involving cheap sales of vacant
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property with repair grants, funding for the Northern Ireland Voluntary
Trust (NIVT) to appoint a Development Officer as an "honest broker"
between tenants' groups and the Executive, and the direct appointment of
a Strategy Co-ordinator. Brownlow Community Council was recognised as
an unmbrella body for tenants' groups. The most defective houses, the
192 derelict and extensively vandalised units in Ridgeway, only twelve
years old and with considerable debts remaining on them, were sold to
private developers at a reputed £500 per house and demolished for
redevelopment (356).
The Housing Executive wanted to encourage the social proletariat of
Brownlow to organise into groups with which it could work. The fact
that local community workers were not doing that, but supporting more
conflictive community action, appeared to be linked to the appointment
from outside the area of the Development Officer, paid for by the
Housing Executive but actually employed by a voluntary organisation, the
NIVT (357). As part of the strategy, Brownlow Community Council was
assisted with the drawing up of a document called Brownlnw Matters - the 
tenants' view on Brownlow. This outlined the main problems of the area
and pressed for local participation in decisions affecting the whole of
Brownlow, rather than the selective participation with tenants in
"problem estates" - now termed "priority estates" by the Housing
Executive - which the Housing Executive was pursuing. Although it
sharply criticised the Housing Executive's "Craigavon Strategy", the
Executive accommodated it by setting up a "joint management agreement"
with Brownlow Community Council.
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The priority estates programme involved redirecting funds for normal
improvement work on Housing Executive stock to these priority estates,
with a view to selling off as much of the housing as possible to relieve
its housing management costs to the Executive (Northern Ireland Housing
Executive, 1983a). This sparked off complaints from estates without
high numbers of vacancies, and hence not priority estates, that
maintenance and improvement work was being cut where tenants had kept
estates in good order to make available funds to prepare vacant
properties for sale (358). Considerable resources were put into various
privatisation measures, including "homesteading", improvement for sale
and equity sharing schemes. The Housing Executive stated that
consultation and participation were "crucial to the success of the
strategy" (359).
Amid the implementation of this strategy rent rises across the province
continued. Local politicians were not impressed and argued that the
rents were too high for the use value of much of the housing in the new
town sector and that:
NO o.. it was a ridiculous situation where people in Craigavon were
asked to subsidise a building programme when there was an abundance
of houses in the area." (360)
In April 1982 Craigavon Borough Council adopted a motion calling for a
rents freeze and more central government investment in housing
improvements (361). The council decided that an all-party delegation
should meet the Environment Minister. The following week a decision was
made to establish a Housing Liaison Committee "to make the Executive
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more sensitive to people on the ground", but this was dominated by
unionist politicians (362). The recently-formed Craigavon Housing
Action Group, with its main base in the new town sector, demanded a rent
freeze for three years and more public investment to take the burden of
maintenance and new build off rents. It organised a series of protests
to highlight what amounted to a 380 per cent rise in rents since 1977
(363). The issue attracted all-party support. The Action Group put
forward proposals for reforming housing finance, policy, investment and
tenant participation. A few tenant activists were vociferous about the
rent rises, claiming that nothing was being done about slow and
inefficient maintenance and management services. However, once again
the rents campaign failed to take off and the Action Group's protests
were not well attended.
The Housing Executive's Twelth Annual Report (Northern Ireland Housing
Executive, 1983b) located the Brownlow problem in terns the legacy of
modernisation. There had been an "over provision" of public sector
housing as levels of employment fell. The Executive's "biggest
headache" was Craigavon, although the problem was also threatening the
other growth centres of the 1960s - Antrim, Newtownabbey and
Carrickfergus. Combined with Conservative Government policies to
stimulate the private sector, the situation led to a scaling down of
Housing Executive new build targets (Northern Ireland Housing Executive,
1983a; see chapter 2). The Executive's policy for Craigavon was partly
modelled on the British "priority estates" initiatives, involving
physical improvements, locally-based housing management, tenant
consultation and tighter security in estates with high numbers of
- 355 -
vacancies (Birrell, 1986). The main emphasis, however, was on
privatisation. This sales strategy was implemented without prior
consultation with tenants, whose role was limited to consultation about
low-level housing management matters through Brownlow Community Council.
It was suggested above that local community workers in Craigavon were,
In essence, displaced by a Development Officer whose remit was to
organise tenants according to the management needs of the Housing
Executive. Two local community workers, Acheson and Carolan (1984),
evaluated Brownlow's early priority estates experience in an article in
the community work review, Scope. They described the background to the
Executive's Craigavon Strategy - the costs and inefficiency of the gas
heating systems, housing design and finish defects, dampness,
maintenance, transfer requests and allocations, and tenant agitation
about these issues. They concluded that the strategy had:
"achieved a degree of ventilation of tenants' feelings and small-
scale improvements in management practice." (p. 6)
The sales policy predominated over participation, which in any case only
ever involved a very small proportion of the tenants. The main interest
in the Craigavon Strategy cane from potential house purchasers (364).
8.4 Summary and conclusions 
It has been argued that Craigavon new town was created as part of a
wider strategy of reproducing the working class for capital in what
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turned out to be unstable transnational outposts. When the
transnationals did not invest on the scale planned for, and when those
that did cone pulled out, the state had to manage large numbers of
workless tenants and empty houses. It is argued that the "logic" of the
system in which both the state and the working class were located
demanded strategies to reproduce people within the wage labour-capital
relationship, including the reproduction of those forced out of work as
a "less eligible" social proletariat. As Byrne (1986) proposes,
strategies of control are the logical consequence of post-modernism's
failure to deliver the reforms that seemed to be possible during the
modernisation era. These strategies can range from the deliberate
participation strategy the Housing Executive introduced to manage the
crisis in Browmlow to the exclusion of tenants from access to the local
state which occurred in Peterlee and Bessemer Park. The generative
processes are very similar, despite the differences in civil society and
state-civil society relations described.
Craigavon appears unique because of the emphasis often put on its
sectarian origins: its location "East of the Bann", its name and the
choice of the Commission's first chairperson, the windfall land profits
made by the large Unionist landowners and the costs borne by the small
farmers. However, the ways in which new town planning has actually
reinforced subregional uneven development, excluded the working class
and involved clientelist relationships between the local state and big
capital have been documented for several British new towns (Robinson,
1983; Mullan, 1980; Austrin and Beynon, 1979; Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin
and Gray, 1985, pp. 214-222). The capitalist determinants which shaped
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planning in Northern Ireland and Britain appeared broadly similar, as
did the working class experiences of modernisation and restructuring -
processes in which the political leaderships in the two areas were
implicated.
The growth of stagnant reserve armies of labour - or a social
proletariat - with the deindustrialisation of the growth centres met in
both County Durham and North Armagh with sporadic and weak community
action which was either ignored or incorporated. It was suggested in
chapter 1 that reproductive strategies in the early post-modern era have
been part of a "two nations" project which the central state has played
the determining role in shaping. In housing, the main locale for the
reproduction of the "second nation" became state housing, much of which
was built during the "one nation" era of modernisation but was
subsequently residualised as the importance of these localities in
global accumulation reduced. The working class experience of Craigavon,
as with County Durham's growth centres, appears as shaped by the need
for the capitalist state to reproduce the class within capitalism, as
wage labour or as a reserve army. In Northern Ireland reproductive
processes take place in relation to a deeply divided working class in
which disproportionately large numbers of catholic workers make up the
social proletariat which occupied much of Brownlow's housing. However,
growing numbers of protestants were also marginalised by urban decline,
and in Craigavon the Borough Council began to respond to this by, for
example, supporting campaigns against rent rises.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION 
In chapter 1 it was proposed that the problem of community action about
housing and planning issues in County Durham and North Armagh might
start to be explained in terns of the experience in civil society of
"modernisation". Community action arose in response to a certain type
of state intervention in civil society in certain localities. This
intervention was based upon strategies of spatial restructuring, with
the creation of growth centres, the production of mass housing,
redevelopment and the marginalisation and decline of small communities
outside the growth areas. The local state in both sub-regions undertook
planning strategies based on ideas about the proper spatial arrangement
of urban centres under a regime of "Fordist" accumulation by
transnationals, or "organised capitalise. Housing provision was
designed to accommodate labour pools in these centres.
It was argued that the dominant political ideology of the "modernisation
era" was "one nation" social democratic corporatism, or the Keynesian
Welfare State. The modernisation wrought by planning and housing
policy, and the strategy's subsequent demise, was not confined to North
East England and Northern Ireland; inspection of the literature suggests
it was a common experience in the old industrial regions of the UK
periphery (for example, see Rees and Lambert (1981) on South Wales;
Mooney (1987) on the Glasgow region; and Lloyd and Reeve (1982) on North
Vest England) but few studies examine the working class experience in
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detail. Indeed, "modernisation" suns up many aspects of urban and
regional policy throughout the UK during the era of "organised"
capitalism (see Lash and Urry, 1987; Rees and Lambert, 1985).
In the sane way that modernisation was imposed on many localities, the
transition to post-modernism necessitated the imposition of new policies
from the top. In County Durham and North Armagh the failure of
modernisation strategy in housing and planning during the 1970s saw the
adoption of policies to contain state expenditures and expand the sphere
of circulation. In County Durham mounting local-central government
tensions and conflicts were evident as the long period of growing local
expenditures cane to an end. In both regions, central government
imposed pressures and controls on the direction of local policies to
achieve a transition from modernisation.	 The scope and influence of
strategic planning by the local state was curtailed, and housing policy
effectively "nationalised" (see Murie, 1985; Grant and Healey, 1985).
These developments appeared to be linked to the strategy of expanding
circulation and means of self-help in areas where central government
considered that the market and self-reliance had been undermined by too
great a degree of state provision, crowding out "entrepreneurialise
and taxing profits.	 The strengthening of central control and
increased flexibility in housing and planning towards needs of private
capital appear to be responses to the "disorganising" of capitalism
which has followed the "organised" accumulation regime of the
modernisation era. Although it was beyond the scope of the present
thesis to investigate these basal changes in detail, considerable
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evidence in support of the "disorganisation thesis" is presented by Lash
and Urry (1987).
The recommodification of housing was a particularly important aspect of
the end of modernisation. Indeed, there appeared to be a general
transition within policies of reproduction from their overall dominance
in economic and social development to a more residual role in which
reproducing the social proletariat (marginalised sections of the working
class which expanded in the depressed growth centres of County Durham
and North Armagh during the 1970s) cane to dominate many of the
functions of the local state. These processes are referred to as "early
post-modern" processes, and Jessop's (1982, pp. 244-245) concept of "two
nations" strategy is employed to describe the political project under
post-modernism: differentiation of the working class and of consumption
experiences, and reproduction of - in broad brush terns - a core of
relatively affluent workers with continuous employment and a periphery
of the unwaged or low paid.
The attempt to develop County Durham and North Armagh within a "one
nation strategy" by removing "slums" and building "new communities" in
modern environments failed as these new centres deindustrialised after a
short period of accumulation. Large numbers of workers in the growth
centres became members of the "second nation" of the early post-modern
era, defined by both economic marginalisation and their dependence on
residualised state provision. The struggles against modernisation in
the old neighbourhoods of Railway Street or the Category "D" villages
were in an important sense struggles against state housing as it had 
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become in the modern era. Much of it had always been unpopular with
regard to its form and location, but at the end of modernisation other
problems emerged making it "difficult-to-live-in". Some of these
struggles were successful because of the alternatives offered by post-
modern developments, principally working class home ownership and
housing associations/cooperatives. The Housing Corporation, the public
local inquiry as an instrument of national policy, and the Priority
Estates Project were enabling structures biased towards certain forms of
social action, particularly privatisation and self-help. This
structural transformation of means of reproduction was central to
answering "how it happened" questions about the community action
studied. But this is only a relatively low level of explanation. In
particular, the question arises as to the nature of reproductive
responses by the state; the restructuring of reproduction was not a
straightforward functional process.
Easington, for example, adopted privatisation partly because of support
for working class hone ownership and partly because of the scale of
pressures on its management and maintenance expenditure (chapter 4).
Derwentside and Durham City's housing policies continued the historical
commitment of the local Labour Parties to council housing and removing
old working class terraces from the housing stock (chapters 5 and 6).
Wear Valley, under the influence of the scale of opposition to Category
"D", decided to retain older private housing and avoided "post-modern"
conflicts of the types documented in Franwellgate Moor and Langley Park
(chapter 3). Responses to defective modern state housing differed
according to the possibility for local people of "escape" within the
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district; in Peterlee there were few alternatives, and most of the
houses had to be refurbished - a long, disruptive and expensive process
for the tenants (chapter 4). In Spennymoor and Craigavon there was
alternative housing available, and large-scale demolition of modern,
non-traditional mass housing that could not attract tenants occurred
(chapters 4 and 8). To varying degrees, depending on local
circumstances, community participation approaches were employed. They
were most advanced in Brownlow, where a privatisation package was
implemented partly under the guise of a tenant participation strategy to
Improve the housing.
The case studies were accounts of what chapter 1 conceptualised as a
"contest of domains" between the local state and local civil society
over reproductive policy in housing and planning. As was noted above,
these struggles could have an effect on policy, but did not have a
generative effect. Rather, the case studies showed how modernisation
was a process with a subject, that subject being the working class.
Working class people were not reduced to the trEiger of modernisation,
but often acted to obstruct and resist it. One form this took was
sporadic community action. However, it has been argued in the present
thesis that a determining pressure on the development and form of
reproductive responses by the state, and working class reactions to
them, was the logic of capitalist process. The purpose of chapter 2 was
to propose a framework which located community action in terms of the
expression of capitalist processes in local housing and planning policy,
while recognising that aspects of modernisation were accommodations of
class conflict. The latter helps to explain why local councils in
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County Durham continued to attempt to implement modernist housing
policies, which were aimed at a qualitative transformation of working
class housing, despite the demise of the dominance of modernisation in
the management strategies of capital and the national state, and thus
the end of any capitalist rationale for modernisation. These policies
became very difficult to sustain during the latter 19706 due to central
government controls and pressures. It also helps to understand aspects
of modernisation, in its dominant and residual forms, in North Armagh,
where the strategy was in large measure aimed at meeting the state's
legitimation needs. But the expansion of output of state housing during
the "modernisation era", in which the needs of capital were dominant,
was associated with changes in its style and locational features
compared with early council housing, and in the process state housing
was considerably discredited as a means of "modernising" working class
housing conditions.
Chapter 1 discussed the usefulness of realist method as an heuristic
device in analysis, especially its treatment of social phenomena as
mediated expressions of central capitalist mechanisms or "system forces"
at particular general economic, political and ideological conjunctures.
In the present thesis, a framework has been proposed which suggests a
level of process relating to international/centralist forces,
particularly the strategies of transnationals, mediated at the level of
local politics and local conditions, producing variation in how the
pressures generated by these forces worked out at a concrete level in
local areas. It should be emphasised, however, that what is being dealt
with here is history and inevitably approaching history from a realist
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position involves considering structure, in the sense of
conceptualisations of necessary, internal relations in particular, as
well as evidence - the oral history and documentary material collected
in the course of the research (see Sayer, 1984, pp. 79-107). In this
way "structures" suggested by theory and other knowledge about advanced
capitalism are brought into analysis. The evidence is used to
interrogate these concepts. As Abrams (1982, p. 335) concludes,
historical sociology involves a "negotiation" between "great abstract
drama" and "telling it as it was" - between theory and concept, and
action and experience. In this way, the purpose of critical social
science is to analyse
"..• the real relationships of inequality hidden within the
apparently natural market laws and political arrangements associated
with capitalism; an attempt to unmask the facts of man-made (sic)
exploitation behind the illusion of an externally given economy ...
(But) the forms of the division of labour and of ownership and
inequality do not march blindly through history with a momentum of
their own. Specific modes of production and specific forms of
inequality are actively made or not made by specific historical
actors in specific historical settings." (Abrams, 1982, pp. 41, 39;
parentheses added)
It is argued that the case studies have shown significant aspects of the
ways in which generative mechanisms were mediated by the values and
actions of social actors both in the local state and in local civil
society. In County Durham actors in the struggles against spatial
restructuring and redevelopment in the old pit villages and in the
larger Category "A" settlements of Langley Park and Framwellgate Moor
often conceived of the local state as the "Labour Party machine". This
was an institution of dominance along the officialdom-people axis,
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controlled by political leaders whose organic links with the communities
under threat had been undermined by corporatist reorganisations of the
local state, but who had a "vision" of progress based on modernisation
and the eradication of "slums". In North Armagh the dominance of
catholics in the communities threatened by restructuring, and in the
social proletariat which became trapped in the new town sector, meant
that the local council failed to support or actually obstructed a number
of local projects and campaigns. However, it had no major powers, and
community action about housing generally engaged directly with the
Housing Executive - a "non-political" body which, faced with a
management problem of very large proportions, moved to establish a
direct relationship with local residents whom it attempted to organise
while pursuing a privatisation package.
The fieldwork and historical investigations were carried out in several
"localities" which were where restructuring processes were experienced
by residents and where community action occurred. It is clear from the
case studies, however, that the central mechanisms producing the changes
which threatened or occurred in these localities involved wider
processes linked to local-central state politics and, above all,
strategies to manage reproduction which appeared to be linked to
dominant regimes of accumulation. These processes were experienced most
directly in localities, with different physical characters and social
compositions. These characters and compositions were contingent
factors. The fact that, for example, Railway Street was a "near slue
and that the residents had the resources to organise themselves and
struggle to save the Street did not cause the community action there,
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although it would almost certainly not have happened without these
contingent conditions. What caused it were decisions taken by the local
council which were products of a historically determined commitment to
"modernising" housing policy, and what resolved it was the decision
taken by central government which was a product of its early post-modern
strategy, namely a reduction of the local state's direct role in
reproduction. In other areas threatened with clearance there was no
community action, but as a consequence of the Railway Street Public
Inquiry these areas were likely to be retained and improved as well. As
Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, p. 248) put it:
"Events are caused by generative mechanisms (determination), but
because these are activated by combination with contingent
relations, the actual concrete outcome is not pre-determined
(determinism) ... (I)t remains logically possible that the whole
world will change, and so change what are necessary generative
mechanisms ..."
While these authors give capitalism as an example of one already created
world, it night be argued that within capitalism modernism was a created
world in the economies and polities of County Durham and North Armagh,
and that this world changed with the transition to early post-modernism.
Lash and Urry's (1987) work is very explicit about this, providing
detailed accounts of the dimensions of a transition from "organised" to
"disorganised" capitalism in all Western nations resulting in
fundamental basal and cultural changes, although with important cross-
national differences deriving particularly from the histories of
organisation at the bottom (among labour) and at top (among capital).
Thus, certain hallmarks characterise advanced capitalism, such as a
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complex division of labour whose product is expropriated by owners of
the means of production to realise surplus value, an occupationally-
based stratification system derived from the workers' degree of
centrality in accumulation/reproduction, and procedures for obtaining
social integration (adapted from Abrams, 1982, p. 21). But the forms of
these basic features appear significantly different in the era of
"modernisation" or "organised" capitalism compared with the era of
"post-modernise or "disorganised" capitalism; for example, "the decline
in the significance of a distinctively proletarian pattern of life from
the 1950s onwards, a pattern focused on trade unionism, the Labour
Party, the co-operative, particular forms of holiday, recreation,
cultural practice, and so on" (Lash and Urry, 1987, p. 211). The
structural features of this transition have not been a central concern
of the present thesis (on this, work is only just beginning, but see
Gough (1986); Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison (1984); Scott and Storper
(1986); Harvey (1987); Sayer, 1986; Holloway, 1987; as well as Lash and
Urry, 1987). What has been noted is the apparent "logic" of housing and
planning policies in County Durham and North Armagh during the post-war
economic expansion, which derives from their relationship to a "Fordist"
regime of "organised" accumulation by transnationals, and the different
"logic" of policies which were put in place at the end of this period of
expansion during deindustrialisation/disorganisation and the rise of
flexible accumulation. It appears more accurate, however, to
conceptualise these phases as strategies, an approach which recent work
on modern/post-modern economic restructuring would seem to support.
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While it was argued in chapter 2 that the transition from modern to
post-modern housing and planning strategy can be conceptualised at a
high level of abstraction as a tendency operating in virtue of changes
in the system forces of capitalism (themselves outcomes of struggle
about the capital-wage labour relation), modernist/post-modern policies
were also determining mechanisms, albeit at a lower level of
abstraction. This method of analysis avoids the error of explaining the
"real-concrete" at the level of appearances, while failing to examine
the more abstract determinations (a criticism that can be applied to
Dennis' (1970; 1972) work on redevelopment in Sunderland). The
transition from "modern" to "early post-modern" reproductive strategies
in County Durham and North Armagh appears as an effect of the economic
crisis which began in the late 1960s (Gough, 1986). In housing and
planning it involved the nationally imposed recommodification of housing
and a new "entrepreneurial" and flexible emphasis in planning (Ball,
1983, pp. 241-271; Harloe, 1981). The plural nature of the capitalist
state meant that the transition was not determined in the determinist 
mechanical sense, but determined by pressures generated by wider system
forces in the capitalist economy and central state (Jessop, 1982, p.
222; Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray, 1985, p. 248; Williams, 1973).
An attempt to portray the process is shown in figure 9.1. This is
obviously schematic and an attempt to order the conclusions of the
thesis so far about the processes involved in producing events in time
and space at different scales by organising them from the most abstract
(processes at the highest level of determination) to particular concrete
outcomes.
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Figure 9.1 PROCESSES WHICH MAY GENERATE COMMUNITY ACTION IN COUNTY
DURHAM AND NORTH ARMAGH
Abstract determinations arising from the
capital-wage labour relation (e.g. economic crisis)
Restructuring strategies (tendencies/mechanisms operating in virtue
of abstract determinations, e.g. modernisation/post-modernism;
determining pressure = need to reproduce conditions for
accumulation, including social reproduction)
State policy (unity must be constituted politically;
determining pressure from restructuring strategies)
Civil society (application and experience of state policy)
Synthesis of capitalist system forces, state policy and civil society
(pressures, strategies, experiences, resources, social action:
occurs in "places" which may form settings for this
interaction, e.g. "localities").
Conjunctures (community action may occur as a concrete outcome in
pre-structured context)
As considered above, the processes suggested in figure 9.1 will be
contingently related and concrete outcomes cannot be taken as pre-
determined (they will depend on, for example, political unity or the
availability of resources for community action). The generalisation
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entailed has not permitted distinguishing between, for instance, the
national state, with its primary orientation to the management of the UK
economy within the world economy, and the local state - local government
and administration - with its prime orientation to social reproduction,
bringing it into very close contact with civil society. In addition,
the outcome of conjunctures at specific local levels may have a
determining effect on policies and practices at more general levels, and
it is not considered essential to move only one way through the levels
(see Gregson, 1987, p. 81).
Although the community action studied in the present thesis was, at a
more concrete level, a "contest of domains" between the local state and
local civil society, the struggles may be analysed at more abstract
levels at which the role of national/international restructuring
strategies becomes clearer and indeed a crucial part of explanation.
For example, the increasing extent of local state intervention in civil
society from the 1930s largely derives from the important role of the
local state in the modernisation required by organised capitalism, when
the sphere of reproduction was dominant and local state expenditures
were expanding. In the early post-modern era of disorganising
capitalism the sphere of circulation has been expanding to commodity
areas which could yield surplus value, and the role of the local state
has consequently been reduced, or restructured, as in the increasing
emphasis on supporting local private enterprise in planning departments
(see Loughlin, Gelfand and Young, 1985). The interventions by local
councils in Framwellgate Moor and Railway Street took place as if wider
conditions were still "modern", with a social democratic party in
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central government, a unified and organised labour movement and
industrial growth. In fact, as shown, wider conditions were "early
post-modernist". Figure 9.2 takes this further by classifying the cases
of community action studied according to the nature of these processes.
Figure 9.2 CLASSIFICATION OF CASES OF COMMUNITY ACTION IN COUNTY DURHAM
AND NORTH ARMAGH
Restructuring strategy	 Early	 Early
(national/international) Modernist	 post-modern	 post-modern
state/capital
Reproductive strategy 	 Early
(local state)	 Modernist	 Modernist	 post-modern
Category "D" Framwellgate Moor	 Brownlow
struggles
Railway Street	 Bessemer Park
Montaighs	 Lurgan	 Peterlee
Figure 9.2 shows that the local state continued modernist policy after
it had been succeeded at the levels of the national state/international
capital by post-modernism. However, as described in the case studies,
the pressures on the local state to conform to post-modernism were
difficult to resist, given the political subordination of the local
state to central government. This was the case in state housing, where
sufficient resources were not made available to continue modernisation.
The demolition of Bessemer Park, preceded by an unsuccessful community
development exercise, is considered a post-modern solution, as are
Brownlow and Peterlee where privatisation and demolition were the fate
of much of the "modern" stock. At local level autonomy was subject to
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top-down integrative forces which tightly constrained the available
options. At a lower level, autonomy in civil society was also subject
to such top-down integration. For example, while the residents of
Railway Street won the "freedom" to improve or sell their hones at a
profit, there was no equivalent "freedom" for many of the tenants of
Brownlow or Peterlee. Autonomy was conditional, and largely depended on
the dominant reproductive strategy.
Parson (1986) suggests that the struggle for "autonomy" explains, and
Justifies from a radical socialist viewpoint, community action about
"statist" housing policy. He writes:
"The point that is to be made here is that, both in theory and in
practice, the democratic state (sic) is often antithetical to the
diverse needs and desires of autonomous movements. In order to
protect historical working class gains (e.g. public housing) from
the state of the right, the progressive state often adopts
authoritarian and oppressive measures. In so doing the state
services not its clientele but its programs. In addition, when
autonomous movements are integrated within state policy, their
ability to experiment with alternatives is sharply curtailed by
being required to participate in (democratic) statist structures."
(p. 7; parenthesis added)
The most "autonomous" struggle in the case studies was the successful
attempt by a group of Railway Street residents to establish a housing
co-operative rather than be rehoused in state housing (chapter 5).
However, this "alternative" was dependent on state support in the form
of the Housing Corporation - the struggle is more accurately analysed as
one against modernism which found its resolution through an institution
of early post-modernism, the Housing Corporation (which was established
In 1964 and considerably expanded during the 1970s as an early post-
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modern alternative to council housing). In Framwellgate Moor "autonomy"
appeared to be interpreted by local residents as laissez-faire in the
housing market, even though the housing market is itself underpinned by
state interventions, but they were in a potentially favourable market
situation. By contrast, in the struggles in modern mass state housing
described in chapters 4 and 8, what was demanded was more, not less,
state action, although with demands for more accountability to tenants.
In capitalist societies, "anti-statist" struggles, which include the
type of struggles against modernisation examined in the present thesis,
have frequently entailed resorting to self-help or market "solutions"
which, because they are likely to lower the cost to capital of
reproducing the working class and to expand the sphere of circulation,
are actively supported by the early post-modern capitalist state. The
only alternative is to obtain control of capital. Thus, the "successes"
of anti-statist struggles in the post-modern phase should be understood
in terms of the accommodation of this action within post-modern
institutions such as mass owner-occupation, housing associations,
housing trusts, etc. In other words, how housing is consumed is closely
related to how the state organises reproduction. This might be put as
follows. The reaction against modernisation generated a base of support
for post-modernism in terns of a self/other opposition to its domination
of civil society (see Therborn, 1980, pp. 27-28). How this was
expressed in concrete outcomes depended on the opportunities available,
especially the means of reproduction. Thus, the social policies of the
Thatcherite state were crucial in enabling some actions and suppressing
others. But this says little about the motivation behind action. In
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relation to the problem of the present thesis, this has been proposed as
reaction to modernisation. Politically, this could have been responded
to differently and certainly did not imply only a "free market/strong
state" solution. For example, Lash and Urry (1987, pp. 299-300) write:
"Postmodern ideology, on its negative side, its new-bourgeois side,
is pre-eminently consistent with Thatcherism, Reaganism and, among
the masses, with what Stuart Hall has called 'authoritarian
populism'. On its positive side it is antihierarchical and
consistent with principles of radical democracy. It may have played
a significant role in fostering the shopfloor revolts in Britain and
elsewhere of the late 1960s and early 1970s, whose decentralized
ethos was radical-democratic rather than simply class-ideological.
A radical-democratic ethos is shared by the various new social
movements ... (I)t would seem that strategies for a reconstituted
left political culture, in an age of disorganizing capitalist
societies, will have to take, if not take on, postmodernism very
seriously indeed."
It is difficult to find any examples of successful community action
against "statism" during the height of the modernisation era in County
Durham and North Armagh. In fact, the frequent failures to stop
modernisation provided national political leaders with examples to
legitimate new post-modern housing policies at national level, which
were actually more to do with economic pressures than "saving
communities" (see chapter 2's discussion of housing policy). Similarly,
it is difficult to find examples of successful community action against
post-modernism, such as the sale of council houses or the imposition of
Urban Development Corporations, during the early post-modern era. This
is not to suggest successful opposition in not possible, but that
"community action" appears to be generally a weak, relatively easily
opposed or managed form of struggle on its own. The reason for this is
largely explained by the extent to which first modernisation and then
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early post-modernism extended into practices and experiences in civil
society to incorporate or oppose them. Indeed, Frankel (1987) goes as
far as to argue that this process means that "civil society" does not
exist as a separate sphere:
"(T)he struggle between social movements and traditional political
processes is erroneously depicted as the struggle of 'civil society
against the state'. This is because new social movement theorists
do not adequately differentiate between 'the state' in the narrow
sense of political administration (that is, government by freely
elected ministers, one party dictators or military-bureaucratic
regimes), and state institutions in the larger sense as part of what 
is called 'civil society'. for example, the vital educational. 
social welfare, transport, media and other national and local 
services ..." (pp. 234-235; stress added)
However, in another passage Frankel refers to "the state-organized
socio-economic and cultural practices which constitute an indispensable
part of the contemporary social reproduction of everyday life" (p. 205),
implying the existence of an "everyday life" that has to be reproduced
by the exercise of state power, i.e. it will not reproduce itself
according to the needs of the wider system. Thus, it is difficult to
discount altogether the existence of a separate domain of social life
outside "the state" and other dominant institutions, even though the
state has penetrated this domain on a large scale. As Williams (1973,
p. 11) observes:
"... I am sure that it is true of the society that has cone into
existence since the last war, that progressively, because of
developments in the social character of labour, in the social
character of communications, and in the social character of
decision, it extends much further than ever before in capitalist
society into certain hitherto resigned areas of experience and
practice and meaning	 A meaning or a practice may be tolerated as
a deviation, and yet still be seen only as another particular way to
live. But as the necessary area of effective dominance extends, the
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same meanings and practices can be seen by the dominant culture, not
merely as disregarding or despising it, but as challenging it."
The state is the most important means by which effective dominance is
extended, even if this is done by facilitating the dominance of large
corporations over their workforces, or the dominance of large private
Investors over local government. During the modernisation era effective
dominance was achieved through social democratic reformism and class co-
operation. Issues concerning the operation of the capitalist economy
were translated into social issues. For example, Dunleavy (1981) shows
that industrial decline was translated into a social problem to be
tackled through housing policy as "a quick technological fix"; in other
words, "modernisation". He writes:
"The distribution of people between areas of good housing and the
'slums' was marked by a profound class cleavage, a cleavage which,
combined with the gross disparities in housing amenities involved,
posed a major threat to the social formation and the legitimacy of
the state." (p. 101)
Plant (1983, P. 19) makes a similar point when he argues that the
political costs of disaffection and violence, real or imagined, have led
one-nation Tories to reject neo-liberal monetarism. Even the
Thatcherite two-nation strategy involves responding with state
programmes to inner-city decay and Northern Ireland. Gaffikin and
Mooney (1987, pp. 68-70) employ the term "regressive modernisation" to
describe these programmes, an alternative term to "post-modernism":
"It is regressive because on the one hand, and in reaction to the
current period of crisis, uncertainty and disruptive social change,
we are encouraged to seek refuge and security in the values and
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images of the past. However, on the other hand, we are
simultaneously being seduced by the values and images of a 'modern'
and 'progressive' world 	 The recent proliferation of neo-
vernacular styles - that is the return to traditional housing design
in Belfast - in new public sector housing illustrates how
architectural design has been employed to address problems which go
far beyond the bounds of aesthetic preferences. This follows wider
trends in Britain, and is a reaction to the perceived failure of
modernism in all its forms 	 At its most basic, we are being
further persuaded into the dominant culture of Thatcher's Britain.
This is a culture which has not only provided fresh moral legitimacy
for the primacy of profit, but which has extended the rules and
values of the market into previously unpenetrated territory."
Lash and Urry (1987, pp. 285-300) argue that the consumption of images,
or the role of imagery in social reproduction, has become of major
significance in "disorganised" (or "post-modern") capitalism. However,
imagery was also a feature of modernisation, as has been referred to at
various points in the present thesis. Gaff ikin and Mooney (1987, pp.
65-66) address this very well as follows:
"Expressions and images can readily change the terns of the planning
debate. Back in the late sixties in Belfast what had been
customarily described as 'neat little terraces' in a city of
villages very quickly became 'slums' in urgent need of demolition.
The old way of life was to change. It was presented as inadequate
in the modern age. Rather, new bright houses in the growth centres
or radically different housing forms in-situ could provide all the
amenities that were lacking in the inner city. The image was
important. It displayed clean, modern materials, geometric forms
and open spaces and it represented the possibility of an improved
way of life."
The suggestion here is that different accumulation strategies generate
different imageries which signify dominant ideologies that contribute to
reproducing these strategies. The imagery changes as basal changes
occur, and these basal changes are themselves used to justify moving on
to a new language and new visual metaphors.
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Panitch (1986a) points out that social democratic reformism appeared
only to be able to keep its direction and popular support as long as
capital would support it. He argues that the economic crisis at the end
of this period, and the political counter-attack on social democratic
reformism which was image-laden, shows how dependent the latter was on
meeting the requirements of capital as to when and where it would
invest. The counter-attack was legitimated on grounds that reforms, and
local autonomy, have to be re-examined when they start scaring business
away. But there is another, perhaps more important, possible reason why
the transition was not widely resisted and was, in fact, relatively
popular among some sections of the population. This was the negative
experience of state authority under modernism which occurred above all
in the creation of "modern" built environments. The struggles against
modernisation described in this thesis went beyond the routine
experience of the state to expose more explicitly the nature of popular
exclusion from its agencies and of officialdom-people relations of
domination. There is evidence that this routine experience is often one
of antagonism (see, for example, Hyde and Deacon, 1986) but above all it
seems to be one which precludes or defuses collective action (Kraushaar,
1981). Thus, where collective action occurs it is of particular
interest in revealing aspects of the nature of the capitalist state.
Figure 9.3 indicates with regard to the particular cases of community
action studied how important selective state intervention was in
managing local conflicts, and how dominant intervention was concordant
with dominant restructuring strategies.
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Figure 9.3 OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY ACTION IN COUNTY DURHAM AND N. ARMAGH
Category "D" struggles	 "Spatial coalitions" modify County Council
strategy; central intervention shifts it to
post-modern strategy.
Bessemer Park	 County Council implements "community
development" which fails; District Council
decides to demolish modern estate.
Peterlee	 District Council resists weak tenant
mobilisation in problematic modern housing.
Some local incorporation of tenants where
appropriate to the council's needs.
Privatisation and demolition of state
housing.
Railway Street
Framwellgate Moor
The Montaighs
Lurgan
Brownlow
Modernist intervention by District fails
with residents able to benefit from
post-modern policy, including Housing
Corporation and central government
intervention by public inquiry, which
was decisive.
Modernist intervention by District Council
gradual to avoid public inquiry but
frustrated by HIP cuts. Residents excluded
from decision-making process.
Modernist restructuring by local
state largely successful; restructuring
ends with national transition to
early post-modernism.
Modernist intervention by Housing Executive
modified by national policy and community
action in early post-modern period.
Incorporation of community action by
Housing Executive while adjusting to
post-modernism. Funded community action
concerned with services to marginalised
tenants.
In general, community action in the older private housing areas was
stronger and more successful than community action in the modern mass
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housing estates. It was suggested at the end of chapter 4 that this
might be explained in terms of the "community-based" local civil
societies of the former and the "disorganised" civil societies of the
latter. However, the chances of success were also different. While
residents in older private housing were defending neighbourhoods in a
national context which, from the 1970s, emphasised the preservation of
such areas, residents in the mass housing estates wanted improvements or
rehousing, and a greater say in maintenance and management, when
national policy was residualising council housing.
The nature of the national context has been explained in terns of
dominant strategies of reproduction, particularly the expansion of
circulation, privatism and self-reliance in the early post-modern era,
with the concomitant expansion of appropriate forms of social control
and imagery. However, although an important aspect of the community
action studied is that it can be classified into two types of
"localities" - old private housing and modern mass state housing - a
common experience of exclusion in relation to the corporate local state
was evident in both types of localities and both case study sub-regions,
which has been described in terns of "officialdom-people" relations of
domination (Jessop, 1982, pp. 247-252).
In all areas there was a very unequal access to political decision-
making by dominant local political institutions, a situation which night
be termed "local corporatism" (Villadsen, 1986). As also found by
Villadsen (1986), conflict in these situations gave rise to some
politicisation, as when Independents stood to oppose Labour candidates
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which supported restructuring in County Durham. In Craigavon there was
some weak politicisation, mainly early discussions by members of
Brownlow Community Council about standing "community candidates", but
such developments were less likely with the incorporation of "community
leaders" into housing management and the dominance of formal politics by
the national question. Villadsen (1986, p. 265) indicates how the
fragmentation and differentiation of civil society in "early post-
modernism" have been reflected in diverse and fragmented responses to
restructuring at local level:
"Tensions and conflicts at the local level have followed
politicisation, but they can only be understood in relation to the
type of community, i.e. in relation to processes of social and
spatial segregation. Actors, networks, forms and issues will vary
according to the type of community. So will the extent to which
local corporatism can be said to exist."
Does this mean that "consumption sectors" are relevant to explanation,
despite the arguments of chapter 1? It is suggested that the answer is
that while consumption divisions are significant, consumption relations
are made by the organisation of capitalist production and reproduction;
they are "basally determined" in the last instance (many aspects of
reproduction - such as the built environment - may be conceptualised as
components of the base; see Williams, 1973; Ball, 1986). Although there
is clearly growing differentiation in reproduction/consumption
experiences in early post-modern society, this differentiation is
largely a result of the operation of the capitalist economy in any given
period, including the nature of production and consumption, and of state
reproductive policies. For example, in post-war housing there has
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generally been a gradation from high quality owner-occupation for the
bourgeoisie and top management to low quality owner-occupation for the
low-moderate income working class, and good council housing for the
"respectable" better-off working class and bad council housing - flats,
maisonnettes and the worst houses - for the "residuum" or social
proletariat. Indeed, tenure may not reflect quality: a good semi-
detached council house on a garden estate is likely to be rated as
superior to a small terraced private house with no garden, even though
the former may have sold quickly under the Right to Buy (and transferred
into a tenure which distributes housing very regressively). Housing
quality appears to reflect, broadly speaking, people's "worth" in terns
of their degree of centrality in capitalist processes, although there
are many contingent factors (such as spatial variations in the standard
of council housing and the housing market). Different "consumption
sectors" are products of the economic, ideological and political
conditions of a given period, which are created to a large extent by
dominant strategies such as modernism and post-modernism. Thus, state
housing in the growth centres was intended for "central" workers and
planned to provide modern amenities and "good" jobs; working class
private housing outside the growth centres was marginalised. In the
early post-modern era the position of these tenures changed, so that
much mass state housing was marginalised and private housing enhanced.
9.1 Statism and housing 
In chapter 1 the selection of County Durham and North Armagh as
comparative case study areas for an investigation of community action
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about housing was justified in terns of a central concern of urban and
regional studies: to develop an explanation which relates local
particularities to wider generative processes. The wider generative
processes have been conceptualised in terns of modernisation and post-
modernism. Local particularities have been identified, especially the
ideologies of Labourism in County Durham and sectarianism in North
Armagh, and the different forms and practices of local government and
administration, which were significantly influenced by these ideologies.
The case studies are accounts of "contests of domains" between state and
civil society. However, if the state plays the crucial role that was
suggested in the previous section, does this mean that the fact that the
local state in County Durham was directly elected and dominated by a
political party which opposed the policies of central government from
1979, while the local state in North Armagh (excluding the weak local
government system) comprised unelected agencies of central government,
makes no difference to working class experiences?
The answer in one respect lies in the way this oversimplifies the
situation: in County Durham Peterlee Development Corporation was a
similar institution of the state to Craigavon Development Commission.
In addition, as has already been noted, the autonomy of local government
in England was severely restricted by interventions and pressures from
Thatcher Governments. These features were directly related to the
Implementation of reproductive strategies from the top. But it is
argued that another conclusion may also be drawn. The similarities
between County Durham and North Armagh in the experiences of "excluded
communities" areas seen as "backward" in an era of modernisation or
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"modern" areas of mass state housing residualised in the early post-
modern era - are also associated with a situation where policies
formulated democratically (however imperfectly) were implemented
bureaucratically.
Rustin (1981) makes some very relevant observations about this. There
is a difference between class struggles in civil society and struggles
which aim to capture the state apparatus. After the last war, Labourism
was preoccupied with the latter (in Northern Ireland, a not dissimilar
preoccupation with local state power was evident with regard to the
Unionist Party). Rustin argues that this marginalised struggles about
the nature of state institutions, and its products such as mass housing,
as they were actually experienced and lived in civil society. As a
result the base of informed support for collective reforms became
narrow, and the ground was prepared for post-modernism as an
individualist ideology prevailed in society. Rustin considers that
Labourism continued to promulgate policies that homogenized different
social identities, including localities, which was particularly damaging
to its project in the early post-modern era because of the extent of
social, institutional and spatial differentiation arising from the
restructuring of production and consumption. It failed to engage with
the particularities of civil society. This was reflected in its post-
war commitment to modernisation, with the type of consequences that have
been described in the case studies of earlier chapters. Rustin (p. 36)
concludes.
"The problem of Labourism has been that it has sought the capture of
power through the State apparatus, but no fundamental change in the
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State apparatus it wishes to capture. Consequently, those subjected
to the reforms of Labour Governments have found the particular power
relations to which they are subject, whether at the hands of the
agencies of central and local government, or of publicly owned
enterprises, substantially unmodified. Reforming governments have
achieved changes in social provision, a limited redistribution of
resources, and an enhancement of the role of State power vis-a-vis
market power. But they have not achieved many changes in the
relation of citizens to the appartus of decision-making and power
itself."
Given this popular experience, which was extreme in localities such as
those of the case studies where restructuring brought the state into
close and conflictive contact with civil society, the libertarian
Ideology of "self-ownership" could be counter-posed to modernism (Cohen,
1985). While this may not give rise to major shifts in political
support, it may lead to a feeling that acquiescance to these
developments is appropriate because of the failures of modernisation.
In housing, the libertarian Right could argue that residents should have
the "right" to use freely their dwelling and in particular to improve
their situation through their own efforts, and aspects of this approach
were incorporated into the 1980 Housing Act, principally the Tenants
Charter, the Right to Buy (for both council tenants and the tenants of
many housing associations) and changes in conditions for the receipt of
renovation grants (see chapter 2). Central to this was the restoration
of property rights, which while actually being a means of further
extending the sphere of circulation, could be legitimated on the grounds
that it stimulates production, protects freedoms and conforms to
principles of Justice. Cohen's (1986, p. 6) description of libertarian
ideology closely resembles the attitudes of residents in Category "D"
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villages, the Montaighs, Railway Street and Framwellgate Moor when faced
with the modernising state:
"If this is mine, what right has anyone, even the state, to take
part of it away from me? And if this is mine, what right has the
state, through regulations and directives, to tell me what do to
with it?"
It is important to emphasise that these residents were acting to protect
living environments they valued against the state; what libertarianism
appears to do is to use such struggles for self-management and survival
within capitalism to support a world view, an ideology which legitimates
dismantling Labourist reforms, one of the most significant of which was
the principle of housing provision as a democratic process managed by
local councils and subsidised by central government. Modernisation did
involve reforms, themselves consequences of developing the productive
forces of social labour during the long boom - especially full
employment - but, as shown in chapter 2, largely dependent on that boom
and essentially top-down. It also undermined Labourist reforms by, for
example, stimulating the transformation of state housing's form and
location to meet the needs of capital, and removing many democratic
aspects of housing provision. Post-modernism could accommodate
struggles to preserve localities by treating them as local markets,
giving the consumer "freedom of choice", but actually removing housing
from a democratic process, however flawed. Gains have been possible
within this strategy, such as the state resources won by the residents
of Railway Street for their housing cooperative, but this hardly
threatened the general direction of New Right housing policies. This
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leads the present writer to disagree with Saunders (1986) when he
argues, following Gorz (1982), that in an advanced industrial economy
"liberation", while not generally possible in the formal work process,
is possible in the sphere of consumption, where people can exercise
"personal control and autonomy". There is little evidence from the
present study to support the idea of "consumption" as an autonomous
sphere. There is considerable evidence to support it as a sphere of
reproduction, subject to different strategies and a locale of different
struggles. Rather than certain "consumption sectors" offering autonomy,
it is suggested that the ability of people to achieve outcomes they want
depends on the articulation of reproduction in different periods -
itself an outcome of class and popular struggles - and the enabling or
disabling opportunities this presents.
Vhat form did this take in the case studies examined in the present
thesis? In all cases central government intervention was on the side of
"self help", "self ownership" and privatism, and against the
displacement of these by the local state. This night be described as a
"self help" housing policy - a solution which Harms (1982) argues
emerges when there is a crisis in capitalism (crisis is seen here in the
sense of a restructuring mechanism - see O'Connor, 1981). He concludes
that measures to recommodify housing and increase the amount of unpaid
labour in society are ways out of the crisis on capital's terns, but are
legitimated as "consumer choice" and "individual rights" (which they
often are, but in response to economic and social changes which are
beyond the individual's control). It is argued in the present thesis
that it is erroneous to support such policy as progressive on the
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grounds that it expands autonomy, as does, for example, Ward (1984b, p.
20 ) :
"I suddenly became a housing pundit in the 70s. With John Turner I
was on the round of tenants associations, housing managers and
conferences. We talked to councillors about the notion of dweller
control and to our horror and amazement I found that the councillors
who agreed with me were Tories, and those who bitterly disagreed
were Labour. It's as though the left wanted tenants to remain in a
serf type situation. There they are, busy defending all sorts of
aspects of the welfare state which don't get organised support from
the working class - a curious and amusing paradox."
Harms' (1982, pp. 20-21) argument is that self-help housing shifts cost
accounting in housing from societal costs to the individual and the
family. Under specific political circumstances it may be a tool of
popular struggle from below, but more often it is individualised self-
help which reproduces the dominance of capitalism in the system as a
whole. It may even not involve less public expenditure, but a
restructuring of state expenditure (Robinson, 1986) - as appeared to be
the case in Railway Street for example. Thus, grassroots struggles in
County Durham and North Armagh were not only reactions to an
articulation of reproduction but became accommodated within a
rearticulation of reproduction in the early post-modern era.
Community action about housing in County Durham and North Armagh had its
origins in working class experiences of the state in several
"localities". The action was sporadic and involved relatively small
numbers of people and specific issues rather than projects or programmes
for social change. However, certain observations can be made about what
happened. It is important to bear in mind that the struggles documented
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took place early in the post-modern phase, and that people - as
knowledgeable actors in Giddens' (1984, pp. 26-27) sense - were acting
in ways that would preserve or improve their living environments in this
wider context. In this sense, their actions were no different from the
everyday actions of most people, but in these cases whole "localities"
were under threat and this formed the basis for collective action. The
threat was either modernisation in older areas, at local level, or the
costs of the failure of modernisation for those having to live in modern
environments (mass state housing). What modernisation failed to do was
to take into account that:
"... for working people the dwelling should be understood as an
activity centre required to meet an extremely diverse range of
cultural needs." (Merrett with Gray, 1982, p. 58).
While the older environments of, for example, Framwellgate Moor or the
Montaighs appeared largely to satisfy these needs, the environments of
modernism - the mass state housing in the growth centres of Peterlee,
Spennymoor or Craigavon - appeared not to for many people, and this was
sufficient to generate community action. Harvey (1987) suggests that
the use values of a locality are particularly critical for low income
groups who cannot "escape". Merrett with Gray (1982, pp. 58-59) propose
a number of factors which comprise the qualitative experience of housing
consumption, including the physical character of the dwelling, control
over it, the attributes of the neighbourhood, the dwelling's relative
location, the ease of moving, and its financial attractiveness. These
approaches help to suggest why struggles to defend the older private
housing areas in the case studies were waged, despite the existence of
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compensation and alternative "modern" housing. Of course, other factors
are likely to have been involved, such as access to employment
opportunities, but it is important to bear in mind that the occupants of
the Category "D" villages and the Montaighs were being told that such
opportunities would not be available, and that the growth centres would
offer such opportunities. The mass state housing of modernisation often
appeared to fail to score highly among "consumers" on any of Merrett and
Gray's factors, especially with the residualisation of the areas at the
end of the modernisation era. The form and location of much of this
housing in County Durham and North Armagh was dominated by the needs of
capital and a top-down type of reformism which saw modern housing as
innately superior to older housing. This is not to suggest that the
areas which were defended by community action would meet general needs:
as Harvey (1973, p. 159) notes, "use value is not the sane for all
people in comparable dwellings". The key point is that in those
particular localities the characteristics of residents broadly matched
the characteristics of the housing environment, and that modernist
housing policy did not recognise these aspects and the need to
accommodate them. It is difficult not to agree with the residents that
housing strategies were dogmatically imposed on the basis of spurious
assumptions which served the interests of the bureaucracy and not of
housing users.
9.2 Two nations? 
Libertarian ideas of private property and the right to a return on it,
anti-statism, pluralism and self-reliance have dominated post-modern
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housing policy. It was inevitable that those who remained dependent on
the state sector were marginal groups as the sphere of circulation
expanded and many reproductive functions were relegated to a largely
welfare function of managing the social proletariat. Whether this
stratum is still a reserve army, or a stagnant reserve army as Byrne and
Parson (1983) claim, is perhaps now debatable. Disorganing capitalism
has given rise to a labour market in which the unemployed are often not
a threat to the jobs of the employed. As Bauman (1987, p. 21) puts it:
"(T)he poor are less and less important to the reproduction of
capital in their traditional role as the 'reserve army of labour'.
They are no longer the object of concern for the twofold political
task of recommodification of labour and limitation of working-class
militancy. The previously taken-for-granted principle of social
responsibility for the survival - and, indeed the well-being - of
that part of society not directly engaged by capital as producers
has suddenly cone under attack 	 (W)elfare payments becoming
instruments of disenfranchisement and the withdrawal of citizenship
rights for that rising minority of consumer society who cannot prove
their citizenship in the only way a consumer market admits."
Chapter 1 used Jessop's (1982) concept of two nations strategy to
conceptualise this, a more satisfactory formulation than Baunan's
because of its emphasis on strategy in response to action, particularly
working class struggle. It was argued that the two nations strategy of
reasserting market processes and narrowing the sphere of direct state
provision typified central state interventions in the early post-modern
era, in the sane way that a one nation strategy characterised the
modernisation era of modest collectivism, corporatism and elite
management. The housing dimension of this was interpreted as state
intervention to favour market and self-help "solutions" in housing,
while public sector tenants experienced state retrenchment, This
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accorded with the description of Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling
(1984, p. 52) that:
"Thatcherism has shifted its battle ground from opposition to the
old consensus to construction of the new order. Increasingly Tory
populism is taking the form of a unification of a privileged nation
of 'good citizens' and 'hard workers' against a contained and
subordinate nation ... In terns of the politics of support, the 'two
nations' approach requires that the productive be rewarded through 
the market for their contribution to production (or at least to the
provision of profitable marketed goods and services); conversely the
parasitic must suffer for their failure to contribute adequately (if
at all) to the market	 In this way Thatcherism hopes to recompose
the conservative working class in a secular, instrumentalist,
privatized direction ..."
These authors proceed to identify the limits to this strategy, such as
the popular support which remains for aspects of the welfare state, but
this is beyond the scope of the present thesis. What is relevant is the
way the policies of the Thatcherite state, and their expression in local
Interventions, appear to have acted to construct a bloc of support (the
first nation) while residualising those who have been unable to take
advantage of the policies or were actually harmed by them (the second
nation). The antagonism of sections of the working class to the
economic and social impact of the Keynesian Welfare State provided a
base of support, especially if won over by compromises and concessions
(Jessop, Bennett, Bromley and Ling, 1984, p. 58). Schematically, the
case studies might be classified in terns of the "two nations" project
as shown in figure 9.4. It will be seen from this that the "second
nation" is associated with mass public sector housing and the "first
nation" with private housing. This can only be regarded as a
representation of tendencies, and in this specific case there are
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qualifications - the Railway Street housing co-operative might not be
classed as private housing, and many houses in Brownlow and, to a lesser
extent, Peterlee were sold. However, in general the "second nation" in
the post-modern period is those sections of the working class rendered
peripheral by capitalist development/undevelopment, including state
policy, and their concentration in depressed state housing areas in
County Durham and North Armagh reflected this (see Friedman, 1977). The
position of working class private housing areas, however, was not always
clearly "first nation", especially in some of the more remote
settlements where market conditions remained depressed in the early
post-modern period.
Figure 9.4 COMMUNITY ACTION IN COUNTY DURHAM AND NORTH ARMAGH: ITS
LOCATION IN TWO NATIONS RESTRUCTURING
Type of state intervention
(early post-modern era)
First nation	 Second nation	 Struggle ends before
(benefit from	 (dependent groups with	 post-modern phase
emphasis on self-	 few self-owned resources becomes dominant
help and privatism)	 marginalised)
Some Category "D"
villages
Railway Street
Framwellgate Moor
Bessemer Park
Peterlee
Brownlow
the Montaighs
Some Category "D"
villages
Chapters 4 and 8 showed how people who were not empowered by wealth or
political influence struggled against housing oppressions in civil
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society. In the present thesis the focus has been on "community
action", but there are also a whole series of often individual struggles
in everyday life against such oppressions (see, for example, Parker,
1985; Reynolds, 1986). As was shown, the local state in depressed areas
has become predominantly concerned with the management of these
populations (although recent developments appear aimed at pluralising
and thus diffusing and de-politicising the management of these groups -
see the White Paper of September 1987, Housing: The Government's 
Proposals, Cm 214). Byrne's (1982, pp. 75-76) conclusion, although
generalising to underline the point, seems appropriate:
"These groups can be considered to represent a contemporary form of
the stagnant reserve army of labour and are a potentially
destabilizing force in late capitalism. Ghettoized through housing
policy, managed personally through social work, accultured through
education, maintained by Supplementary Benefits, they are the
objects of the local state and the local agencies of the national
state. At the 1978 CSE conference Cockburn made an important verbal
contribution when she pointed out the hostility of these groups to
the state	 They are defined out of the political community and
represented through corporatist mechanisms as problems. Thus for a
significant section of the working class Anderson's 'ultimate self-
determination' is far from being an article of political faith."
The struggles of the residents of the Category "D" villages, Railway
Street, Framwellgate Moor, the Montaighs and Lurgan were struggles to
win some control of housing. These residents generally had more
resources and support to do this than the occupants of state housing,
who were in a position of dependence on the local housing authority and
often unemployed. Of significance were the structures of post-modernism
in supporting self-help versus bureaucracy, and privatism versus
statism, which defined them - to same degree - into the "first nation"
- 395 -
of a two nations strategy. In addition, these structures - such as
housing associations - could be expanded to displace "statist" housing
policies, as suggested by Cowan (1986, p. 22) in his interpretation of
the Conservative Government's enthusiasm for housing co-operatives in
Liverpool:
"When prime minister Thatcher visited Liverpool's co-ops, it was not
because their co-operation inspired her, but because she saw a
chance to drive a wedge between a municipal housing authority and
the people who would normally have been its natural constituency."
However, although high income groups could be expected to be in a secure
position within the "first nation", it is by no means certain that low
income groups attracted by the prospect of first nation membership
(benefits for privatised consumption and self-reliance) will experience
an improvement in their circumstances. What is perhaps significant
about the state funding obtained by the residents of Railway Street to
improve their homes was that it followed from a struggle against a
Labour local council, as in the case of the Liverpool co-ops. In other
areas funding was not so readily available (365). As chapter 2
suggested, there is a politics of housing renewal - a prime example
being the private sector improvement boom stimulated by the Conservative
Government in the run-up to the 1983 General Election (Gibson, 1986, pp.
103-105). This contrasted with the massive inadequacy of central
government allocations for the revitalisation and repair of state
housing and the extension of the Right to Buy, itself transferring
maintenance costs to individuals (Cantle, 1986). But the use of
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privatisation and housing renewal policies to build political support is
not unproblematic.
A number of researchers have emphasised the growing expense to the state
of a system of housing finance which generously subsidises the
comfortably-off while failing to protect low-income owner-occupiers or
owner-occupiers in depressed local economies (see, for example, Ball,
1986; Karn, Doling and Stafford, 1986; Forrest and Williams, 1984).
Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray (1985, pp. 62-118) argue that the UK's
structures of housing provision are not only associated with major
inequities, but are also inefficient and inflationary. In addition,
post-modernist housing policy is, according to some commentators, a
recipe for growing decay in the housing stock. It has been argued in
this thesis that struggles to defend older down-market private housing
against modernisation were motivated by perceptions of the use value of
the housing, with residents satisfied that this was reflected in its
exchange value if the market was allowed to operate. Bower (1981),
however, argues that if lower-income private housing is left to
occupants' views about its habitability and to market processes, the
result is likely to be underlying decay as many occupants invest only in
"cosmetic" maintenance and neglect more fundamental work. Underlying
decay, in this situation, can be neglected until it reaches a point
where the dwelling is uninhabitable and rapidly loses its market value.
Where a residential area is desirable and in high demand, but contains
much poor quality housing (such as parts of Old Framwellgate Moor), low
income households are likely to be outbid by better-off households who
will realise its market potential by safeguarding and improving it
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("gentrification"). But in declining low demand areas (such as many ex-
Category "D" villages or Lurgan) low-income households will often accept
less habitable accommodation because it is cheap, but will not have the
money to tackle underlying decay. Bower (1981, p. 23) concludes that:
"The end effect that we have seen of commodification is that
decaying housing is shuffled around until it is finally those who
can do nothing about it that are left with the burden. They become
dependent on the charity of the state, in this case in the form of
local government, to declare slum clearance areas and offer everyone
rehousing or to offer special incentives to owners in particular
areas to improve their houses."
While this problem of how to prop up the market at the lower end was a
rationale for state renovation grants to private owners and
redevelopment, Bower argues that the new grant provisions of the 1980
Housing Act reduced the emphasis of renewal policy on underlying decay
and concentrated it instead on high market value repairs and
Improvements which would "oil the wheels" in the sphere of circulation.
Thus the reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of post-modernism may be
very costly to some hone owners. It is not possible to say whether this
has, in fact, happened in any of the case study areas because the
research was carried out too early in the post-modern era to be able to
judge. Railway Street won full improvement funds from the Housing
Corporation and appeared to be safe; Framwellgate Moor, initially
blighted by the council's suspension of renovation grants partly for
reasons with which Bower would probably agree, appeared to be a safe
investment in a vibrant local housing market after the council was
forced to abandon its policy for the area; housing in many of the
Category "D" villages and the townlands of the Montaighs is more likely
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to become a liability for owners trapped in depressed markets with
ageing properties.	 At the sane tine, of course, there have been
predictions that the predicament of the occupants of mass state housing
would deteriorate due to the main source of funding for maintenance and
improvements, capital receipts, declining as maintenance liabilities
grow (Cantle, 1986). It would be interesting to return to the state
housing in the case study areas in the late 1980s to investigate how
conditions had been affected.
9.3 Final conclusions 
In focusing on the research problem discussed in chapter 1, and in
adopting the type of methods discussed in Appendix 1, inevitably
processes and experiences in the case study areas have not been studied
as comprehensively as would have been desirable. As explained in
chapter 1, a broad conception of working class has been employed - one
which in non-marxist studies would be described as "the public", "the
people" or "citizens". Although a detailed class analysis would have
been enlightening, this was not the central concern of the thesis and
doing justice to this aspect would have consumed resources and time that
were considered more appropriately devoted to investigating other
aspects of the research issue and problem. The thesis had as its
problem the contest of domains between state and civil society expressed
in community action. A broad conception of working class was, it is
argued, appropriate to this task, although detail on some interesting
dimensions is lost. An example is the spatial coalitions which appeared
to form in the Category "D" villages between the petty bourgeoisie,
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small capital and a fairly diverse working class to oppose local
councils comprised largely of one fraction of the working class - older
manual workers. This is clearly an area where further research would
have been of considerable interest.
Another weakness is the "invisibility" of women in many parts of the
present thesis, and the lack of gender analysis. It would have been
possible to develop a feminist critique of modernisation - its
assumptions about the nuclear family and the unwaged reproductive labour
of women for instance. This would have added a further dimension to
analysis. In addition, to what extent could the intransigence of the
conservative male-dominated Labour council of Derwentside in regard to
the proposals of the Railway Street Residents' Association be explained
by the councillors' hostility to a communal dwelling in the Street as
part of the housing co-op? (366). Similarly, although it was suggested
In chapter 8 that the conservative male-dominated Craigavon Borough
Council's negative attitude to the Craigavon Independent Advice Centre
was sectarian-based, to what extent was it also sexist? The advice
centre was mainly run by and strongly orientated towards the problems
encountered largely by women, such as childcare, feeding and clothing
the family, access to shops, desertion and male violence. The marxist
orientation of the present thesis makes it weak in analysing gender
relations, which were not a central issue. In general actors in the
community action studied appeared to take gender relations as given; it
was the disruption of everyday life which appeared to encompass, on the
whole, traditional gender roles that mobilised community action.
However, it is very likely that a significant reason why state
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intervention during modernisation was so insensitive to existing civil
society was because it was a male-dominated process (see, for example,
Mark-Lawson, Savage and Warde, 1985; MacKenzie and Rose, 1983).
Finally, especially in state housing, many and sometimes the majority of
actors in community action were women. In Peterlee, for example,
situations of female tenants confronting male councillors were common.
It has been argued that community action about housing in County Durham
and North Armagh can be explained in terns of the working class
experience of modernisation and of depressed modern environments in the
early post-modern era. Despite the reformist aspects of modernisation -
such as the decline in unfitness and improved access to some housing
amenities brought about by mass state housing - its economic and social
impact on some sections of the working class was often costly.
Modernisation, though, was itself a response to wider system forces in
the capitalist process, which exerted determining pressure upon the
development and form of housing and planning policies. People reacted
to this process and to its expression in policies that sought to replace
environments of small houses, convenient facilities and community life
by uniform mass state housing easily distinguishable from private sector
housing. But, as one of the chairpersons of Old Framwellgate Moor
Residents Association argued so persistently, it was not possible
towards the end of the modernisation era in the case of many "near
slums" to use health grounds to justify redevelopment. Redevelopment
appeared, in fact, as part of a nodernisation ideology. Many residents
in the villages and older urban centres of County Durham and North
Armagh denied that modern state housing was better than old private
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housing. But although struggles ensued between residents and the local
state, they were generally weak and sporadic. The corporatist nature of
the local state explains to a large degree why this was so: local people
could not penetrate decision-making centres. However, the structures of
early post-modernism provided some groups of residents with the
resources they needed to win their case - most clearly demonstrated in
Railway Street.
There are three levels at which the situation might begin to be put
right, The most "structural" is suggested by chapter 2, where the
fundamental problem of uneven development was identified. Economic
planning which controls and allocates capital, land and labour on the
basis of equality criteria and use value, rather than profit and
exchange value determining the uses to which these resources are put,
would be a - revolutionary - solution.
	 Secondly, given the post-modern
development of increasing differentiation and fragmentation within the
working class in both work and consumption, structures within civil
society which contribute to rebuilding the communities contemporary
capitalism has broken up, so as to reconstruct grassroots frameworks for
collective action and politics, could be put in place through radical
practice in local government and the voluntary sector (Willians, 1983,
pp. 177-199; Pope, 1985; Blackman, 1986). Thirdly, radical practice
could be aimed at restructuring the relationship between the state and
civil society which is at the core of many of the issues discussed in
the present thesis. Others have cone to this third strategic conclusion
through different routes, and its relevance to the whole area of
- 402 -
socialist practice cannot be underestimated, as Panitch (1986a, p. 92)
warns:
"For socialists, the fact that a right-wing market populism
representing the most blatantly reactionary elements of capitalist
ideology rushed in to fill the vacuum left by the failures of social
democracy and Keynesianism became, and must remain, a very great
cause for concern	 (W)e must also learn from what the popular
appeal of the radical right tells us. The strength of the
monetarist assault should not have become the occasion for a knee-
jerk defence of the Keynesian/welfare state with all its ambiguous
and constricted reforms, but rather treated as the occasion for
proposing - for insisting on - the fundamental restructuring of the
state and its relationship to society so that the communities it is
supposed to serve and the people who labour for it together have
great involvement in the public domain. Rather than leave the issue
at 'less state' versus 'more state', socialists must recognise that
popular antipathy to the state can also be addressed in terns of
speaking of a different kind of state."
It is suggested that the research in the present thesis does support
what are believed to be very important conclusions about the nature of
the relationship between the state and civil society in advanced
capitalism, as illustrated by the history of modernisation and its
demise in County Durham and North Armagh. Under capitalism, the state
has to treat the working class as a commodity, to make its labour power
available and attractive to capital and to control those denied paid
work. Under mass democracy, compromises and concessions also have to be
made. It is to constrain the former and expand the latter that a new
type of state should be struggled for to avoid the costs that have been
documented in this study, and in many others, so that the struggle
against the treatment of human beings as commodities can be waged at a
higher level than tactics of exclusionary closure or the private search
for an elusive autonomy within existing structures.
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APPENDIX 1
GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Chapter 1 introduced the research problem of the present thesis,
described the research strategy adopted and discussed the main concepts
it was proposed to use to organise and explain the empirical material.
This appendix considers in more detail the techniques employed and the
justification for them.
1. Techniques of data collection 
Two main tasks were involved in undertaking this thesis, both entailing
essentially historical investigations. First, it attempts to answer why
community action happened in the cases studied. Second, it attempts to
show what this community action was like. The thesis aims to place
particular local events within a conceptualisation of wider processes to
reveal cumulative causations and significant patternings through a
comparative study. It is, in essence, an exercise in "historical
sociology" (Abrams, 1980, p. 302).
The research is based on a diverse range of data. A literature review
continued throughout the research period, and secondary sources form the
major part of the information used for chapters 1 and 2.
Various techniques were used to find out what happened/was happening in
the case study areas of County Durham and North Armagh. These had been
-404 -
selected as sub-regions which had undergone "modernisation" in housing
and planning. The first methodological problem at the beginning of the
research was to locate where community action was occurring and where it
had occurred in the recent past (the late 1970s/early 1980s). Key
informants were identified and interviewed to compile overviews of
community action in the two sub-regions and to start a process of
networking by which other informants could be located. In County Durham
the organisation Community Service for County Durham kept records going
back several years of community action about housing and planning issues
in the county. The organisation equates with both a Rural Community
Council and a Council for Voluntary Service. Two current employees and
one ex-employee were interviewed at length at the beginning of the
research, and this generated a large number of contacts in the local
community which were subsequently followed up.
A second organisation played a key role at this stage, the voluntary
agency Folkus which had files on community action in the county and
members who had been involved in some of this action. The local group
of Shelter operated from its offices and were well-informed of local
housing struggles. The researcher had been employed full-tine as a
Volunteer Organiser with Folkus for a year before leaving to pursue the
present study and was well-placed to gather information at the
grassroots of community action in the county.
In North Armagh the researcher also benefitted from previous employment
experience which, although with the Belfast-based Voluntary Service
Belfast (VSB), brought him into contact with members and ex-members of
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community groups in Craigavon. David Byrne's contacts in Craigavon
Independent Advice Centre proved invaluable, and this organisation made
its facilities available to the researcher. Workers in the centre were
able to provide a large number of contacts in the local community, as
did community workers employed by Craigavon Borough Council and the
Southern Health and Social Services Board who were associated with the
centre.
By January 1981 the researcher was satisfied that all cases of
contemporary and recent community action on a scale sufficient to
attract local newspaper coverage and/or involve umbrella/resource
organisations in County Durham and North Armagh had been identified, and
this was confirmed during the course of fieldwork. Several more minor
cases were not researched in detail or included in the present thesis
because of their similarity to cases which more clearly illustrated the
issues and processes involved, examples being a struggle in New Kyo
(County Durham) to save old terraces from redevelopment and the
activities of some small tenants' associations (these could, of course,
have been included if resources had been adequate). All groups that had
recently been or were active and prominent in areas encompassed by
modernisation strategies were included. This boiled down in County
Durham to Railway Street Residents' Association, Old Framwellgate Moor
Residents' Association and several tenants' groups in Peterlee; and in
North Armagh to several tenants' associations in Craigavon. The
important contextual investigations of the struggles against Category
"D" and the depopulation of the Montaighs (chapters 3 and 7) were
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basically recent historical surveys as community action about these
issues had largely ceased by the 1980s,
It is possible that other less prominent cases were not identified, but
the prominent cases - in terns of their media profiles and the links
made with other organisations - were included in the fieldwork and
historical investigation. It is recognised that struggles about
modernisation and other issues would have occurred at a variety of other
levels, and that community action of the type selected was just one of a
wide range of possible types of struggle (see, for example, Dickens,
Duncan, Goodwin and Gray, 1985, pp. 200-201). The thesis is not
suggesting that community action encompasses all struggles in civil
society, that all community action can be explained in terns of
struggles against modernisation or that modernisation always provoked
community action. It is arguing that modernisation met with community
action in both County Durham and North Armagh, that common issues were
involved, that the causes and implications of these processes and
conflicts were broadly the sane, and that these issues and implications
have wider relevance because of what they reveal about relations between
state and civil society. By analytically structuring empirical material
on community action the thesis has attempted to show how the history of
"modernisation" and its demise "happened", and how working class people
in localities were part of this history, and took part in local events
which were connected to much wider forces of change determined by the
operation of a capitalist economic system and the exercise of state
power within these system forces.
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The research involved three main techniques considered, in combination,
most relevant to the research problem:
1. Inspection of written sources and documents. The main sources were
local newspapers, a large number of bulletins, reports and internal
documents produced by community groups and statutory agencies,
correspondence, council minutes and documentation, and official
statistics. These sources were used both to assist in constructing
accounts of community action and for the profiles of the local areas
with which each case study opens. Local newspapers were examined on a
regular basis in both County Durham and North Armagh - principally the
Lurgan Mail, the Fortadown Herald, the Fortadown News, Craigavon 
Progress, the Belfast Telegraph, the Durham Advertizer, the Newsletter,
the Irish News, Durham City News, Durham Street Press, The Journal,the
Northern Echo and the Bvening Despatch. Use was made of four archives:
the Northern Echo library in Darlington, the collections of Folkus, the
Belfast City Library newspaper collection and the cuttings kept by
Craigavon Independent Advice Centre. Although it was relatively easy to
inspect local newspapers in Durham, where the researcher was based, it
was more difficult to keep abreast of coverage in North Armagh. The
cuttings kept by Craigavon Independent Advice Centre were a great help
In this respect. In Durham the researcher also enjoyed similar
cooperation from the community group Folkus.
Council minutes were inspected in the relevant public libraries - namely
Durham City, Consett and Easington. Documents such as Housing
Investment Programmes and Housing Strategies were obtained on request
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directly from council offices. Council business was less relevant in
Craigavon, and whilst Housing Executive Board minutes are not made
public, a variety of useful documents was obtained on request from the
Housing Centre in Belfast and the Regional Headquarters in Craigavon.
Although few of the community groups kept formal minutes of their
meetings, it was usual for them to keep files of correspondence and
other material, to which the researcher was able to obtain access. Most
groups produced newsletters of some description used to keep local
residents informed of developments. Members also sometimes wrote
accounts of their work at various stages for community newspapers, and
the Rewsletter produced by the Durham Shelter Group was particularly
useful in this respect.
Most of the written material examined was primary sources, having a
direct relationship with the people, situations and events studied.
However, although these provided first-hand accounts, they are not meant
to be treated as "objective" accounts but to be located within
historical context (see Burgess, 1984, pp. 123-124). Since the research
was largely concerned with what actors experienced and did, and with
their views of social processes and changes, these data were treated as
valid evidence. They were used in combination with public documents
such as newspaper reports and council minutes. These too, of course,
are versions of social reality.
2. Participant observation in local situations. Participant
observation enabled the researcher to study the contemporary expression
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of historical processes and was undertaken with this in mind. The bulk
of the fieldwork was carried out between October 1980 and October 1982.
Several trips of between one and two months' duration, totalling eight
months, were made to Craigavon, and the remainder of the time was spent
based in Durham City. Research access was often achieved through the
networking process referred to above. The purpose of participant
observation was to discern the general pattern of issues which
determined the events under investigation (see Butcher, Collis, Glen and
Sills, 1980, pp. 18-21). It took the form of attendance at committee
meetings, public meetings, accompanying local community workers in their
day-to-day activities and making pre-arranged visits to community
groups. The researcher's role was made clear as one of a student
documenting community action from a grassroots perspective and the
researcher was accepted in this role. His previous experience as a
community worker facilitated communication and interaction. There was
no attempt to play a passive role; in fact the researcher often assisted
with local activities and engaged in long informal conversations with
participants.
In Durham the researcher's identification with Folkus and in Craigavon
with the Independent Advice Centre inevitably shaped attitudes to the
research when known. In some cases this was helpful in soliciting
cooperation, in others it made informants wary. The result has probably
been a greater influence of radical perspectives than of conservative
perspectives on the issues and events documented.
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The focus of the research was on what people experienced and did in
civil society, and as noted above there were no major problems in
gaining access at this level to observe events. Therefore, the problem
of carrying out participant observation within the state or other
significant institutions was not considered to be a major methodological
obstacle. In any case, as Jenkins (1983, p. 23) points out, participant
observation is of very limited efficacy in such contexts because of the
few decisions that are made in public to allow an adequate account of
what is going on to be constructed by observation alone. A feature of
recent capitalism has been the increasingly hidden role of its elites
and for this and other reasons connected with the nature of the
capitalist world system, the character of capitalist development
discussed in the present thesis has been treated as a social process at
an abstract level which has specific concrete outcomes in particular
local situations (see Massey and Meegan, 1985). Furthermore, it is very
unlikely that the trust that was established with the community groups
would have been so forthcoming if the researcher was easily accepted
Into state or other powerful institutions to carry out participant
observation (see Burton, 1978, pp. 164-179).
3. The most important source of data was interviews with key
informants. These usually took the form of a dialogue about the history
of a particular local issue and associated events. In total 68
interviews were conducted, but this excludes a large number of informal
discussions mostly with community action participants and community
workers. Some of these were taped and some were recorded in note form.
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Informants were selected on the basis of quite extensive knowledge
collected from other sources. A list of interviews follows:
Interviews in County Durham
1. Ex-Countryside Officer, Community Service for Durham County
(27.10.80).
2. Countryside Officer, Community Service for Durham County
(30.10.80).
3. Rural Development Officer, Community Service for Durham County.
(3.10.80).
4. Retired Chief Environmental Health Officer, Wear Valley District
Council (3.4.81).
5. Deputy Chief Environmental Health Officer, Wear Valley District
Council (7.10.81).
6. Housing Officer, Easington District Council (4.8.82)
7. Planning Officer, Easington District Council (5.8.82).
8, Deputy Chief Environmental Health Officer, Derwentside District
Council (8.7.81).
9. Grants Officer, Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council
(9.12.80).
10. Environmental Health Officer, Wear Valley District Council
(7.10.81).
11. Community worker, Newton Aycliffe Development Corporation
(27.11.80).
12, Community workers, Washington Social Development Department
(8.12.80).
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13. Neighbourhood Worker, Bessemer Park (6.8.82).
14. Ex-social worker, Bessemer Park (28.7.81).
15. Secretary, Wear Valley Trades Council (1.12.80).
16. Secretary, Durham County Housing Association (27.1.81).
17. Leader of Labour Group, Wear Valley District Council (29.1.81).
18. Secretary, District Labour Party, Durham City (9.8.83).
19. Chairperson of Old Framwellgate Moor Residents' Association
(6.11.80 and 28.1.82).
20. Secretary of Old Framwellgate Moor Residents' Association
(5.3.82).
21. Railway Street Association leading member (22.7.83).
22. Railway Street Association, Secretary (27.1.81).
23. Leading tenant activist, Peterlee (4.8.82).
24. Leading tenant activist, Peterlee (30.4.81 and 1.6.81).
25. Group interview with members of Old Framwellgate Moor Residents
Association (10.3.82).
26. Group interview with members of New Kyo Residents' Association
(11.11.80).
27. Chair of Witton Park Action Committee (30.4.81).
28. Group interview with members of Witton Park Action Committee
(27.1.81).
29. Group interview with members of Consett Retired Men's Forum
(5.2.81).
30. Lecturer in Social Policy, Durham University (9.12.80).
31. Housing officer, Durham City Council (8.10.87)
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Interviews in Borthern Ireland 
1. Senior Social Services Officer, Craigavon Area Hospital, Social
Services Department (19.11.80 and 18.5.81),
2. Social Services Officer, Craigavon Area Hospital, Social Services
Department (1.6.81, 7.4.82).
3. Advice worker, Craigavon Independent Advice Centre (1.6.81 and
2.6.81).
4. Treasurer, Craigavon Community Worker Project (18.5.81).
5. Community worker, Craigavon Borough Council (3.6.81, 29.9.81,
1.10.81 and 7,4.82).
6. Local planning consultant, Craigavon (6.6.81)
7. Principal Housing Officer, Brownlow District Housing Executive
Office (20.5.81 and 1.10.81),
8. District Manager, Brownlow District Housing Executive Office
(7.4.82).
9. Regional Director, Housing Executive Southern Region
(30.9.81 and 8.4.82).
10. District Manager, Lurgan District Housing Executive Office
(30.9.81).
11. Planning Officer, Department of the Environment, Belfast
(28.5.81).
12. Planning Officer, Department of the Environment, Belfast
(4.6.81).
13. Senior Social Worker, Newry Area Hospital, Social Services
Department, ex-member of the Montaighs Housing Action Group
(21.5.81).
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14, Information Officer, Craigavon Development Office (19.11.80).
15. Information Officer, Northern Ireland Council of Social Service
(2.6.81).
16. Development Officer, Shelter (Northern Ireland) (2.6.81).
17. Ex-CONI (Community Organisations Northern Ireland) worker (4.6.81).
18. Chairperson, Private Housebuilders Association of Northern Ireland
(4.6.81).
19. Chairperson, Craigavon Trades Council (19.11,80).
20. Secretary, Brownlow Community Council (19.11.80).
21. Workers' Party councillor, Craigavon Borough Council (20.11.81).
22. Chairperson, St Peter's Community Association, Lurgan (20.5.81
and 21.5.81).
23. Ex-member of St Peter's Community Association (3,6.81).
24. Chairperson, Meadowbrook Tenants' Association, Brownlow (21.5.81).
25. Founding members of Ridgeway Action Committee (4.6.81 and 30,9,81).
26. Founding member of the Montaighs Housing Action Group (30.9.81).
Often an interview, a period of participant observation or a documentary
source would suggest potential informants. In contrast to participant
observation, where the level of investigation was in one "social world"
- that of community action - the interview technique was used to
generate data from actors in many different positions in the social
processes being studied, including community groups, local councils, the
Housing Executive and other statutory bodies. Informants were made
aware of the nature of the research and again the data were taken
largely at face-value as the informant's perspective on, experience of,
and/or analysis of an event or issue. In general, informants were
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remarkably frank and cooperative. The interviews were always quite
general in nature, eliciting detail where relevant, but covered a pre-
determined list of topics (semi-structured). With regard to community
groups, interviews were either with key activists or with a group of
members. A typical set of guidelines in such cases were as follows:
1. What have been/are the group's main concerns, what have/been are
its main activities?
2. Who have been/are its most active members?
3. Has the group kept records of its work and experiences? (Inspect if
possible).
4. The context - what was the situation before the group was formed?
How much awareness was there of the problems or issues
subsequently taken up by the group?
5. What is the group's constituency, or whose interests does the group
want to represent? Is there support from any local councillors?
6. What is seen as positive about the locality, which should be
retained or improved, and what is seen as negative, which should be
ameliorated or removed, comparing it with other areas?
7. What are seen as the roles of the group, local government and
administration, and the private sector in improving the locality?
8. Were there any particular events which triggered the formation of
the group?
9. What was the nature of any support obtained from other
individuals/organisations? What contacts were made with areas
known to have similar problems?
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10. What is the nature of the group's relationships with local
government and administration? With whom has it dealt? That
particular policies or practices cause problems?
11. What coverage in the local media has the group had? (Details).
12. What organisational and developmental problems have there been?
Have any active members moved away from the area or fallen out with
the group - why?
13. What has been/is the group's strategy to achieve its objectives?
14. What have been its achievements and failures to date? That
problems are anticipated in future? Has it all been worth it?
As can be seen, the emphasis was on the history of the group and its
experiences and relationships, rather than its internal composition and
structure. Interviews were often quite long - two hours was not
unusual. If the interview was tape recorded key passages were
transcribed very soon after the interview. If only notes were taken,
the author wrote up the notes in detail immediately after the interview.
One of the problems with the interview technique as a means of finding
out what happened in the past is the distortion of the past by
informants, due to selective recall for example. However it is argued
that what is important for the present study is recall as a "social
document": it illustrates the way the informant sees things, often
reflects his/her current preoccupations and frequently forms the basis
of revealing dialogues (Williamson, 1982b). Such oral history, while
fruitful in itself and still neglected in urban sociology, is best used
with other evidence to construct accounts of "how it was".
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A number of conferences and workshops were attended during the fieldwork
period. Some examples are as follows:
1. National Housing Liaison Committee Conference: "How Do We Fight
the Housing Crisis?" (31.1.81).
2. Durham Shelter Group Public Meeting: "Housing Issues in the 1980s"
(7.3.81).
3. Shelter Regional Conference on Housing, Durham City: "The Challenge
of the 80s" (10-12.4.81),
4. Shelter (Northern Ireland) First Conference (6.6.81).
5. National Union of Public Employees, UCATT and North East Tenants'
Organisation: Joint Union and Tenant Weekend School (15.9.81).
6. Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Sheffield (25.9,82).
7. Community Workers Forum: "A Seminar on Environmental Schemes,
Craigavon" (23,9.83).
2. The research design 
Chapter 1 considered the research issue, problem, strategy and key
concepts, but it is appropriate at this point to make some observations
under the general heading of research design.
The thesis has been organised around an attempt to explain community
action in County Durham and North Armagh in terms of a response to
modernisation and to show how the transition to post-modernism shaped
the outcome of these struggles. The combination of techniques of data
collection considered above was used to construct historical accounts of
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particular social processes in which community action and modernisation
interacted, from which certain conclusions were drawn about the nature
of state-civil society relations. In particular, data were gathered on:
1. The nature of modernisation in County Durham and North Armagh and
the transition to post-modernism, with particular reference to
housing and planning.
2. With reference to community action in areas encompassed by
modernisation strategies, the main problems at stake, the processes
by which they were produced and the policies attempted to manage
them, attempting to relate these to (1).
3. The relationships between community action and the state.
4. Other interesting aspects of the community struggles selected as
case studies as they arose.
Two points need to be made about the research design which determined
why these data were collected. Firstly, the extensive nature of the
research strategy and the fact that the work was carried out by a single
researcher with limited resources meant that it was not possible to
collect and analyse information in the kind of depth that would have
been possible in an intensive study. For this reason substantial use
was made of relatively few key informants and participant observation
was limited by both practical and strategic considerations. Interviews
were planned to generate information from key actors in the processes
under investigation.
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Oral history and participant observation both suffer from what Abrams'
(1982, pp. 316-318) calls "the hallucination of the direct encounter".
It is not possible to recover the past "in all its empirical actuality",
and anyway, even if it were possible, or nearly possible, such a mass of
data would be likely to be "overkill" in terns of constructing
explanations. Problems of "how it was" not being the same as "how it
was said to be" apply to participant observation just as much as to
interviews or documentary evidence. Making sense of the past involves a
conscious effort to theorise it and an approach based on the mutual
interdependence of analysis and description. This is a complex task,
which as Abrams (pp. 334-335) hints at, might be usefully informed by
realist method.
This introduces the second point. In analysing the material collected
during the course of the research, attention was paid to how analysis
might be informed heuristically by the approach of realist method. This
meant considering the possible generative mechanisms behind the rise and
fall of modernisation and the way these shaped state intervention in
civil society, as well as paying attention to the detail of contingent
factors. A comparative approach was used to assist in identifying the
generative mechanisms (see Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin and Gray, 1985, pp.
23-31). This was largely done by examining working class experiences in
the case study localities, looking for common concepts and modes of
social action, and relating these to what was known mainly from
secondary sources about wider economic and policy processes. However,
as Saunders (1986, pp. 352-362) points out, this is often to a large
extent a conjectural exercise because of the difficulty of testing
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empirically theories which are at a fairly abstract level, even if they
appear capable of extension to the concrete. The present thesis has
attempted to approach this problem by presenting an account which makes
clear what is being debated, makes clear what is being claimed, and
makes clear how information has been assembled to support these claims.
As Sayer (1985, p. 229) writes, although social science aims "to
construct a coherent description and explanation of the world and hence
to represent and perhaps 'mirror' an object external to itself", it
cannot by its nature mimic the practices of natural sciences, but
progresses through the overlapping of abstract, concrete and critical
elements.
"The identification of theory and practice is a critical act,
through which practice is demonstrated rational and necessary, and
theory realistic and rational." (Gramsci, 1971, p. 365).
1 I.• f •• II 	 IP	 I
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APPENDIX 2
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4. See note 3.
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6. Durham County Council, Written Analysis: County Deve2opment Plan 
Amendment 1971, p. 1.
7. Talk by Mike Murphy, Labour History Group, Newcastle Upon Tyne
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8. Northern Ireland Housing Executive News Release,
8 March 1984.
9. Durham County Council, Housing . Durham County Structure Plan 
Technical Paper Jo 3 (undated).
10. Financial Times, 13 September 1985.
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Flan - Report ot the Panel Chaired by P Otton QC, 1980,
12. Department of the Environment (Northern Regional Office), Town and 
Country Planning Act 1971 (as amended) Durham County Struct re 
Secretary of State's proposed modifications (undated).
13. Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning Press
Release, 19 December 1975.
14. Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland, Residential 
Development ill Rural Areas, Development Control Policy Note,
November 1976.
15. Central Statistical Office, Regional Trends, annual.
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17. Northern Ireland Housing Executive Annual Reports.
18. See note 16.
19. See note 15.
20. See note 17.
21. See note 15.
22. Northern Ireland Housing Executive (1985) Northern Ireland Nouse 
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26. Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Corporate Strategy Review 
1983, Section 4.2, paras 22, 25.
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29. Letter to The Guardian, 14 November 1977.
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34. Interview with John Callaghan, Secretary, Durham County Housing
Association, 27 January 1981,
35. See note 33.
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45. See note 30.
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74. See note 70, p. 6.
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